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Abstract	  
	  
Periods	   of	   sociopolitical	   transition	   from	  authoritarian	   rule	   offer	   renewed	  expectations	   for	  
more	  representative	  and	  accountable	  state	   institutions,	   for	  enhanced	  pluralism	  and	  public	  
participation,	  and	  for	  opportunities	  for	  marginalised	  groups	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  periphery.	  
Several	  thousand	  new	  civil	  society	  organisations	  were	  legally	  established	  in	  Tunisia	  following	  
the	  2010–2011	  uprising	  that	  forced	  a	  long-­‐serving	  dictator	  from	  office.	  These	  organisations	  
had	  different	   visions	   for	   a	  new	  Tunisia,	   thereby	  bringing	   into	   sharp	   relief	   a	  multiplicity	  of	  
emerging	  conflicts.	  As	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  priorities	  was	  outlined,	  these	  contestations	  entailed	  
a	   host	   of	   inclusions	   and	   exclusions	   from	   Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces	   in	   which	   a	   range	   of	   civil	  
society	  actors	  and	  groups	  jostled	  to	  be	  recognised.	  	  
	  
This	   research	   looks	  to	  a	  remarkable	  period	  of	   transformation	  for	  Tunisia	  during	  which	  the	  
euphoria	  of	  having	  brought	  down	  a	  dictator	  was	  tempered	  with	  the	  apprehension	  of	  what	  
may	   follow—the	   “uncertain	   something	   else.”	   Within	   the	   context	   of	   a	   transition	   from	  
authoritarian	  rule,	  the	  thesis	  examines	  the	  conflicts	  that	  manifested	  between	  the	  different	  
elements	  of	  civil	   society	   following	   the	  uprising	   in	  early	  2011.	   It	   looks	   to	   the	  effects	  of	   the	  
opening	  up	  of	  the	  public	  space;	  the	  sociocultural	  and	  socioreligious	  divisions	  that	  emerged,	  
including	  the	  rise	  of	  associational	  or	  social	  Islam;	  and	  the	  exclusionary	  nature	  of	  consensus	  
in	   “liberal”	   democracies.	   The	   research	   underscores	   conceptual	   understandings	   of	   civil	  
society	   that	  evolved	   from	  emphasising	  the	  conflicts	  among	  these	  actors	   to	  deemphasising	  
them	   over	   time	   as	   an	   outcome	   of	   the	   unprecedented	   legitimacy	   now	   afforded	   to	   civil	  
society	   in	   neoliberal	   frameworks.	   The	   thesis	   contends	   that	   conflict	   among	   these	   actors	   is	  
neither	   positive	   nor	   negative,	   but	   nevertheless	   is	   consequential.	   Conflict	   serves	   as	   a	  
productive	   tool	   to	   expand	   and	  maintain	   agonistic	   discursive	   contestation.	  Moreover,	   the	  
preservation	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  discursive	  arenas	  during	  periods	  of	  sociopolitical	  turmoil	  can	  
sustain	  spaces	  for	  more	  democratic	  and	  representative	  institutions	  to	  eventually	  emerge.	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In	  the	  Pursuit	  of	  Dignity	  and	  Freedom	  
Chapter	  I:	  Introduction	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Here	  AIDS	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  priority.	  Instead	  there	  are	  discussions	  around	  single	  mothers	  and	  
even	  the	  introduction	  of	  temporary	  marriage.	  How	  can	  we	  even	  begin	  to	  explain	  what	  we	  
want	  to	  do	  in	  this	  environment?	  We	  therefore	  have	  to	  look	  at	  our	  strategy	  and	  think	  again.	  
We	  could	  address	  some	  of	  these	  issues	  before	  the	  revolution	  but	  not	  now—we	  have	  to	  work	  
with	  a	  view	  to	  protecting	  these	  populations,	  what	  we	  do	  and	  say	  could	  affect	  them	  
negatively.	  
	  
-­‐-­‐Human	  rights	  lawyer,	  Tunis1	  
	  
	  
In	  February	  2011	  during	  what	  was	  described	  as	  a	  “wave	  of	  violence,”	  it	  was	  estimated	  that	  
2,000	   individuals	   attacked	   a	  maison	   close	   in	   the	   old	   town	   of	   Tunis,	   the	   Tunisian	   capital,	  
followed	  by	  similar	  attacks	  on	  maisons	  closes	  in	  Medenine,	  Sfax,	  Kairouan	  and	  Sousse,	  with	  
sex	  workers	  chased	  out	  and	  some	  of	  the	  establishments	  firmly	  boarded	  and	  bricked	  over.2	  
Les	   maisons	   de	   tolerance	   or	   les	   maisons	   closes	   are	   a	   remnant	   from	   the	   French	   colonial	  
period	  in	  Tunisia.3	  In	  1942	  the	  French	  authorities	   in	  Tunisia	  introduced	  the	  maisons	  closes,	  
or	   institutional	   brothels,	   with	   a	   decree	   outlining	   the	   regulations	   for	   legal	   prostitution.4	  
Before	  2011,	   some	  300	   legal	   sex	  workers	  were	  working	  across	   the	  urban	  areas	  of	  Tunisia	  
such	  as	  in	  Tunis,	  Sousse,	  Sfax,	  Gabes,	  and	  Kairouan;	  over	  100	  women	  were	  working	  in	  Tunis	  
alone,	  while	  the	  maison	  close	  in	  Sfax	  was	  the	  third-­‐largest	  legal	  establishment	  for	  sex	  work	  
in	  Tunisia.5	  Prior	  to	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising	  in	  2010–2011,	  both	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  and	  the	  
Ministry	   of	   Health	   had	   supervisory	   responsibilities	   over	   the	  maisons	   closes:	   sex	   workers	  
would	  submit	  a	  formal	  application	  to	  the	  former	  for	  permission	  to	  work,	  and	  the	  latter	  was	  
responsible	  for	  ensuring	  that	  public	  health	  was	  protected.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Informant	  36:	  Founder	  and	  lawyer,	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Feb.	  2012.	  	  
2	  Bensaied,	  “Les	  Islamistes	  s’Attaquent	  aux	  Maisons	  Closes.”	  	  
3	  It	  is	  also	  argued	  that	  “tolerated	  prostitution”	  in	  North	  Africa	  stretches	  back	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  
period	  in	  the	  17th	  century.	  See:	  Largueche	  and	  Largueche,	  Marginales	  en	  Terre	  d’Islam,	  19–22.	  
4	  El	  Feki,	  Sex	  and	  the	  Citadel,	  202;	  for	  additional	  information	  on	  the	  history	  of	  prostitution,	  see	  Snoussi	  “La	  
Prostitution	  en	  Tunisie	  au	  Temps	  de	  la	  Colonisation,”	  www.sexandthecitadel.com.	  
5	  Abid	  and	  Ghorbel,	  “Enquete	  sur	  l’Utilisation	  de	  Preservatif	  Aupres	  des	  Jeunes	  Clients	  des	  Professionnelles	  du	  
Sexe	  Declarees,”	  11,	  cited	  in	  El	  Feki,	  Sex	  and	  the	  Citadel,	  202.	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The	   individuals	   who	   participated	   in	   the	   attacks	   on	   the	   maisons	   closes	   in	   2011	   openly	  
regarded	   the	   establishments	   as	   symbols	   of	   the	   debauchery	   and	   impiety	   of	   the	   former	  
secular	   authoritarian	   regimes	   of	   Habib	   Bourguiba	   and	   Zine	   El	   Abidine	   Ben	   Ali.	   This	  
movement	   from	   the	   street	   to	   shut	   down	   the	  maisons	   closes	   was	   diffused	   through	   local	  
mosques	   and	   via	   the	   Internet	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   reclaim	   Tunisia’s	   moral	   identity.6 	  These	  
targeted	  acts,	  led	  by	  members	  of	  communities	  rather	  than	  a	  formal	  government	  authority,	  
sharply	   reverberated	   among	   marginalised	   communities	   and	   organisations	   working	   with	  
them.	   Organisations	   working	   in	   human	   rights	   and	   with	   vulnerable	   groups	   affected	   by	  
HIV/AIDS	  in	  Tunisia	  became	  anxious	  about	  the	  attacks	  on	  the	  maisons	  closes	  so	  soon	  after	  
the	  uprising	  began	   in	  December	  2010.	  A	  woman	  supporting	  HIV/AIDS	  outreach	  work	  with	  
sex	   workers	   explained,	   “These	   invisible	   forces	   appeared	   suddenly....They	   closed	   up	   the	  
doors	   to	   the	  maisons	   closes	  with	   bricks.	   This	   caused	   quite	   a	   disruption...quite	   a	   few	   sex	  
workers	   left	  the	  centre	  and	  moved	  underground	  to	  do	  clandestine	  sex	  work	  feeling	   it	  was	  
safer.”7	  	  
	  
The	  downfall	  of	  a	  dictator	  opened	  a	  space	  in	  which	  numerous	  actors	  rushed	  in	  to	  seize	  the	  
opportunity	   to	   genuinely	   and	   actively	   participate	   in	   the	   sociopolitical	   transformations	   of	  
post-­‐revolution	   Tunisia.	   New	   actors	   and	   groups	   immediately	   emerged	   at	   the	   forefront	   to	  
claim	  new	  spaces	  and	  set	  fresh	  priorities	  for	  the	  Tunisian	  state.	  For	  some	  civil	  society	  actors	  
manoeuvring	   in	   Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces,	   the	   2010–2011	   uprising	   allowed	   them	   to	   have	   a	  
strong	  voice	  that	  was	  previously	  muted	  under	  the	  former	  regimes.	  For	  others,	  the	  conflicts	  
and	   contentions	   that	   emerged	   between	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	   brought	   different	  
repressions	   and	   exclusions—this	   time	   not	   from	   the	   regime,	   but	   from	   among	   the	   actors	  
engaging	   in	   collective	   activism	   and	   the	   various	   other	   groups	   that	   considered	   themselves	  
part	  of	  “civil	  society.”	  Consequently,	  more	  controversial	  or	  divisive	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  status	  
of	   women,	   legalised	   prostitution,	   homosexuality,	   and	   human	   rights	   became	   highly	  
contested	   as	   a	   multitude	   of	   disparate	   visions	   filled	   these	   new	   spaces.	   Vulnerable	  
populations	  and	  the	  organisations	  working	  with	  them	  soon	  found	  themselves	  operating	  on	  
uncertain	   terrain	   where	   continuing	   to	   support	   marginalised	   and	   routinely	   criminalised	  
communities	   brought	   new	   challenges.	   Following	   the	   2010–2011	   Tunisia	   uprising,	   some	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Bensaied,	  “Les	  Islamistes	  s’Attaquent	  aux	  Maisons	  Closes.”	  
7	  Informant	  20:	  Country	  officer,	  multilateral	  development	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  16	  Jan.	  2012	  and	  13	  Mar.	  2013.	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these	  actors	  eventually	  developed	  nostalgia	  for	  a	  dictator	  where	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  were	  
clearly	  defined	  and	  they	  could	  freely	  operate	  within	  the	  discretionary	  parameters	  set	  by	  the	  
authoritarian	  regime.	  The	  unsettled	  social,	  political	  and	  cultural	   situation	  made	  the	   future	  
difficult	   to	  predict.	  Would	   the	   various	   conflicts	  between	   civil	   society	   groups	   serve	  as	   vital	  
tools	   for	   widening	   previously	   constrained	   discursive	   spaces?	   Or	   ultimately,	   would	   the	  
volatility	   and	   uncertainty	   of	   democratisation	   impede	   peripheral	   actors	   and	   consequently	  
limit	  the	  likelihood	  of	  contentious	  issues	  entering	  Tunisia’s	  national	  deliberations?	  	  
	  
	  
	  
1.	  The	  downfall	  of	  a	  dictator	  and	  the	  resurgence	  of	  civil	  society	  
	  
Mohamed	   Bouazizi’s	   self-­‐immolation	   in	   the	   town	   of	   Sidi	   Bouzid,	   on	   17	   December	   2010,	  
ignited	   a	   succession	   of	   uprisings	   across	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	   North	   Africa.	   Over	   the	   next	  
several	   months,	   one	   revolution	   inspired	   another	   “in	   a	   domino	   effect	   of	   sympathy	   and	  
solidarity”8	  with	   Tunisia,	   Egypt,	   Yemen,	   Libya,	   Syria,	   and	   Bahrain	   all	   affected	   to	   varying	  
degree.	  Individuals	  across	  the	  region	  relinquished	  their	  fear	  of	  repressive	  regimes,	  thereby	  
revealing	   the	   true	   vulnerability	   of	   the	   ruling	   elites.	   Only	   two	   days	   after	   the	   26-­‐year-­‐old	  
Bouazizi’s	  death	  on	  4	  January	  2011,	  wider	  protests	  across	  Tunisia	  began	  and	  soon	  after,	  the	  
government	  declared	  a	  state	  of	  emergency.	  Within	  weeks,	  cries	  of	  “Ash-­‐sh’ab	  yurid	  isqat	  al-­‐
nizam”	  (“the	  people	  want	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  regime”),	  and	  “khobz	  wa	  maa,	  Ben	  Ali	  leh”	  
(“Bread	  and	  water,	  no	  to	  Ben	  Ali”)	  eventually	  led	  to	  Zine	  El	  Abidine	  Ben	  Ali’s	  televised	  public	  
acknowledgement	  of	  “Ana	  fahmt”	  (“I	  have	  understood”).	  On	  14	  January,	  he	  and	  his	  family	  
fled	   for	   Saudi	   Arabia.	   Hamit	   Bozarslan	   poignantly	   writes	   that	   “the	   system	   appeared	   as	  
‘unbelievable’	  in	  its	  own	  being	  than	  in	  its	  demand	  for	  obedience.”9	  	  
	  
Those	   spearheading	   and	   participating	   in	   the	   Tunisian	   revolution	   from	   December	   2010	   to	  
January	   2011	   called	   not	   only	   for	   bread	   and	   water,	   but	   more	   broadly	   for	   employment,	  
freedom,	   and	   dignity	   as	   the	   immolation	   of	   Bouazizi	   managed	   to	   encapsulate	   and	   direct	  
attention	  toward	  the	  issues	  of	  inequality	  and	  humiliation.10	  The	  more	  than	  300	  deaths	  in	  the	  
days	   during	   and	   after	   14	   January	   strengthened	   the	   will	   of	   the	   protesters	   who	   united	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Manhire,	  The	  Arab	  Spring,	  xi.	  	  
9	  Bozarslan,“Réflexions	  sur	  les	  Configurations	  Révolutionnaires,”	  18.	  
10	  Deboulet	  and	  Nicolaidis,	  “Les	  Hirondelles	  Font-­‐Elles	  le	  Printemps?”	  9.	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together	   in	   the	   face	   of	   their	   own	   apprehensions	   against	   a	   repressive	   regime.11	  Protesters	  
held	  night-­‐time	  candlelight	  vigils	  for	  those	  killed	  in	  the	  violence	  and	  brought	  blankets,	  food,	  
and	  tea	  to	  fellow	  demonstrators.	  Many	  report	  a	  time	  of	  unprecedented	  national	  solidarity	  
and	   some	   today	   are	   still	   unable	   to	   believe	   they	   took	   part	   in	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	  
regime.	  Kmar	  Bendana	   in	  Chronique	  d’une	  Transition	  observed,	   “The	  horizontal	  unfolding,	  
which	   surprised	   journalists,	   diplomats,	   bloggers	   and	   spectators	   with	   its	   rhythm	   and	  
efficiency…where	   Tunisians	   were	   perceived	   as	   positive	   heroes	   as	   well	   as	   protagonists	  
involved	  in	  an	  unexpected	  democratic	  process.”12	  	  
	  
The	  initial	  outcomes	  of	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  set	  out	  a	  path	  to	  what	  observers	  would	  come	  to	  
consider	   to	   be	   a	   possible	   “fourth	   wave”	   of	   democratisation	   as	   Tunisia	   put	   in	   place	  
democratic	  and	  multi-­‐party	  election	  road	  maps	  alongside	  liberalisation	  measures.	  Following	  
the	   2010–2011	   uprising	   in	   Tunisia,	   measures	   to	   initiate	   greater	   political	   liberalism	   were	  
instigated	   almost	   immediately.	   In	   October	   2011,	   Tunisia	   was	   the	   first	   post-­‐revolution	  
country	   in	   the	  Arab	  world	   to	  hold	  democratic	  elections.	   The	   transition	   from	  authoritarian	  
rule	   soon	  nourished	   expectations	   among	   a	   range	  of	   stakeholders,	   from	   individuals	   to	   the	  
international	   community,	   for	   an	   expansion	   of	   space	   for	   political	   liberalisation,	   pluralism,	  
redistribution,	  and—perhaps	  most	   importantly—recognition.	  For	  example,	  Chantal	  Mouffe	  
emphasised	  in	  her	  subsequent	  publication	  Agonistics:	  Thinking	  the	  World	  Politically	  that	  the	  
Arab	  uprisings	  not	  only	  put	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  build	  a	  democracy	  back	  on	  the	  agenda	  in	  
the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  but	  also	  took	  her	  articulation	  of	  radical	  democracy	  from	  
the	  theoretical	  to	  the	  actual.13	  In	  addition,	  scholars	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  “global	  civil	  society”—
Helmut	  Anheier,	  Mary	  Kaldor,	  and	  Marlies	  Glasius—questioned	  in	  “The	  Global	  Civil	  Society	  
Yearbook:	  Lessons	  and	  Insights	  2001–2011”	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  uprisings	  in	  the	  region	  were	  
the	   signal	   of	   a	   new	   beginning,	   the	   start	   of	   “a	   new	   political	  movement.”	   They	   effectively	  
argued	  that	  the	  events	  of	  2011	  gave	  new	  meaning	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  as	  
the	   emerging	   emancipatory	   agenda	   fused	   with	   post-­‐1968	   issues	   of	   social	   justice. 14	  
International	   optimism	   following	   the	   uprisings	   in	   the	   region	   reinvigorated	   interest	   in	   the	  
links	   between	   democracy,	   development,	   and	   good	   governance—as	   did	   similar	   events	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Bendana,	  Chronique	  d’une	  Transition,	  66.	  
12	  Ibid.,	  61–62.	  
13	  Mouffe,	  Agonistics,	  xv	  and	  107.	  
14	  Anheier,	  Kaldor,	  and	  Glasius,	  “The	  Global	  Civil	  Society	  Yearbook,”	  2–3.	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Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  1980s—the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  was	  once	  again	  
resurrected	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  “antonym	  of	  authoritarianism.”	  
	  
From	  2011	  to	  2013,	  the	  landscape	  for	  collective	  action	  and	  grassroots	  movements	  in	  Tunisia	  
widened	  with	   the	   establishment	   of	   several	   thousand	   new	   civil	   society	   organisations.	   The	  
deregulation	   of	   the	   former	   and	   more	   rigid	   laws	   of	   association	   allowed	   organisations	  
operating	  in	  Tunisia’s	  physical	  and	  symbolic	  public	  spaces	  to	  engage	  more	  openly	  in	  a	  broad	  
range	  of	  activities	  including	  civic	  activism,	  human	  rights,	  social	  welfare	  initiatives,	  and	  direct	  
outreach	  work	  with	  deprived	  communities	  across	   the	  country.15	  It	   is	  estimated	   that	  1,700	  
new	   associations	   were	   created	   from	   January	   to	   October	   2011,	   with	   a	   further	   600	   civil	  
society	   organisations	   registering	   between	   October	   2011	   and	   March	   2012.16	  Individuals	  
acting	   inside	   Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces	   also	   re-­‐appropriated	   the	   concept	   of	   muwatana	   or	  
citoyenneté,	  which	  refers	  to	  citizens	  feeling	  engaged	  and	  mobilised	  as	  equal	  partners	  in	  the	  
future	   of	   the	   country,	  with	   or	  without	   the	   state	   to	   accompany	   them	  along	   the	  way.	   This	  
took	   the	   form	   of	   popular	   protest,	   mass	   mobilisation,	   and	   demonstrations	   alongside	  
collective	   activism.	   The	   concept	   equally	   manifested	   in	   growing	   notions	   of	   voluntarism	  
among	  Tunisians,	  resulting	  in	  local	  collections	  for	  vulnerable	  communities,	  Tunisian	  diaspora	  
raising	   money	   to	   purchase	   emergency	   transportation	   for	   their	   local	   towns,	   and	   even	  
neighbourhood	   members	   meeting	   in	   a	   family’s	   garage	   to	   plan	   support	   to	   marginalised	  
women.	  One	  could	  observe	  a	  return	  to	  the	  self-­‐organisation	  of	  the	  grassroots,	  agency,	  self-­‐
determination,	  and	  self-­‐management	  agendas	  set	  in	  community	  mobilisation	  unmistakeable	  
in	   the	  popular	  social	  movements	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America	  only	   three	  decades	  
earlier.	  Nevertheless,	  by	  looking	  more	  closely	  to	  this	  period,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  possible	  to	  discern	  
multiple	  conflicts	  and	  contentions	  among	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  organisations,	  but	  also	  to	  
perceive	  the	  combined	  sociopolitical	  divisions	  that	  have	  a	  remarkable	  effect	  on	  the	  various	  
groups	   that	   materialise	   following	   the	   downfall	   of	   a	   dictatorship.	   With	   the	   multitude	   of	  
inclusions	  and	  exclusions	  that	  take	  place	  among	  and	  between	  both	  secular	  and	  non-­‐secular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  During	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  Tunisia’s	  transition	  the	  “High	  Authority	  for	  the	  Realisation	  of	  the	  Objectives	  of	  the	  
Revolution,	  Political	  Reform	  and	  Democratic	  Transition”	  was	  established	  to	  oversee	  the	  transition	  from	  
revolution	  to	  elections.	  Among	  its	  many	  remits	  it	  was	  also	  tasked	  with	  modifying	  the	  text	  on	  the	  laws	  of	  
association.	  For	  additional	  information	  see	  Zemni,	  2014	  and	  Guellali,	  2011;	  and	  decree	  laws	  no.	  14	  of	  23	  Mar.	  
2011	  and	  no.	  27	  of	  18	  Apr.	  2011.	  
16	  Union	  Européenne,	  “Rapport	  de	  Diagnostic,”	  5.	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civil	   society	  actors	  during	  a	  period	  of	  simultaneous	  disruption	  and	  transformation,	  various	  
groups	  consequently	  emerge	  either	  as	  publics	  or	  are	  sidelined	  as	  peripheral	  counter-­‐publics.	  	  
	  
This	  thesis	  is	  situated	  within	  the	  highly	  tumultuous	  and	  uncertain	  period	  from	  the	  downfall	  
of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime	   in	   2011	   to	   the	   two	   years	   of	   social,	   political	   and	   economic	  
transformation	   following	   this	   critical	   event	   in	   the	  history	   of	   Tunisia.	   It	   ultimately	   looks	   to	  
what	  happens	  when	  a	   space	  opens	  up	  and	  who	   rushes	   in	   to	   fill	   that	  ephemeral	   space.	   In	  
order	   to	   do	   this	   I	   examine	   the	  myriad	   actors	   and	   organisations	   that	   consider	   themselves	  
“civil	  society,”	   including	  those	  organisations	  established	  during	  the	  period	  of	  authoritarian	  
rule	   prior	   to	   December	   2010	   as	   well	   as	   the	   nascent	   organisations	   created	   through	   the	  
revised	  and	  expanded	  laws	  of	  association	  in	  2011.	  This	  thesis	  contends	  that	  just	  as	  there	  are	  
areas	  of	  consensus	  and	  solidarity	  among	  these	  different	  actors,	  there	  are	  also	  areas	  in	  which	  
there	   is	   intense	  disagreement	  and	  divergence.	  Just	  as	  there	  can	  be	  harmony	  among	  these	  
actors,	   there	   can	   also	   be	   conflict.	   In	   particular,	   the	   thesis	   looks	   to	   the	   conflicts	   and	  
contentions	  that	  emerged	  among	  the	  different	  elements	  of	  civil	  society	  during	  a	  period	  of	  
remarkable	   sociopolitical	   transformation	   in	   which	   the	   stakes	   were	   arguably	   higher	   in	  
regards	  to	  defining	  national	  priorities.	  Identifying	  the	  areas	  of	  conflicts	  during	  these	  periods	  
can	  reveal	  the	  characteristics	  that	  contradict	  “liberal”	  understandings	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  well	  
as	  demonstrate	  the	  destructive	  nature	  of	  democratisation	   itself.	  This	  analysis	  also	  aims	  to	  
determine	   whether	   these	   conflicts	   and	   contentions	   are	   destructive	   or	   in	   fact	   productive	  
forces	   to	  maintain	   deliberative	   spaces	   for	   discursive	   contestation—as	   agonistic	   forces	   for	  
consolidating	  pluralist	  democracies.	  The	  overarching	  purpose	  and	  question	  for	  the	  research	  
is	  to	  consider	  how	  conflict	  is	  manifested	  among	  and	  between	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups.	  
This	  approach	  centres	  on	  examining	  both	  the	  areas	  in	  which	  these	  conflicts	  take	  place	  and	  
the	  consequences	  of	  these	  emerging	  contentions.	  	  
	  
This	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  further	  understand	  and	  clarify	  these	  issues	  by	  undertaking	  a	  conceptual	  
and	   an	   empirical	   analysis	   of	   civil	   society	   to	   establish	  what	   actually	   transpires	   among	   civil	  
society	   actors	   and	   groups.	   The	   research	   therefore	   analyses	   how	   these	   conflicts	   are	  
manifested	  among	  civil	  society	  actors—in	  the	  symbolic	  and	  physical	  occupation	  of	  the	  public	  
space,	  within	  social	  divisions,	  and	   in	  mapping	  national	  democratic	  priorities.	  Therefore,	  as	  
the	  primary	  context	  for	  the	  research	  is	  grounded	  in	  events	  that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  two	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years	  subsequent	  to	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  in	  Tunisia	  in	  January	  2011,	  this	  
thesis	  identifies	  and	  explores	  three	  principal	  themes:	  the	  “illiberal”	  effects	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  
the	   public	   space(s),	   the	   emerging	   sociocultural	   and	   socioreligious	   divisions	   (including	   the	  
rise	  of	  associational	  or	  social	  Islam),	  and	  finally	  the	  exclusionary	  (and	  undemocratic)	  nature	  
of	  consensus	  in	  “liberal”	  democracies.	  Effectively,	  these	  three	  themes	  bring	  into	  sharp	  relief	  
the	   notion	   that	   civil	   society	   became	   more	   conflictual	   and	   contested	   across	   its	   diverse	  
elements	   during	   the	   two	   years	   following	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising	   in	   2010–2011	   than	   it	   was	  
previously	  under	  authoritarian	  rule.	  This	  in	  turn	  not	  only	  has	  direct	  implications	  for	  donor-­‐
led	   “civil	   society	   strengthening”	   and	   “democracy	   promotion”	   initiatives	   in	   middle-­‐	   and	  
lower-­‐income	   countries,	   but	   also	   further	   casts	   doubt	   on	   the	   premise	   that	   civil	   society	  
represents	  an	  alternative	  to	  dominant	  donor	  and	  development	  discourses	  enshrined	  in	  the	  
neoliberal	  architecture	  today.	  
	  
Situating	  the	  research	  within	  marginalised	  communities	  
In	  order	  to	  give	  weight	  to	  this	  analysis,	  this	  research	  is	  primarily	  grounded	  in	  the	  discipline	  
of	  development	  studies,	  in	  particular	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  it	  analyses	  and	  situates	  the	  concept	  of	  
civil	   society	   in	  neoliberal	   frameworks	  and	   in	   liberal	  democracy.	  The	   research	  engages	   in	  a	  
critical	  examination	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society,	   looking	  to	  contemporary	  and	  neoliberal	  
understandings	   of	   the	   concept	   in	   which	   the	   conflicts	   among	   these	   actors	   are	   both	  
emphasised	   and	   de-­‐emphasised	   throughout	   history.	   The	   definition	   of	   civil	   society	  
throughout	  this	  thesis	  is	  a	  field	  of	  actors,	  groups	  and	  organisations,	  acting	  and	  manoeuvring	  
within	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   physical	   and	   symbolic	   public	   spaces.	   These	   public	   spaces	   serve	   to	  
harness	  a	  discursive	  arena	  in	  which	  these	  different	  actors	  can	  deliberate	  and	  contest	  critical	  
matters	  of	  concern.	  This	  approach	  allows	  for	  a	  further	  contribution	  into	  how	  civil	  society	  is	  
understood	   conceptually	   and	   empirically	   in	   different	   contexts,	   namely	   during	   transitions	  
from	  authoritarian	  rule.	  
	  
The	   research	   also	   conceptualises	   a	   specific	   understanding	   of	   civil	   society	   namely	   through	  
the	  nongovernmental	  organisations	  (NGOs)	  as	  framed	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  understanding.17	  By	  
effectively	   situating	   civil	   society	   within	   neoliberal	   frameworks,	   the	   research	   underscores	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  There	  are	  different	  meanings,	  understandings	  and	  versions	  of	  “civil	  society.”	  For	  example,	  and	  for	  greater	  
clarity,	  Kaldor,	  Global	  Civil	  Society:	  An	  Answer	  to	  War,	  10,	  outlines	  five	  versions:	  Societas	  civilis,	  Burgerliche	  
Gesellschaft,	  Activist,	  Neoliberal,	  and	  Postmodern.	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that	   neoliberal	   policies	   have	   been	   designed	   with	   the	   fundamental	   premise	   that	   state	  
expenditure	   is	   better	   directed	   toward	   creating	   an	   enabling	   environment	   for	   growth.	  
Moreover,	  underpinning	  neoliberal	  policy	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  economic	  inefficiency	  or	  crises	  
are	   the	   result	   of	   excessive	   state	   intervention.	   Neoliberalism	   has	   entailed	   a	   total	  
reconfiguration	   of	   the	   social	   contract	   between	   the	   state	   and	   its	   citizens,	   often	   provoking	  
significant	   socioeconomic	   disruption.	   Consequently,	   with	   the	   development	   of	   the	   “New	  
Policy	  Agenda”	  and	  the	  Washington	  Consensus	  in	  the	  1990s,	  the	  role(s)	  of	  civil	  society	  has	  
become	   paramount	   in	   serving	   both	   as	   cost-­‐effective	   providers	   of	   services	   and	   as	  
torchbearers	   for	   democratic	   values	   and	   good	   governance.	  Moreover,	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	  
society	  has	   since	  been	   rearticulated	   to	  contain	  a	  burden	  of	  virtues	   that	  even	   includes	   the	  
instigation	   of	   the	   transition	   to	   and	   consolidation	   of	   democracy.18	  The	   normative	   weight	  
attached	   to	   this	   concept	   simultaneously	   celebrates	   these	   virtues	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	  
virtually	   empties	   the	   concept	   of	  meaning	   and	   value	   in	   today’s	   international	   development	  
lexicon.	   More	   importantly,	   the	   primacy	   of	   the	   roles	   allocated	   to	   civil	   society	   within	  
neoliberal	  policies	  has	  over	  time	  afforded	  these	  actors	  an	  unquestioned	   legitimacy	   in	  how	  
they	   operate.	   Consequently,	   under	   these	   frameworks	   the	   conflicts,	   repressions,	   and	  
exclusions	  that	  manifest	  among	  these	  actors	  are	  often	  overlooked	  or	  de-­‐emphasised.	  
	  
The	   research	   engages	   with	   these	   diverse	   understandings	   of	   civil	   society	   to	   further	  
determine	   the	  motivations	  and	  aims	  of	   these	  different	  actors	  and	   to	  critically	  analyse	   the	  
consequences	  of	  conflict	  among	  these	  groups	  and	  organisations.	  It	  looks	  to	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  
who	   emerged	   to	   fill	   the	   public	   space	   following	   the	   Tunisian	   uprising	   in	   2010–2011.	   This	  
range	   includes	   not	   only	   nascent	   humanitarian	   development	   organisations	   but	   also	  
organisations	   working	   with	   groups	   on	   the	   periphery,	   which	  may	   often	   be	   excluded	   from	  
mainstream	  public	  discourses.	  Specifically,	  the	  research	  includes	  human	  rights	  organisations	  
established	  before	  and	  after	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  regime	  in	  2011,	  humanitarian	  development	  
organisations	  (including	  Islamic	  associations)	  created	  after	  2011,	  and	  organisations	  working	  
with	   communities	   living	  with	   and	   affected	   by	   HIV/AIDS	   and	   sexual	  minorities	   established	  
before	  and	  subsequent	  to	  the	  uprising	  in	  Tunisia.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  See	  Diamond,	  “Toward	  Democratic	  Consolidation.”	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In	  particular,	   I	  chose	  to	  examine	  organisations	  working	   in	  HIV/AIDS	  (including	  the	  bilateral	  
and	  multilateral	  entities	  which	  fund	  them)	  because	  many	  of	  these	  organisations	  work	  with	  
vulnerable	   populations	   such	   as	   sex	   workers,	   homosexual	   populations,	   people	   who	   use	  
drugs,	   and	  prisoners.	   Even	   though	   the	  work	  of	   these	  organisations	  often	   concentrates	  on	  
close	  programmatic	  outreach	   interventions	  with	  affected	  communities,	   it	  also	  assumes	  an	  
inherent	   political	   nature	   because	  many	  organisations	   advocate	   for	   the	   provision	  of	   costly	  
HIV	   treatment	   by	   the	   government;	   highlight	   instances	   of	   institutional	   stigma	   and	  
discrimination;	  and	  call	  for	  the	  eradication	  of	  controversial	  legal	  stipulations	  that	  criminalise	  
sex	  work,	  homosexuality	  or	  same-­‐sex	  relations,	  and	  drug	  use.	  This	  research	  emphasises,	  and	  
at	   the	   same	   time	   advocates,	   that	   it	   is	   vital	   to	   research	   communities	   that	   are	   routinely	  
marginalised.	  Through	  HIV/AIDS	  one	  encounters	  highly	  contentious	  and	  in	  fact	  illegal	  groups	  
of	  people	  who	  feel	  the	  brunt	  of	  any	  sociopolitical	  turmoil.	  More	  importantly,	  these	  groups	  
serve	   to	   remind	   us	   that	   what	   happens	   on	   the	   periphery	   is	   indeed	   highly	   relevant	   to	  
understanding	  the	  broader	  sociopolitical	  and	  sociocultural	  landscape	  of	  a	  country.	  
	  
To	   provide	   some	   context	   to	   understanding	   HIV/AIDS	   in	   the	   region,	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	  
North	  Africa	  continues	  to	  have	  one	  of	  the	  fastest-­‐growing	  epidemics	  compared	  with	  other	  
regions,	   with	   concentrated	   epidemics	   in	   each	   of	   the	   sub-­‐regions	   including	   the	  Maghreb,	  
Shaam	  or	  Mashriq,	  and	   the	  Gulf	   Cooperation	  Council	   (GCC)	   countries.	  With	   a	   rise	   in	   new	  
infections	  since	  2001,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  adults	  and	  children	  living	  with	  HIV	  in	  the	  Middle	  
East	  and	  North	  Africa	  region	  was	  estimated	  to	  be	  270,000,	  with	  new	  infections	  increasing	  by	  
55	  percent	  over	  the	  last	  ten	  years	  (from	  22,000	  to	  34,000).19	  The	  increase	  in	  new	  infections	  
is	  attributed	  to	  a	  growing	  HIV	  prevalence	  among	  key	  populations	  at	  higher	  risk	  of	  acquiring	  
HIV	  who	  transmit	  the	  virus	  to	  individuals	  both	  at	  higher	  and	  lower	  risk	  of	  infection.	  In	  2011,	  
the	  estimated	  number	  of	  deaths	  due	  to	  HIV/AIDS	  was	  16,500.20	  These	  trends	  and	  figures	  are	  
the	  result	  of	  an	  overall	  acceleration	   in	  the	  epidemic	  throughout	  the	  region,	  an	   increase	   in	  
the	  total	  number	  of	  women	  living	  with	  HIV,	  and	  the	  continued	  lack	  of	  adequate	  services	  to	  
prevent	  new	  infections,	  particularly	  among	  children.21	  The	  HIV	  epidemic	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  
increasingly	   reflects	   the	  diversity	   of	   the	   region,	   as	   different	   populations	   are	  more	  heavily	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  UNAIDS,	  Regional	  Report	  2013,	  18.	  
20	  Ibid.	  	  
21	  UNAIDS,	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  I.	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affected	   in	   various	   geographical	   areas.	   This	   diversity	   is	   magnified	   by	   disparate	   attitudes,	  
policies,	   political	   commitments,	   and	   availability	   of	   and	   access	   to	   HIV/AIDS	   services. 22	  
Moreover,	   conflicts	   and	   sociopolitical	   unrest	   across	   the	   region	  over	   the	   last	   several	   years	  
have	  also	  exacerbated	  the	  epidemic	  by	  not	  only	  disrupting	  vital	  services,	  such	  as	  access	  to	  
treatment	   and	   service	   delivery,	   but	   also	   by	   aggravating	   the	   conditions	   that	   intensify	  
vulnerability	  to	  acquiring	  HIV/AIDS.23	  	  
	  
In	   selecting	   this	   range	   of	   organisations	   for	   the	   research	   (and	   the	   populations	  with	  which	  
they	  work)—and	  by	  including	  civil	  society	  organisations	  that	  operated	  both	  during	  the	  Ben	  
Ali	  regime,	  as	  well	  as	  organisations	  that	  were	  established	  after	  the	  regime’s	  downfall—the	  
thesis	   brings	   into	   relief	   the	   multiple	   challenges	   and	   advances	   these	   organisations	  
experienced.	  Moreover,	   it	   sheds	   further	   light	   on	   the	   formidable	   role	   of	   the	   state,	   which	  
regularly	  opens	  and	  tightens	  the	  spaces	  within	  which	  these	  organisations	  function.	  Finally,	  it	  
is	  often	  easy	   to	  overlook	   the	  groups	  and	  actors	   that	   find	  spaces	  contracting	  around	   them	  
during	   periods	   of	   sociopolitical	   transformation	   as	   the	   priorities	   for	   democratisation	   are	  
outlined	   and	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   concerns	   push	   certain	   issues	   and	   groups	   to	   the	   periphery;	  
some	   are	   even	   negated	   entirely.	   This	   tightening	   of	   certain	   spaces	   for	   individuals	   and	  
organisations	  underscores	   the	  complex	  and	  unstable	  nature	  of	  democratisation	  and	  more	  
importantly,	   the	   fundamental	   role	  of	   conflict	  within	  and	  among	  civil	   society	  actors.	   Issues	  
perceived	  as	  contentious	  are	  often	  sidelined	   in	   favour	  of	   those	  that	  are	  acceptable	   to	   the	  
greater	  public	  and	  that	  equally	  feature	  the	  collective	  imaginings	  of	  a	  country’s	  new	  national	  
identity.	  These	  new	  sociopolitical	   imaginings	  can	  mask	  emerging	  groups	  and	  contestations	  
in	   order	   to	   adhere	   to	   one	   of	   the	   core	   principles	   of	   pluralist	   democracy—consensus.	   This	  
raises	  questions	   regarding	   the	   advantages	   and	   the	  disadvantages	  of	   continuing	   to	  uphold	  
and	   endorse	   the	   term	   civil	   society,	   in	   particular	   given	   the	   nature	   in	  which	   the	   concept	   is	  
diffused	  during	  transitions	  from	  authoritarian	  rule.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  UNAIDS,	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  II.	  	  
23	  UNAIDS,	  Regional	  Report	  2013,	  20.	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2.	  Tunisia	  in	  transition:	  a	  critical	  approach	  	  
	  
Conducting	   research	   immediately	   following	  what	  was	   considered	   the	   height	   of	   the	   “Arab	  
Spring”	   brought	   challenges	   as	   well	   as,	   more	   importantly,	   the	   opportunity	   to	   observe	   a	  
period	   of	   remarkable	   sociopolitical	   transformation	   under	   the	   microscope.	   Following	   the	  
downfall	   of	   the	  Ben	  Ali	   regime	   in	   Tunisia,	   the	   country	  was	  not	   only	   closely	  monitored	  by	  
newly	  politicised	   Tunisian	  nationals,	   but	   also	  by	   international	   governments,	   policymakers,	  
donors,	   and	   academics	   globally.	   After	   decades	   of	   authoritarian	   rule	   across	   the	   region,	  
onlookers	   followed	   Tunisia	   in	   hopes	   that	   the	   power	   of	   Al-­‐Shaab	   could	   triumph	   over	  
infamously	  corrupt	  and	  repressive	  regimes.	  This	  thesis	  looks	  closely	  to	  the	  transformations	  
within	   civil	   society	   from	   January	   2011	   to	   July	   2013,	   from	   the	   peak	   of	   the	   post-­‐revolution	  
euphoria	  to	  the	  moment	  enthusiasm	  for	  a	  smooth	  transition	  effectively	  waned	  following	  the	  
targeted	  assassinations	  of	  opposition	  political	   actors	  Chokri	  Belaid	  and	  Mohamed	  Brahmi.	  
The	   overall	   context	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   situated	   within	   the	   period	   of	   political	   and	   social	  
transition	  for	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  and	  for	  Tunisia	  in	  particular.	  This	  is	  to	  bring	  
into	   further	   relief	  what	   actually	   transpires	   empirically	  within	   the	   physical	   and	   a	   symbolic	  
public	   spaces	   in	  which	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	  organisations	  manouevre	  during	  periods	  of	  
sharp	  and	  often	  turbulent	  sociopolitical	  turmoil.	  
	  
It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  power	  in	  an	  idea	  and	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  democracy	  has	  spread	  
across	  the	  majority	  governments	  and	  societies	  globally	  during	  the	   last	  century.	  Transitions	  
from	   authoritarian,	   totalitarian,	   or	   military	   rule	   have	   often	   been	   linked	   to	   “waves	   of	  
democratisation”	   documented	   from	   the	   1800s.	   In	   the	   last	   three	   decades	   the	   number	   of	  
democracies	  has	   risen	   to	   its	  highest	  peak,	   from	  69	   in	  1989	   to	  120	   in	  2000–2001	  with	   the	  
crest	   of	   the	   wave,	   before	   declining	   slightly	   to	   115	   in	   2011.24	  Samuel	   Huntington’s	   euro-­‐
centrist	   notion	   of	   a	   “wave	   of	   democratisation”	   refers	   to	   a	   multitude	   of	   countries	   that	  
transition	  from	  nondemocratic	  to	  democratic	  regimes	  within	  a	  similar	  time	  frame	  and	  which	  
consequently	   outnumber	   transitions	   in	   the	   opposite	   direction	   during	   that	   same	   period.	  
These	   theories	   derived	   their	   popularity	   in	   part	   from	   the	   events	   and	   popular	   social	  
movements	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  1980s,	  in	  what	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Freedom	  House	  www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=637	  as	  cited	  in	  Miszlivetz,	  “Lost	  in	  
Transformation,”	  55.	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considered	   by	   Huntington	   as	   the	   “third	   wave	   of	   democratisation,”	   in	   particular	   with	   the	  
collapse	  of	  Communism	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  in	  1989.25	  While	  Huntington’s	  analysis	  
is	   problematic	   for	   a	   host	   of	   reasons,	   his	   notion	   of	   the	   “wave	   of	   democratisation”	   re-­‐
manifested,	  perhaps	  uncritically,	  following	  the	  events	  of	  2010–2011	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  
North	  Africa	  where	  the	  world	  witnessed	  the	  downfall	  of	  a	  number	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes	  
and	  when	  several	  countries	  transitioned	  toward	  an	  “uncertain	  something	  else.”26	  	  
	  
Contextualising	  the	  thesis	  in	  part	  within	  the	  “transition”	  is	  not	  without	  contention,	  however,	  
just	  as	  scholars	  are	  cautious	  in	  their	  use	  of	  concepts	  such	  as	  “revolution”	  versus	  “uprisings”	  
when	   reflecting	   upon	   events	   in	   the	   region	   during	   this	   time.	   There	   is	   a	   limited	   amount	   of	  
literature	  on	   transitions	   from	  authoritarian	   rule,	   and	  existing	   literature	  mainly	   focuses	   on	  
the	  transitions	  from	  totalitarian	  and	  military	  rule	  in	  Southern	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  and	  Latin	  
America. 27 	  Moreover,	   the	   literature	   concentrates	   on	   the	   “transition	   to	   democracy,”	  
suggesting	  both	  a	  normative	  and	  linear	  consideration	  of	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  state	  to	  a	  final	  
end	  point	  manifesting	   in	  both	   stable	  macroeconomic	  growth	  and	  democracy.	   It	   is	   for	   this	  
reason	   that	  although	   this	   research	   is	   situated	  during	  what	   international	  policymakers	  and	  
donors	  often	  consider	  a	  transition	  phase	  for	  Tunisia	  (2011–2013),	  the	  concept	  of	  transition	  
deserves	   critical	   scrutiny.	   I	   acknowledge	   those	   comparisons	   to	   the	   transitions	   in	   Latin	  
America	  and	  Southern	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  where	  they	  can	  be	  made,	  but	  I	  also	  urge	  careful	  
consideration	  when	  comparing	  the	  events	  across	  the	  Arab	  region,	   in	  particular	   in	  terms	  of	  
how	   they	   relate	   to	   generalities	   between	   “transitions	   to	   democracy.”	   There	   are	   indeed	  
commonalities	  across	   these	  disparate	  countries	  and	  events;	  however,	   the	   specificities	   can	  
also	   remind	   us	   that	   a	   transition	   concerns	   not	   only	   democracy,	   but	   also	   the	   critical	  
socioeconomic	   and	   sociocultural	   transitions	   that	   can	   play	   out.	   For	   this	   reason,	   and	  
throughout	   the	   thesis,	   while	   a	   transition	   is	   acknowledged	   to	   have	   taken	   place,	   I	   avoid	  
semantic	   and/or	   linear	   links	   to	   the	   “transition	   to	   democracy.”	   This	   thesis	   emphasises	  
Guillermo	   Schmitter	   and	   Philippe	   O’Donnell’s	   notion	   of	   the	   “uncertain	   something	   else,”	  
which	  allows	   for	   the	  capturing	  of	   the	  “extraordinary	  uncertainty	  of	   the	  transition,	  with	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Huntington,	  The	  Third	  Wave:	  Democratization	  in	  the	  Late	  Twentieth	  Century.	  
26	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Tentative	  Conclusions,	  3.	  
27	  See	  Huntington,	  The	  Third	  Wave;	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Tentative	  
Conclusions;	  O’Donnell,	  Schmitter,	  and	  Whitehead,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Comparative	  
Perspectives;	  Miszlivetz,	  “Lost	  in	  Transformation;”	  Diamond,	  “Toward	  Democratic	  Consolidation;”	  and	  
Denoeux,	  “Promoting	  Democracy	  and	  Governance	  in	  Arab	  Countries.”	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numerous	  surprises	  and	  difficult	  dilemmas.”28	  Rather	  than	  to	  understand	  transitions	  as	  both	  
normative	   and	   linear	   considerations	   regarding	   the	   trajectory	   of	   the	   “modern”	   state,	   the	  
understanding	  and	  use	  of	  transition	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  instead	  emphasises	  sociopolitical	  
and	  socioeconomic	  disruption,	  change	  and	  transformation	  at	  manifold	  levels.	  Effectively,	  it	  
argues	  transitions	  must	  be	  disruptive	  to	  be	  transformative.	  
	  
Generalities	  and	  specificities	  of	  the	  transition	  	  
Before	  describing	  the	  methodology	  for	  the	  research,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  briefly	  engage	  with	  
some	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  transitions	  from	  authoritarian	  rule.	  This	  will	  allow	  what	  is	  specific	  
to	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   transition	   in	   Tunisia	   following	   the	   2010	   uprising	   to	   be	   brought	   into	  
sharper	   relief	   across	   the	   thesis.	   Schmitter	   and	   O’Donnell	   refer	   to	   the	   transition	   as	   “the	  
interval	  between	  one	  political	  regime	  and	  another.”29	  Their	  analysis	  ceases	  from	  the	  point	  at	  
which	  a	  new	  regime	  is	  installed.	  They	  write,	  “Transitions	  are	  delimited,	  on	  the	  one	  side,	  by	  
the	  launching	  of	  the	  process	  of	  dissolution	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  by	  
the	  installation	  of	  some	  form	  of	  democracy,	  the	  return	  to	  some	  form	  of	  authoritarian	  rule,	  
or	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  alternative.”30	  Given	  the	  different	  attempts	  to	  set	  out	  
some	   general	   parameters	   to	   define	   and	   understand	   transitions	   from	   authoritarian	   rule	  
based	  upon	  the	  experiences	  of	  countries	  in	  Southern	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America,	  
it	   is	   important	  to	  set	  out	  what	   is	  general	  overall	   to	  sociopolitical	  transitions.	  There	  are	  for	  
example	  three	  areas	  that	  are	  general,	  or	  in	  which	  there	  are	  commonalities	  across,	  at	  least,	  
the	   initial	  stages	  of	  the	  sociopolitical	   transitions	   in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  Latin	  America,	  and	  the	  
Middle	   East.	   They	   are:	   1)	   the	  mobilisation	   or	   a	   popular	   upsurge	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   citizen	  
population,	  2)	  the	  processes	  for	  redefining	  or	  extending	  rights	  or	  “liberalisation”	  measures,	  
and	  3)	  the	  “resurrection	  of	  civil	  society.”	  There	  are	  also	  areas	  that	  are	  particular	  or	  specific	  
to	   the	   transition	   in	   Tunisia	   and	   the	   Middle	   East	   and	   North	   Africa.	   They	   are:	   1)	   severe	  
macroeconomic	   instability/crises,	   2)	   initial	   and	   growing	   violence	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	  
transition,	  and	  3)	  Islamism	  as	  a	  religious	  ideology	  and	  as	  a	  political	  system.	  	  
	  
During	   the	   sociopolitical	   transitions	   that	   took	  place	   in	  Eastern	  Europe,	   Latin	  America,	   and	  
the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  one	  can	  point	  to	  similar	  captivating	  and	  vivid,	  oscillating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Tentative	  Conclusions,	  53.	  
29	  Ibid.,	  6.	  
30	  Ibid.	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images	  of	  masses	  of	  citizens	  participating	   in	  what	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  
“popular	  upsurge.”	  These	  images	  portray	  a	  very	  physical	  occupation	  of	  space	  by	  individuals	  
in	  peaceful	  protest	  adhering	  to	  non-­‐violent	  collective	  action,	  for	  example	  during	  the	  Velvet	  
Revolution	  in	  Prague	  in	  1989	  as	  well	  as	  the	  protests	  on	  Avenue	  Bourguiba	  in	  Tunis	  in	  2010	  
and	  2011.	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter	  write:	  
	  
The	   catalyst	   in	   this	   transformation	   comes	   first	   from	   gestures	   by	   exemplary	  
individuals,	  who	   begin	   testing	   the	   boundaries	   of	   behavior	   initially	   imposed	   by	   the	  
incumbent	   regime....In	   the	   precarious	   public	   spaces	   of	   the	   first	   stages	   of	   the	  
transition,	   these	   individual	   gestures	   are	   astonishingly	   successful	   in	   provoking	   or	  
reviving	   collective	   identifications	   and	   actions;	   they,	   in	   turn,	   help	   forge	   broad	  
identifications	   which	   embody	   the	   explosion	   of	   a	   highly	   repoliticised	   and	   angry	  
society.31	  	  
	  
The	   often	   non-­‐violent	   and	   heterogeneous	   nature	   of	   the	   popular	   upsurge	   not	   only	   brings	  
along	  with	  it	  the	  element	  of	  surprise	  but	  also	  a	  physical	  and	  symbolic	  representation	  of	  the	  
“people”	   united	   in	   solidarity	   against	   authoritarianism	   or	   totalitarianism.	   This	   popular	  
upsurge	   can	   also	   involve	   mass	   unrest,	   non-­‐compliance,	   multiple	   and	   often	   simultaneous	  
demonstrations	  across	  urban	  and	  rural	  centres,	  tactics	  of	  disruption,	  and	  popular	  activism.	  
For	   example,	   following	   the	   self-­‐immolation	   of	  Mohamed	   Bouazizi	   on	   17	   December	   2010,	  
national	   scale	  mass	  mobilisations	   had	   organised	   only	   ten	   days	   later	   across	   Tunisia	   in	   Al-­‐
Miknassi,	   Kairouan,	   Sfax,	   Ben	  Guerdane,	   and	   Tunis.	  What	   is	   important	   to	   acknowledge	   is	  
that	  not	  only	  did	  these	  various	  popular	  upsurges	  eventually	  contribute	  to	  the	  momentum	  of	  
the	  downfall	  of	  a	  host	  of	  authoritarian	  and	  totalitarian	  regimes	  across	  the	  three	  regions	  in	  
the	  1980s	  and	  again	  from	  2010-­‐2011,	  but	  these	  mass	  demonstrations	  were	  also	  maintained	  
across	   several	  weeks	   and	  months	   in	   order	   that	   initial	  moves	   towards	   regime	   change	   and	  
democratisation	  did	  not	  dissipate	  or	  flounder.	  
	  
Not	  long	  after	  the	  initial	  moments	  of	  mass	  popular	  mobilisations,	  political	  liberalisation	  and	  
the	   “resurrection	   of	   civil	   society”	   were	   also	   general	   features	   across	   the	   sociopolitical	  
transitions	  in	  these	  different	  regions.	  The	  regimes	  that	  underwent	  sociopolitical	  transitions	  
(and	   which	   pursued	   paths	   to	   some	   form	   of	   democratisation)	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	  
(Czechoslovakia,	  Hungary	  Poland,	  and	  Yugoslavia),	  Latin	  America	  (Argentina,	  Bolivia,	  Brazil,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Tentative	  Conclusions,	  49.	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Chile,	  Peru,	  and	  Uruguay)	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (Egypt	  and	  Tunisia)32	  all	  at	  
one	   point	   or	   another	   introduced	   a	   range	   of	   procedures	   to	   redefine	   and	   extend	   rights	   to	  
citizens.	   Such	   liberalisation	  measures	   often	   came	   after	   extensive	   periods	   of	   repression	   or	  
strict	   restrictions	  against	   collective	  action,	  political	  opposition,	   free	   speech/press,	   and	   the	  
right	   to	  association;	   they	  were	  either	   immediately	   introduced	  prior	   to	   the	  downfall	  of	   the	  
regime	  or	  within	  the	  first	  months	  of	  the	  transition.	  This,	   in	  some	  cases,	  almost	   immediate	  
opening	   up	   of	   the	   public	   space	   entailed	   the	   registration	   of	   new	   (or	   resurgent)	   political	  
parties,	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  press	  and	  broader	  media,	  and	  the	  drafting	  (or	  redrafting)	  of	  
laws	   of	   association	   allowing	   a	   multitude	   of	   different	   forms	   of	   collective	   activism	   and	  
mobilisation	   to	   emerge.	   O’Donnell	   and	   Schmitter	   write,	   for	   example,	   that	   “data	   sources,	  
book	  manuscripts,	  essays,	  and	  pieces	  of	  research	  which	  were	  prepared	  during	  the	  years	  of	  
severe	   repression	  but	  which	  authors	   could	  not	   (or	  dared	  not)	  make	  public	  now	  emerge...	  
Thus,	  once	  the	  first	  steps	  toward	  liberalisation	  are	  made	  and	  some	  dare	  to	  test	  their	  limits,	  
the	  whole	  texture,	  density,	  and	  content	  of	  intellectually	  authoritative	  discourse	  changes…”33	  	  
	  
Often	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  liberalisation	  measures	  during	  those	  initial	  stages	  of	  the	  transition	  
from	   authoritarian	   or	   totalitarian	   rule,	   one	   begins	   to	   witness	   the	   “resurrection	   of	   civil	  
society.”34	  One	   could	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   highly	   likely	   that	   different	   forms	   of	   this	   kind	   of	  
collective	  organisation	  of	  civil	  society	  existed	  before	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  incumbent	  regime,	  
for	   example	   either	   through	   a	   degree	   of	   sanctioned	   civil	   society	   permitted	   by	   the	  
authoritarian	   regime	  or	  clandestine	   social	  movements/activism	  hidden	  under	   the	   radar	   to	  
guard	   against	   despotic	   predispositions	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   state.	   Nevertheless,	   this	  
resurrection	   occurs	  when	   the	   cost	   of	   collective	   action	   and	  mobilisation	   are	   lowered,	   and	  
more	   importantly	  when	   fear	   is	   no	   longer	   a	   factor.35	  O’Donnell	   and	   Schmitter,	   referring	   to	  
Latin	  American	  and	  Eastern	  European	   cases,	   observe,	   “There	   are	   suddenly	   a	  multitude	  of	  
popular	   forums…in	   which	   the	   exercise	   and	   learning	   of	   citizenship	   can	   flourish	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Although	  a	  number	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  which	  citizens	  staged	  mass	  protest	  following	  the	  uprising	  in	  Tunisia	  in	  
2010	  did	  result	  in	  the	  downfall	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes	  such	  as	  in	  Libya	  and	  Yemen,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  ongoing	  
conflict	  these	  countries	  have	  not	  been	  engaged	  in	  consistent	  processes	  to	  democratise	  their	  political	  systems.	  
33	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Tentative	  Conclusions,	  51.	  
34	  Ibid.,	  48.	  
35	  See	  Gunning	  and	  Baron,	  Why	  Occupy	  a	  Square;	  Beinin	  and	  Vairel,	  “Afterword:	  Popular	  uprisings	  in	  Tunisia	  
and	  Egypt;”	  and	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Tentative	  Conclusions,	  49.	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deliberations	  about	  everyday	  concern.”36	  Detailing	  the	  risks	  taken	  by	  human	  rights	  activists	  
during	   the	   transitions	   from	   military	   rule	   in	   Latin	   America,	   O’Donnell	   and	   Schmitter	   also	  
underscore	  the	  powerful	  and	  critical	  element	  of	  the	  “recovery	  of	  personal	  dignity”	  inherent	  
in	   the	   (re)emergence	   of	   some	   of	   these	   organisations	   during	   this	   potent	   period	   of	  
“resurrection.”37	  	  The	  notion	  of	  “dignity”	  featured	  prominently	  alongside	  “employment”	   in	  
the	  principle	  slogans	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  uprising,	  carrying	  with	  it	  a	  moral	  authority	  to	  give	  name	  
to	  the	  violence	  and	  repression	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.	  And	  while	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  
will	  be	  explored	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  relation	  to	  mobilisations	  in	  
Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognise	  the	  (re-­‐)emergence	  of	  these	  
actors	   and	   organisations	   immediately	   prior	   to	   or	   following	   transitions	   from	   authoritarian	  
rule.	   In	   the	  transition	  countries	  considered	  as	  part	  of	   the	  “third	  wave	  of	  democratisation”	  
and	   in	   post-­‐uprising	   Tunisia,	   thousands	   of	   civil	   society	   organisations	   were	   established	   to	  
participate	  in	  the	  rebuilding	  of	  what	  would	  come	  after	  years	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  decades	  of	  
authoritarian	  rule.	  And	  while	  it	  is	  not	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  articulate	  whether	  or	  
not	   civil	   society	   is/was	   effective	   in	   the	   transition	   to	   or	   consolidation	   of	   democratic	  
outcomes,38	  this	  “resurrection”	  is	  not	  without	  consequence.	  	  
	  
Given	   some	  of	   the	   commonalities	   in	   these	   regions	   and	  what	   can	   be	   argued	   is	   general	   to	  
transitions	   from	  authoritarian	  or	   totalitarian	   rule,	   it	   is	   also	  necessary	   to	  articulate	  what	   is	  
specific	  and	  particular	  to	  the	  transition	  period	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  
in	  Tunisia	  in	  2011.	  The	  first	  area,	  which	  is	  particular	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  and	  
to	   Tunisia,	   lies	   in	   the	   macroeconomic	   specificities.	   The	   macroeconomic	   specificities	   are	  
significant	   as	   they	   are	   situated	   in	   arguments	   advocating	   that	   once	   a	   country	   reaches	   a	  
certain	   point	   of	   strong	  macroeconomic	   stability	   and	   growth,	   or	   socioeconomic	   status,	   its	  
citizens	   will	   consequently	   demand	   more	   representative	   and	   accountable	   governance	  
institutions.39	  However,	   despite	   the	   security	   that	   oil	   rents	   have	   provided	   the	   region,	   the	  
Middle	   East	   and	   North	   Africa	   until	   2010	   had	   some	   of	   the	   lowest	   growth	   and	   human	  
development	  indicators	  across	  all	  middle-­‐	  and	  lower-­‐income	  countries.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Tentative	  Conclusions,	  53.	  
37	  Ibid.,	  52.	  
38	  Diamond,	  “Toward	  Democratic	  Consolidation.”	  
39	  Based	  on	  the	  theories	  of	  Seymour	  Lipset;	  see	  Waterbury,	  “Democracy	  Without	  Democrats?”	  24.	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From	  the	  1970s,	   countries	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  adopted	  policies	  of	   infitah	  
(opening),	  whereby	  the	  privatisation	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  diminishing	  
social	   contract	   between	   the	   state	   and	   its	   citizens.40	  From	   this	   period	   the	   gross	   domestic	  
product	   (GDP)	  per	  capita	  average	  annual	  growth	  rate	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  
from	  1970–1990	  and	  from	  1990–2010	  was	  -­‐0.2	  percent	  and	  2.4	  percent,	  respectively.	  From	  
1990–2010	  this	  growth	  rate	  was	  lower	  than	  all	  other	  middle-­‐	  and	  lower-­‐income	  regions	  bar	  
sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (2	  percent	  from	  1990–2010).41	  Moreover,	  from	  2000–2008	  GDP	  average	  
annual	  growth	  rate	  was	  4.7	  percent	  for	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  representing	  the	  
lowest	   across	   all	   regions	   during	   this	   period.42	  Despite	   some	   of	   the	   lowest	   growth	   figures	  
overall	   for	   the	   region	   in	   comparison	   to	   other	   regions	   during	   the	   same	   period,	   what	   is	  
particular	   to	   the	   region	   is	   the	   “social	   situation”	   or	  what	  Gilbert	  Achcar	   refers	   to	   as	   three	  
critical	  words	  that	  are	  specific	  to	  the	  Middle	  East:	  poverty,	   inequality,	  and	  precarity.43	  And	  
while	   Achcar	   provides	   a	   much	   more	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   in	   The	   People	   Want,	   it	   is	   worth	  
pointing	  out	  some	  of	  these	  particular	  social	  indicators	  here.	  The	  unemployment	  rate	  in	  2010	  
for	  North	  Africa	  of	  9.6	  percent,	  for	  example,	  was	  higher	  than	  that	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (8.2	  
percent)	   and	   higher	   for	   all	   other	   regions	   outside	   the	   Middle	   East. 44 	  Moreover,	   the	  
unemployment	  rate	  of	  youth	  in	  2010	  in	  North	  Africa	  of	  23	  percent	  was	  also	  far	  greater	  than	  
any	  other	  region	  outside	  the	  Middle	  East.45	  In	  addition	  to	  figures	  that	  set	  out	  some	  of	  the	  
highest	   levels	   of	   female	   unemployment	   and	   total	   youth	   in	   the	   population,	   the	   social	  
development	   statistics	   for	   the	   region	   are	   critical	   and	   particular.	   O’Donnell	   and	   Schmitter	  
argue	   that	   authoritarian	   regimes	   typically	   leave	   problematic	   economic	   legacies,46	  but	   the	  
social	   implications	   are	   equally	   as	   poignant	   and	   relevant	   for	   the	   transition.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  
Latin	   America	   for	   example,	   economic	   fundamentalism	   played	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   transitions	  
from	  authoritarian	  rule.	  And	  while	  countries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  did	  adopt	  
some	  neoliberal	  policies,	  Achcar	  writes,	  “Arab	  states	  are	  far	   from	  fully	  complying	  with	  the	  
neoliberal	   model.”47	  Among	   the	   factors	   that	   are	   particular	   to	   the	   region	   are	   the	   large	  
proportion	   of	   middle	   classes	   that	   are	   directly	   dependent	   or	   employed	   by	   the	   state,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Achcar,	  The	  People	  Want,	  23.	  
41	  Ibid.,	  24.	  
42	  Ibid.,	  27.	  
43	  Ibid.,	  29.	  
44	  Ibid.,	  38.	  
45	  Ibid.,	  40.	  
46	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Tentative	  Conclusions,	  46.	  
47	  Achcar,	  The	  People	  Want,	  71.	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repression	  and	  violence	  inflicted	  by	  regimes	  on	  their	  citizens	  to	  maintain	  legitimacy,	  and	  the	  
prevalence	  of	  armed	  conflict	  across	  the	  region.48	  
	  
Based	  on	  this	  it	  is	  also	  necessary	  to	  highlight	  that	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America,	  the	  
transitions	   to	   democracy	   were	   regarded	   as	   relatively	   peaceful	   and	   non-­‐violent	   despite	  
stagnation	   and	   crisis.	   Human	   Rights	  Watch	   and	  Amnesty	   International	   reports	   from	   8–12	  
January	  2011	  noted	  that	   in	  Tunisia	  protesters	  were	  shot	   in	  the	  back,	  head,	  abdomen,	  and	  
chest,	  with	  over	  50	  deaths	  by	  police	  and	  state	  forces	  during	  this	  period	  alone.	  Moreover,	  in	  
Egypt	  the	  regime’s	  “hired	  thugs”	  on	  horses	  and	  camels	  threw	  rocks	  and	  whipped	  crowds	  in	  
Tahrir	  Square.49	  Violence	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  continued	  in	  the	  months	  and	  years	  following	  
the	   downfall	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   and	   Mubarak	   regimes	   as	   both	   countries	   attempted	  
democratisation.	   Only	   two	   years	   after	   the	   uprising,	   in	   February	   2013,	   Chokri	   Belaid,	   a	  
Tunisian	   politician	   and	   lawyer	   who	   was	   a	   key	   opposition	   leader	   with	   the	   secular-­‐left	  
Democratic	   Patriots	  Movement,	  was	   assassinated	  outside	  his	   home	   in	   Tunis.	   Five	  months	  
later,	   in	   July	   2013,	   Mohamed	   Brahmi,	   the	   founder	   and	   former	   leader	   of	   the	   People’s	  
Movement,	  was	  also	  shot	  (14	  times)	  outside	  his	  home.50	  More	  recent	  and	  worrying	  signs	  of	  
violence	   culminating	   in	   2015	   with	   terror	   attacks	   outside	   the	   Tunis	   Bardo	   Museum	   and	  
tourist	   beaches	   in	   Sousse	   point	   to	   uncertainty	   and	   instability	   in	   Tunisia’s	   transition	   from	  
authoritarian	   rule,	  with	   no	   guarantees	   that	   the	   democratic	   presidential	   elections	   of	   2014	  
won	   by	   88-­‐year-­‐old	   Beji	   Caid	   Essebsi	   of	   Nidaa	   Tounes	   would	   yield	   lasting	   democratic	  
outcomes	  for	  Tunisia.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  what	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  is	  the	  religious	  ideology	  of	  Islam	  
and	   Islam	   as	   a	   potential	   political	   system.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Tunisia,	   while	   Islamists	   did	   not	  
instigate	   the	   transition,	   they	   did	   play	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   the	   shaping	   of	   Tunisian	  
democratisation	  in	  particular	  during	  the	  two	  years	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  incumbent	  
Ben	  Ali	  regime.	  While	  more	  will	  be	  said	  on	  the	  role	  of	  Islam	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  the	  Ennahda	  party	  
following	  the	  October	  2011	  elections,	  democracy	  does	  not	  necessarily	  entail	  more	  “open”	  
societies.	   In	   Tunisia,	   Islam	   played	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   debates	   of	   the	   National	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Waterbury,	  “Democracy	  Without	  Democrats?”	  26–33.	  
49	  Beinin	  and	  Vairel,	  “Afterword:	  Popular	  uprisings	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt,”	  240	  and	  245.	  
50	  “Tunisian	  Politician	  Mohamed	  Brahmi	  Assassinated.”	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Constituent	   Assembly,	   debates	   that	   did	   not	   always	   reflect	   the	   “liberal”	   ideals	   of	   human	  
rights	  and	  equality.	  Outside	  the	  halls	  of	  these	  debates,	  antagonistic	  and	  highly	  contentious	  
battles	   at	   the	   sociocultural	   level	   unfolded	   between	   Islamist	   and	   secular	   factions	   of	   the	  
population	  whereby	  the	  impiety	  associated	  with	  the	  former	  regime	  was	  a	  target,	  including	  
the	  status	  of	  women,	  human	  rights,	  legalised	  sex	  work,	  and	  homosexuality.	  During	  what	  was	  
a	  significantly	  contentious	  period	  of	  the	  transition	  for	  Tunisia,	  from	  2011	  to	  2013	  (and	  which	  
arguably	   continues	   today),	  democracy	   could	  not	  necessarily	  be	  equated	  with	   “liberalism.”	  
The	  role	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	  region	  has	  made	  this	  specific	  to	  the	  transition	  and	  shaped,	  for	  better	  
or	  for	  worse,	  the	  democratic	  outcomes	  in	  Tunisia	  up	  until	  today.	  
	  
The	  events	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  almost	  instantaneously	  led	  to	  an	  association	  
with	   the	  “third	  wave	  of	  democratisation”	   in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America	  during	   the	  
1980s,	   even	   referring	   to	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   Arab	   Uprisings	   as	   potentially	   the	   “fourth	  
wave.”	  Underpinning	   these	   comparisons	  are	  masked	   suggestions	  of	  modernisation	   theory	  
whereby	   all	   states	   share	   a	   final	   or	   linear	   end	   point	   of	   maintaining	   democratic	   political	  
systems	   alongside	  macroeconomic	   stability.	  Moreover,	   those	   countries	   that	   do	  make	   the	  
“transition	   to	   democracy”	   are	   also	   capable	   of	   eventually	   institutionalising	   new	   and	  more	  
severe	   forms	   of	   authoritarian	   rule.	   Despite	   appearances	   and	   viable	   democratic	   elections	  
following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  in	  Tunisia	  in	  2011	  and	  again	  in	  2014,	  the	  
situation	   is	  still	  very	  much	   in	  flux.	  This,	  and	   in	  particular	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  transitions	  
from	   authoritarian	   rule	   observed	   today	   in	   the	   region,	   render	   the	   more	   hegemonic	  
understandings	   of	   transitions	   problematic.	   Therefore,	   rather	   than	   disregarding	   the	   term	  
completely,	   this	   thesis	   engages	  with	   the	   term	   “transition”	   in	   its	  most	   stripped	   down	   and	  
bare	  form—as	  a	  simultaneous	  process	  of	  disruption	  and	  transformation,	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  invite	  
openness	  to	  uncertainty.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   Page	  |	  27	  
3.	  Methodology	  for	  the	  research	  	  
	  
The	  futures	  are	  much	  closer	  to	  us	  than	  any	  pasts	  we	  might	  want	  to	  return	  to	  or	  revisit.	  What	  
does	  it	  mean	  to	  be	  examining,	  absorbing,	  feeling,	  reflecting	  on,	  and	  writing	  about	  the	  
archive	  as	  it	  is	  being	  produced,	  rushing	  at	  us—literally,	  to	  entertain	  an	  unfolding	  archive?	  
	  
-­‐-­‐Jasbir	  K.	  Puar,	  	  
Terrorist	  Assemblages51	  
	  
	  	  
This	   research	  began	  with	  a	  question:	  what	   is	   the	  nature	  of	  civil	   society	   in	  the	  Middle	  East	  
and	  North	  Africa?	  First,	  this	  question	  emerged	  based	  on	  the	  assumptions	  of	  others.	  Across	  
my	  own	  previous	  professional	   interactions	  working	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	   it	  
was	  often	  argued	  that	  civil	  society	  was	  somehow	  an	  aberration	  in	  the	  region.	  Second,	  this	  
question	  emerged	  based	  on	  my	  own	  assumptions.	  As	  a	  development	  practitioner	  working	  in	  
the	  field	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  sexual	  health,	  I	  perceived	  that	  civil	  society	  organisations	  working	  
with	   vulnerable	   and	  marginalised	   groups	  would	   certainly	   face	   insurmountable	   challenges,	  
including	   repression	   and	   violence,	   under	   authoritarian	   regimes.	   Therefore,	   the	   research	  
ultimately	  sought	  to	  disentangle	  and	  further	  engage	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	   society	  both	  
theoretically	  and	  empirically	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  as	  it	  related	  in	  particular	  to	  
marginalised	   groups	   and	   the	   organisations	   that	   chose	   to	   work	   with	   them	   in	   constrained	  
contexts.	   For	   example,	   across	   the	   Middle	   East	   and	   North	   Africa	   homosexuality	   is	  
criminalised	   through	   formal	   penal	   codes,	   sex	   work	   outside	   of	   legalised	   institutions	   is	   a	  
criminal	  offense,	  and	  drug	  use	  is	  illegal.	  Organisations	  that	  work	  with	  these	  criminalised	  and	  
marginalised	   populations	   choose	   to	   operate	   in	   the	   unlawful,	   the	   prohibited,	   and	   the	  
forbidden.	  
	  
Methods	  in	  transition	  
In	  2011,	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  reverberated	  across	  the	  entire	  Middle	  East	  and	  
North	   Africa	   region	   and	   internationally.	   Although	   the	   uprisings	   effectively	   presented	  
numerous	   dilemmas	   for	   researchers	   in	   the	   region,	   they	   also	   opened	   up	   opportunities	   to	  
indirectly	  participate	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  revolutions.	  For	  a	  researcher	  interested	  in	  the	  
concept	  of	  civil	  society	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings	  brought	  fertile	  terrain,	  as	  the	  concept	  appeared	  
to	   be	   almost	   instantaneously	   resurrected	   as	   a	   strong	   echo	  of	   the	  mass	  mobilisations	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Puar,	  Terrorist	  Assemblages,	  xix.	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popular	   upsurges	   among	   citizens	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   and	   Latin	   America	   in	   the	   1980s.	   As	   a	  
consequence	   of	   sustained	   popular	   pressure	   on	   behalf	   of	   protesters,	   measures	   to	   initiate	  
political	   liberalism	   in	  Tunisia	   came	   into	  effect	   relatively	   immediately	  after	   the	  downfall	  of	  
the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime	   in	   2011.	   As	   a	   result,	   an	   election	   road	  map	  was	   outlined,	   former	   and	  
newer	   political	   parties	  were	   recognised,	   and	   the	   laws	   of	   association	  were	   redrafted.	   The	  
space	  effectively	  opened.	   Thousands	  of	  new	  civil	   society	  organisations	   rushed	   to	   fill	  what	  
was	  fast	  becoming	  a	  pulsating	  space	  for	  collective	  action.	  Nevertheless,	  there	  was	  often	  the	  
argument	  that	  the	  events	  in	  the	  region	  at	  the	  time	  were	  too	  fresh	  and	  erratic	  to	  evaluate—
and	   that	   furthermore,	   scholars	   must	   wait	   “until	   the	   transition	   has	   ended”	   to	   effectively	  
analyse	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  2011	  uprisings	  on	  the	  disparate	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  including	  those	  
acting	   on	   the	   periphery.	   The	   social	   and	   political	   upheaval	   brought	   by	   the	   downfall	   of	   an	  
authoritarian	  regime	  is	   important	   in	  that	   it	  can	  enormously	  affect	  the	  various	  actors	   living	  
through	   it.	  More	   importantly,	   this	  upheaval	  can	  also	   reveal	  a	  great	  deal	  about	   the	   role	  of	  
conflict,	   including	  whether	   or	   not	   it	   serves	   as	   a	   destructive	  or	   a	   productive	   force	   for	   civil	  
society	  actors.	  
	  
Jasbir	  Puar,	  citing	  Achille	  Mbembe,	  contends	  that	  when	  researching	  in	  similar	  contexts	  one	  
can	  mistakenly	  attempt	  to	  delineate	  between	  stability	  and	  chaos,	  whereby	  time	  is	  perceived	  
in	   its	   “normal”	   state	   as	   linear.	   She	   problematises	   the	   notion	   of	   time	   as	   having	   a	   “steady	  
rhythm”52	  and	   so	   encourages	   her	   readers	   to	   be	   receptive	   to	   what	   might	   emerge	   from	  
“chaos”	   rather	   than	   to	   characterise	   its	   presence	   as	   abnormal.	   Moreover,	   O’Donnell	   and	  
Schmitter	   advocate	   the	   value	   of	   adopting	   a	   theory	   of	   “abnormality”	   in	   which	   the	  
unexpected	  and	  the	  possible	  are	  as	  important	  as	  the	  usual	  and	  the	  probable.53	  A	  theory	  of	  
abnormality	   would	   also	   allow	   scholars	   to	   account	   for	   a	   period	   during	   which	   a	   variety	   of	  
hegemonies	  are	  being	  challenged,	  and	  in	  which	  fierce	  battles	  to	  articulate	  which	  worldview	  
will	   define	   the	   new	   sociopolitical	   order	   play	   out.54	  The	   decision	   to	   continue	  my	   research	  
during	  this	  sporadic	  and	  fluctuating	  period	  demanded	  a	  flexible	  research	  model,	  but	  it	  also	  
permitted	   the	  opportunity	   to	  observe	  a	  country	  under	   the	  “democratisation”	  microscope.	  
By	   effectively	   integrating	   Puar	   and	   O’Donnell	   and	   Schmitter,	   I	   allowed	   my	   research	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Puar,	  Terrorist	  Assemblages,	  xix	  and	  xx.	  
53	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Tentative	  Conclusions,	  4.	  
54	  Voll,	  “Sultans,	  Saints,	  and	  Presidents,”	  3.	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framework	   to	   be	   open	   to	   the	   chaos	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   sociopolitical	   transformation	   as	   a	  
determined	  strategy	  and	  so	  maintained	  my	  own	  theory	  of	  abnormality	  throughout.	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  sociopolitical	  transformations	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  a	  regime	  in	  
place	   for	   over	   two	   decades,	   it	   was	   necessary	   from	   the	   outset	   to	   adopt	   an	   inductive	  
approach	   with	   primarily	   descriptive	   research	   to	   examine	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relationships	  
between	  the	  different	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups.	  The	  research	  was	   intended	  as	  cross-­‐
sectional	  research	  as	  well	  as	  a	  correlational	  study	  as	  I	  analysed	  four	  main	  areas—the	  role	  of	  
the	  state	  in	  shaping/influencing	  how	  civil	  society	  is	  able	  to	  operate;	  the	  disparate	  actors	  and	  
multitude	   of	   organisations	  which	   not	   only	   considered	   themselves	   civil	   society,	   but	  which	  
also	   emerged	   following	   the	   uprising	   to	   create	   civil	   society	   organisations;	   the	   range	   of	  
strategies	   different	   civil	   society	   organisations	   employed	   to	   meet	   their	   objectives;	   and	  
perhaps	   most	   importantly,	   the	   key	   issues	   of	   conflict	   and	   contestation	   emerging	   among	  
these	  actors.	  Through	  the	  examination	  of	  these	  four	  areas,	  the	  research	  could	  concentrate	  
on	  the	  critical	  areas	  as	  well	  as	  consequences	  of	  the	  conflicts	  that	  emerged	  between	  these	  
actors	   and	   groups	   during	   Tunisia’s	   transition	   from	   authoritarian	   rule.	   From	   the	   initial	  
question	  that	  brought	  me	  to	  this	  research,	  where	  I	  sought	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  civil	  
society	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  I	  perceived	  both	  harmony	  and	  conflict	  among	  a	  
multiplicity	  of	  actors	  who	  considered	  themselves	  members	  of	  civil	   society.	  The	  approach	   I	  
developed	   and	   have	   adopted	   herein	   serves	   to	   guide	   the	   thesis	   by	   critically	   exploring	  
specifically	   how	   conflict	   is	   manifested	   among	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups.	   First,	   this	  
requires	  an	  analysis	  and	  critique	  of	  how	  the	  concept	   is	  understood	  as	  well	  as	  an	  empirical	  
investigation	   into	   what	   actually	   transpires	   within	   and	   between	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	  
organisations.	   Second,	   it	   necessitates	   a	  more	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   the	   areas	   where	   these	  
conflicts	  take	  place—the	  public	  space,	  within	  social	  divisions	  and	  during	  the	  drive	  towards	  
popular	  consensus	  as	  Tunisia	  defines	  its	  new	  national	  priorities,	  such	  as	  through	  the	  body	  of	  
the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  effectively	  address	  the	  main	  research	  question	  and	  its	  core	  themes,	  the	  research	  
undertaken	  was	  primarily	  qualitative	   in	  conjunction	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  printed	  and	  online	  
press	  and	  organisational	  documentation	  and	  a	  review	  of	  relevant	  literature.	  The	  qualitative	  
analysis	  involved	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  results	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	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a	  range	  of	  actors.	  During	  this	  period	  of	  sociopolitical	  turmoil,	  I	  felt	  it	  even	  more	  necessary	  to	  
adopt	  a	  flexible	  research	  design	  as	  well	  as	  different	  methods	  of	  data	  triangulation	  to	  bring	  
to	  light	  emerging	  themes	  and	  inconsistencies	  within	  the	  research.	  For	  participant	  selection,	  I	  
relied	  on	  the	  data	  collected	  from	  December	  2010	  to	  November	  2011	  for	  the	  United	  Nations	  
Joint	   Programme	   on	   HIV/AIDS	   (UNAIDS)	   Middle	   East	   and	   North	   Africa	   civil	   society	  
organisational	   mapping	   (unpublished). 55 	  With	   permission	   from	   the	   UNAIDS	   Regional	  
Support	   Team	   (RST)	   based	   in	   Cairo,	   I	   was	   able	   to	   apply	   the	   mapping	   to	   initially	   identify	  
organisations	   working	   in	   HIV/AIDS	   in	   Tunisia	   and	   the	   target	   groups	   they	   prioritised	   for	  
outreach	   work	   and	   support.	   After	   commencing	   the	   field	   research	   in	   Tunisia	   with	   the	  
HIV/AIDS	  organisations,	  I	  then	  adopted	  the	  approach	  of	  “snowball	  sampling”	  to	  also	  access	  
a	   spectrum	   of	   outreach	   workers,	   lawyers,	   organisations	   focusing	   on	   women’s	   rights	   and	  
human	  rights	  more	  broadly,	  humanitarian	  development	  organisations	  including	  the	  Islamic	  
associations,	   and	   international	   donors.	   Participant	   selection	   was	   neither	   random	   nor	  
haphazard	   as	   every	   participant	   was	   either	   known	   by	   me	   directly	   or	   introduced	   to	   me	  
through	  a	  friend	  or	  colleague.	  
	  
One	  of	   the	   limitations	  of	   this	  research	   is	   that	  the	  majority	  of	   the	  actors	  and	  organisations	  
who	   participated	   in	   the	   qualitative	   interviews	  were	   secular	   and	   from	   the	  middle	   classes.	  
Across	   the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  many	  organisations	  working	   in	  human	  rights	  and	  
with	  individuals	  living	  with	  and	  affected	  by	  HIV/AIDS	  have	  similar	  typologies.	  Furthermore,	  
this	  is	  a	  theoretical-­‐based	  research	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  civil	  society	  prior	  to	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  
Ben	  Ali	   regime	  and	  during	   the	  political	   transformations	   following	   the	  2010–2011	  uprising.	  
This	   research	   is	   effectively	   a	   study	   of	   civil	   society	   through	   the	   case	   study	   of	   Tunisia.	  
Therefore,	   the	   research	   does	   not	   present	   an	   exhaustive	   set	   of	   literature	   on	   the	   primary	  
sociopolitical	  and	  historical	  phenomena	  of	  Tunisia.	  The	  materials	  that	  feature	   in	  the	  thesis	  
instead	  represent	  a	  selection	  of	  sources	  as	  background	  literature	  to	  highlight	  the	  theoretical	  
issues	  I	  engage	  with.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  I	  acted	  as	  the	  lead	  consultant	  for	  the	  UNAIDS	  MENA	  RST	  region-­‐wide	  civil	  society	  organisational	  mapping	  in	  
October	  2010.	  The	  mapping	  involved	  a	  combination	  of	  quantitative	  surveys	  along	  with	  semi-­‐structured	  
interviews	  with	  staff	  members	  working	  in	  humanitarian	  development	  initiatives	  that	  supported	  HIV/AIDS	  
programmes	  and	  interventions	  (see	  Annex	  1	  for	  survey	  used	  in	  initial	  mapping).	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It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  emphasise	  that	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  make	  a	  determination	  as	  to	  
whether	   or	   not	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   organisations	   were	   instrumental	   either	   in	   the	  
transition	   to	   or	   consolidation	   of	   democratic	   outcomes.	   Prior	   to	   the	   uprising	   in	   Tunisia,	  
numerous	  actors	  participated	  in	  a	  gradual	  chipping	  away	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  over	  several	  
years,	  with	  acts	  of	  both	  overt	  and	  underground	  resistance.	  The	  research	  does	  not	  attempt	  
to	   catalogue	   all	   of	   these	   diverse	   actors	   or	   the	  multiplicity	   of	   their	   actions.	   Furthermore,	  
during	   the	   approximately	   two-­‐year	   period	   this	   thesis	   examines,	   the	   transition	   from	  
authoritarian	   rule	   in	   Tunisia	   was	   very	   much	   still	   ongoing,	   with	   rapid	   and	   shifting	  
involvements	   in	   the	  both	   the	  physical	  and	  symbolic	  public	   space(s).	  While	   the	   thesis	  does	  
analyse	  the	  role	  of	  conflict	  as	  well	  as	  how	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  manoeuvre	  once	  
liberalism	   and	   pluralism	   are	   pursued	   following	   the	   downfall	   of	   a	   dictatorship,	   it	   cannot	  
attribute	   a	   concrete	   end	   to	   the	   actions	   of	   civil	   society	   with	   a	   sociopolitical	   and	  
socioeconomic	  transition	  still	  very	  much	  in	  process.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  similar	  to	  Jeroen	  Gunning	  and	  Illan	  Baron,	  I	  am	  not	  making	  a	  definitive	  statement	  on	  
how	   civil	   society	   is	   conceptualised;	   rather,	   I	   articulate	   a	   “contribution”	   to	   how	   these	  
disparate	   actors	   and	   groups	   are	   understood	   conceptually	   and	   empirically	   in	   disparate	  
contexts.	  This	  research	  contributes	  to	  an	  existing	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  
Middle	   East	   and	   North	   Africa,	   as	   well	   as	   empirical	   evidence	   on	   what	   actually	   transpires	  
among	  civil	  society	  actors	  during	  transitions	  from	  authoritarian	  rule.	  My	  contribution	  on	  civil	  
society	  in	  Tunisia,	  such	  as	  with	  Gunning	  and	  Baron’s	  research	  on	  social	  movements	  in	  post-­‐
revolution	  Egypt,	  is	  therefore	  time-­‐specific;	  its	  fundamental	  purpose	  is	  to	  encourage	  debate	  
and	  to	  remain	  open	  to	  new	  meanings	  when	  they	  emerge.56	  But	  more	  importantly,	  I	  hope	  to	  
encourage	   academics,	   policymakers,	   and	   donors	   who	   regularly	   engage	   with	   the	   often	  
overused	  and	  misused	  concept	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  critical	  manner,	  one	  in	  which	  the	  tremendous	  
volatility	   of	   the	   interactions	   and	   relationships	   between	   these	   groups	   and	   actors	   is	  
appreciated.	   Throughout	   the	   thesis	   I	   appreciate	   Jasbir	   Puar’s	   integration	   of	   Gayatri	  
Chakravorty	  Spikak’s	  notion	  of	  “politics	  of	  the	  open	  end”	  whereby	  she	  is	  “positively	  enticing	  
unknowable	   political	   futures	   into	   our	   wake.”57	  The	   events	   that	   transpire	   following	   the	  
downfall	   of	   an	   authoritarian	   regime	   can	   afford	   a	   snapshot	   for	   analysis	   during	   a	   finite	  but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Gunning	  and	  Baron,	  Why	  Occupy	  a	  Square,	  20.	  
57	  Puar,	  Terrorist	  Assemblages,	  xx.	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unpredictable	  period.	  Ultimately,	  some	  critical	  phenomena	  will	  not	  be	  captured	  and	  some	  
questions	  will	  remain	  unanswered.	  	  
	  
Field	  research	  in	  Tunisia	  
The	  field	  research	  was	  conducted	  over	  a	  series	  of	  phases	  during	  which	  I	  was	  able	  to	  come	  
into	  and	  out	  of	  the	  turbulent	  transition	  process	  for	  Tunisia.	  The	  field	  research	  was	  divided	  
into	  three	  core	  phases	  from	  September	  2011	  to	  March	  2013.	  The	  initial	  phase	  involved	  an	  
exploratory	   visit	   of	   six	  weeks	   to	   Egypt	   to	   conduct	   interviews	  with	   representatives	   of	   civil	  
society	  organisations	  working	   in	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  human	   rights,	  multilateral	   institutions,	   and	  
regional	  donors	  that	  at	  the	  time	  maintained	  their	  headquarters	  in	  Cairo.	  The	  second	  phase	  
of	   research	   incorporated	   a	   six-­‐week	   field	   visit	   to	   Tunisia	   to	   interview	   civil	   society	  
organisations	   working	   in	   HIV/AIDS	   and	   human	   rights	   organisations,	   and	   multilateral	   and	  
bilateral	  institutions	  that	  were	  giving	  technical	  support	  or	  resourcing	  HIV/AIDS	  interventions	  
in	   the	   country.	   The	   third	   phase	   of	   research	   involved	   an	   additional	   visit	   of	   six	   weeks	   in	  
Tunisia	  as	  the	  first	  visit	  yielded	  strong	  data	  and	  a	  more	  diverse	  set	  of	  actors	  willing	  to	  speak	  
about	   the	  pre-­‐	   and	  post-­‐revolution	   contexts.	   I	   also	   returned	   to	  Tunisia	   in	  March	  2013	   for	  
two	  weeks	  to	  follow	  up	  with	  some	  of	  the	  interviewees	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  sociopolitical	  
environment	  had	  changed.58	  	  
	  
During	  the	  course	  of	  the	  three	  stages	  of	  field	  research,	  I	  conducted	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  
58	   individuals	   ranging	   from	  members	   or	   representatives	   of	   newly	   formed	   associations	   to	  
“historic”	  associations,	  outreach	  workers,	  lawyers,	  organisations	  focusing	  on	  women’s	  rights	  
and	  human	  rights	  more	  broadly,	  humanitarian	  organisations	  including	  Islamic	  associations,	  
bilateral	   and	   multilateral	   donors	   (UNAIDS,	   United	   Nations	   Development	   Programme	  
(UNDP),	   UN	   High	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights,	   World	   Health	   Organisation	   (WHO),	   US	  
Agency	   for	   International	  Development	   (USAID))	  and	   international	  NGOs,	  as	  well	  as	  people	  
living	  with	  HIV	  (See	  Table	  1	  below	  for	  a	  breakdown	  of	  interviews	  by	  sector	  and	  annex	  2	  for	  a	  
complete	   list	   of	   the	   organisational	   type	   and	   location). 59 	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	  
interviews	  with	  the	  Egyptian	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  while	  not	  used	  directly	  in	  the	  thesis,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Informants	  no:	  18,	  20,	  25,	  and	  38.	  	  
59	  Note:	  During	  the	  course	  of	  the	  research,	  given	  the	  post-­‐revolution	  context,	  interviewees	  differentiated	  
between	  new	  civil	  society	  organisations	  and	  “historic”	  associations	  referring	  to	  those	  that	  existed	  
legally/formally	  before	  the	  revolutions	  in	  the	  region	  from	  December	  2010.	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substantially	   contributed	   to	   the	   development	   of	   the	   situation	   analysis	   and	   final	   research	  
framework	  that	  was	  eventually	  applied	  in	  Tunisia.60	  In	  Tunisia,	  I	  interviewed	  16	  members	  of	  
historic	   associations	   and	   conducted	   interviews	   with	   approximately	   eight	   newer	  
organisations,	   including	  three	   Islamist	  organisations.	  However,	  a	   limitation	  of	  the	  research	  
was	   the	   number	   of	   Islamist	   organisations	   I	   was	   able	   to	   interview—as	   many	   of	   these	  
organisations	  were	   only	   just	   being	   established	   and	   often	  were	   reluctant	   to	  meet	  with	   an	  
unknown	   researcher	   for	   an	   interview.	   Apart	   from	   the	   interviews	   with	   the	   Islamist	  
associations,	   the	  majority	  of	   the	   research	  participants	  and	   the	  organisations	  within	  which	  
they	   worked	   were	   also	   from	   the	   secular-­‐liberal	   middle	   classes.	   The	   return	   field	   visit	   to	  
Tunisia	  in	  the	  third	  stage	  of	  the	  research	  aimed	  to	  address	  this	  imbalance.	  
	  
	  
	  
I	   conducted	   the	   interviews	   primarily	   in	   French	   in	   Tunisia	   and	   English	   in	   Egypt;	   where	  
necessary,	   I	  used	  Arabic	   to	  be	  certain	   I	  understood	  the	  participant’s	  answer	  correctly.	  For	  
the	   research	   in	  Tunisia,	  by	   conducting	   the	   interviews	   in	   French,	   the	  milieu	  of	  participants	  
sampled	   was	   also	   relatively	   restricted.	   The	   research	   was	   not	   able	   to	   access	   the	   poorer	  
milieus	  engaging	  in	  associational	  activities.	  In	  the	  interview	  notes	  and	  in	  the	  final	  thesis,	  all	  
interviewees	   are	   anonymous	   and	   the	   names	   have	   been	   changed;	   in	   addition,	   only	   with	  
explicit	  verbal	  permission	  is	  the	  name	  of	  the	  organisation	  or	   institution	  cited	  in	  the	  thesis.	  
After	   I	   explained	   to	   the	   interviewees	   my	   processes	   for	   maintaining	   confidentiality	   and	  
anonymity,	  I	  requested	  verbal	  consent.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  From	  the	  58	  interviews,	  10	  were	  conducted	  with	  Egyptian	  associations	  and	  do	  not	  feature	  in	  the	  thesis.	  
Bilateral	  and	  
mulslateral	  
21%	  
HIV/AIDS	  
36%	  
Human	  Rights	  
10%	  
Democracy-­‐
strengthening	  
3%	  
Development	  
9%	  
Internasonal	  
NGO	  (INGO)	  
9%	  
Government	  	  
7%	  
Other	  
5%	  
Table	  1:	  Interviews	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia	  
Bilateral	  and	  mulslateral	  
HIV/AIDS	  
Human	  Rights	  
Democracy-­‐strengthening	  
Development	  
Internasonal	  NGO	  (INGO)	  
Government	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By	  October	  2011	  Tunisia	  had	  established	  a	  multi-­‐party	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly	  and	  
already	   was	   in	   the	   process	   of	   creating	   new	   spaces	   for	   increased	   political	   liberalisation,	  
namely	   changes	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   association	   initially	   established	   in	   1959	   under	   former	  
President	  Habib	  Bourguiba.	  I	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  stay	  with	  a	  colleague’s	  family	  in	  Tunis—
his	   78-­‐year-­‐old	  mother	   and	   36-­‐year-­‐old	   sister.	   They	   lived	   in	   a	   gated	   home	   in	   downtown	  
Tunis	  adjacent	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Defence.	  I	  was	  hosted	  by	  an	  Islamist	  
family,	  where	  the	  father	  of	  the	  family	  (deceased	  only	  years	  earlier)	  had	  served	  as	  an	  imam	  
in	   one	   of	   the	   grandes	   mosquées	   for	   over	   15	   years.	   By	   living	   in	   the	   home	   of	   Islamic	  
conservatives	  just	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Ben	  Ali	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  Ennahda	  I	  was	  able	  to	  experience	  
the	  euphoria	  and	  sense	  of	  excitement	  encompassing	  members	  of	  the	  family	  over	  the	  future	  
of	   Islam	   in	   Tunisia.	   For	   example,	   one	   of	  my	  more	  memorable	   experiences	  was	  when	   the	  
mother	   and	   sister	   returned	   from	   submitting	   new	   passport	   applications,	   with	   the	   new	  
passport	  photos	  in	  hand.	  “Look,”	  they	  said	  excitedly,	  showing	  me	  their	  photos	  wearing	  their	  
hijab	   in	   the	  photograph,	  “we	  could	  never	  do	   this	  before,	  and	  since	   the	   revolution	  we	  can	  
take	   our	   passport	   photos	   with	   our	   veils	   on,	   a	   sign	   of	   progress!”	   While	   many	   of	   my	  
colleagues	   in	  Tunis	  and	  a	   large	  proportion	  of	   the	  research	  participants	  were	  secular,	   I	   felt	  
that	  by	  living	  in	  an	  Islamist	  household,	  my	  perceptions	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  uncertain	  
transition	   facing	   Tunisia	   remained	   balanced	   as	   I	   was	   regularly	   exposed	   to	   both	   factions’	  
interpretation	   and	   perspectives	   on	   events.	   The	   secular-­‐liberal	   discourse	   was	   in	   fact	  
hegemonic	  and	  individuals,	  such	  as	  those	  in	  the	  family	  with	  whom	  I	  stayed,	  were	  often	  the	  
subject	  and	  object	  of	   this	  discourse.	  Through	   this	   lens,	   I	  was	  able	   to	  better	   recognise	   the	  
complexity	   surrounding	   the	   secular-­‐Islamist	   contestations	   occurring	   in	   Tunisia,	   and	   the	  
wider	  region	  during	  this	  time.	  In	  effect,	  I	  was	  forced	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  the	  initial	  biases	  I	  carried	  
to	  this	  research	  concerning	  civil	  society	  and	  Islam.	  
	  
During	   the	   field	   research	   in	   Tunisia,	   I	   also	   attended	   two	  meetings	   as	   an	  observer,	   one	   to	  
hear	   the	   findings	  of	  a	   recent	  study	  done	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  sexual	  minorities	   in	  Tunisia	  
and	   another	   on	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   prevention	   and	   eradication	   of	   torture	   in	   Tunisia	  
(during	   which	   the	   newly	   appointed	   Minister	   of	   Human	   Rights	   spoke).	   In	   addition,	   I	   also	  
regularly	   reviewed	  press	  articles	   in	   the	   local	  Tunisian	  broadsheets	  and	  on	   the	   Internet,	  as	  
well	  as	  tried	  to	  follow	  media	  sources	  on	  the	  sociopolitical	  transformations	  in	  Egypt	  following	  
the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Mubarak	  regime.	  The	  press	  articles	  used	  for	  the	  research	  were	  featured	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primarily	   in	  French	  and	  English.	  And	  while	  as	  a	  researcher	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  the	  bias	  that,	  for	  
example,	  Francophone	  media	  in	  Tunisia	  can	  present,	  I	  often	  use	  these	  materials	  throughout	  
the	  thesis	  to	  underscore	  sensationalist	  attitudes,	  myth-­‐making,	  and	  anti-­‐Islamist	  undertones	  
rife	  during	  this	  period.	  
	  
During	  the	  second	  field	  research	  visit	  to	  Tunisia,	  the	  benefits	  of	  being	  in	  a	  research	  context	  
longer	   began	   to	   surface	   as	   I	  was	   invited	   to	   demonstrations,	   civil	   society	   capacity-­‐building	  
workshops	  and	  conferences,	  and	  site	  visits	  outside	  of	  Tunis.	  I	  also	  attended	  two	  larger	  civil	  
society	  forums	  and	  workshops,	  the	  first	  being	  the	  “Support	  to	  Local	  Democratic	  Governance	  
for	   the	   Construction	   of	   Peace	   in	   the	  MENA	   Region”	   hosted	   by	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   the	  
“French-­‐Tunisian	   Civil	   Society	   Forum”	   supported	   by	   the	   French	   Embassy,	   the	   L’Institut	  
Francais,	  and	  France	  Voluntaires.	  I	  also	  visited	  three	  sites	  in	  Sfax,	  L’Espace	  de	  Jeunesse	  (The	  
Young	  People’s	  Centre),	  a	  drug	  rehabilitation	  centre	  and	  a	  maison	  close.	  Finally,	  I	  conducted	  
two	  focus	  group	  discussions,	  the	  first	  with	  female	  clandestine	  sex	  workers	  and	  the	  second	  
with	   drug	   users	   housed	   in	   the	   rehabilitation	   programme.	   As	   principal	   targets	   of	   the	  
associations’	   outreach	   and	   service	   programmes,	   I	   considered	   it	   would	   be	   useful	   to	   have	  
feedback	   from	   the	   populations	   with	   whom	   they	   work	   on	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   these	  
interventions	   and	   their	   post-­‐revolution	   expectations.	   These	  were	   difficult	   focus	   groups	   to	  
conduct	   for	   various	   reasons;	   nevertheless,	   I	   did	   gain	   a	   more	   profound	   sense	   of	   the	  
incredible	  challenges	  facing	  these	  particular	  marginalised	  groups.	  	  
	  
After	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime,	  political	  actors	  also	  occupied	  visible	  platforms	  on	  
both	  national	   and	  private	   television	   channels	   such	   as	  Nessma	  TV	  where	  politicians	  would	  
experiment	  with	  populist	  style	  debates	  and	  interviews.	  One	  example	  was	  “The	  Truth	  leads	  
to	  Peace,”	  in	  which	  in	  a	  talk-­‐show	  format,	  a	  journalist	  interviewed	  new	  politicians	  as	  well	  as	  
individuals	   associated	   with	   the	   former	   regime.	   One	   evening,	   during	   an	   interview	   with	   a	  
former	  member	   of	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Interior,	   the	   host	   asked	   plainly,	   “How	  do	   you	   sleep	   at	  
night	  and	  look	  your	  children	  in	  the	  face	  when	  you	  know	  you	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  killing	  
of	   innocent	   demonstrators?”	   So	   not	   only	   was	   there	   a	   perceived	   opening	   of	   the	   political	  
space,	   but	   Tunisians	   appeared	   eager	   and	  mobilised	   to	   claim	   this	   space.	   Bendana	   writes,	  
“Since	   the	  14th	   of	   January,	   everyone	   reclaims	  his	   right	   to	   information,	   everyone	  wants	   to	  
know	  everything.	  After	  fearful	  apathy	  and	  passivity,	  the	  curiosity	  of	  the	  Tunisians	  unleashes	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itself.”61	  This	   thirst	   for	   information	  and	  renewed	  politicisation	  even	   trickled	  over	   to	  young	  
children.	   On	   the	   one-­‐year	   anniversary	   of	   the	   revolution,	   families	   participated	   in	   the	  
festivities	  on	  Avenue	  Bourguiba.	  The	  children	  themselves	  became	  politicised.	  I	  met	  children	  
who	   could	   cite	   the	   names	   of	   military	   leaders	   and	   current	   key	   political	   figures.	   On	   one	  
occasion	   I	   even	  noticed	  one	  of	   the	  nine-­‐year-­‐old	  nieces	   in	   the	   family	  where	   I	  was	   staying	  
had	   an	   unflattering	   animated	   image	   of	   Colonel	   Muammar	   Gaddafi	   on	   her	   pink	   mobile	  
telephone.	  
	  
Moreover,	   approximately	   one	   year	   after	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising,	   interviewees	   conveyed	   the	  
sense	  that	  things	  were	  “getting	  back	  to	  normal”	  with	  motorways	  being	  finished	  and	  a	  more	  
visible	  police	  presence	  on	  the	  streets.	  However,	  major	  concerns	  of	  national	  identity	  focusing	  
on	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  status	  of	  women	  took	  precedence	  in	  the	  government,	  the	  media,	  and	  
in	  my	  conversations.	  These	  subjects	  consequently	  invoked	  some	  sensitive	  discussions	  in	  the	  
Islamist	  home	  where	  I	  was	  staying.	  Leila,	  the	  36-­‐year-­‐old	  daughter	  in	  the	  family	  with	  whom	  I	  
resided,	  was	  a	  self-­‐proclaimed	  Salafist,	  and	  over	  the	  years	  had	  evolved	  in	  her	  understanding	  
of	   Islam	   from	   “theory	   to	   practice.”	   Since	   the	   revolution	   she	   regularly	   attended	   Qur’anic	  
recitation	   sessions	   targeted	   specifically	   at	   women	   in	   the	   community	   through	   a	   local	  
association;	   upon	   my	   return	   visit	   in	   2013	   I	   attended	   these	   lessons	   with	   her.	   On	   most	  
evenings	  in	  the	  house,	  I	  sat	  with	  Leila	  as	  she	  watched	  her	  favourite	  Egyptian	  imam,	  Hassan,	  
on	  satellite	  television.	  We	  often	  entered	  into	  discussions	  on	  Islam,	  where	  our	  conversations	  
concerning	  the	  niqab	  and	  homosexuality	  were	  the	  most	  complex	  and	  dangerous.	  I	  felt	  that	  
both	   sides—the	   secular	   and	   the	   Islamists—struggled	   with	   adopting	   new	   language,	   new	  
discourses,	   and	   new	   approaches	   to	   engage	   with	   what	   they	   perceived	   as	   “other.”	  
Unfortunately,	   during	   my	   return	   visit	   in	   2013,	   I	   also	   felt	   the	   sociopolitical	   climate	   had	  
profoundly	   changed.	   The	   atmosphere	   in	   the	   country	   bordered	   on	   sour	   and	   hostile.	  
Arguably,	   the	   assassinations	   in	   2013	   sharply	   altered	   the	   post-­‐revolution	   euphoria.	  
Expectations	  for	  the	  future	  among	  some	  of	  the	  former	  interviewees	  could	  be	  characterised	  
by	  pessimism,	  suspicion,	  and	  despair	  rather	  than	  excitement	  and	  optimism.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Bendana,	  Chronique	  d’une	  Transition,	  118.	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During	   the	   research	   for	   the	   thesis	   I	   also	   faced	   a	   number	   of	   ethical	   challenges,	   as	   I	   was	  
constantly	   concerned	   for	   the	  protection	  of	   the	   individuals	   I	  was	   researching.	  Many	  of	   the	  
people	   I	   interviewed	   either	   worked	   with	   illegal	   populations	   or	   were	   members	   of	   these	  
populations	   themselves.	   Before	   and	   after	   my	   arrival	   there	   were	   instances	   of	   targeted	  
violence	  against	  homosexual	  men	  in	  Tunisia.	  It	  was	  a	  personal	  and	  professional	  priority	  for	  
me	  to	  protect	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  individuals	  I	  interviewed	  for	  my	  research	  in	  my	  notes	  and	  
transcripts,	   and	   a	   challenge	   within	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   ensure	   they	   remain	   protected	   while	  
delivering	  rigour	  in	  the	  analysis.62	  Furthermore,	  given	  the	  fluctuating	  nature	  of	  sociopolitical	  
transformations	   following	   the	   downfall	   of	   an	   authoritarian	   regime,	   data	   analysis	   had	   to	  
remain	  an	  ongoing	  and	  reflexive	  activity	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  the	  writing.	  Events	  in	  the	  
region	  continue	  to	  evolve	  rapidly,	  and	  it	  was	  a	  constant	  challenge	  to	  stay	  abreast	  of	  these	  
events	   in	  my	   own	   research.	  While	   I	   hope	   to	   be	   able	   to	   reflect	   the	  most	   current	   analysis	  
possible,	   there	   will	   inevitably	   be	   gaps	   in	   this	   examination,	   as	   it	   could	   not	   continue	  
indefinitely.	  	  
	  
Finally,	   perhaps	   the	   greatest	   challenge	   to	   conducting	   the	   field	   research	   was	   the	   “Arab	  
Spring”	   itself;	  however,	   I	  also	  believe	  this	  uncertain	  and	  continually	  unfolding	  context	  also	  
yielded	   interesting	   findings	   during	   an	   extraordinary	   period	   for	   the	   region.	   The	  major	   and	  
constant	  looming	  ambiguity	  over	  my	  research	  was	  this	  question	  of	  when	  the	  transition	  from	  
authoritarian	   rule	   begins	   and	   ends.	   Transitions	   from	   authoritarian	   rule	   are	   distinctive	   for	  
many	  reasons	  and	  are	  undoubtedly	  worth	  further	  academic	  scrutiny.	  Following	  the	  downfall	  
of	   an	   authoritarian	   regime,	   state	   infrastructure	   is	   often	   seemingly	  paralyzed,	   in	   particular	  
the	   security	   apparatus	   and	   judiciary	   systems	   held	   dear	   by	   the	   former	   regimes.	  With	   the	  
destabilisation	  of	   these	   systems,	  perceptions	  of	   increased	  violence	   (real	  or	   imagined)	  and	  
mounting	  rumour	  create	  the	   impression	  of	  a	  storm	  of	  chaos	  and	  confusion.	  This	  notion	  of	  
chaos,	   often	   accompanied	   by	   fear	   and	   reactionary	   emotions,	   can	   be	   a	   challenge	   for	   any	  
researcher.	  However,	  within	  this	  chaos,	  abnormality	  itself	  quickly	  becomes	  the	  norm	  where	  
power	   frequently	   changes	   hands	   from	   hegemonic	   authorities	   to	   non-­‐state	   actors,	   and	  
between	   publics	   and	   emerging	   counter-­‐publics.	   Fundamentally,	   the	   researcher	   is	   always	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fully	   aware	   that	   she	   is	   not	   only	   witnessing,	   but	   also	   participating	   in,	   something	  
extraordinary.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
4.	  Structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  
	  
This	   thesis	   is	   divided	   into	   seven	   chapters	   including	   the	   Introduction	   and	   Conclusion	  
chapters.	  There	  are	  two	  principal	  chapters	  that	  lay	  the	  foundations	  for	  the	  overall	  context	  of	  
the	  thesis—Chapter	  II:	  Situating	  civil	  society:	  emancipation	  or	  modernisation	  and	  Chapter	  III:	  
The	  consolidation	  of	   the	  Tunisian	   state.	  Chapter	   II	   is	   first	  a	   theoretical	  examination	  of	   the	  
concept	   of	   civil	   society	   with	   an	   initial	   concentration	   on	   the	   theories	   of	   writers	   who	  
underscored	   the	   conflicts	   and	   contentions	   among	   and	   between	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	  
groups,	   such	   as	   Georg	  W.F.	   Hegel,	   Karl	  Marx,	   and	   Antonio	   Gramsci.	   Second,	   the	   chapter	  
critically	  explores	  the	  moments	  during	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  re-­‐manifested	  both	  
ideologically	   and	   in	   practice	   throughout	   the	   social	   movements	   and	   transitions	   from	  
authoritarian	   rule	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   and	   Latin	   America.	   More	   significantly,	   it	   traces	   the	  
period	   from	   which	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   was	   ideologically	   re-­‐appropriated	   and	  
transplanted	   into	  neoliberal	   frameworks.	   The	   chapter	   subsequently	   outlines	   the	  dual	   role	  
with	  which	  civil	   society	   is	   tasked	   in	  dominant	   international	  development	  policy,	  both	  as	  a	  
provider	  of	  social	  welfare	  services	  and	  as	  a	  torchbearer	  for	  democratic	  values	  and	  holding	  
states	  accountable.	  I	  argue	  that	  under	  neoliberalism	  from	  the	  1980s,	  civil	  society	  groups	  and	  
organisations	  acquired	  an	  unprecedented	  legitimacy	  and	  authority	  within	  development	  and	  
poverty	  alleviation	  discourses.	  Furthermore,	  the	  hegemony	  of	  these	  actors	  in	  many	  contexts	  
has	  allowed	  for	  multiple	  exclusions	  of	  contentious	  or	  peripheral	  groups	  and	  issues.	  Perhaps	  
more	   importantly,	   one	   is	   able	   to	   more	   clearly	   observe	   the	   incompatibility	   of	   conceptual	  
understandings	   of	   civil	   society	   (and	   the	   ideologies	   underpinning	   them)	   that	   originally	  
emphasised	   the	   conflicts	   among	   and	   between	   civil	   society	   actors,	   to	   understandings	   that	  
later	  come	  to	  de-­‐emphasise	  and	  overlook	  these	  conflicts.	  	  
	  
Chapter	   III:	  The	   consolidation	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   state	   begins	  with	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   origins,	  
structure,	   and	   leadership	   of	   the	   pre-­‐	   and	   post-­‐independence	   state,	   through	   the	  
consideration	  of	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	   influenced	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  seen	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today.	  To	  do	  this	  the	  chapter	  commences	  with	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  the	  origins	  and	  structure	  
of	  the	  pre-­‐independence	  Tunisian	  state,	  by	  looking	  specifically	  to	  the	  influences	  of	  Ottoman	  
control	  from	  the	  sixteenth	  century	  and	  French	  colonial	  rule	  from	  1881.	  It	  then	  examines	  the	  
leadership	  of	  the	  post-­‐independence	  state	  from	  1956	  to	  1987	  under	  Habib	  Bourguiba	  and	  
from	  1987	  to	  2010	  under	  the	  regime	  of	  Zine	  El	  Abidine	  Ben	  Ali.	  These	  particular	  origins	  and	  
initial	  structures	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  provided	  the	  opportunity	  to	  not	  only	  consolidate	  the	  
bureaucratic	   apparatus	   necessary	   to	   govern	   and	   maintain	   legitimacy,	   but	   also	   to	   bring	  
peripheral	  regions	  and	  tribal	  populations	  under	  greater	  state	  social	  control	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  
the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  chapter	  describes	  how	  from	  1956,	  Bourguiba	  was	  able	  to	  steer	  
the	   post-­‐independence	   Tunisian	   state	   through	   periods	   of	   sociopolitical	   and	   economic	  
turmoil	   and	   to	   govern	   a	   highly	   efficient	   and	   highly	   centralised	   state	   apparatus.	   It	   also	  
underscores	  how	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  soon	  entered	  into	  an	  “authoritarian	  spiral,”	  the	  residue	  
of	   which	   would	   carry	   over	   into	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime	   from	   1987.	   The	  
“authoritarian	   spiral”	   manifested	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   range	   of	   factors	   including	   managing	  
political	   opposition	   and	   dissent,	   implementing	   austere	   socioeconomic	   policy,	   and	  
introducing	   modernising	   secular	   reforms,	   each	   of	   which	   resulted	   in	   fresh	   measures	   to	  
reinforce	  the	   legitimacy	  and	  authority	  of	   the	  regime.	  Despite	  earlier	  signs	  to	  the	  contrary,	  
not	  long	  after	  Ben	  Ali	  assumed	  the	  presidency	  in	  1987,	  tendencies	  for	  authoritarian	  rule	  re-­‐
materialised.	  Civil	   society	  organisations	   that	   chose	   to	  operate	  during	   this	  period	  accepted	  
known	   risks	   of	   harassment	   and	   intimidation,	   in	   particular	   if	   their	   interventions	   were	  
perceived	  to	  be	  political	  in	  nature.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  targeting	  of	  secular	  organisations,	  the	  
regime	   gradually	   closed	   down	   spaces	   for	   Islamist	   actors	   and	   groups	   to	  manoeuvre.	   Over	  
time,	  this	  directly	  impacted	  the	  nature	  and	  structure	  of	  Tunisian	  society	  as	  with	  the	  vigorous	  
targeting	   of	   the	   Islamists	   by	   the	   government,	   some	   secular	   organisations	   also	   began	   to	  
distance	  themselves	  from	  Islamist	  organisations.	  The	  conditions	  set	  by	  the	  two	  regimes,	  and	  
the	   residue	   of	   authoritarian	   rule	   that	   would	   carry	   over	   into	   post-­‐uprising	   Tunisia,	   would	  
leave	  its	  mark	  on	  Tunisia’s	  new	  and	  expanding	  symbolic	  and	  physical	  public	  spaces.	  
	  
Chapter	   IV:	   Civil	   society	   and	   the	   opening	   up	   of	   the	   public	   space	   examines	   the	   first	   core	  
theme	  of	  the	  thesis,	  specifically	  the	  “illiberal”	  effects	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  public	  space(s).	  
This	  chapter	  looks	  to	  the	  moments	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  in	  January	  
2011	   when	   Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces	   opened	   as	   a	   result	   of	   almost	   immediate	   political	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liberalisation	  measures	  implemented	  by	  the	  transition	  governments.	  The	  chapter	  describes	  
the	  initial	  months	  following	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising,	   including	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  elections	  to	  
the	   National	   Constituent	   Assembly	   in	   October	   2011	   where	   the	   Islamist	   Ennahda	   party	  
gained	   the	  majority	   through	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   coalition,	   known	   as	   the	   Troika,	  with	   two	  
secular	  parties,	   Ettakol	   and	   the	  Congress	   for	   the	  Republic.	   It	   then	   illustrates	   the	  manifold	  
expectations	  and	  contentions	  that	  emerged	  among	  the	  different	  actors	   in	  Tunisia’	  political	  
as	  well	  as	  public	  spaces,	  through	  a	  narrative	  of	  the	  key	  events	  which	  transpired	  during	  the	  
two	   years	   after	   the	   uprising.	   In	   particular,	   touchstone	   issues	   such	   as	   the	   freedom	   of	   the	  
press;	   the	   status	   of	  women;	   support	   for	   and	   recognition	   of	   vulnerable	   (and	   criminalised)	  
populations	   such	   as	   people	   affected	   by	   HIV/AIDS,	   sex	   workers,	   and	   homosexual	  
communities;	   and	   a	   key	   symbol	   of	   national	   identity,	   the	   Tunisian	   flag,	   each	   became	   key	  
areas	  of	  contestation	  as	  actors	  both	  inside	  and	  external	  to	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces	  expressed	  
their	   priorities	   and	   visions	   for	   post-­‐uprising	   Tunisia.	   This	   chapter	   then	   analyses	   the	  
“resurrection	  of	  civil	  society”	   in	  which	  thousands	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  were	  legally	  
established	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   amendments	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   association	   initially	  
promulgated	   by	   Bourguiba	   in	   1959	   and	   redrafted	   by	   the	   High	   Authority	   in	   the	   months	  
following	  the	  uprising.	  The	  thousands	  of	  new	  organisations	  created	  during	  this	  time	  would	  
also	   be	   acting	   alongside	   and	   sharing	   the	   same	   symbolic	   as	  well	   as	   physical	   public	   spaces	  
with	  Tunisia’s	  historic	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  created	  in	  the	  decades	  prior	  to	  the	  2010–
2011	  uprising.	  Each	  set	  of	  organisations	  encountered	  opportunities	  and	  challenges	  as	  they	  
endeavoured	  to	  ascertain	   the	  nature	  of	  Tunisia’s	  expanding	  public	   spaces.	  Effectively,	   this	  
chapter	   demonstrates	   that	   there	   is	   a	   tumultuous	   but	   definitive	   period	   following	   political	  
liberalisation	   measures	   during	   which	   actors	   can	   take	   maximum	   advantages	   of	   these	  
expanding	   spaces,	   and	   where	   the	   field	   for	   discursive	   contestation	   is	   at	   its	   widest.	   The	  
consequence	  of	  these	  new	  and	  vast	  public	  spaces,	  and	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  different	  conflicts	  
which	  emerged,	  resulted	  in	  an	  uncivil	  and	  illiberal	  jostling	  of	  views,	  visions,	  and	  ideologies.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  V:	  Rising	  social	  division	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  social	  Islam	  analyses	  the	  second	  core	  
theme	   of	   the	   research,	   namely	   the	   emerging	   sociocultural	   and	   socioreligious	   divisions,	  
including	  the	  rise	  of	  associational	  or	  social	  Islam	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  
in	  2011.	  It	  examines	  in	  more	  depth	  the	  emerging	  conflicts	  and	  divisions	  between	  the	  secular	  
and	  Islamist	  actors	  and	  groups	  to	  further	  determine	  how	  conflict	   is	  manifested	  within	  and	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among	  civil	  society.	  Following	  on	  from	  Chapter	  IV,	  this	  chapter	  continues	  to	  map	  the	  areas	  
where	   this	   conflict	  materialises	  and	  analyses	   the	  consequences	  of	   these	  contestations	   for	  
both	   these	   actors,	   as	   well	   as	   on	   democratisation	   in	   Tunisia	   following	   the	   2010–2011	  
uprising.	  This	  chapter	  describes	  the	  disparate	  Islamist	  groups	  that	  emerged	  to	  participate	  in	  
Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces,	  including	  those	  that	  were	  denied	  the	  opportunity	  to	  engage	  in	  legal	  
civil	   society	   organisations	   under	   Ben	   Ali	   but	   subsequently	   chose	   to	   participate	   in	   the	  
momentum	  of	  post-­‐uprising	  Tunisia.	  The	  chapter	  then	  analyses	  the	  key	  areas	  of	  conflict	  and	  
contestation	   between	   Islamist	   and	   secular	   organisations,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   reactions	   from	  
organisations	  operating	  on	  the	  periphery	  with	  marginalised	  and	  vulnerable	  groups	  to	  new	  
actors	  inhabiting	  these	  spaces.	  Finally,	  this	  chapter	  demonstrates	  that	  civil	  society	  became	  
more	   contentious	  and	   conflictual	   following	   the	   initial	   expansion	  of	   Tunisia’s	  public	   spaces	  
and	  during	  the	  two	  years	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  as	  a	  result	  of	  two	  core	  
factors.	   First,	   civil	   society	   became	   more	   divided	   during	   this	   period	   based	   on	   the	  
sociopolitical	  residue	  it	  inherited	  from	  the	  Bourguiba	  and	  Ben	  Ali	  regimes,	  during	  which	  civil	  
society	  was	  both	  constructed	  in	  opposition	  to	  Islam	  and	  operated	  in	  a	  relatively	  constrained	  
public	  space	  for	  several	  decades.	  Second,	  civil	  society	  became	  more	  contested	  between	  its	  
different	  elements	  as	  a	  rush	  of	  new	  actors	  filled	  the	  public	  space—these	  actors	  were	  secular	  
and	   Islamist,	   embodying	   often	   vastly	   different	   visions	   and	   ideologies	   for	   post-­‐revolution	  
Tunisia.	   As	   the	   stakes	   for	   shaping	   Tunisia’s	   national	   identity	   intensified,	   the	   conflicts	  
between	  civil	   society	  not	  only	   reinforced	   social	  divisions	  but	  also	   legitimised	  exclusions	   in	  
the	  name	  of	  democracy.	  
	  
Chapter	  VI:	  Consensus	  and	  marginalisation:	  the	  mapping	  of	  priorities	  in	  post-­‐uprising	  Tunisia	  
examines	   the	   third	   and	   final	   theme	   of	   the	   thesis,	   specifically	   the	   exclusionary	   (and	  
undemocratic)	  nature	  of	   consensus	   in	   “liberal”	  democracies.	   From	   the	  point	   at	  which	   the	  
discursive	  arena	  is	  at	  its	  widest	  following	  the	  political	  liberalisation	  measures	  put	  in	  place	  by	  
the	  transition	  government(s),	  to	  when	  gradually	  these	  spaces	  are	  narrowed	  down	  through	  
“the	  hegemony	  of	  consensus,”	  this	  chapter	  frames	  the	  touchtone	  issue	  of	  homosexuality	  in	  
post-­‐uprising	  Tunisia.	  It	  follows	  the	  case	  study	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  some	  of	  the	  members	  
of	   the	   homosexual	   community	   in	   Tunisia	   who	   established	   the	   organisation	   Damj	  
(“reintegration”)	  after	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising	  to	  more	  effectively	  defend	  human	  rights	  and	  
the	   rights	   of	   minorities,	   including	   lesbian,	   gay,	   bisexual,	   and	   transgender	   (LGBT)	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populations.	  Through	   this	  case	  study,	   I	   further	  examine	  how	  conflict	   is	  manifested	  among	  
civil	   society	   groups	   and	   actors	   by	   looking	   to	   the	   areas	   of	   these	   conflicts,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
consequences	   for	   these	   actors.	   Members	   of	   these	   communities	   not	   only	   experienced	  
simultaneous	   expansions	   in	   the	   public	   space	   to	   manoeuvre	   but	   also	   experienced	  
constraints,	   such	   as	   increases	   in	   discrimination	   and	   violence.	   In	   the	   further	   mapping	   of	  
democratic	  priorities,	  homosexual	  communities	  worked	  to	  put	   issues	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  
freedom	  from	  violence	  on	  the	  national	  agenda;	  however,	  actors	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  
to	  civil	   society	  acted	  to	  exclude	  marginal	  views	   in	  the	  name	  of	  consensus	  and	  democracy.	  
Following	  a	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  rule,	  consensus	  effectively	  becomes	  a	  key	  means	  
to	   enforce	   hegemonies	   as	   the	   post-­‐revolution	   hierarchy	   of	   priorities	   is	   redefined	   and	  
“other”	   is	  pushed	  to	  the	  periphery	  or	  negated	  entirely.	  Consequently,	  consensus	  becomes	  
the	   critical	   mechanism	   through	   which	   conflicts	   are	   muted	   and	   discursive	   arenas	   are	  
squeezed.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   these	   conflicts,	   there	   is	   little	   evidence	   that	   discursive	  
contestation	  is	  taking	  place.	  
	  
In	   the	  weeks	  before	  and	  after	  ousting	  of	   the	  Ben	  Ali	   regime,	   individuals	  and	  communities	  
came	  together	   in	   the	  streets	  across	  Tunisia	   in	  apparent	  solidarity,	  calling	   for	   freedom	  and	  
dignity.	   Even	   two	   years	   after	   the	   2010–2011	   uprising	   many	   spoke	   of	   nostalgia	   for	   the	  
moments	  when	  the	  country	  rallied	  together	  in	  unison	  for	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  democracy.	  
Yet	   by	   2013,	   Tunisia	   was	   characterised	   by	   an	   emerging	   secular-­‐Islamist	   stalemate	   at	   the	  
political	   level,	   as	   well	   as	   conflict,	   and	   at	   times	   even	   hostility,	   among	   members	   of	   civil	  
society.	   Touchstone	   issues	   such	   as	   the	   status	   of	   women,	   the	   freedom	   of	   the	   press,	   and	  
issues	   related	   to	   marginalised	   and	   stigmatised	   populations	   such	   as	   sex	   workers	   and	  
homosexual	  communities,	  often	  sparked	  contention	  and	  occupied	  discursive	  space	  among	  
civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups.	   As	   a	   result,	   rather	   than	   a	   continued	   expansion	   of	  
opportunities	  for	  agonistic	  debate,	  relationships	  between	  actors	  were	  often	  antagonistic,	  as	  
the	   country	   was	   driven	   by	   the	   pursuit	   of	   consensus	   on	   national	   priorities	   and	   identity	  
following	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime.	   In	   effect,	   during	   this	   period	   there	   was	   a	  
constant	   jostling	   of	   visions	   and	   ideologies	   for	   post-­‐uprising	   Tunisia	   in	   the	   country’s	  
expanding	  public	   spaces.	  Did	   this	  multiplicity	  of	  discourses	  at	   the	   time	  yield	   consensus	  or	  
subjugation,	   tolerance	   or	   repression,	   harmony	   or	   conflict	   in	   Tunisia’s	   rapidly	   fluctuating	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post-­‐revolution	   environment?	   Ultimately,	   did	   it	   provide	   fertile	   terrain	   for	   dignity	   and	  
freedom	  following	  decades	  of	  authoritarian	  rule?	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Chapter	  II:	  Situating	  civil	  society:	  emancipation	  or	  modernisation	  
	  
	  
	  
Cited	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  dilemmas	  by	  politicians	  and	  thinkers	  
from	  the	  left,	  right,	  and	  all	  perspectives	  in	  between,	  civil	  society	  is	  claimed	  by	  every	  part	  of	  
the	  ideological	  spectrum	  as	  its	  own.	  But	  what	  exactly	  is	  it?	  
	  
Neera	  Chandhoke,	  “Civil	  Society”	  63	  
	  
	  
From	   December	   2010,	   a	   number	   of	   countries	   across	   the	   Middle	   East	   and	   North	   Africa	  
entered	  into	  periods	  of	  sociopolitical	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  rule	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  an	  
uncertain	  something	  else.	  Tunisia	  continues	  to	  map	  its	  own	  transition	  path(s)	  based	  largely	  
on	   popular	   aspirations	   for	   change	   and	   a	   desire	   for	   a	   higher	   or	   greater	   standard	   of	  
democracy,64	  but	   also	   on	   the	   residue	   of	   power	   it	   has	   inherited.	   During	   the	   two	   years	  
following	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising,	   frequent	   mass	   demonstrations	   were	   mobilised	   to	   remind	  
state	   power	   that	   the	   people	   as	   watchdog	   over	   creeping	   authoritarianism	   remained	  
ubiquitous	  and	  ever	  vigilant.	  The	  power	  of	  the	  people,	  or	  the	  will	  of	  Al	  Shaab,	  fuelled	  new	  
debates	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  transitions	  from	  authoritarian	  rule.	  
	  
The	   events	   of	   the	   “Arab	   Spring”	   continue	   to	   spark	   a	   range	   of	   vibrant	   discussions	   and	  
questions	   concerning	   the	  hegemony	  of	   the	  neoliberal	   architecture,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	  
underscore	   the	   normative	   frame	   implicit	   in	   concepts	   such	   as	   civil	   society	   specifically	   in	  
relation	   to	   democratisation.	   Inherent	   to	   these	   conceptual	   debates	   are	   the	   conflation	   and	  
contention	   over	   the	   exact	   nature	   and	   functioning	   of	   civil	   society	   given	   the	   often	  
unattainable	  expectations	   for	   these	  actors,	  and	  whether	   the	  manifold	  views	  and	  priorities	  
among	   its	  members	  will	  eventually	  be	  able	   to	  deliver	  a	  greater	   standard	  of	  democracy	  or	  
instead	  impede	  this	  process.	  At	  the	  core	  of	  these	  deliberations	  on	  civil	  society	  are	  questions	  
regarding	  the	  role	  of	  conflict,	  the	  hegemony	  of	  consensus,	  the	  limitations	  of	  pluralism,	  and	  
whether	  civil	  society	  can	  continue	  to	  represent	  an	  alternative	  to	  dominant	  development	  and	  
donor	   discourses.	   For	   example,	   in	   State	   and	   Civil	   Society	   Neera	   Chandhoke	   contends,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Chandhoke,	  “Civil	  Society,”	  608.	  
64	  In	  his	  lecture	  on	  “Secularism,	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  Middle	  East:	  challenges	  and	  reflections”	  at	  the	  London	  
School	  of	  Economics	  (LSE)	  on	  23	  Oct.	  2012,	  Gilbert	  Achcar	  articulated	  that	  what	  the	  demonstrations	  across	  the	  
regions	  shared	  was	  aspirations	  for	  a	  higher	  or	  greater	  standard	  of	  democracy.	  See:	  
www.lse.ac.uk/humanRights/events/2012/Secularism.aspx.	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“Basically	   it	   (civil	   society)	   refers	   to	  an	  entire	   tradition	  of	  political	   thought	  which	  has	  dealt	  
with	   issues	   of	   human	   emancipation.”65	  Ultimately,	   as	   others	   have	   done,	   I	   endeavour	   to	  
discern	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   as	   it	   is	   currently	   understood	   has	   the	  
potential	  to	  be	  politically	  transformative.66	  
	  
The	   voices	   of	   civil	   society,	   or	   al-­‐mujtama	   al-­‐madani	   and	   al-­‐mujtama	   al-­‐ahli, 67 	  are	  
traditionally	  thought	  to	  have	  had	  little	  influence	  on	  the	  weighty	  authoritarian	  regimes	  of	  the	  
Middle	   East	   and	  North	  Africa.	   Some	  would	   argue	   that	   given	   the	  origins	  of	   the	   concept,	   a	  
genuine	  civil	  society	  could	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  region.	  As	  Augustus	  Norton	  observes,	  “There,	  civil	  
society	  is	  said	  to	  be	  deficient,	  corrupt,	  aggressive,	  hostile,	  infiltrated,	  co-­‐opted,	  insignificant	  
or	   absent,	   depending	   on	   which	   observer	   one	   prefers	   to	   cite.” 68 	  The	   ongoing	   social	  
movements	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  also	  continue	  to	  raise	  questions	  regarding	  
the	  extent	  of	  civic	  activism	  and	  collective	  pursuits	   in	  public	  spaces,	   including	  the	  nature	  of	  
civil	   society’s	   relationship	   to	   the	   state,	   its	   role	   in	   the	   transition	   to	   and	   consolidation	   of	  
democratic	   processes,	   its	   ability	   to	   function	   independently	   within	   authoritarian	   regimes,	  
and	  finally	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  civil	  society	  has	  inherited	  the	  social	  contract	  from	  
“weaker”	  states	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  concept	  of	  civil	  society—specifically	  the	  more	  hegemonic	  
liberal	   understanding—is	   habitually	   utilised	   by	   scholars,	   international	   institutions,	   state	  
entities,	   and	   NGOs	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	   engaging	   with	   the	   concept	   remains	   essential.	  
Therefore	   it	   becomes	   even	   more	   imperative	   to	   routinely	   and	   critically	   scrutinise	   the	  
profound	  implications	  of	  the	  concept,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  different	  agents	  who	  gain	  and	  lose	  in	  its	  
application.	  This	  thesis	  examines	  how	  conflict	   is	  manifested	  among	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  
groups,	  by	  looking	  to	  the	  areas	  in	  which	  these	  conflicts	  occur	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  
conflicts.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  I	  first	  analyse	  how	  the	  writers	  who	  emphasise	  in	  particular	  the	  
conflictual	   nature	   of	   the	   interactions	   between	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	   understood	  
the	   concept.	   Second,	   I	   consider	   how	   civil	   society	   is	   understood	   in	   neoliberal	   frameworks,	  
through	   an	   examination	   of	   neoliberal	   policies	   that	   in	   fact	   de-­‐emphasise	   the	   conflicts	   and	  
contentions	  between	  these	  organisations	  while	  simultaneously	  providing	  these	  actors	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Chandhoke,	  State	  and	  Civil	  Society,	  33.	  
66	  See	  Abdelrahman,	  Civil	  Society	  Exposed,	  1	  and	  Chandhoke,	  “Civil	  Society.”	  
67	  al-­‐mujtama	  al-­‐madani	  invokes	  the	  sense	  of	  institutions	  organised	  along	  civil	  lines	  with	  the	  word	  madani	  
derived	  from	  medina	  or	  “city;”	  or	  the	  more	  traditional	  reference	  to	  al-­‐mujtama	  al-­‐ahli	  which	  refers	  to	  a	  wider	  
variety	  of	  communal	  and	  religious	  institutions.	  See	  Sajoo,	  Civil	  Society	  in	  the	  Muslim	  World,	  15.	  
68	  Norton,	  “The	  Future	  of	  Civil	  Society,”	  212.	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unprecedented	   authority	   and	   legitimacy	   in	   national	   and	   international	   arenas.	   By	   further	  
understanding	   the	   points	   at	   which	   these	   conflicts	   are	   emphasised	   and	   de-­‐emphasised	  
across	   history,	   it	   becomes	   possible	   to	   understand	   more	   holistically	   the	   civil	   society	   that	  
emerged	   in	   Tunisia	   prior	   to	   and	   following	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime	   in	   2011.	  
Moreover,	   it	  allows	   for	  a	   further	  determination	  as	   to	  whether	   the	  concept	  of	   civil	   society	  
can	  continue	  to	  be	  considered	  transformative.	  
	  
This	  chapter	  commences	  by	  exploring	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  how	  
it	  was	  conceived	  by	  writers	   such	  as	  Georg	  W.F.	  Hegel,	  Karl	  Marx,	  and	  Antonio	  Gramsci.	   It	  
then	  describes	  the	  resurrection	  of	  the	  concept	  during	  the	  “third	  wave	  of	  democratisation”	  
in	   which	   the	   collective	   activism	   and	   social	   movements	   of	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s	   in	   Latin	  
America	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  were	  largely	  associated	  with	  the	  transition	  to	  or	  consolidation	  
of	   democratic	   outcomes	   from	   authoritarian	   regimes.	   This	   chapter	   subsequently	   sets	   out	  
how	   the	   concept	   has	   undergone	   a	   transformation	   within	   neoliberal	   frameworks	   and	  
outlines	   the	   dual	   role	   with	   which	   civil	   society	   is	   tasked	   in	   dominant	   international	  
development	  policy,	  both	  as	  a	  provider	  of	  social	  welfare	  services	  and	  as	  a	  torchbearer	   for	  
democratic	  values	  and	  in	  holding	  states	  accountable.	  This	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  some	  of	  
the	  emerging	  contentions	  and	  challenges	  with	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  is	  currently	  
understood	   and	   reflects	   on	   the	   principal	   research	   question	   of	   the	   thesis,	   in	   particular	   in	  
discerning	  how	  or	  why	  conflict	  manifests	  among	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups.	  I	  argue	  that	  
the	   incompatibility	  between	  the	  ideologies	  underpinning	  how	  civil	  society	  was	  understood	  
in	   the	   social	   movements	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   and	   Latin	   America,	   and	   then	   later	   re-­‐
appropriated	   in	   neoliberal	   frameworks,	   is	   a	   critical	   source	   of	   tension	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  
concept	  today.	  The	  two	  simultaneously	  operating	  but	  incompatible	  concepts	  of	  civil	  society,	  
influenced	   by	   the	   ideology	   of	   Communism	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   the	   ideology	   of	  
neoliberalism	   on	   the	   other,	   radically	   depart	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   they	   understand,	   and	  more	  
importantly,	  create	  space	  for	  conflict	  in	  the	  building	  of	  pluralist	  democracies.	  
	  
Carving	  out	  public	  spaces	  
To	  begin	  and	  to	  maintain	  conceptual	  clarity	   in	  terms	  of	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	   is	  
used	  across	  the	  thesis,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  establish	  here	  that	  civil	  society	  is	  a	  field	  of	  actors,	  
groups,	   and	   organisations	   acting	   and	  manoeuvring	   within	   a	   physical	   and	   symbolic	   public	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space	  as	  opposed	   to	   the	  “pubic	   sphere.”	  The	  public	   space(s)	   serves	   to	  harness	  a	   range	  of	  
discursive	   arenas	   in	   which	   different	   actors	   can	   deliberate	   and	   contest	   critical	   matters	   of	  
concern.	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note,	   however,	   that	  while	   some	  writers	   such	  as	  Chandhoke	   in	  
State	  and	  Society:	  Explorations	  in	  Political	  Theory	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  
civil	   society	   interchangeably,	   doing	   so	   can	   create	   slippages	   between	   the	   two	   concepts.69	  
Moreover,	  Jurgen	  Habermas,	  a	  key	  writer	  on	  the	  public	  sphere,	  attributes	  both	  a	  horizontal	  
as	  well	  as	  vertical	   relationship	  between	  civil	   society	  and	   the	  public	   sphere.70	  For	  example,	  
Habermas	   describes	   an	   idealised	   public	   sphere	   in	   which	   equal	   individuals	   participate	  
alongside	  each	  other	  to	  occupy	  a	  central	  position	  within	  the	  public	  through	  rational-­‐critical	  
debate—eventually	   through	   the	   “coffee	   houses,	   salons,	   and	   table	   societies.”71	  He	   writes,	  
“Transcending	   the	   barriers	   of	   social	   hierarchy,	   the	   bourgeois	   met	   here	   with	   the	   socially	  
prestigious	  but	  politically	  uninfluential	  nobles	  as	  ‘common’	  human	  beings....	  Social	  equality	  
was	  possible	  at	  first	  only	  as	  an	  equality	  outside	  the	  state.”72	  He	  articulates	  a	  public	  that	  was	  
in	  principle	  inclusive	  and	  whereby	  everyone,	  through	  their	  own	  consciousness	  of	  being	  part	  
of	  a	  larger	  public,	  had	  to	  be	  able	  to	  participate.73	  However,	  Habermas	  is	  criticised	  by	  writers	  
such	   as	   Nancy	   Fraser	   for	   not	   fully	   emphasising	   unequal	   status	   relations,	   the	   lack	   of	  
participatory	   parity,	   and	   the	   normative	   preference	   for	   a	   singularity	   of	   publics. 74 	  She	  
attributes	   this	   to	  Habermas’	   emphasis	   on	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	   as	   an	   idealised	  
entity	   based	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   inclusion	   and	   accessibility.	   Her	   premise	   rests	   on	   her	  
understanding	   of	   Habermas’	   unexplored	   consideration	   of	   the	   “social	   question”	   in	   which	  
society	  was	  increasingly	  marked	  by	  class	  struggle	  and	  eventually	  splintered	  off	  into	  a	  host	  of	  
“competing	  interest	  groups.”75	  Fraser	  acknowledges	  that	  for	  Habermas	  the	  full	  potential	  of	  
the	   bourgeois	   conception	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   never	   developed	   in	   practice76	  because	  
Habermas	  himself	  admits	  that	  the	  one	  public	  sphere	  was	  always	  a	  fiction,	  presented	  as	  an	  
institutionalised	  idea	  rather	  than	  true	  state	  of	  interaction.77	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Chandhoke,	  State	  and	  Civil	  Society,	  9.	  
70	  In	  the	  Structural	  Transformation	  of	  the	  Public	  Sphere,	  Habermas	  suggests	  that	  the	  public	  sphere	  sits	  within	  
civil	  society	  (p.	  34)	  and	  simultaneously	  he	  articulates	  that	  the	  public	  sphere	  regulates	  civil	  society—suggesting	  
a	  vertical	  relationship	  (p.	  52).	  
71	  Habermas,	  The	  Structural	  Transformation	  of	  the	  Public	  Sphere,	  30.	  	  
72Ibid.,	  34–35.	  
73Ibid.,	  37.	  
74	  See:	  Fraser,	  “Rethinking	  the	  Public	  Sphere.”	  	  
75	  Fraser,	  “Rethinking	  the	  Public	  Sphere,”	  59.	  
76	  Ibid.,	  59.	  
77	  Habermas,	  The	  Structural	  Transformation	  of	  the	  Public	  Sphere,	  36	  and	  56.	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Given	  both	  Habermas’	  own	  inconsistencies	  in	  his	  distinction	  between	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  
civil	   society,	   and	   the	   idealised	   nature	   in	   which	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   was	  
theorised,	  other	  writers	  have	  attempted	  to	  clarify	  this	  conceptual	  confusion.	  For	  example,	  
Seteney	  Shami	  articulates	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “integrative	  promise”	  where	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
public	   sphere	   can	   provide	   disparate	   perspectives	   on	   civil	   society,	   private	   and	   public	  
domains,	  urban	  social	  movements,	  and	  sexual	  identity.	  Shami	  writes,	  “The	  concept	  of	  public	  
spheres	  thus	  promises	  to	  elucidate	  the	  diversity	  of	  civil	  society,	  of	  resistance	  practices	  and	  
democratisation.”78	  In	   principle	   for	   Shami,	   the	   public	   sphere	   could	   serve	   as	   an	   analytical	  
frame	   to	   enable	   and	   observe	   new	   perspectives	   on	   how	   the	   term	   civil	   society	   is	  
understood.79	  While	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  situate	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  within	  or	  alongside	  
the	  public	   sphere	  given	   the	   richness	  and	  often	  complementarity	  of	   the	   two	  concepts,	   the	  
slippages	   between	   the	   two	   are	   problematic.	   Therefore,	   I	   do	   not	   use	   the	   concept	   of	   the	  
public	  sphere	  in	  the	  thesis,	  but	  rather	  describe	  the	  symbolic	  and	  physical	  public	  spaces	  both	  
afforded	  to	  civil	  society	  actors	  by	  the	  different	  governance	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	  through	  the	  
institutions	  of	   the	  state	  and	   from	  within	   the	  neoliberal	  architecture,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  spaces	  
these	  actors	  carve	  out	  for	  themselves	  when	  room	  to	  manoeuvre	   is	  detected.	   In	  this	  sense	  
and	   alongside	   writers	   such	   as	   Chantal	  Mouffe,	   rather	   than	   to	   refer	   to	   a	   single	   space,	   “a	  
multiplicity	  of	  discursive	  surfaces	  and	  public	  spaces”	  are	  emphasised	  across	  the	  thesis.80	  
	  
	  
	  
1.	  Locating	  civil	  society	  following	  the	  emergence	  of	  capitalism	  
	  
Throughout	  the	  last	  century	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  has	  taken	  on	  many	  different	  forms	  
and	   has	   often	   been	   related	   to	   or	   polarised	   against	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	   state,	   the	  
economic	  market,	  the	  private	  sphere,	  or	  the	  family-­‐household	  domain.	  The	  concept	  has	  also	  
been	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  a	  modernisation	  trajectory	  in	  which	  the	  density	  of	  civil	  society	  is	  
associated	  with	  progress,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  civil	  society	  with	  those	  of	  traditionalist	  or	  primordial	  
institutions.	  Some	  scholars,	  such	  as	  Alan	  Kidd,	  argue	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Communist	  states	  
was	  responsible	   for	  stimulating	  an	   increased	   interest	   in	   the	  concept	  of	  civil	   society	  during	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Shami,	  Publics,	  Politics	  and	  Participation,	  36.	  
79	  Ibid.,	  15-­‐16.	  
80	  Mouffe,	  Agonistics,	  91.	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the	  1990s,	  notably	   the	  emphasis	  upon	   its	   importance	  to	  democracy;	  81	  others,	  meanwhile,	  
would	  point	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  good	  governance	  discourse	  supported	  by	  proponents	  
of	   the	   neoliberal	   architecture	   from	   the	   mid-­‐1980s	   as	   responsible	   for	   its	   popularity.	   The	  
concept	  remains	  highly	  contested	  territory82	  and	  retains	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  complexity.83	  Jean	  
Roca	   contends	   that	   the	   identities	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	   are	   “increasingly	   multiple	   and	  
mobile,	  and	  allegiances	  are	  fluid.	  It	  would	  therefore	  be	  wise...to	  speak	  of	  ‘civil	  societies.’”84	  
	  
For	   example,	   John	   Keane,	   relying	   on	   its	   more	   classical	   usage,	   argues,	   “Civil	   society	   is	   an	  
ideal-­‐typical	  category...that	  both	  describes	  and	  envisages	  a	  complex	  and	  dynamic	  ensemble	  
of	   legally-­‐protected	   non-­‐governmental	   institutions	   that	   tend	   to	   be	   non-­‐violent,	   self-­‐
organising,	   self-­‐reflexive	   and	   permanently	   in	   tension	   with	   each	   other	   and	   with	   the	   state	  
institutions	   that	   frame,	   construct	   and	   enable	   their	   activities.”85	  Amyn	   Sajoo,	   adopting	   a	  
more	   hybrid	   understanding,	   contends	   civil	   society	   comprises	   “not	   only	   the	   more	   formal	  
webs	  of	  associations	  of	  civil	  society,	  but	  also	  its	  more	  fluid	  communicative	  actions—outside	  
the	   direct	  mediation	   of	   the	   political	   (that	   is,	   formal	   state)	   sphere.”86	  While	   in	  Global	   Civil	  
Society	  2012,	  in	  consideration	  of	  the	  recent	  social	  movements	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  
Africa,	   Anheier,	   Kaldor	   and	   Glasius	   describe	   civil	   society	   as	   “the	   medium	   through	   which	  
individuals	   participate	   in	   public	   affairs,	   through	   which	   they	   endorse	   or	   challenge	   the	  
dominant	  discourse.”87	  There	  is	  a	  contentious	  and	  ongoing	  debate	  about	  which	  groups	  civil	  
society	   does	   and	   does	   not	   include	   (often	   based	   on	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   concept)	   and	   the	  
notion,	   that	   certain	   institutions	   can	   gain	   from	   how	   the	   parameters	   of	   this	   concept	   are	  
defined.	  Mary	  Kaldor	  argues	  that	  in	  fact,	  the	  literature	  on	  civil	  society	  is	  so	  diverse	  it	  permits	  
varying	   degrees	   of	   “selectivity”	   in	   terms	   of	   which	   texts	   and	   meanings	   to	   study.88 	  By	  
endeavouring	  to	  interpret	  the	  various	  meanings	  of	  the	  concept	  across	  disparate	  contexts	  it	  
is	  possible	  to	  construct	  a	  space	  for	  a	  broader	  discussion	  of	  the	  implications	  for	  this	  concept	  
following	  the	  events	  of	  2010–2011.	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Situating	  conflict:	  a	  critical	  exploration	  of	  Hegel,	  Marx,	  and	  Gramsci	  
This	  section	  begins	  with	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  theories	  of	  Hegel,	  Marx,	  and	  Gramsci	  on	  civil	  
society	  as	  these	  theorists	  were	  not	  only	  concerned	  with	  how	  civil	  society	  could	  be	  organised	  
and	   transformed,	   but	   also	   underscored	   the	   conflictual	   and	   contentious	   nature	   of	   this	  
domain.	  Here	  we	  see	  the	  emergence	  of	  theoretical	  understandings	  on	  civil	  society	  that	  aim	  
to	  further	  determine	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  both	  spatially	  and	  
conceptually.	   While	   their	   overall	   understandings	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   do	   not	  
necessarily	   reflect	   how	   the	   concept	   is	   currently	   understood	   and	   applied—in	   particular	  
within	   neoliberal	   frameworks—they	   are	   each	   extremely	   compelling	   in	   terms	   of	  
demonstrating	  how	  civil	  society	  is	  often	  characterised	  by	  conflict.	  And	  although	  there	  exist	  a	  
multitude	   of	   disparate	   theories	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society,	   each	   of	   these	   writers’	  
particular	   understandings	   of	   the	   concept	   remain	   relevant	   today	   when	   locating	   the	   inter-­‐
relationship	   between	   the	   state	   and	   civil	   society	   and	   the	   role	   that	   conflict	   plays	   in	   these	  
relationships.	  
	  
For	  Hegel,	  Marx,	  and	  Gramsci,	  civil	  society	  was	  linked	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  capitalism	  and	  
together	   they	   demonstrate	   how	   civil	   society	   has	   routinely	   oppressed	   its	   different	  
inhabitants.	   They	   were	   each	   concerned	   with	   the	   composition	   of	   civil	   society	   and	   its	  
organisation,	   leadership,	   and	   direction.	   Georg	  W.F.	   Hegel	   was	   one	   of	   the	   first	   to	   clearly	  
distinguish	   the	   state	   from	   civil	   society	   and	   hence	   the	   political	   from	   the	   civil.89	  Hegel,	  
according	   to	   Keane,	   believed,	   “Civil	   society	   cannot	   remain	   ‘civil’	   unless	   it	   is	   ordered	  
politically,	   subjected	   to	   the	   ‘higher	   surveillance	   of	   the	   state.’” 90 	  Furthermore,	   Hegel	  
conceived	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  positive	  entity	  that	  safeguarded	  the	  conflicting	  elements	  of	  civil	  
society	   because	   “the	   state	   represents	   society	   in	   its	   unity...”91	  With	   Hegel’s	   deep	   trust	   in	  
state	   regulation,	   he	   understood	   civil	   society	   as	   a	   sphere	   of	   contradictions	   that	   could	   be	  
resolved	   from	   above	   through	   the	   higher	   institutions	   of	   the	   state.	   Boaventura	   de	   Sousa	  
Santos	  writes	  of	  Hegel,	  “In	  his	  most	  Hegelian	  moment,	  civil	  society—rather	  than	  being	  the	  
opposite	  of	  the	  state—is	  a	  transitional	  stage	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  idea,	  the	  final	  stage	  
being	   the	  state.	  The	   family	   is	   the	   thesis,	  civil	   society	   is	   the	  antithesis,	  and	  the	  state	   is	   the	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synthesis.”92	  As	  such,	  Hegel	  conceived	  a	  distinct	  but	  also	  hierarchical	  relationship	  between	  
the	   state	   and	   civil	   society.	   He	   described	   the	  modern	   individual	   as	   “rootless”	  with	   limited	  
protection	   against	   the	   state;	   civil	   society	   could	   therefore	   provide	   this	   grounding	   despite	  
being	  an	  entity	  that	  was	  unable	  to	  organise	  itself	  or	  sustain	  an	  alternative	  public	  discourse	  
from	   the	   state.93	  Hegel’s	   understanding	   of	   civil	   society	   was	   effectively	   truncated	   as	   he	  
described	  a	  restricted	  public	  space	  in	  which	  the	  emphasis	  was	  on	  the	  propertied	  classes	  and	  
where	   marginalised	   groups	   and	   working	   classes	   were	   excluded	   from	   critical	   rational	  
discourse(s).94	  
	  
In	   response	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	   working	   classes	   from	   Hegel’s	   understanding	   of	   the	  
relationship	  between	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  state,	  Marx’s	  emerging	  conception	  of	  this	  domain	  
shifted	   the	   emphasis	   back	   to	   the	   power	   of	   the	  working	   classes.	  Marx	   also	   envisaged	   the	  
space	   in	  which	  civil	   society	  operated	  and	  manoeuvred	  as	  conflictual,	  yet	  within	   this	  space	  
civil	  society	  could	  overcome	  its	  own	  internal	  struggles	  and	  contentions.	  And	  although	  Marx	  
aligned	  with	  Hegel	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  state	  should	  in	  principle	  regulate	  civil	  society,	  he	  
did	  not	  actually	  believe	  the	  state	  had	  the	  power	  to	  effectively	  do	  this.	  Furthermore,	  Marx	  
perceived	   the	   negative	   role	   of	   the	   state	   that	   effectively	   encouraged	   political	   and	   social	  
divisions,	  whereas	   for	   Hegel	   the	   state	  was	   a	   positive	   regulating	   entity.	  With	   the	  Marxian	  
notion	  that	  the	  social	  in	  effect	  encompassed	  the	  political,	  the	  state	  would	  eventually	  mirror	  
the	   class	   configuration	   and	   divisions	   within	   society.	   These	   social	   divisions	   and	   struggles	  
would	   also	   serve	   to	   eventually	   overthrow	   the	   state	   as	   Marx	   depicted	   a	   state	   that	   was	  
subordinate	  to	  civil	   society.	  Chandhoke	  writes,	  “The	  power	  of	   the	  organised	  working	  class	  
within	  civil	  society	  creates	  the	  possibilities	  that	  the	  class	  will	  be	  able	  to	  liberate	  both	  itself	  
and	  the	  civil	  sphere.”95	  
	  
Both	   Hegel	   and	   Marx	   developed	   their	   conceptualisations	   on	   civil	   society	   and	   the	   state	  
during	   a	   similar	   historical	   period	   following	   the	   emergence	   of	   capitalism. 96 	  Gramsci’s	  
understanding	   of	   civil	   society	   however	   emerged	   several	   decades	   later	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   which	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impacts	  of	  the	  consolidation	  of	  capitalism	  were	  being	  revealed,	  and	  in	  which	  working	  class	  
movements	  were	   failing.	   For	  Gramsci,	   civil	   society	  became	   the	   site	  where	   the	   state	   could	  
reinforce	   its	   legitimacy	   through	   the	   educational,	   cultural,	   and	   religious	   institutions.97	  Civil	  
society	  could	  also	  become	  a	  space	  through	  which	  marginalised	  or	  subaltern	  groups/classes	  
could	  challenge	  and	  eventually	  subvert	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state.98	  For	  Gramsci,	  this	  could	  be	  
achieved	   through	   a	   more	   subversive	   process	   of	   “normative	   consent”	   or	   what	   Gramsci	  
eventually	  refers	  to	  as	  hegemony	  in	  which	  consensus	  upon	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  a	  
sociopolitical	  discourse	  could	  materialise	   into	  a	  form	  of	  social	  control.99	  More	   importantly,	  
Gramsci’s	   conception	   of	   civil	   society	   depicted	   civil	   society	   as	   a	   buffer	   to	   the	   state,	   as	   a	  
sphere	  of	  actors	   that	  could	  effectively	  safeguard	   the	  state.	  Chandhoke	  writes,	  “The	   life	  of	  
the	   state	   is	   a	   ‘continuous	   process	   of	   formation	   and	   superseding	   of	   unstable	   equilibria’	   in	  
civil	  society.”100	  
	  
Gramsci	  articulated	  volatile	  and	  reversible	  hegemonies	  between	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  state,	  
with	   the	   superstructures	   of	   civil	   society	   being	   imagined	   through	   the	   “trench	   systems	   of	  
modern	   warfare.”	   With	   each	   “fierce	   artillery	   attack”	   the	   outer	   perimeter	   would	   be	  
destroyed,	  but	  new	  layers	  would	  reveal	  “a	  line	  of	  defence	  which	  was	  still	  effective.”	  101	  For	  
Gramsci	   hegemony	   was	   never	   stable,	   and	   was	   in	   fact	   always	   a	   contested	   and	   dynamic	  
process	   activated	   through	   both	   practices	   of	   coercion	   and	   consent.	   Maha	   Abdelrahman	  
states,	   “In	   no	   other	   theory	   does	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   assume	   a	   more	   active	   and	  
dynamic	   dimension	   than	   in	   Gramsci’s	   analysis.” 102	  Gramsci’s	   analysis	   also	   attempts	   to	  
situate	   power	   among	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors,	   or	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	  
political/integral	  society.	  Ultimately	  for	  Gramsci,	  hegemony	  was	  not	  simply	  wielded	  by	  state	  
institutions,	   but	   across	   and	   through	   civil	   society.	   Gramsci’s	   conception	   of	   civil	   society	  
perhaps	   has	   its	   most	   profound	   implication	   in	   the	   notion	   that	   rather	   than	   being	   a	   set	   of	  
institutions,	   the	   state	   is	   effectively	   a	   complex	   web	   of	   social	   relations	   with,	   according	   to	  
Chandhoke,	   the	   “continuous	   and	   constant	   reference	   point	   for	   the	   state”	   being	   civil	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society.103	  Adam	  Morton	  in	  fact	  considers	  Gramsci	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  paramount	  theorists	  of	  
capillary	  power	  given	  his	  emphasis	  on	  hegemony	  within	  forms	  of	  social	  relations.	  He	  argues,	  
“Hegemony	  within	   the	   realm	   of	   civil	   society	   is	   then	   grasped	  when	   the	   citizenry	   come	   to	  
believe	   that	   authority	   over	   their	   lives	   emanates	   from	   the	   self.	   Hegemony	   is	   therefore	  
articulated	   through	   capillary	   power...when	   it	   is	   transmitted	   organically	   through	   various	  
‘social	  infusoria.’”104	  	  
	  
Hegel,	   Marx,	   and	   Gramsci	   each	   underscored	   the	   conflictual	   nature	   of	   civil	   society;	  
nevertheless,	  how	   they	  conceptualise	   these	  actors	  and	   the	   symbolic	   spaces	   in	  which	   they	  
operated	   was	   different	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   agency	   and	   capacity	   for	   self-­‐organisation	   they	  
understand	   civil	   society	   could	   possess.	   Hegel	   depicts	   a	   civil	   society	   that	   is	   organised	   and	  
regulated	  by	  the	  state	  with	  little	  or	  no	  capacity	  for	  agency,	  or	  the	  ability	  to	  fully	  sustain	  an	  
alternative	   public	   discourse.	   For	   Marx,	   however,	   the	   departure	   is	   first	   in	   the	   manner	   in	  
which	  he	  shifts	   the	   focus	  of	   the	  discourse	  and	   restores	  agency	  onto	   the	  marginalised	  and	  
working	  classes,	  who	   for	  Hegel	   represent	  a	   sphere	  of	   instability.	  And	  second,	   the	  working	  
class	  or	  proletariat	   in	   this	  sense	  act	   inside	  and	  as	  a	  part	  of	  civil	   society	   to	  self-­‐organise	   to	  
eventually	   participate	   in	   political	   action	   to	   disrupt	   capitalist	   systems	   of	   production.	   For	  
Marx,	  civil	  society	   is	  able	  to	  resolve	   its	  own	  disharmonies	  through	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  
its	  own	  agency.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  with	  Gramsci,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  observe	  how	  he	  incorporates	  the	  dynamic	  influences	  
of	  both	  thinkers	  on	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  state	  into	  his	  own	  understanding	  of	  civil	  society	  at	  a	  
later	  stage	  in	  capitalist	  development.	  Gramsci	  and	  Marx	  both	  acknowledge	  the	  relationships	  
of	  domination	  and	  hegemony	  within	  civil	  society,	  in	  particular	  how	  civil	  society	  could	  be	  the	  
terrain	  not	  only	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	  these	  relationships,	  but	  also	  the	  terrain	  in	  which	  this	  
domination	  could	  be	  subverted.	  And	  while	  Marx	  places	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  working	  classes	  
and	   class	   divisions,	   Gramsci	   broadens	   the	   scope	   of	   these	   actors	   to	   include	   educational,	  
cultural,	   and	   religious	   systems	   and	   institutions	   where	   not	   only	   class	   but	   also	   ideological	  
battles	  are	  constructed	  and	  deconstructed.	  For	  both	  writers,	  civil	  society	  is	  a	  field	  of	  actors	  
that	   can	   legitimise	  and	  delegitimise	   the	  power	  of	   the	   state,	  where	  power	   is	  unstable	  and	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hegemonies	  are	  reversible.	  Gramsci	  and	  Marx	  both	  depart	  from	  Hegel	   in	  that	  they	  denote	  
agency	  to	  marginalised	  and	  subaltern	  groups,	  and	  underscore	  the	  capacity	  for	  these	  actors	  
to	   self-­‐organise	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   being	   able	   to	   overthrow	   the	   state	   through	   revolution.	  
However,	   for	   Hegel	   civil	   society	   would	   be	   eventually	   transcended	   by	   the	   state	   whereas	  
Gramsci	   articulated	   the	   reverse,	   as	   the	   state	   would	   be	   superseded	   by	   civil	   society.	  
Furthermore,	  for	  Hegel,	  the	  formation	  and	  consolidation	  of	  the	  state	  with	  the	  “universality”	  
of	   the	   state	   being	   realised	   through	   the	   “particularity”	   of	   civil	   society	   represents	   a	   final	  
moment.	   For	   Gramsci,	   though,	   hegemony	   has	   to	   be	   constantly	   rearticulated—with	   the	  
formation	  of	  the	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  as	  a	  continuous	  and	  relational	  process.	  Chandhoke	  
writes,	  “Thus	  hegemony	  is	  not	  something	  that	  can	  be	  established	  once	  and	  for	  all	  and	  then	  
left	  to	  fend	  for	  itself.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  constantly	  reformulated	  and	  expressed.	  It	  is	  a	  process	  that	  
brings	  the	  state	  into	  a	  continual	  relationship	  with	  society	  and	  enables	  it	  to	  vitalize	  itself.”105	  
	  
A	  re-­‐articulation	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America	  
The	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  articulated	  by	  Marx	  and	  Gramsci	  experienced	  a	  revival	  during	  
various	   sociopolitical	  movements	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   in	   particular	   during	   the	   social	  
movements	   and	   protests	   of	   the	   1960s,	   1970s,	   and	   1980s.	   During	   this	   period	   the	   world	  
witnessed	  movements	   that	  effectively	  drew	  support	   from	  across	   class	  boundaries	   such	  as	  
the	  civil	  rights	  campaigns,	  feminist	  movements,	  student	  and	  youth	  movements,	  and	  peace	  
and	  anti-­‐war	  protests.	  In	  particular,	  the	  theories	  of	  Marx	  and	  Gramsci	  played	  a	  central	  role	  
in	   the	   resistance	   to	   authoritarian,	   autocratic	   and	  military	   regimes	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   and	  
Latin	  America	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  Here	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  became	  a	  vital	  tool	  
for	   intellectuals	   in	   reframing	   the	  various	   resistance	  movements	   in	   these	  different	   regions.	  
The	   emphasis	   during	   these	  movements	   shifted	   to	  more	   grassroots	   and	   informal	   forms	   of	  
organisation	  with	  both	  political	  and	  non-­‐political	  objectives	  stretching	  beyond	  the	  state	  as	  a	  
primary	  focus.	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly	  was	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  was	  reborn	  
and	   rearticulated	   during	   this	   period	   as	   both	   an	   antonym	   to	   authoritarian	   rule	   but	   also	  
eventually	  as	  a	  critical	  tool	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  arsenal	  to	  promote	  democratic	  movements	  and	  
to	  curtail	   the	  role	  of	   the	  state	   in	   low-­‐	  and	  middle-­‐income	  countries.	  The	  manner	   in	  which	  
the	   concept	   was	   utilised	   during	   the	   different	   resistance	   movements	   across	   these	   two	  
regions	  sets	   the	  stage	   for	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	   society	   is	  understood	  and	  applied,	  and	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perhaps	  has	  even	  been	  co-­‐opted,	  today	  by	  disparate	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  particular	  
during	  periods	  of	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  rule.	  
	  
During	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s	   in	   Eastern	   Europe,	   the	   failure	   of	   Communist	   reform	   was	  
becoming	  more	  evident	   in	  one-­‐party	  systems	  such	  as	  those	   in	  place	   in	  Poland,	  Yugoslavia,	  
Czechoslovakia,	   and	   Hungary.	   The	   heavy	   weight	   of	   the	   state	   bureaucratic	   apparatus	  
increasingly	   used	  methods	   of	   surveillance	   and	   co-­‐optation	   to	   manage	   citizen	   opposition.	  
The	   ubiquitous	   repression	   found	   in	   the	   totalitarian	   regimes	   in	   the	   region	   manifested	   in	  
either	   more	   overt,	   brutal,	   and	   violent	   forms	   of	   oppression	   against	   public	   opposition	   or	  
through	  concessions	  to	  sanctioned	  forms	  of	  political	  action	  to	  avoid	  open	  forms	  of	  political	  
confrontation	   and	   antagonism.106	  Referring	   specifically	   to	   the	   Soviet-­‐type	   regimes	   of	   the	  
region,	   Keane	   writes,	   “Their	   former	   brutality	   and	  monstrous	   delirium	   have	   given	   way	   to	  
modes	  of	  control	  which	  are	   less	  brutal	  and	  more	  anonymous,	  selective	  and	  calculated.”107	  
Hence	   during	   the	   1980s,	   cognizant	   that	   neither	   reforming	   state	   power	   from	   above	   nor	  
revolution	  from	  below	  was	  an	  effective	  strategy	  for	  emancipation	  from	  totalitarian	  regimes,	  
intellectuals	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  sought	  out	  alternatives	  to	  create	  civil	  and	  political	  channels	  
for	   expression.108	  Civil	   and	   political	   actors	   perceived	   the	   necessity	   for	   a	   “free	   zone”	   that	  
would	  enable	  them	  to	  establish	  spaces	  for	  protection	  from	  the	  state,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  solidarity	  
and	   collective	   action.109	  Chandhoke	  writes,	   “The	   Eastern	   Europeans	   called	   this	   free	   zone,	  
peopled	   by	   social	   associations,	   self-­‐help	   and	   self-­‐management	   organisations,	   and	  
characterised	  by	  mutual	  solidarity,	  ‘civil	  society.’”110	  However,	  what	  would	  begin	  as	  a	  space	  
to	   foster	  agency	  as	  a	  counterpoint	   to	  oppressive	  states	  effectively	   transformed	   into	  social	  
and	  political	  movements	  across	   the	   region	   in	  direct	  opposition	   to	  dictatorial	   state	  power.	  
And	  although	  Gramsci	  may	  have	  not	  been	  directly	  credited	  in	  the	  sociopolitical	  movements	  
in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  this	  notion	  of	  the	  reversal	  of	  hegemonies	  to	  overthrow	  state	  power	  was	  
indeed	   relevant.	   Chandhoke	   contends,	   “Gramsci’s	   dictum	   that	   states	   that	   do	   not	   possess	  
civil	  societies	  are	  more	  vulnerable	  than	  those	  that	  do	  possess	  them	  was	  to	  prove	  more	  than	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prescient	  in	  this	  case.”111	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  intellectuals	  appropriated	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  
society	  served	  to	  not	  only	  severely	  disrupt,	  but	  to	  also	  bring	  down,	  a	  number	  of	  powerful	  
states	  in	  the	  region.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  it	  served	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  create	  a	  space	  for	  marginalised	  
and	   disempowered	   groups	   to	   forge	   solidarities	   and	   remedy	   the	   asphyxiation	   caused	   by	  
years	  of	  state	  oppression.	  On	  the	  other,	   the	   formation	  of	   these	  alliances	  ultimately	   led	  to	  
wider	  movements	  for	  emancipation	  through	  greater	  participation	  in	  discourses	  shaping	  the	  
conditions	  of	  political	  and	  civil	  rights,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  even	  leading	  to	  political	  revolution.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Latin	  America	  during	  a	  similar	  time	  period,	   it	   is	  also	  possible	  to	  observe	  the	  
appropriation	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   by	   intellectuals	   in	   the	   face	   of	   repressive	  
regimes.	  	  
	  
For	   the	  new	  Latin	  American	   left,	   the	  perceived	   importance	  of	   the	   self-­‐organisation	  of	   the	  
grassroots	   began	   to	   take	   hold	   during	   the	   1980s.	   The	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   became	   a	  
critical	  concept	  in	  leftist	  thinking	  with	  civil	  society	  assuming	  an	  essential	  place	  in	  new	  radical	  
democratic	  theory.112	  During	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  Marxist	  theory—in	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  
civil	   society	   played	   only	   a	  marginal	   role—was	   dominant	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Faced	  with	   the	  
incompatibility	   between	   formal	  political	   equality	   and	   the	   inequalities	  of	   global	   capitalism,	  
Gideon	   Baker	   argues	   the	   Latin	   American	   left	   soon	   began	   to	   question	   the	   merits	   of	  
democratic	   governments.113	  During	   this	   time,	   the	   concept	  of	   civil	   society	   that	  had	   initially	  
been	   equated	   with	   resistance	   to	   authoritarian	   regimes	   in	   Latin	   America	   evolved	   into	   a	  
distinct	  self-­‐management	  agenda,	  or	  rather	  the	  notion	  of	  “defence	  of	  freedom	  outside	  the	  
state.”114	  As	   a	   result	   of	   repressive	   military	   rule	   across	   several	   countries	   in	   the	   region,	  
members	   of	   opposition	   movements	   questioned	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   state	   was	   the	   most	  
effective	   target	   for	   resistance. 115 	  Eventually	   this	   brought	   about	   a	   more	   positive	   and	  
Gramscian	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  which	  there	  was	  a	  conceptual	  and	  
spatial	  relocation	  for	  opposition	  within	  the	  context	  of	  oppressive	  environments.	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Gramsci’s	  influence	  on	  the	  necessity	  to	  create	  spaces	  for	  civil	  society	  to	  manoeuvre	  within	  
the	  context	  of	  pervasive	  state	  repression	  became	   increasingly	  relevant.	  Francisco	  Weffort,	  
an	  influential	  Brazilian	  social	  scientist	  and	  former	  Marxist,	  writes,	  “The	  discovery	  that	  there	  
was	  something	  more	  to	  politics	  than	  the	  state	  began	  with	  the	  simplest	  facts	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  
persecuted.	  In	  the	  most	  difficult	  moments,	  they	  had	  to	  make	  use	  of	  what	  they	  found	  around	  
them.”116	  This	   resulted	   in	   a	   rethink	   of	   the	   ethos	   and	   tactics	   employed	   by	   these	   different	  
actors,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  self-­‐organisation	  of	  the	  grassroots	  and	  deprived	  communities	  as	  
well	   as	   upon	   voluntarism,	   self-­‐determination,	   self-­‐management,	   and	   community	  
mobilisation	  over	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  seizure	  of	  power.	  More	  importantly,	  political	  transitions	  
in	  Southern	  Europe	  during	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  pointed	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  “bloodless	  revolution”	  
to	   effectively	   overthrow	   military	   dictatorships. 117 	  During	   this	   period,	   Gramsci’s	  
understanding	   of	   civil	   society	   opened	   the	   door	   for	   transformatory	   political	   action	  
emphasising	   the	   ability	   to	   manoeuvre	   outside	   and	   separate	   from	   the	   state.118	  It	   is	   also	  
important	   to	   point	   out	   the	   structural	   consequences	   of	   uneven	   development	   taking	   place	  
globally	   during	   this	   time,	   and	   the	   impact	   of	   peripheral	   capitalism	   on	   the	   popular	   classes.	  
Baker	  contends	  that	  these	  structural	  features	  contributed	  to	  creating	  the	  (need	  for)	  spaces	  
and	   the	  will	   towards	  more	   urgent	   and	   innovative	   forms	   for	   collective	   action.119	  In	   effect,	  
from	   the	   1970s	   a	   response	   by	   the	   popular	   classes	   to	   underdevelopment	   also	   emerged,	  
thereby	  underscoring	  the	  exclusion	  of	  these	  actors	  from	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  spheres.	  
This	   effectively	   resulted	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   multitude	   of	   different	   organisations	   cutting	  
across	   the	   poor	   and	   marginalised	   in	   Latin	   America;	   the	   focus	   of	   these	   actors	   was	   on	  
autonomy	   and	   self-­‐constitution	   with	   manifold	   interests,	   extending	   beyond	   the	   notion	   of	  
class	   reductionism.120	  Weffort,	  writing	  during	   this	  period,	   states,	   “We	  want	  a	   civil	   society,	  
we	  need	  to	  defend	  ourselves	  from	  the	  monstrous	  state	  in	  front	  of	  us….In	  a	  word,	  we	  need	  
to	  build	  civil	  society	  because	  we	  want	  freedom.”	  From	  this	  period,	  according	  to	  Weffort,	  the	  
concept	  of	   civil	   society	  became	   the	   “new	  politics	  of	   the	   region”	  with	  an	  almost	   complete	  
paradigm	  shift	   in	  which	   “civil	   society”	  and	   “democracy”	   replaced	   “revolution”	  as	   the	  new	  
discourse	   for	   Latin	   America.	   And	   eventually	   by	   the	   mid-­‐1980s	   the	   region	   experienced	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Weffort,	  “Why	  Democracy?”	  in	  A.	  Stephan.	  Democratising	  Brazil	  (Oxford:	  1989),	  347–348	  as	  cited	  in	  Baker,	  
Civil	  Society	  and	  Democratic	  Theory,	  57.	  
117	  Baker,	  Civil	  Society	  and	  Democratic	  Theory,	  56.	  
118	  Ibid.,	  58.	  
119	  Ibid.,	  74.	  
120	  Ibid.,	  64–65.	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transitions	   from	   military	   or	   authoritarian	   rule	   to	   democratic	   governments	   in	   Argentina,	  
Bolivia,	  Brazil,	  Chile	  Peru,	  and	  Uruguay.	  
	  
The	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   as	   understood	   by	   Gramsci	   in	   particular	   was	   co-­‐opted	   and	  
transformed	   during	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s	   social	   movements	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   and	   Latin	  
America.	   The	   concept	   was	   reborn	   as	   a	   remedy	   to	   the	   growing	   penetrations	   of	   the	  
bureaucratic	  state,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  two	  regions,	  totalitarian	  and	  military	  regimes.	  In	  
both	   regions	   the	  notion	  of	   civil	   society	  was	  primarily	   resurrected	   to	   restore	  agency	  and	  a	  
sense	  of	  self-­‐management	  onto	  marginalised	  populations,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  defence	  
of	   freedom	   outside	   the	   state	   and	   “free	   zones.”	   However,	   in	   both	   regions	   the	   social	  
transformed	   into	   the	   political	   as	   citizens	   advocated	   for	   more	   representative	   and	  
accountable	   forms	   of	   government,	   effectively	   calling	   for	   liberal	   democracy.	   Civil	   society	  
emerged	   during	   this	   period	   as	   the	   “antonym	   of	   authoritarianism.”121	  At	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
1980s,	   however,	   development	   scholars	   note	   the	   emergence	   of	   what	   is	   considered	   the	  
“boom”	   of	   NGOs	   across	   low-­‐	   and	   middle-­‐income	   countries	   whereby	   the	   density	   of	   civil	  
society	   organisations	   was	   invariably	   and	   often	   directly	   linked	   with	   “liberal”	   democratic	  
governments	  and	  societies.	  The	  concept,	  in	  part	  through	  its	  ideological	  association	  with	  the	  
end	  of	  socialist	  societies,	  emerged	  as	  a	  critical	   instrument	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  arsenal	  for	  the	  
promotion	  of	  democracy	  and	  for	  the	  minimalist	  state.122	  
	  
	  
	  
2.	  Bringing	  civil	  society	  back	  in:	  neoliberal	  policy	  and	  “liberal”	  democracy	  	  	  
	  
The	   transition(s)	   from	   totalitarian	   and	   authoritarian	   regimes	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   and	   Latin	  
America	   carried	  with	   them	   the	   often	   un-­‐scrutinised	   ideological	   emphasis	   on	   the	   concept	  
and	  capacity	  of	  civil	  society	  for	  emancipation	  and	  liberation.	  Scholars	  tracing	  the	  history	  and	  
emergence	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  for	  example,	  note	  the	  period	  of	  the	  1970s	  to	  1980s	  
as	  the	  stage	  of	  “institutionalisation”	  of	  NGOs	  where	  a	  multitude	  of	  associations	  emerged	  in	  
response	  to	  various	  and	  simultaneous	  global	  trends.123	  These	  trends	  included	  the	  oil	  crisis	  of	  
the	   1970s,	   the	   centrality	   of	   debt	   and	   macro-­‐instability	   in	   middle-­‐	   and	   lower-­‐income	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Chandhoke,	  “Civil	  Society,”	  608.	  
122	  Ibid.,	  611.	  
123	  Charnovitz,	  “Two	  Centuries	  of	  Participation.”	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countries,	   the	   increased	   severity	   and	  duration	   of	   conflict,	   the	   emergence	  of	   international	  
development	  discourses,	  the	  focus	  on	  poverty	  initiatives,	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  social	  movements	  
across	  different	  regions.124	  Alongside	  these	  trends	  neoliberalism	  began	  to	  materialise	  as	  the	  
dominant	  political	  ideology	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “minimalist”	  or	  limited	  state.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  give	  weight	  to	  this	  critique	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  the	  fundamental	  policies	  and	  tenets	  
of	  the	  neoliberal	  framework	  are	  examined;	  from	  here	  one	  is	  able	  to	  further	  discern	  where	  
the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   and	   civil	   society	   organisations	   fit	   within	   this	   framework.	  
Moreover,	   it	   is	   in	   understanding	   these	   fundamental	   policies	   that	   is	   it	   also	   possible	   to	  
observe	  the	  evolving	  relationship	  of	  the	  state	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  concept.	  Although	  the	  role	  
of	   civil	   society	  organisations	  became	  more	  paramount	   in	   the	  Washington	  Consensus,	   it	   is	  
equally	   important	   to	   note	   the	   critical	   elements	   of	   neoliberalism	   including	   in	   earlier	  
structural	   adjustment	   programmes.	   Neoliberalism	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   a	   political	   project	   of	  
economic,	   state,	   and	   social	   transformation	   with	   structural	   adjustment	   programmes	  
embodying	   a	   set	   of	   specific	   economic	   policies	   and	   conditionalities	   designed	   and	   often	  
imposed	  on	  countries	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF).	  The	  “New	  
Policy	   Agenda”(1990s),	   for	   example,	   combines	   neoliberal	   policy	   prescriptions	   with	   a	   new	  
focus	  on	  civil	  society	  organisations	  as	  the	  preferred	  channel	  for	  social	  welfare	  initiatives	  in	  
addition	   to	   an	   emerging	   correlation	   between	   a	   healthy	   economy	   and	   democratic	   good	  
governance.	   Michael	   Edwards	   and	   David	   Hulme	   consider	   this	   foremost	   role	   for	   these	  
organisations	   as	   a	   fundamental	   and	   noteworthy	   change.125	  In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	  
particular	   aspects	   of	   social	   transformation	   in	   neoliberal	   policies,	   it	   is	   first	   important	   to	  
understand	   the	   economic	   and	   state	   aspects	   of	   these	   transformations	   envisioned	   by	  
neoliberal	  policy.	  	  
	  
A	  project	  of	  economic,	  state	  and	  social	  transformation	  
During	   the	   1980s,	   emerging	   neoliberal	   policy,	   outlined	   in	  what	   came	   to	   be	   known	   as	   the	  
Washington	   Consensus,	   underscored	   the	   notion	   that	   market	   failures	   and	   imperfections	  
were	   widespread	   in	   lower-­‐income	   countries.	   The	   growing	   perception	   within	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  See:	  Bebbington,	  Hickey	  and	  Mitlin,	  Can	  NGOs	  Make	  a	  Difference;	  Gordenker	  and	  Weiss,	  NGOs,	  The	  UN	  and	  
Global	  Governance;	  Barnett	  and	  Weiss,	  Humanitarianism	  in	  Question;	  and	  Manji	  and	  O’Coill,	  “The	  Missionary	  
Position.”	  
125	  Edwards	  and	  Hulme,	  “Too	  Close	  for	  Comfort,”	  961.	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institutions	  was	  that	  state	  intervention	  was	  the	  principal	  problem	  rather	  than	  the	  solution.	  
In	  Profit	  and	  Pleasure,	   Rosemary	  Hennessey	  writes	   that	  neoliberalism	   therefore	   “seeks	   to	  
free	  up	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  capitalist	  market	  from	  public	  (state)	  controls	  and	  regulations;	  at	  
the	   same	   time	   it	   tries	   to	   extend	   the	   rationality	   of	   the	  market…to	   areas	   of	   social	   life	   that	  
have	   not	   been	   primarily	   economic.”126 	  Therefore,	   neoliberal	   policy	   dictates	   that	   state	  
expenditure	  would	  be	  better	  directed	  towards	  creating	  an	  enabling	  environment	  for	  growth	  
such	   as	   through	   tax	   concessions	   on	   profits,	   the	   liberalisation	   of	   price	   controls,	   and	   the	  
dismantling	   of	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises.	   This	   entails	   a	   de-­‐emphasis	   on	   public	   healthcare	  
provision,	  education,	  and	  social	  welfare	  programmes/measures.	  As	  fallout	  from	  the	  oil	  crisis	  
in	   the	   1970s,	   debt	   effectively	   created	   the	   leverage	   to	   allow	   the	  World	   Bank	   and	   IMF	   to	  
impose	  structural	  adjustment	  packages	  modelling	  this	  philosophy.	  This	   included	  policies	  of	  
market	   deregulation	   and	   privatisation,	   market	   stabilisation,	   market	   liberalisation	   (open	  
markets,	   the	   lowering	  of	   trade	  barriers	   and	  deregulation),	   the	   removal	  of	   state	   subsidies,	  
and	   trade	   liberalisation	   alongside	   theories	   that	   stipulated	   a	   “trickle	   down”	   effect	   of	  
wealth.127	  Neoliberalism	   effectively	   advocated	   a	   discourse	   that	   established	   that	   all	   needs	  
are	   to	   be	   met	   through	   the	   market	   and	   not	   through	   the	   state,	   from	   which	   emerged	   the	  
notion	  of	  the	  “minimalist”	  state	  and	  a	  “rolling	  back”	  of	  the	  state.	  
	  
The	  depiction	  of	  the	  state	  as	  part	  of	  the	  problem	  rather	  than	  the	  solution	  had	  the	  knock-­‐on	  
effect	   of	   substantially	   reconfiguring	   the	   social	   contract	   between	   states	   and	   their	   citizens.	  
Structural	  adjustment	  programmes	  articulated	  state	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  
services	  alongside	   the	   reduction	   in	   size	  of	   state	  apparatuses	  and	   institutions.	   The	  austere	  
nature	  and	  conditions	  of	  these	  policies,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  were	  imposed	  
by	   international	   financial	   institutions,	   provoked	   significant	   socioeconomic	   disruption.	   The	  
consequences	  of	  these	  reforms	  in	  middle-­‐	  and	  lower-­‐income	  countries	  during	  the	  1980s	  and	  
early	  1990s	  were	  severe.	  The	  impact	  of	  IMF	  and	  World	  Bank	  economic	  reform	  programmes	  
led	   to	   significant	   levels	   of	   unemployment,	   poverty,	   and	   social	   marginalisation	   in	   many	  
countries	   with	   increases	   in	   income	   disparity	   leading	   to	   significant	   changes	   in	   labour	  
markets.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  by	  the	  late	  1990s	  one	  billion	  workers	  in	  lower-­‐income	  countries	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  Hennessey,	  Profit	  and	  Pleasure,	  75.	  
127	  See	  Stiglitz,	  “The	  Post-­‐Washington	  Consensus	  Consensus,”	  7.	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were	   either	   unemployed	   or	   underemployed.128	  The	   earlier	   emphasis	   in	   regions	   such	   as	  
Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America	  on	  protecting	  civil	  society	  from	  the	  intrusions	  of	  the	  state	  
or	  even	  the	  notion	  of	  preserving	  radical	  democratic	  practice	  was	  eventually	  replaced	  by	  the	  
notion	  of	  the	  deep	  erosion	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  between	  the	  state	  and	  its	  citizens.	  In	  this	  
context,	  millions	  of	  middle-­‐class	  and	  public	  sector	  workers	  were	  “pushed	  into	  the	  ranks	  of	  
the	  urban	  poor	  in	  labour	  and	  housing	  markets”	  and	  consequently	  forced	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  
own	   welfare. 129 	  Assef	   Bayat	   contends,	   “One	   major	   consequence	   of	   the	   new	   global	  
restructuring	   in	   the	  developing	  countries	  has	  been	  a	  double	  process	  of,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  
integration	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  social	  exclusion	  and	  informalisation.”130	  In	  addition,	  sizeable	  
reductions	   in	   free	   access	   to	   public	   services	   such	   as	   health	   and	   education	   through	   the	  
introduction	   of	   user	   fees	   opened	   the	   door	   to	   a	   new	   wave	   of	   marginalisation	   and	  
vulnerability	   across	   class	   divides.	   Writers	   such	   as	   Hennessey	   consider	   the	   growing	   gap	  
between	  the	  rich	  and	  poor	  to	  be	  “neoliberalism’s	  most	  glaring	  legacy.”131	  
	  
Popular	   dissatisfaction	   with	   structural	   adjustment	   programmes	   and	   policies	   led	   to	   a	  
multitude	  of	  political	  demonstrations,	  strikes,	  and	  riots.	  Between	  1976	  and	  1992	  there	  were	  
146	   documented	   protests	   against	   austerity	   measures	   in	   39	   countries,	   mostly	   in	   urban	  
areas.132	  In	   1983,	   there	   were	   riots	   in	   Morocco	   in	   response	   to	   the	   government	   reducing	  
consumer	  subsidies	  by	  20	  percent;	  in	  1984,	  Tunisian	  riots	  against	  austerity	  measures	  led	  to	  
84	  deaths;	  in	  1988,	  strikes	  in	  Algeria	  took	  place	  in	  response	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  living;	  and	  in	  1998,	  
there	   were	   approximately	   70	   strikes	   in	   Egypt	   against	   new	   labour	   laws	   governing	   larger	  
companies,	  which	  stripped	  workers	  of	   job	  security.133	  In	  many	  cases	  national	  governments	  
responded	   to	   the	   demonstrations	  with	   repressive	  measures	   and	  often	   violence,	  with	   civil	  
society	   and	   political	   opposition	   parties	   becoming	   the	   target	   of	   oppressive	   tactics	   to	   quell	  
insecurity.	   Eventually	   this	   led	   to	   two	   major	   consequences	   for	   both	   states	   and	   the	  
international	   financial	   institutions.	   First,	   neoliberal	   policy	   framed	   within	   the	   Washington	  
Consensus	   required	   an	   urgent	   rethink	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   severe	   socioeconomic	   impact	   of	  
these	  policies	  and	  continuing	   social	  unrest.	   Second,	   states	  were	  beginning	   to	   lose	  grip	  on	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  Bayat,	  Life	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  Politics,	  34.	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  Ibid.	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  Ibid.,	  33–34.	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  Hennessey,	  Profit	  and	  Pleasure,	  75.	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  578.	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their	   own	   legitimacy	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   harsh	   fiscal	  measures	   affecting	  
middle	   and	   lower	   classes;	   faced	   with	   the	   risk	   of	   waning	   popularity,	   some	   governments	  
delayed	  the	  implementation	  of	  unpopular	  policies	  or	  inevitably	  cherry-­‐picked	  the	  structural	  
adjustment	   policies	   they	   would	   implement.	   And	   while	   many	   governments	   would	   tighten	  
their	   grip	   on	   collective	   association,	   community	   mobilisation,	   and	   social	   movements	   in	  
response	  to	  the	  erosion	  of	  state	  legitimacy,	  they	  would	  also	  transfer	  a	  significant	  proportion	  
of	   the	   social	   welfare	   provision	   role	   onto	   civil	   society	   organisations.	   Maha	   Abdelrahman	  
notes	   that	   central	   to	   the	   neoliberal	   paradigm	   is	   that	   the	   “Rolling	   back	   of	   the	   state	   from	  
areas	  of	  social	  services	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  balanced	  by	  NGOs	  filling	  the	  gaps	  created	  by	  the	  
state’s	  retreat.”134	  She	  argues	  further	  that	  neoliberal	  preferences	  for	  civil	  society	  promotion	  
were	  based	  less	  on	  a	  given	  ideology	  and	  more	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  civil	  society	  organisations	  
could	   serve	   as	   “band-­‐aids”	   to	   cover	   the	   wounds	   of	   austere	   structural	   adjustment	  
programmes.	  135	  This	   parallels	   with	   James	   Ferguson	   and	   Akhil	   Gupta’s	   perception	   of	   civil	  
society	   organisations	   that	   have	   helped	   Western	   development	   agencies	   to	   circumvent	  
uncooperative	   national	   governments,	   highlighting	   both	   a	   “disdain	   for	   the	   state”	   while	  
simultaneously	  underscoring	  a	  “celebration	  of	  civil	  society.”136	  
	  
In	  the	  1990s,	  Western	  governments	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  began	  to	  criticise	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  
market	   fundamentalism	   of	   the	   Washington	   Consensus,	   acknowledging	   that	   the	   strong	  
market-­‐based	   approach	   had	   not	   only	   profound	   negative	   socioeconomic	   and	   political	  
consequences	  but	  also	  that	  it	  was	  not	  resulting	  in	  strong	  economic	  growth.	  The	  reduction	  in	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  these	  policies	  was	  questioned	  for	  example	  in	  the	  “Post-­‐Washington	  
Consensus	   Consensus.”	   Joseph	   Stiglitz	   writes,	   “The	   consensus	   (Washington	   Consensus)	  
policies	  often	  assumed	  the	  worst	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  capability	  of	  governments	  and	  made	  
that	  one	   size	   fit	   all.”137	  A	   “Post-­‐Washington	  Consensus”	  emerged	  whereby	   the	   role	  of	   the	  
state	   was	   effectively	   brought	   back	   in,	   alongside	   an	   emphasis	   on	   good	   governance	   and	  
poverty-­‐reduction	   strategies.	   Stiglitz	   states,	   “The	   post	   Washington	   consensus	   recognizes	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  role	  for	  a	  market;	  the	  question	  is	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  the	  neo-­‐liberals	  recognize	  
that	   there	   is	   a	   role	   for	   the	   state,	   beyond	   the	   minimal	   role	   of	   enforcing	   contracts	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  Abdelrahman,	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  25.	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  Ibid.,	  25	  and	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property	  rights.”138	  Civil	  society	  organisations	  subsequently	  were	  framed	  as	  partners	  of	  the	  
state	  rather	  than	  alternatives	  to	  the	  state.	  	  
	  
Effective	  providers	  of	  services	  or	  agents	  of	  democratisation?	  
From	  this	  period,	  civil	  society	  re-­‐materialised	  to	  fill	  two	  primary	  roles.	  The	  first	  would	  be	  as	  
cost-­‐effective	  providers	  of	  social	  welfare	  services	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  in	  middle-­‐	  and	  low-­‐
income	  countries,	  effectively	  assisting	  the	  declining	  public	  sector.	  The	  second	  would	  be	  as	  
torchbearers	  for	  democratic	  values	  and	  good	  governance,	  thus	  becoming	  key	  agents	  in	  the	  
transition	  to	  and	  consolidation	  of	  democracy	  as	  well	  as	  for	  enhanced	  social	   justice.139	  Civil	  
society	   understood	   as	   a	   “cost-­‐effective	   provider	   of	   services”	   has	   arguably	   resulted	   in	   a	  
series	   of	   outcomes.	   For	   example,	   civil	   society	   organisations	   were	   becoming	   increasingly	  
associated	   with	   service	   provision	   within	   time-­‐limited	   projects	   and	   financial	   sustainability.	  
Growing	   concerns	   for	   risk	   aversion	   and	   burdensome	   transaction	   costs	   in	   low-­‐income	  
settings	   also	   led	   to	   a	   concentration	   of	   international	   donor	   aid	   to	   the	   larger	   civil	   society	  
organisations.140	  Furthermore,	   donor	   decisions	   focused	   increasingly	   on	   technical	   criteria	  
such	   as	   “efficiency,	   value-­‐added,	   cost	   effectiveness,	   and	   output-­‐performance	  
orientations.”141	  This	  has	   led	  some	  to	  point	  out	   the	   increasing	  homogenisation	  of	   the	  civil	  
society	   sector.	   Chandhoke	   argues	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   that	   was	   once	  
characterised	  by	  its	  “subversive	  edge”	  has	  now	  been	  essentially	  “flattened	  out.”142	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  overall	  preference	  for	  good	  governance	  discourses	  among	  neoliberals	  and	  
international	   donors	   eventually	   took	   hold.	   Naila	   Kabeer	   explains,	   “The	   good	   governance	  
agenda	  which	   became	  popular	  within	   the	   donor	   community	   around	   this	   time	   highlighted	  
the	   role	   of	   civil	   society	   in	   holding	   governments	   to	   account,	   suggesting	   a	   ‘virtuous	   circle’	  
could	  be	  built	  between	  state,	  economy	  and	  civil	  society	  that	  would	  balance	  growth,	  equity	  
and	   social	   stability.” 143 	  Notions	   of	   good	   governance	   coincided	   with	   increased	   donor	  
pressure	  to	  meet	  international	  development	  goals	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  ineffective	  use	  by	  
governments	   (in	   both	   low-­‐	   and	  middle-­‐income	   countries)	   of	   donor	   resources	   in	   primarily	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non-­‐democratic	   settings.	   It	   is	   here	   where	   Robert	   Putnam’s	   theories	   on	   civil	   society	   and	  
“social	  capital”	  were	  adopted	  to	  support	  the	  necessity	  to	  strengthen	  civil	  society.	  Putnam,	  
under	  the	  influence	  of	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville,	  argued	  that	  the	  concentration	  of	  social	  capital	  
could	   contribute	   directly	   to	   political	   stability	   and	   good	   governance.144	  Kabeer	   emphasises	  
that	  according	  to	  Putnam,	  “It	  was	  the	  density	  of	  associational	  life	  rather	  than	  the	  character	  
of	  different	  associations	  that	  mattered	  for	  the	  development	  of	  generalised	  trust	  in	  a	  society,	  
providing	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  its	  citizens	  were	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  democratic	  life	  and	  hold	  
their	  governments	  accountable.”145	  In	  addition,	  Jonathan	  Fox	  explains	  that	  for	  Putnam,	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  unit	  of	  social	  capital	  is	  irrelevant,	  but	  rather	  “that	  social	  capital	  is	  continuously	  
distributed	  both	  horizontally	  and	  vertically.”146	  	  
	  
Putnam’s	   influence	   on	   neoliberal	   reforms	   in	   development	   and	   democratisation	   initiatives	  
has	  been	  noteworthy,	  in	  particular	  for	  donor	  preferences	  to	  support	  the	  establishment	  and	  
“strengthening”	   of	   civil	   society	   organisations	   in	   authoritarian	   environments.	   For	   example,	  
Guilain	   Denoeux	   describes	   the	   US	   government’s	   predilection	   under	   former	   President	   Bill	  
Clinton	   for	   demand-­‐	   over	   supply-­‐side	   civil	   society	   assistance	   strategies.	   “Supply-­‐side”	  
strategies	   concentrated	   on	   increasing	   the	   “quality	   of	   governance”	   or	   the	   “quantity	   of	  
democracy”	   provided	   through	   the	   state,	   whereas	   “demand-­‐side”	   approaches	   focused	   on	  
strengthening	   civil	   society	   “in	   relation	   to	   the	   state”	   to	   augment	   its	   own	   capacity	   to	  
communicate	   demands	   for	   democracy	   and	   good	   governance.	   According	   to	   Denoeux,	  
“demand-­‐side”	   approaches	   tended	   to	   reserve	   a	  privileged	  position	   to	   increase	   support	   to	  
NGOs.147	  Denoeux	  contends	  that	  demand-­‐side	  strategies	  rested	  on	  paradigms	  that	  explicitly	  
supported	   both	   the	   notion	   that	   “participation	   in	   voluntary	   associations	   fosters	   habits,	  
values,	  attitudes,	  and	  skills	  conducive	  to	  democratic	  governance”	  and	  “the	  denser	  and	  the	  
more	  active	  the	  network	  of	  voluntary	  associations	  in	  which	  individuals	  take	  part,	  the	  greater	  
this	  network	   can	  act	  as	  a	   counter-­‐weight	   to	   the	   state.”148	  For	  example,	  by	   the	  end	  of	   the	  
1990s	   it	   is	  estimated	  that	  there	  were	  15,000	  registered	  civil	  society	  organisations	   in	  Egypt	  
(double	   the	   amount	   existing	   in	   1977),	   while	   the	   number	   of	   registered	   civil	   society	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  Countries,”	  70.	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  Ibid.	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organisations	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Lebanon	  totalled	  around	  5,000	  and	  3,500,	  respectively	  toward	  
the	  end	  of	  that	  same	  decade.149	  This	  more	  quantitative	  focus	  on	  the	  density	  of	  civil	  society	  
organisations	   and	   more	   demand-­‐oriented	   strategies	   overshadowed,	   however,	   the	   social	  
function	  of	  civil	  society	  manifesting	  during	  this	  period.	  This	  social	  function	  effectively	  served	  
to	  provide	  safe	  spaces	   for	  marginalised	  groups	  and	   for	  community	  actors	   to	  meet.	  Within	  
this	   context	   one	   observes	   a	   conglomeration	   of	   classical	  welfare	   associations,	   professional	  
NGOs,	  state-­‐sponsored	  NGOs,	  religiously	  oriented	  associations,	  and	  grassroots	  movements	  
providing	   new	   spaces	   to	   assemble—for	   example,	   in	   civil	   society	   organisation	  
headquarters—to	  gather	  and	  learn	  new	  skills	  such	  as	  advocacy	  training	  and	  civic	  education,	  
to	  network	  and	  forge	  solidarities.150	  	  
	  
The	  next	   section	   further	   traces	   the	   re-­‐emergence	  of	   the	   concept	  of	   civil	   society	   from	   the	  
period	  of	  the	  various	  pro-­‐democracy	  social	  movements	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America	  
to	  its	  more	  recent	  transformation	  and	  integration	  into	  neoliberal	  frameworks.	  It	  begins	  with	  
a	   brief	   historical	   analysis	   of	   the	   rise	   of	   civil	   society	   organisations	   from	   the	   period	   of	  
“institutionalisation”	  or	  “intensification”	  to	  the	  period	  of	  today	  known	  as	  “empowerment”	  
to	   underscore	   the	   prominence	   these	   different	   organisations	   began	   to	   assume	   within	  
neoliberal	   frameworks,	   in	   particular	   from	   the	   period	   of	   the	   Washington	   Consensus.151	  It	  
then	  presents	  more	  recent	  donor	  contributions	  to	  these	  organisations,	  with	  a	  clarification	  of	  
how	   finances	   are	   channelled	   “to”	   and	   “through”	   civil	   society	   organisations	   as	   well	   as	  
through	  a	  host	  of	   conditionalities	   and	  directives,	   thereby	   raising	   critical	   questions	   around	  
the	  legitimacy	  and	  accountability	  of	  these	  organisations	  within	  neoliberal	  frameworks.	  It	   is	  
important	   to	  note,	  however,	   that	  while	  a	   significant	  proportion	  of	   the	   literature	  on	   these	  
entities	  refers	  to	  NGOs	  this	  thesis	  uses	  the	  term	  civil	  society	  to	  refer	  to	  not	  only	  a	  broader	  
set	   of	   organisations	   that	   can	   include	   social	   movements,	   but	   also	   to	   emphasise	   the	  
ideological	   association	   and	   appropriation	   of	   the	   concept	   to	   effectively	   serve	   a	   range	   of	  
disparate	  agendas	  present	  day.	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  Bayat,	  Life	  as	  Politics,	  84.	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3.	  The	  institutionalisation	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  legitimation	  of	  the	  NGO	  
	  
As	  a	  point	  of	  departure,	   in	   the	  article	  “Is	  Social	  Change	  Fundable?”	   Jenny	  Pearce	  critically	  
examines	  civil	   society	  organisations	   that	  emphasise	   their	  own	  commitment	   to	  progressive	  
social	   change	   in	   Latin	   America.	   She	   looks	   back	   to	   some	   of	   the	   organisations	   that	   were	  
established	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  in	  the	  region	  to	  advocate	  for	  radical	  social	  change.	  
She	  concentrates	  on	  these	  organisations	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  into	  relief	  the	  notion	  that	  many	  of	  
these	  same	  organisations	  are	  now	  members	  of	  the	  more	  professionalised	  aid	  sector	  and	  are	  
heavily	  dependent	  on	  both	  national	  and	  international	  donor	  funding.	  She	  asks,	  “Should	  we	  
be	   arguing	   for	   an	   end	   to	   external	   funding,	   and	   should	   we	   challenge	   any	   claim	   that	   its	  
purpose	   is	   to	   further	  pro-­‐poor	   social	   change	   in	   Latin	  America?	   Is	   it	  not	  only	  dangerous	   in	  
practice	  to	  fund	  social	  change,	  but	  also	  misguided	  in	  principle?”152	  Highlighting	  some	  of	  the	  
contentions	   with	   civil	   society	   organisations	   from	   this	   period,	   Pearce	   underscores	   a	  
fundamental	   shift	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   these	   organisations	   as	   agents	   formerly	   organised	   to	  
contest	  hegemony,	   to	   actors	  who	  are	  more	  aptly	   considered	   to	   consolidate	   and	  maintain	  
hegemonies.	  Moreover,	   she	  highlights	   that	   the	  hegemonic	   force	  has	  also	  shifted	   from	  the	  
totalitarian	  and	  authoritarian	   state	   to	   the	  more	  ubiquitous	  power	  of	   the	   international	  aid	  
industry	  embedded	  within	  the	  neoliberal	  architecture.	  	  
	  
During	   the	   1970s,	   two	   percent	   of	   civil	   society	   organisation	   income	   globally	   came	   from	  
official	   donors;	   from	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   income	   from	   official	   donors	   rose	   to	   30	   percent.	  
Moreover,	   from	   1984–1994	   the	   British	   government	   increased	   its	   funding	   of	   civil	   society	  
organisations	   by	   almost	   400	   percent	   to	   £68.7	   million.153	  In	   2001,	   just	   six	   of	   the	   larger	  
international	  NGOs	  controlled	  between	  US$2.5	  billion	  and	  US$3	  billion	  or	  between	  45–55	  
percent	  of	  all	  global	  humanitarian	  aid	  and	  assistance.154	  Finally,	  in	  2011,	  US$19.3	  billion	  was	  
allocated	   to	   and	   through	   civil	   society	   organisations	   by	   the	   24	   Development	   Assistance	  
Committee	   (DAC)	   country	   members.155 	  This	   represents	   14.4	   percent	   of	   total	   overseas	  
development	   aid	   for	   2011.156 	  These	   figures	   point	   to	   several	   trends,	   among	   them	   the	  
astonishing	   amount	   of	   funding	   available	   in	   the	   last	   two	   decades	   for	   civil	   society	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  Pearce,	  “Is	  Social	  Change	  Fundable?”	  622.	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  Manji	  and	  O’Coill,	  “The	  Missionary	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  580.	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  Barnett	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organisations	  from	  governments	  and	  moreover,	  the	  likelihood	  that	  these	  organisations	  have	  
grown	   reliant	   on	   these	   funding	   streams.	   Anthony	   Bebbington,	   Samuel	   Hickey,	   and	   Diana	  
Mitlin	  in	  Can	  NGOs	  Make	  a	  Difference:	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Development	  Alternatives	  and	  Steve	  
Charnovitz	   in	   “Two	   Centuries	   of	   Participation:	   NGOs	   and	   International	   Governance”	  
chronicle	   the	   rise	   of	   these	   organisations,	   from	   several	   decades	   (Bebbington,	   Hickey	   and	  
Mitlin)	  to	  over	  two	  centuries	  (Charnovitz),	  aligning	  their	  increasing	  prominence	  with	  global	  
trends	  and	  development	  discourses.	  While	  each	  writer	  frames	  and	  categorises	  these	  periods	  
differently,	  they	  do	  share	  considerable	  overlap	  so	  both	  understandings	  are	  presented	  here.	  
In	  addition,	  although	  this	  history	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  200	  years,	  I	  concentrate	  mainly	  on	  the	  
period	  following	  the	  Cold	  War	  where	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  re-­‐emerged	  alongside	  the	  
pro-­‐democracy	  social	  movements	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America.	  It	  is	  from	  this	  period	  
where	  a	  significant	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  transformation	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  
takes	  place.	  	  
	  
Chronicling	  the	  proliferation	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  	  
Charnovitz	   and	   Bebbington,	   Hickey	   and	   Mitlin	   refer	   respectively	   to	   the	   period	   of	  
“intensification”	   (1972–1991)	  and	  the	  second	  “institutionalisation”	  and	  third	  “NGO	  boom”	  
phases	   (1970s–1980s)	  of	   civil	   society	  organisations	   in	  broader	  discourses	  on	  development	  
and	   poverty	   alleviation.157	  During	   these	   different	   periods	   these	   organisations	   were	   more	  
formally	   integrated	   into	   official	   aid	   portfolios,	   with	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   civil	   society	   sector	  
occurring	   in	  both	   the	  high	   income	  “North”	   as	  well	   as	   in	   low-­‐income	  countries,	   or	  what	   is	  
known	  as	  the	  rather	  pejorative	  “South.”	  Here	  a	  tactical	  swing	  occurred	  where	  civil	  society	  
participation	   in	   social	   movements	   for	   emancipation	   from	   repressive	   structures	   and	   the	  
denial	  of	  rights	  altered	  its	  course	  to	  focus	  on	  poverty	  and	  basic	  needs.158	  It	  is	  also	  during	  this	  
period	   in	   which	   neoliberalism	   emerged	   as	   a	   prevailing	   discourse	   alongside	   the	   design	   of	  
structural	   adjustment	   packages	   for	   lower-­‐	   and	   middle-­‐income	   countries.	   As	  
aforementioned,	   neoliberal	   policy	   during	   this	   time	   emphasised	   that,	   as	   an	   outcome	   of	  
growing	   macroeconomic	   instability,	   state	   expenditure	   should	   be	   directed	   towards	   the	  
creation	   of	   an	   enabling	   environment	   for	   growth	   rather	   than	   on	   the	   provision	   of	   public	  
services.	   This	   left	   an	   opening	   for	   non-­‐state	   actors	   such	   as	   civil	   society	   organisations	   to	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  Bebbington,	  Hickey	  and	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  12–13	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provide	   such	   services,	   namely	   the	  provision	  of	   social	  welfare	   interventions	   to	   poorer	   and	  
marginalised	  communities.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   here	  where	  Bebbington,	  Hickey	   and	  Mitlin	   describe	   the	   “NGO	  boom”	  marked	  by	   the	  
increasing	   willingness	   of	   state	   and	   development	   agencies	   to	   fund	   these	   interventions.159	  
Moreover,	   they	   note	   the	   direct	   correlation	   between	   the	   rise	   in	   foreign	   aid	   and	   the	  
diminishing	  capacity	   for	   civil	   society	   to	  offer	  genuine	  alternatives	   to	   the	  scale	  of	   suffering	  
caused	  by	  the	   impact	  of	  unyielding	  structural	  adjustment	  programmes.	  They	  write,	  “Much	  
was	  expected	  of	  NGOs	  in	  this	  period	  but	  there	  was	  little	  to	  no	  space	  to	  pursue	  large-­‐scale	  or	  
system-­‐questioning	   alternative	   projects.”160 	  Finally	   throughout	   this	   period,	   civil	   society	  
organisations	   assumed	   a	   greater	   role	   in	   United	   Nations	   fora,	   for	   example	   through	   their	  
participation	   in	   the	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	   the	  Child	  and	  the	  UN	  Conferences	  on	  
Women	  (1975–1995).	  This	  more	  public	  role	  and	  participation	  in	  international	  deliberations	  
soon	  conferred	  more	  power	  and	  legitimacy	  unto	  civil	  society	  (organisations	  primarily	  in	  the	  
North)	   to	   contribute	   to	   development	   discourses;	   arguably,	   it	   is	   also	   with	   this	   increased	  
participation	  from	  “above”	  that	  civil	  society	  relationships	  and	  hence	  accountability	  to	  their	  
counterparts	  “below”	  (in	  the	  Global	  South)	  came	  under	  increased	  scrutiny.161	  
	  
From	  the	  1990s	  the	  prominence	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  in	  neoliberal	  frameworks	  could	  
largely	   be	   discernible	   through	   overseas	   development	   assistance/aid	   budgets	   from	   the	  
Development	  Assistance	  Committee	  (DAC)	  countries.	  The	  amount	  of	  official	  funding	  for	  civil	  
society	   organisations	   during	   this	   period	  more	   than	   tripled	   from	  US$2.1	  million	   to	  US$5.9	  
billion	  (1990–2000)	  with	  aid	  conditionalities	  from	  states	  and	  donors	  becoming	  significantly	  
more	   rigid. 162 	  Bilateral	   and	   multilateral	   organisations	   allocated	   significant	   volumes	   of	  
funding	   to	   mitigate	   the	   impact	   of	   structural	   adjustment	   programmes	   in	   lower-­‐income	  
countries,	   with	   civil	   society	   organisations	   becoming	   the	   preferred	   safety	   net	   for	   the	  
vulnerable	   in	   these	   contexts.	   It	   is	   here	   where	   Bebbington,	   Hickey	   and	   Mitlin	   argue	   that	  
these	  organisations	  were	  co-­‐opted	   into	   the	  mainstream	  neoliberal	   framework	  and	   further	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  Bebbington,	  Hickey	  and	  Mitlin,	  “Introduction:	  Can	  NGOs	  Make	  a	  Difference?”	  13.	  
160	  Ibid.	  
161	  See	  Edwards	  and	  Hulme,	  “Too	  Close	  for	  Comfort”	  and	  Manji,	  “Collaboration	  with	  the	  South:	  	  agents	  of	  aid	  
or	  solidarity?”	  
162	  Barnett	  and	  Weiss,	  Humanitarianism	  in	  Question,	  33.	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distanced	   from	   their	   ability	   to	   provide	   alternatives	   to	   these	   mainstream	   developments.	  
They	  observe	  three	  primary	  trends	  during	  this	  period:	  the	  deepening	  of	  the	  democratisation	  
and	  neoliberal	  agenda,	   the	  hegemony	  of	   the	  poverty	  agenda	   in	   international	  aid,	  and	   the	  
more	   recent	   emergence	  of	   the	   security	   agenda	  whereby	   international	   peace	   and	   security	  
become	   integral	   to	   the	   development	   discourse. 163 	  Here	   “counterterrorism”	   and	  
“humanitarianism”	  became	  increasingly	  framed	  alongside	  one	  another.	  In	  Humanitarianism	  
in	  Question,	  Michael	  Barnett	  and	  Thomas	  Weiss	  underscore	  this	  trend	  with	  comments	  from	  
former	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Colin	  Powell,	  who	  stated,	  “Just	  as	  surely	  as	  our	  diplomats	  and	  
military,	   American	   NGOs	   are	   out	   there	   (in	   Afghanistan)	   serving	   and	   sacrificing	   on	   the	  
frontlines	  of	  freedom.	  NGOs	  are	  such	  a	  force	  multiplier	  for	  us,	  such	  an	  important	  part	  of	  our	  
combat	  team.”164	  	  
	  
The	   growing	   distance	   between	   civil	   society	   organisations	   and	   the	   populations	  with	  which	  
they	  worked	   could	   also	   be	   perceptible	   through	   a	  marked	   distinction	   in	   the	  way	   overseas	  
development	  assistance	  was	  increasingly	  being	  allocated.	  In	  the	  OECD	  report	  “Aid	  for	  CSOs,”	  
a	  clear	  demarcation	  is	  made	  between	  aid	  that	  is	  channelled	  “to”	  civil	  society	  and	  aid	  that	  is	  
channelled	  “through”	   these	  different	  organisations,	   in	  particular	  by	   the	  24	  DAC	  members.	  
This	  distinction	  demonstrates	  not	  only	   the	  power	  dynamics	  between	   international	  donors	  
and	  civil	   society	  organisations,	  but	  also	  how	  embedded	  some	  of	   these	  organisations	  have	  
become	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  foreign	  aid	  (effectively	  bypassing	  governments)	  to	  lower-­‐income	  
countries.	  For	  example,	  in	  2011,	  US$3.2	  billion	  in	  bilateral	  aid	  was	  channelled	  through	  civil	  
society	  organisations	  for	  interventions	  in	  “government	  and	  civil	  society;”	  US$3.1	  billion	  for	  
“emergency	   response”	   and	   an	   additional	   US$2.2	   billion	   for	   “population	   policies	   and	  
reproductive	  health.”	  Of	  the	  ten	  sub-­‐sector	  categories	  for	  interventions	  for	  bilateral	  aid,	  the	  
three	   above	   areas	   feature	   the	   highest	   in	   terms	   of	   aid	   allocations.	   Overall	   the	   amount	   of	  
total	  aid	  allocated	  for	  “government	  and	  civil	  society”	  interventions	  in	  2011	  is	  only	  marginally	  
smaller	   than	   the	   overall	   aid	   allocations	   for	   humanitarian	   assistance	   of	   US$3.4	   billion	  
(including	   all	   emergency	   response,	   reconstruction	   relief,	   and	   disaster	   prevention). 165	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163	  Bebbington,	  Hickey	  and	  Mitlin,	  “Introduction:	  Can	  NGOs	  Make	  a	  Difference?”	  15.	  
164	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Colin	  Powell,	  Remarks	  to	  the	  National	  Foreign	  Policy	  Conference	  for	  Leaders	  of	  
Nongovernmental	  Organizations,	  26	  Oct.	  2001,	  as	  cited	  in	  Barnett	  and	  Weiss,	  Humanitarianism	  in	  Question,	  
25.	  
165	  OECD,	  “Aid	  for	  CSOs,”	  10-­‐14.	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Moreover,	   the	  weight	   becoming	   increasingly	   attached	   to	   the	   role	   of	   civil	   society	   in	   good	  
governance	  strategies	  in	  low-­‐	  and	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  was	  noteworthy.	  In	  addition,	  the	  
“to”	  and	   “through”	   figures	  on	   foreign	  aid	   flows	   to	   civil	   society	   are	  directly	   relevant	  when	  
considering	   an	   organisation’s	   ability	   to	   contest	   power	   or	   to	   maintain	   it	   in	   relation	   to	  
dominant	   development	   discourses	   and	   liberal	   ideology.	  Overseas	   development	   assistance	  
managed	  and	  delivered	  by	  civil	  society	  organisations	  has	  increased	  year	  on	  year	  since	  2008;	  
this	  includes	  both	  aid	  directly	  “to”	  civil	  society	  organisations	  as	  core	  support	  as	  well	  as	  aid	  
channelled	   “through”	   civil	   society	   to	   implement	   donor-­‐initiated	   projects	   or	   earmarked	  
funding.	  Overseas	  development	  assistance	  channelled	  “through”	  civil	  society	  organisations	  
continues	  to	  be	  higher	  than	  aid	  flows	  “to”	  civil	  society.	  For	  example,	   in	  2008	  and	  2011	  aid	  
“to”	   civil	   society	   organisations	   as	   core	   aid	   was	   US$2.9	   billion	   and	   US$2.4	   billion,	  
respectively.	   During	   the	   same	   period,	   aid	   flows	   “through”	   civil	   society	   organisations	   as	  
earmarked	  funding	  were	  US$11.6	  billion	  and	  US$16.9	  billion,	  respectively;166	  in	  2011	  alone,	  
all	  aid	  flows	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  EU	  institutions,	  Germany,	  and	  France	  to	  civil	  society	  
organisations	  were	  “through”	  as	  earmarked	  donor-­‐initiated	  projects.167	  	  
	  
During	  what	  Bebbington,	  Hickey	  and	  Mitlin	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  “fourth	  phase”	  of	  the	  history	  of	  
civil	   society	  organisations,	   they	  document	   this	  period	  as	  being	  characterised	  by	  a	  growing	  
concern	   over	   the	   practice,	   direction,	   and	   focus	   of	   these	   organisations,	   their	   role	   in	   the	  
overall	  reform	  agenda,	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  be	  accountable	  to	  the	  communities	  where	  they	  
work.168	  The	  figures	  above	  illustrate	  an	  increasing	  depolitisation	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  sector	  as	  
it	   potentially	  moves	   away	   from	   relationships	  with	   social	  movements	   and	   towards	   a	  more	  
restricted	   role	   as	   public	   service	   contractors	   and	   instruments	   of	   democracy	   promotion.	   In	  
“Reflections	   on	  NGOs	   and	  Development,”	  David	  Hulme	  analyses	  whether	   civil	   society	   has	  
genuinely	   been	   capable	   of	   maintaining	   a	   dual	   strategy	   of	   both	   engagement	   in	   global	  
development	  initiatives—an	  engagement	  that	  often	  requires	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  
with	   international	   donors,	   the	   state	   and	   with	   social	   welfare	   provision	   to	   deprived	  
communities—and	   a	   critique	   of	   these	   very	   same	   actors	   and	   of	   the	   broader	   Washington	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  OECD,	  “Aid	  for	  CSOs,”	  5.	  
167	  Ibid.,	  6.	  
168	  Bebbington,	  Hickey	  and	  Mitlin,	  “Introduction:	  Can	  NGOs	  Make	  a	  Difference?”	  15.	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Consensus	   agenda.	   Hulme	   argues,	   “NGOs	   have	   failed	   to	   take	   sufficient	   note	   of	   the	   key	  
hegemonic	  actors	  in	  both	  the	  NGO	  world	  and	  in	  global	  power	  relations.”169	  	  
	  
Today	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  features	  across	  multilateral	  institutional	  policy	  documents	  
and	   guidelines,	   encouraging	   multistakeholder	   partnerships	   in	   the	   design	   and	  
implementation	   of	   anti-­‐poverty	   and	   global	   health	   initiatives.	   Some	   donors,	   such	   as	   the	  
Global	   Fund	   to	   Fight	   AIDS,	   Tuberculosis	   and	   Malaria,	   even	   require	   a	   percentage	   of	   civil	  
society	  organisation	  participation	  in	  national	  proposal	  consultation	  and	  development.170	  The	  
concept	   of	   civil	   society	   and	   the	   role	   of	   these	   immeasurably	   different	   organisations	   have	  
increasingly	  gained	  greater	  prominence	   in	   the	  neoliberal	  architecture.	  This	  has	   resulted	   in	  
careful	  consideration	  among	  some	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  organisations	  can	  effectively	  
put	   forward	   alternatives	   to	   social	   change	   or	   can	   realistically	   contest	   hegemonic	  
international	  development	  discourses.	  And	  arguably	  as	  these	  organisations	  are	  expected	  to	  
fill	  both	  a	  role	  of	  public	  service	  contractor	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  social	  welfare	  services	  and	  as	  
agents	  to	  uphold	  democratic	  values	  and	  good	  governance,	  has	  civil	  society	  instead	  become	  
an	   instrument	  to	  maintain	  and	  consolidate	  these	  hegemonies?	  The	  next	  section	  highlights	  
some	  of	  the	  different	  issues	  and	  contentions,	  even	  disenchantment,	  raised	  in	  the	  literature	  
in	   relation	   to	   civil	   society	   organisations	   and	  how	   they	  operate,	   specifically	  whether	   these	  
organisations	   can	   continue	   to	   be	   conceived	   as	   agents	   for	   humanitarian	   emancipation	   or	  
whether,	   with	   their	   internal	   disharmonies	   comfortably	   ignored,	   they	   are	   instruments	   to	  
support	  and	  consolidate	  neoliberal	  hegemonies.	  
	  
	  
	  
4.	  Emerging	  contentions	  on	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  neoliberal	  architecture	  	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  continues	  to	  evolve	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  it	  is	  understood	  and	  applied	  
by	  a	  number	  of	  different	  actors.	  Moreover,	  not	  only	  does	  the	  concept	  evolve	  but	  patterns	  of	  
civil	   society	   engagement	   also	   rise	   and	   fall	   in	   response	   to	   a	   range	  of	   factors	   including,	   for	  
example,	   a	   change	   in	   government	   regime	   type	   in	   which	   laws	   of	   association	   are	   either	  
expanded	  or	  contracted,	   the	  donor	  and	  overall	   funding	  climate,	  and	   in	   response	  to	  global	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169	  Paraphrasing	  Hulme	  in	  Bebbington,	  Hickey	  and	  Mitlin,	  “Introduction:	  Can	  NGOs	  Make	  a	  Difference?”	  31.	  
170	  For	  more	  information	  see	  the	  Global	  Fund	  Country	  Coordinating	  Mechanism	  Eligibility	  Requirements,	  
Minimum	  Standards	  and	  Updated	  Guidelines:	  www.theglobalfund.org/en/ccm/guidelines/	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trends	  or	  issues	  of	  concern	  such	  as	  complex	  humanitarian	  emergencies,	  etc.	  During	  the	  last	  
two	   decades,	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   and	   the	   civil	   society	   sector	   has	   come	   under	  
increased	  scrutiny	  as	  a	   range	  of	  academics	  and	  development	  practitioners	  caution	  against	  
the	   heavy	   normative	   assumptions	   and	   expectations	   now	   resting	   upon	   civil	   society	   actors.	  
Some	   of	   the	   most	   common	   criticisms	   against	   civil	   society	   organisations	   emphasise	   the	  
growing	   distance	   and	   priorities	   between	   organisations	   whose	   resources	   and	   institutions	  
mainly	  originate	  in	  the	  industrialised	  West	  and	  poorer,	  marginalised	  communities	  in	  middle-­‐	  
and	  lower-­‐income	  countries.	  These	  criticisms	  not	  only	  point	  to	  the	  fundamental	  challenge	  of	  
“upwards”	  and	  “downwards”	  representation	  and	  accountability	  mechanisms,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  
inherent	  weaknesses	  and	  contradictions	  of	  civil	  society	  itself,	  or	  rather	  the	  incivilities	  inside	  
which	   are	   often	   easy	   for	   both	   international	   donors	   and	   states	   to	   overlook.	   Chandhoke	  
writes,	   “Civil	   societies	   are	  what	   their	   inhabitants	  make	   of	   them.	   They	   can	   easily	   become	  
hostages	   to	   formal	   democracy	   at	   best,	   and	   undemocratic	   trends	   at	   worst.”171	  Hence	   a	  
number	  of	  writers	  advocate	  the	  necessity	  to	  look	  beyond	  accountability	  mechanisms	  to	  the	  
question	   of	  whether	   civil	   society	   is	   itself	   intrinsically	   democratic	   or	   undemocratic,	   and	   to	  
examine	  more	  carefully	  its	  own	  inclusions	  and	  exclusions.	  
	  
Writers	   such	   as	   Benoit	   Challand	   note	   the	   dichotomy	   between	   the	   inherently	   domestic	  
features	  of	   civil	   society	  and	   the	   increasingly	   international	  dimension	  of	   the	   sector	   shaped	  
through	  “civil	  society	  strengthening”	  and	  promotion	  initiatives	  by	  international	  institutions.	  
He	  probes,	   “What	   impact	  does	  external	  aid	   towards	  civil	   society	  have	  on	  already	  existing,	  
well-­‐established	   and	   firmly	   rooted	   civil	   society	   organisations?”172 	  This	   implies	   a	   linear	  
assumption	   that	   with	   increased	   donor	   aid	   from	   “above”	   civil	   society	   organisations	  move	  
further	   away	   from	   their	   legitimate	   bases	   “below.” 173 	  Furthermore,	   this	   line	   of	  
argumentation	   follows	   that	   international	   donors	   are	   directly	   able	   to	   influence	   the	  
discourses	   and	   practices	   of	   these	   actors	   through	   substantial	   resource	   provision.	   In	  
Palestinian	   Civil	   Society:	   Foreign	   Donors	   and	   the	   Power	   to	   Promote	   or	   Exclude,	   Challand	  
contends	   that	   through	   the	   gradual	   closing	   of	   this	   discursive	   (and	   consequently	  
programmatic)	  space,	  donors	  are	  inevitably	  able	  to	  decide	  which	  organisations	  are	  included	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  Chandhoke,	  “Civil	  Society,”	  613.	  
172	  Challand,	  Palestinian	  Civil	  Society,	  11.	  
173	  See	  Edwards	  and	  Hulme	  (1996),	  Challand	  (2009),	  Abdelrahman	  (2004),	  and	  Ferguson	  and	  Gupta	  (2005).	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and	   excluded.	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   in	   Civil	   Society	   Exposed:	   The	   Politics	   of	   NGOs	   in	   Egypt,	  
Abdelrahman	  considers	  who	  in	  fact	  draws	  the	  line	  between	  which	  groups	  should	  or	  should	  
not	  be	  included	  in	  civil	  society,	  while	  underscoring	  the	  hegemonic	  power	  of	  donors	  and	  the	  
neoliberal	   discourse.174	  She	   asks,	   “Whose	   interests	   does	   the	   universally	   celebrated	   civil	  
society	   project,	   and	   NGOs	   within	   it,	   serve	   and	   represent,	   and	   who	   benefits	   from	   its	  
enhancement?” 175 	  Both	   Challand	   and	   Abdelrahman	   highlight	   the	   instrumentalising	   or	  
functionalist	   tendencies	   of	   the	   international	   donors	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   concept	   (and	  
application)	  of	  civil	  society	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  
neoliberal	  architecture	  in	  the	  overall	  understanding	  of	  this	  concept	  present	  day.	  
	  
Chandhoke	  and	  Abdelrahman	  perceive	  a	  domain	  of	  actors	  that	  have	  been	  kidnapped	  by	  the	  
neoliberal	   agenda,	   a	   development	   that	   has	   forced	   even	   the	   actors	  within	   these	   different	  
spaces	  to	  assert	  dominant	  hegemonies	  and	  exercise	  repression	  over	  marginalised	  groups;	  in	  
effect	   they	   argue	   civil	   society	   has	   lost	   its	   “critical	   function.”	   Both	  writers	   underscore	   the	  
idiosyncrasies	  within	   and	   among	   civil	   society	   as	   they	   encourage	   academics,	   practitioners,	  
and	   donors	   to	   look	   beyond	   a	   concept	   that	   encourages	   consensus	   among	   a	   range	   of	  
disparate	  groups,	  income	  levels,	  and	  identities	  to	  what	  actually	  transpires	  inside	  civil	  society	  
empirically.	  It	  is	  this	  critical	  advocacy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  these	  scholars	  that	  has	  in	  fact	  inspired	  
and	  driven	  the	  dual	  approach	  of	  my	  research—both	  as	  a	  conceptual	  as	  well	  as	  an	  empirical	  
interrogation	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  these	  actors/organisations.	  They	  each	  highlight	  two	  critical	  
issues	  with	   regard	   to	   civil	   society:	   the	   incivilities	  within	   civil	   society	   and	   the	   necessity	   to	  
conceptualise	  civil	  society	  alongside	  the	  state.	  Chandhoke	  explains:	  
	  
The	   de-­‐linking	   of	   the	   state	   and	   civil	   society	   has	   greatly	   impoverished	   our	  
understanding	  of	  both	  concepts.	  Those	  theorists	  who	  waxed	  eloquent	  on	  the	  need	  
for	  people	  to	  connect	  were	  to	  stray	  away	  from	  the	  shadowy	  peripheries	  of	  actually	  
existing	  civil	  societies	  and	  underplay	  the	  ambiguous	  relationship	  of	  this	  sphere	  with	  
democracy.176	  
	  
From	  the	  period	  of	   the	  seventeenth	  century	   the	  state	  could	  be	   increasingly	   seen	   to	  over-­‐
govern	  its	  societies.	  The	  eighteenth	  and	  nineteenth	  centuries	  shifted	  this	  trend	  when,	  first,	  
conceptualisations	  on	  civil	  society	  emerged	  as	  guarantees	  against	  the	  unchecked	  powers	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  Abdelrahman,	  Civil	  Society	  Exposed,	  26.	  
175	  Ibid.,	  1.	  
176	  Chandhoke,	  “Civil	  Society,”	  613.	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the	   state;	   and	   second,	   when	   the	   state	   came	   to	   play	   a	   principal	   role	   in	   development	   in	  
particular	   for	   lower-­‐income	  countries	  with	  organisations	  such	  as	  charities	  playing	  a	  critical	  
role	  as	  partners	  in	  development.177	  What	  is	  critical	  in	  this	  regard	  today	  is	  less	  the	  boundaries	  
between	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  state,	  but	  that	  this	  spatial	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  
society	  is	  constantly	  being	  reimagined.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  description	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  
Left,	  Baker	  articulates	  that	  civil	  society	  actors	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  were	  concerned	  
with	   freedom	   outside	   the	   state,	   with	   a	   politics	   of	   survival	   from	   the	   state.	   Here,	   Latin	  
American	  activists	  and	  intellectuals	  sought	  to	  separate	  civil	  society	  entirely	  from	  the	  state	  as	  
a	   self-­‐managing	   society.	   Conceptualisations	   that	   situated	   civil	   society	   completely	   outside	  
and	   apart	   from	   the	   state	   could	   then	   later	   be	   contrasted	  with	   how	   civil	   society	  would	   be	  
framed	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   architecture,	   where	   civil	   society	   is	   articulated	   above	   the	   state	  
through	  webs	  of	   transnational	   relationships	   and	   institutions.	   The	   spatial	   imagining	  of	   this	  
relationship	   as	   described	   in	   Ferguson	   and	   Gupta’s	   “Spatializing	   States:	   Toward	   an	  
Ethnography	   of	   Neoliberal	   Governmentality”	   analyses	   notions	   of	   “verticality”	   and	  
“encompassing”	   in	   regard	   to	   how	   the	   state	   has	   been	   imagined	   and	   perpetuated	  
historically.178	  The	  transnational	  characterisation	  of	  the	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  underscores	  a	  
key	  argument	  put	  forward	  by	  Abdelrahman,	  namely	  that	  the	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  are	  not	  
self-­‐contained.	  She	  writes,	   “They	  all	  operate	  within	  a	  world	  system	   in	  which	  social	   forces,	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  State,	  and	  international	  powers	  are	  constantly	   interacting	  and	  reshaping	  
the	  relations	  between	  them.”179	  
	  
Writers	  such	  as	  Keane	  and	  Chandhoke	  advocate	  for	  the	  necessity	  to	  maintain	  the	  state–civil	  
society	   distinction.	   This	   is	   in	   response	   to	   theories	   that	   blur	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	   two	  
entities	  and	  to	  neoliberal	  policies	  that	  have	  rendered	  the	  state	  less	  relevant.	  Keane	  argues	  
that	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	   continues	   to	   be	   particularly	   relevant	   because	   of	   economic	  
restructuring,	  controversy	  over	  the	  welfare	  state,	  and	  the	  growth	  in	  social	  movements.	  He	  
contends	   that	   in	   fact	   through	   neoliberal	   policies	   the	   state	   has	   effectively	   become	   more	  
powerful	   in	  some	  aspects	  and	  more	   limited	   in	  others.180	  Each	  writer	  cites	   for	  example	  the	  
role	  of	   the	   state	   in	   guaranteeing	   the	   role	  of	   civil	   society	  organisations	   and	   the	  density	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177	  See	  Jennings,	  Surrogates	  of	  the	  State	  and	  Jennings,	  “Do	  not	  Turn	  Away	  a	  Poor	  Man.”	  
178	  Ferguson	  and	  Gupta,	  “Spatializing	  States.”	  
179	  Abdelrahman,	  Civil	  Society	  Exposed,	  10.	  
180	  Keane,	  Civil	  Society	  and	  the	  State.	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these	  organisations	  to	  meet	  social	  needs.	  The	  state	  effectively	  is	  responsible	  for	  instituting	  
the	  regulations	  that	  govern	  these	  organisations,	  such	  as	  through	  the	  laws	  of	  association	  and	  
articulating	  the	  rights	  of	  its	  citizens.	  Chandhoke	  argues,	  “If	  we	  now	  add	  that	  states,	  far	  from	  
being	  passive	  recipients	  of	  pressures	   launched	  from	  civil	  society,	  have	  been	  active	  both	   in	  
the	  construction	  and	  in	  the	  diminution	  of	  this	  sphere.”181	  Thus	  even	  though	  concepts	  such	  
as	   the	   state	  and	  civil	   society	  appear	   to	  be	   shifting	   from	  a	  hierarchical	  ordering	   to	  a	  more	  
transnational	  character,	  the	  two	  are	  in	  fact,	  and	  remain,	  a	  conceptual	  pair.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  
more	   holistically	   understand	   the	   state–civil	   society	   conceptual	   binary	   though	   adopting	   a	  
lens	   that	   looks	   historically	   and	   currently	   to	   not	   only	   how	   civil	   society	   and	   the	   state	   are	  
limited	  by	  one	  other,	  but	  also	  to	  how	  they	  enable	  each	  other.	  
	  
A	   point	   of	   criticism	   that	   is	   also	   levelled	   against	   civil	   society	   is	   that	   through	   its	   increasing	  
association	  with	   democratic	   outcomes,	   the	   incivilities	   and	   exclusions	   among	   these	   actors	  
are	  often	  overlooked.	  In	  “The	  Politics	  of	   ‘UnCivil’	  Society	   in	  Egypt,”	  Abdelrahman	  observes	  
that	  civil	   society	  has	  become	  a	  space	   for	  political	   conflict,	  a	  domain	  of	  contradictions	  and	  
“enduring	  conflicts	  of	  interests.”182	  She	  notes	  further:	  
	  
Repression	  of	  civilians	  and	  organisations	  of	  civil	  society	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  sole	  domain	  
of	  the	  state	  apparatus.	  Instead,	  the	  very	  organisations	  of	  civil	  society	  that	  have	  been	  
engaged	   in	   a	   struggle	   for	   democracy	   with	   the	   state	   are	   contributing	   to	   the	  
harassment	  of	  other	  elements	  of	  civil	  society	  with	  whom	  they	  disagree	  on	  the	  form	  
of	  society	  and	  state	  that	  they	  want.183	  
	  
Moreover,	  she	  underscores	  the	  normative	  framework	  in	  which	  debates	  on	  civil	  society	  and	  
NGOs	  are	  situated.	  She	  effectively	  advocates	  for	  more	  empirical	  evidence	  into	  what	  actually	  
transpires	   among	   and	   between	   civil	   society	   actors	   over	   uncritical	   ideological	   fervour.184	  
Abdelrahman	   contends	   that	   the	  multiple	   antagonisms	  between	   the	  different	  members	   of	  
civil	   society	   serve	   as	   evidence	   of	   the	   inherent	   contradictions	   embedded	   within	   the	  
concept.185	  Later,	   in	  Civil	  Society	  Exposed:	  The	  Politics	  of	  NGOs	   in	  Egypt,	  she	  questions	  the	  
emancipatory	  function	  of	  the	  concept,	  challenging	  the	  notion	  that	  civil	  society	  could	  be	  “the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181	  Chandhoke,	  State	  and	  Civil	  Society,	  165.	  
182	  Abdelrahman,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  ‘UnCivil’	  Society	  in	  Egypt,”	  21–23.	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  Ibid.,	  25.	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  Ibid.,	  21.	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  Ibid.,	  32.	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main	   source	   for	   social	   and	  political	   transformation.”186	  While	  emphasising	   that	   in	   fact	   the	  
concept	  of	  civil	  society	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  valuable	  framework	  for	  analysis,	  she	  underscores	  the	  
importance	   of	   examining	   the	   actual	   context	   in	   which	   these	   actors	   function.	   Through	   her	  
research	   into	   the	   Egyptian	   context,	   Abdelrahman	   articulates	   civil	   society	   as	   fraught	   with	  
insurmountable	  degrees	  internal	  contention	  and	  conflict.	  
	  
Similarly,	  Chandhoke	  perceives	  a	  domain	  stripped	  of	  agency	  and	  characterised	  by	  enforced	  
consensus	  and	  multiple	  hegemonies.	  She	  observes,	  “The	  moment	  we	  perceive	  civil	  society	  
from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  marginalised	  groups,	  we	  may	  be	  forced	  to	  accept	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
deep	  and	  perhaps	  irresolvable	  tension	  between	  the	  acknowledged	  virtues	  of	  the	  sphere	  and	  
its	  actual	  functioning.”187	  Like	  Abdelrahman,	  Chandhoke	  in	  effect	  advises	  a	  departure	  from	  
normative	   expectations	   of	   civil	   society	   in	   order	   to	   analyse	   more	   concretely	   what	   occurs	  
among	  the	  actors	  in	  this	  sphere.188	  She	  writes,	  “Where	  in	  all	  of	  this	  are	  the	  grey	  areas	  of	  civil	  
society	  that	  Hegel	  spoke	  of?	  Where	  are	  the	  exploitations	  and	  the	  oppressions	  of	  civil	  society	  
that	  Marx	   passionately	   castigated?	  Where	   is	   the	   state-­‐inspired	   project	   of	   hegemony	   that	  
Gramsci	   unearthed	   so	   brilliantly	   and	   perceptively?” 189 	  Do	   some	   of	   the	   more	   recent	  
criticisms	   against	   conceptual	   and	   empirical	   understandings	   of	   civil	   society	   underscore	   a	  
public	   space	   of	   civil	   society	   that	   is	   consensual	   rather	   than	   conflictual	   by	   virtue	   of	   an	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  these	  conflicts,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  regular	  exclusion	  
of	  marginalised	  groups,	  are	  indeed	  present?	  Moreover,	  do	  they	  articulate	  that	  there	  exists	  
an	   abnormal	   state	   of	   contention	   within	   the	   domain	   of	   civil	   society?	   Finally,	   do	   these	  
contentions	   and	   antagonisms	   play	   a	   destructive	   rather	   than	   constructive	   role	   in	   actually	  
expanding	  discursive	  spaces?	  	  
	  
	  
Conclusion	  	  
The	  nature	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  depicted	  by	  Hegel,	  Marx,	  and	  Gramsci	  following	  the	  emergence	  
of	   capitalism	   in	   the	   eighteenth	   and	   nineteenth	   centuries	   bears	   little	   resemblance	   to	   how	  
civil	   society	   is	   understood	   in	   present	   discourses	   on	   international	   development	   and	   good	  
governance	   found	  within	   the	  neoliberal	   framework.	  However,	   it	   could	  be	  argued	   that	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186	  Abdelrahman,	  Civil	  Society	  Exposed,	  1.	  
187	  Chandhoke,	  “Civil	  Society,”	  612.	  
188	  Ibid.,	  613.	  
189	  Ibid.,	  609.	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actual	   nature	   and	   functioning	   of	   civil	   society,	   in	   particular	   during	   key	   transformative	  
moments	  for	  the	  state	  when	  the	  stakes	  are	  arguably	  higher,	  reflects	  the	  way	  these	  writers	  
understood	   this	   dynamic	   and	   contentious	   field	   of	   actors.	   While	   Hegel	   characterised	   civil	  
society	  as	   inherently	   replete	  with	   contradictions	  and	   conflict,	   necessitating	   the	   regulatory	  
function	  of	  the	  state,	  Marx	  shifted	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  discourse	  to	  restore	  agency	  onto	  civil	  
society,	   in	   particular	   for	   the	  marginalised	   and	  working	   classes.	   Hegel	   situated	   the	   power	  
within	   the	   state	   to	  organise	   the	   internal	  disharmonies	  of	   civil	   society,	  while	  Marx	   located	  
the	   agency	   within	   civil	   society	   itself	   to	   resolve	   its	   own	   inconsistencies	   and	   liberate	   itself	  
from	  capitalist	  modes	  of	  production.	  	  
	  
Gramsci	  incorporated	  both	  Hegel	  and	  Marx’s	  fundamental	  understandings	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  
he	   witnessed	   several	   decades	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   capitalism	   on	   the	   state	   and	   civil	   society.	  
Gramsci	   effectively	   reversed	  Hegel’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   state	  
and	   civil	   society,	   as	   he	   articulated	   civil	   society	   as	   the	   final	   moment	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	  
“universality”	  of	  the	  state	  as	  described	  by	  Hegel.	  Gramsci,	  like	  Marx,	  also	  acknowledged	  the	  
relationships	  of	  domination	  and	  hegemony	  within	  civil	  society;	  however,	  he	  broadens	  these	  
different	  sets	  of	  actors	  to	  not	  only	  include	  the	  working	  classes	  and	  marginalised	  groups	  but	  
also	  educational,	  cultural,	  and	  religious	  institutions,	  where	  class	  and	  ideological	  battles	  are	  
constantly	  being	  constructed	  and	  deconstructed.	  Both	  Gramsci	  and	  Marx	  restore	  agency	  to	  
these	  actors	  who	  are	  capable	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  and	  self-­‐organisation,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  able	  
to	   overthrow	   the	   state.	   However	   for	   Gramsci,	   hegemony	   is	   never	   a	   final	   end	   point	   but	  
rather	  a	  continual	  process	  embedded	  within	  the	  inter-­‐relationships	  between	  the	  state	  and	  
civil	  society.	  	  
	  
Gramsci’s	  understanding	  of	  civil	  society	  was	   influential	   in	  the	  social	  movements	   in	  Eastern	  
Europe,	  but	  in	  particular	  in	  Latin	  America	  among	  the	  region’s	  new	  left	  during	  the	  1980s.	  The	  
concept	   during	   this	   period	   assumed	   a	   central	   role	   in	   new	   radical	   democratic	   theory	   and	  
allowed	   civil	   society	   to	   become	   associated	   with	   a	   distinct	   self-­‐management	   agenda	  
emphasising	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “defence	  of	   freedom	  outside	  the	  state.”	  Within	  contexts	  of	  
totalitarian	  and	  military	  rule,	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  transformed	  into	  an	  ideological	  tool	  
to	   cultivate	   the	   transition	   to,	   and	   consolidation	   of,	   democracy	   in	   oppressive	   countries—
consequently	   relocating	   civil	   society	   as	   the	  antithesis	  of	   authoritarianism.	   The	   concept,	   in	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part	   through	   its	   ideological	   association	  with	   the	   end	   of	   socialist	   societies,	   became	   a	   vital	  
instrument	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  architecture	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  minimalist	  state	  and	  for	  
democratisation.	  	  
	  
The	  1980s	  witnessed	  an	  effective	  “NGO	  boom,”	  with	  funding	  for	  civil	  society	  organisations	  
from	   some	   governments	   increasing	   greatly—e.g.,	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   increasing	   400	  
percent	   to	   £68.7	   million	   in	   one	   decade.	   This	   significant	   increase	   in	   the	   prominence	   and	  
legitimacy	   of	   civil	   society	   organisations	  was	   a	   result	   of	   policies	   outlined	   in	   the	   neoliberal	  
“New	  Policy	  Agenda”	  and	  Washington	  Consensus	  that	  advocated	  for	  a	   limited	  state	   in	  the	  
promotion	  of	  macroeconomic	  stability.	  The	  principal	  efforts	  of	  the	  state	  were	  to	  be	  directed	  
toward	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   enabling	   environment	   for	   growth	   rather	   than	   toward	   the	  
provision	  of	  public	  services.	  Civil	  society,	  through	  the	  formalised	  entities	  of	  NGOs,	  emerged	  
to	   fill	   this	   gap	   and	   to	   alleviate	   the	   often	   severe,	   socioeconomic	   disruption	   caused	   by	  
neoliberal	   policy	   through	   the	   form	   of	   structural	   adjustment	   packages.	   During	   a	   relatively	  
short	   period	   of	   time,	   thousands	   of	   civil	   society	   organisations	   emerged	   to	   assume	   two	  
primary	   roles—as	   cost-­‐effective	   providers	   of	   welfare	   services	   and	   poverty-­‐reduction	  
initiatives,	  and	  as	   torchbearers	   for	  democratic	  values	  and	  good	  governance.	  Despite	  mass	  
mobilisations	  across	  middle-­‐	  and	  lower-­‐income	  countries	  against	  the	  austerity	  of	  neoliberal	  
policies,	   civil	   society	   organisations	   have	   remained	   critical	   instruments	   in	   sustaining	   these	  
policies.	  Furthermore,	  with	  increasing	  overseas	  development	  assistance	  directed	  “through”	  
these	  organisations	  as	  earmarked	  funding	  from	  primarily	  Western	  governments,	  questions	  
emerge	   as	   to	   whether	   or	   not	   civil	   society	   can	   continue	   to	   fill	   the	   ideological	   shoes	   they	  
inherited	  during	  the	  social	  movements	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  	  
	  
In	   contrasting	   the	   dynamic	   role	   directly	   assumed	   by	   civil	   society	   throughout	   the	   social	  
movements	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America	  in	  which	  Gramscian	  revolutionary	  thought	  
featured	  prominently,	  to	  the	  more	  functionalist	  role	  in	  which	  these	  organisations	  now	  find	  
themselves,	  it	   is	  possible	  to	  locate	  the	  origins	  of	  conflicting	  understandings	  of	  civil	  society.	  
During	  periods	  of	  sharp	  sociopolitical	  turmoil,	  in	  particular	  when	  there	  is	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
radically	   reshape	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   state,	   the	   internal	   disharmonies	   of	   a	   society	   are	  
brought	  into	  full	  relief.	  These	  vastly	  disparate	  understandings	  and	  historical	  transformations	  
of	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  are	  a	  fundamental	  source	  of	  this	   internal	  disharmony	  where	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conflict	   which	   was	   once	   considered	   as	   positive	   and	   productive,	   is	   now	   understood	   as	  
destructive	   to	  democratisation.	   In	  particular,	   the	  Gramscian	  understanding	  of	   the	  concept	  
that	  emphasises	  agency,	  instability,	  and	  the	  reversible	  nature	  of	  hegemony	  begins	  to	  stand	  
in	  discernible	  opposition	  to	  the	  neoliberal	  understanding	  in	  which	  the	  role	  ascribed	  for	  civil	  
society	  actors	  is	  constrained	  and	  conflicts	  are	  de-­‐emphasised.	  I	  contend	  here	  and	  across	  the	  
thesis	  that	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  conflicts	  and	  contentions	  observed	  among	  civil	  society	  are	  also	  
two	  simultaneously	  operating	  but	   incompatible	  concepts	  of	   civil	   society	   influenced	  by	   the	  
ideology	  of	  Communism	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  ideology	  of	  neoliberalism	  on	  the	  other.	  	  
	  
The	   next	   chapter	   undertakes	   a	   brief	   discussion	   of	   the	   origins	   and	   structure	   of	   the	   pre-­‐
independence	  Tunisian	   state,	   in	  particular	  by	   looking	   to	   the	   influence	  of	  Ottoman	  control	  
from	   the	   sixteenth	  century	  and	  French	  colonial	   rule	   from	  1881.	   It	   then	  examines	   in	  more	  
detail	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   post-­‐independence	   state	   from	   1956	   to	   1987	   under	   Habib	  
Bourguiba	  and	  from	  1987	  to	  2010	  under	  the	  regime	  of	  Zine	  El	  Abidine	  Ben	  Ali.	  The	  chapter	  
highlights	   how	   each	   regime	   introduced	   elements	   of	   liberalism	   and	   pluralism	   at	   varying	  
periods,	   but	   also	   quickly	   withdrew	   these	   measures	   upon	   manifestations	   of	   perceived	  
opposition;	  this	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  public	  spaces	  in	  which	  both	  political	  and	  civil	  opposition	  
could	  be	  detected.	  Through	   this	  examination	  of	   the	  consolidation	  of	   the	  Tunisian	   state,	   it	  
will	  be	  possible	   to	   further	  understand	  how	  the	  disparate	  conflicts	  and	  cleavages	  emerged	  
among	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  in	  2011.	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Chapter	  III.	  The	  consolidation	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  
	  
	  
The	   security	   and	   stabilisation	  of	   the	   status	   quo	   in	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	  North	  Africa	   have	  
often	  taken	  precedence	  for	  states	  over	  political	  and	  societal	  pluralism	  in	  the	  region.	  This	  has	  
led	  over	  time	  to	  various	  consequences	  for	  civil	  society.	  One	  outcome	  is	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  
public	  sector	  by	  the	  state	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  it	  has	  inevitably	  sought	  to	  incorporate	  civil	  
society	   organisations	   directly	   into	   the	   state	   structure.	   This	   has	   had	   the	   effect	   of	   driving	  
many	   alternative	   forms	   of	   collective	   activism	   and	   association	   underground,	   further	  
fermenting	   dissent. 190 	  A	   second	   consequence	   is	   that	   the	   cost	   of	   maintaining	   an	  
overstretched	  “bureaucratic”	  state	  has	   led,	   in	  some	  instances,	  to	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  social	  
contract	   to	   civil	   society	   organisations	   to	   support	   social	   welfare	   interventions.	   To	   avoid	  
contestations	   to	   the	   existing	   hegemonic	   order	   while	   simultaneously	   managing	   dissent,	   a	  
degree	  of	  “sanctioned”	  civil	  society	  is	  permitted	  to	  operate,	  often	  under	  the	  direct	  guise	  of	  
the	  government’s	  public	  sector.191	  Since	  Tunisia’s	   independence	   in	  1956,	  the	  symbolic	  and	  
physical	  public	  spaces	  provided	  for	  civil	  society	  have	  regularly	  expanded	  and	  contracted	  to	  
accommodate	  the	  disparate	  agendas	  of	  state	  and	  international	  entities.	  Through	  a	  strategy	  
of	   what	   Eva	   Bellin	   describes	   as	   “controlled	   civisme”	   Tunisian	   leaders	   “have	   actively	  
mobilised	   their	   citizens	   in	   parties	   and	   associations,	   but	   have	   subjected	   these	   parties	   and	  
associations	   to	   very	   strict	   state	   control	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   limit	   their	   autonomy	   and	   their	  
contestatory	   capacities.”192	  Under	   the	   leadership	   of	   Habib	   Bourguiba	   and	   Zine	   El	   Abidine	  
Ben	  Ali,	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  simultaneously	  cracked	  down	  routinely	  on	  perceived	  opposition	  
and	   fostered	   secular	   spaces	   for	   civil	   society	   to	   manoeuvre	   as	   well	   as	   Islamist	   subaltern	  
spaces.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  more	  fully	  understand	  how	  conflict	  is	  manifested	  among	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  
groups,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   critical	   areas	   and	   consequences	   of	   these	   conflicts	   following	   the	  
downfall	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  regime,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  prior	  
to	   this	   regime	  change.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  examine	   the	   space(s)	   afforded	   to	   civil	  
society	   actors	   and	   groups	   prior	   to	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime.	   This	   involves	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  See	  Ismael,	  Middle	  East	  Politics	  Today,	  72.	  
191	  Bellin,	  “Civil	  Society	  in	  Formation:	  Tunisia,”	  124.	  
192	  Ibid.,	  126.	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consideration	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   pre-­‐	   and	   post-­‐independence	   Tunisian	   state	   and	   its	  
approach	  to	  not	  only	  civil	  society,	  but	  also	  more	  broadly	  to	  perceived	  or	  viable	  opposition.	  
This	   chapter	   begins	   with	   a	   brief	   discussion	   of	   the	   origins	   and	   structure	   of	   the	   pre-­‐
independence	   Tunisian	   state,	   by	   looking	   specifically	   to	   the	   influences	   of	  Ottoman	   control	  
from	   the	   sixteenth	   century	   and	   French	   colonial	   rule	   from	   1881.	   It	   then	   examines	   the	  
leadership	  of	  the	  post-­‐independence	  state	  from	  1956	  to	  1987	  under	  Habib	  Bourguiba	  and	  
from	  1987	  to	  2010	  under	  the	  regime	  of	  Zine	  El	  Abidine	  Ben	  Ali.	   In	  particular,	   I	  underscore	  
how	  each	   regime	   introduced	   elements	   of	   liberalism	  and	  pluralism	  at	   varying	   periods,	   but	  
also	   quickly	   withdrew	   these	   measures	   upon	   manifestations	   of	   perceived	   political	   or	   civil	  
opposition.	  Moreover,	   I	   highlight	   the	   impact	  of	   these	  practices	  on	  Tunisian	   society	  across	  
this	  period.	  The	  chapter	  then	  examines	  the	  response	  of	   the	  Ben	  Ali	   regime	  to	  civil	   society	  
actors	   and	   groups.	   To	   do	   this	   I	   analyse	   the	   laws	   of	   association	   promulgated	   during	   this	  
period	  (and	  the	  modifications	  therein)	  and	  provide	  a	  description	  of	  the	  particular	  aspects	  of	  
harassment	   and	   repression	   applied	   by	   the	   regime	   against	   more	   public	   or	   contentious	  
organisations,	   such	   as	   the	   Tunisian	  Human	  Rights	   League	   (LTDH)	   and	   the	  General	   Labour	  
Union	  of	  Tunisia	  (UGTT),	  as	  well	  as	  against	  smaller	  human	  rights	  organisations.	  Finally,	  this	  
chapter	  presents	  the	  different	  experiences	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  organisations	  interviewed	  for	  
the	   research	   that	  operated	  under	   a	  dictatorial	   regime	   that,	   over	   time,	   greatly	   constricted	  
the	   spaces	   for	   collective	   activism	   and	   grassroots	   organisation.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note,	  
however,	   that	  while	   renowned	   organisations	   such	   as	   LTDH	   and	  UGTT	   have	   played	   a	   vital	  
role	   in	   Tunisia’s	   civil	   society	   and	   sociopolitical	   landscape,	   I	   do	   not	   examine	   these	  
organisations	   in	  detail	   in	  this	  thesis.	  First,	   this	   is	  because	  much	  has	  been	  written	  on	  these	  
organisations	   by	   other	   scholars;	  193	  and	   second,	   because	   the	   two	   organisations	   are	   larger	  
umbrella	   network	   organisations	   comprising	   several	   interests	   and	   groups,	   as	   for	   example	  
UGTT	  represents	  all	  workers’	  interests	  in	  all	  sectors	  on	  labour	  laws	  and	  rights.	  This	  research	  
looks	   to	   smaller	   organisations,	   some	   of	   which	   operate	   on	   the	   periphery	   with	   vulnerable	  
groups	  and/or	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  mainstream	  of	  sociopolitical	  priorities.	  Finally,	  throughout	  
this	  chapter	  and	  the	  subsequent	  three	  chapters,	  much	  of	  the	  data	  I	  draw	  upon	  comes	  from	  
the	   research	   informants	  and	   the	  parallel	   experiences	   they	  had	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  principal	  
themes	   I	   explore	   in	   the	   thesis.	   And	   while	   this	   research	   is	   primarily	   qualitative,	   in	   places	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	  See	  Yousfi,	  L’UGTT:	  Une	  Passion	  Tunissienne;	  Cavallo,	  “Trade	  Unions	  in	  Tunisia;”	  King,	  “Regime	  Type,	  
Economic	  Reform,	  and	  Political	  Change	  in	  Tunisia;”	  and	  Ben	  Romdhane,	  Tunisie:	  Etat,	  Economie	  et	  Société.	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where	  I	  think	  it	  would	  be	  constructive	  to	  indicate	  how	  much	  an	  experience	  or	  sentiment	  is	  
shared	  by	  participants,	  I	  highlight	  this	  quantitatively.	  	  
	  
The	  next	  section	  examines	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  state.	  This	  involves	  a	  short	  discussion	  
of	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  prior	  to	  independence	  in	  1956,	  alongside	  a	  more	  detailed	  examination	  
of	   the	  different	   transformations	  of	   the	  state	  under	   the	   regimes	  of	  Bourguiba	  and	  Ben	  Ali.	  
This	   allows	   space	   to	   consider	   the	   origins,	   structure,	   and	   leadership	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   state	  
while	  giving	  room	  for	  a	  more	  explicit	  focus	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  Tunisian	  society	  that	  developed	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  disparate	  developments.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
1.	  Situating	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  
	  
While	   descriptions	   of	   the	   political	   history	   of	   Tunisia	   often	   begin	   with	   the	   charismatic	  
leadership	  of	  Habib	  Bourguiba	  following	  Tunisia’s	  independence	  from	  French	  colonial	  rule	  in	  
1956,	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  in	  the	  Maghreb	  region	  have	  far	  deeper	  roots.	   In	  his	  
book	  Tunisie:	   Etat,	   Economie,	   et	   Société,	  Mahmoud	  Ben	  Romdhane	   examines	   the	   various	  
factors	  that	  could	  explain	  the	  persistence	  of	  authoritarianism	  in	  Tunisia	  over	  a	  half	  century	  
after	   its	   independence.	   He	   and	   other	   writers,	   such	   as	   Michael	   Willis	   and	   Christopher	  
Alexander,	   trace	   the	   specific	   characteristics	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   state	   from	   even	   before	   the	  
eighteenth	   century	   to	   explain	   some	   of	   the	   core	   features	   that	   continue	   to	   leave	   their	  
historical	   residue	   on	   the	   country	   today.194	  Although	   there	   are	   several	   key	   factors	   and	  
historical	   events	   that	   greatly	   influenced	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   state	   that	   emerged	  
following	  independence	  in	  1956,	  two	  are	  considered	  here.	  These	  are	  Ottoman	  control	  from	  
the	  sixteenth	  century	  and	  French	  colonial	  rule	  from	  1881	  to	  1956,	  as	  these	  represent	  critical	  
periods	   during	   which	   core	   structures	   and	   features	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   state	   began	   to	  
materialise.	  	  
	  
The	  origins	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  
Prior	   to	  Ottoman	   control,	   the	  Hafsid	   dynasty	   governed	   the	  majority	   of	  what	   is	   known	   as	  
Tunisian	   territory	   from	   1207	   to	   1574,	   with	   its	   control	   expanding	   in	   conjunction	  with	   the	  
extension	   of	   trade	   ties	   with	   Europe.	   	   Alexander	   points	   out,	   “More	   than	   any	   other	   pre-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	  Willis,	  Politics	  and	  Power	  and	  Alexander,	  Tunisia.	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Ottoman	  dynasty,	  it	  is	  the	  Hafsids	  that	  modern	  Tunisians	  often	  regard	  as	  the	  founders	  of	  a	  
Tunisian	  state.”195	  The	  Ottomans	  seized	  control	  of	  Tunis	  in	  1574	  and	  eventually	  appointed	  a	  
bey,	  or	  a	  civil	  administrator,	  to	  maintain	  all	  executive,	  legislative,	  and	  judicial	  authority	  over	  
Tunisia.	  However,	  difficult	  climates	  and	  nomadic	  populations	  continued	  to	  pose	  challenges	  
for	  political	  administration,	  thus	  constraining	  the	  bey’s	  authority	  and	  ability	  to	  collect	  taxes	  
and	   enforce	   the	   law	   in	   the	   central	   and	   southern	   areas	   as	   well	   as	   the	   northwest	   regions	  
along	  the	  Algerian	  border.196	  To	  address	  this,	  the	  bey	  appointed	  chiefs	  to	  collect	  taxes	  and	  
administer	   the	   law	   in	   their	   local	   tribes;	   these	   local	   chiefs	   are	   said	   to	   have	   maintained	  
complete	   independence	   during	   this	   period. 197 	  While	   this	   allowed	   a	   more	   effective	  
administration	   of	   these	   key	   functions	   in	   the	  more	   difficult	   to	   reach	   territories,	   authority	  
over	  the	  disparate	  tribal	  populations	  remained	  fragmented	  in	  Tunisia	  for	  several	  centuries.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  reform	  movement	  in	  Istanbul	  on	  similar	  reform	  movements	  
in	  Tunisia,	  such	  as	  the	  “Young	  Tunisians,”	  moved	  the	  country	  closer	  to	  more	  established	  and	  
centralised	   forms	   of	   government	   and	   a	   more	   consolidated	   state. 198 	  Nevertheless,	   the	  
Ottoman	  period	  in	  Tunisia	  effectively	  exacerbated	  the	  coastal	  versus	  interior	  divide.	  It	  also	  
carried	  with	   it	   the	   increasing	   importance	  of	   Islam	  as	   a	   “central	   and	   legitimising	   aspect	   of	  
political	  power.”199	  	  
	  
Subsequently,	   French	   colonial	   rule	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   eighteenth	   century	   introduced	   a	  
number	   of	   reforms	   that	  would	   eventually	   extend	   and	   consolidate	   the	   Tunisian	   state	   into	  
well	  beyond	  the	  75-­‐year	  period	  of	  colonial	   rule.	   In	  1881	  France	  gained	  substantial	  control	  
over	  Tunisia	  and	  in	  1883	  it	  became	  a	  French	  protectorate.	  French	  colonialism	  had	  economic	  
impacts	  that	  arguably	  continue	  today	  through	  the	  extraction	  of	  raw	  materials,	  exploitation	  
of	   labour,	   the	   dislocation	   of	   agricultural	   labourers,	   and	   the	   gradual	   process	   of	   the	  
privatisation	  and	  centralisation	  of	  land.	  But	  the	  protectorate	  administration	  also	  established	  
municipal	   governments,	   improved	   transport	   infrastructure,	   and	   strengthened	   the	   central	  
government’s	  ability	  to	  extend	  into	  the	  more	  difficult-­‐to-­‐reach	  peripheral	  and	  tribal	  areas	  of	  
the	  country.	  For	  many	  countries,	  such	  as	  neighbouring	  Algeria,	  the	  experience	  of	  colonialism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  Alexander,	  Tunisia,	  12.	  
196	  Ibid.,	  13.	  
197	  Ibid.	  
198	  Willis,	  Politics	  and	  Power,	  15.	  
199	  Ibid.,	  18.	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not	  only	  significantly	  disrupted	  economic	  dynamics,	  but	  also	  damaged	  political	  institutions.	  
Alexander	   contends,	   “This	   experience	   of	   uninterrupted	   state-­‐building	   and	   progressive	  
centralisation	  marks	   an	   important	   difference	   between	   Tunisia	   and	  many	   other	   colonized	  
countries.…Since	   Tunisia	   avoided	   this	   kind	  of	   profound	  disruption	  of	   its	   central	   governing	  
institutions,	   the	   new	   government	  would	   not	   have	   to	   create	   a	  whole	   new	   order	   atop	   the	  
rubble	  of	   the	  old	  one.”200	  In	  addition,	   French	   support	   for	  educational	   reforms	  allowed	   for	  
the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  educated	  elite	  whereby	  a	   significant	  number	  of	  young	  people	   from	  
middle-­‐class	   families,	  children	  of	  provincial	   landowners,	  and	  small	  businessmen	  were	  able	  
to	  access	  new	  educational	  opportunities	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.201	  With	  economic	  conditions	  
worsening	  under	  French	  colonial	   rule	  and	  an	  emerging	  well-­‐educated	  class,	  both	   the	  “old	  
indigenous	  elite”	  and	  the	  younger	  and	  more	  radical	  elements	  of	  Tunisian	  society	  returning	  
from	  studies	  in	  France	  eventually	  formed	  the	  nationalist	  Destour	  party	  in	  1920.202	  The	  party	  
called	   for	  greater	   rights	   for	  Tunisians,	  but	   it	  did	  not	  make	  attempts	   to	  unite	   the	  different	  
elements	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   population—such	   as	   traditional	   elites,	   students,	   workers,	   and	  
farmers—behind	   a	   collective	   united	   strategy	   for	   opposing	   French	   rule.203	  Concerned	  with	  
the	   daily	   economic	   problems	   facing	   Tunisians	   across	   the	   rural-­‐urban	   dichotomy,	   younger	  
activists,	  including	  Habib	  Bourguiba,	  worked	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  party	  that	  could	  construct	  a	  
broad-­‐based	  and	  unifying	  movement	  for	  Tunisians	  to	  support;	  as	  a	  result	  the	  Neo-­‐Destour	  
party	  was	  established	   in	  1934.	  Neo-­‐Destour,	  while	  not	  without	  conflicting	  elements	   inside	  
the	   party,	   operated	   based	   on	   a	   moderate	   strategy	   of	   a	   negotiated	   transition	   to	  
independence	   from	   the	   French.204	  It	   became	   evident	   that	   a	   unified	   nationalist	  movement	  
could	  be	  effective	  and	  widely	  influential	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  practices	  adopted	  under	  French	  
rule.	  Willis	  points	  out,	  “The	  full	  and	  effective	  subjugation	  of	  the	  rural	  areas	  and	  the	  tribes	  
that	  lived	  there	  by	  the	  colonial	  powers,	  and	  their	  success	  in	  bringing	  them	  under	  the	  control	  
of	  central	  political	  authority,	  had	  never	  previously	  been	  achieved.”205	  Effectively,	  prolonged	  
efforts	  towards	  political	  centralisation	   in	  Tunisia	  became	  a	  tool	   through	  which	  to	  diminish	  
the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  tribes,	  but	  also	  to	  serve	  Neo-­‐Destour	  in	  unifying	  and	  mobilising	  broad	  
elements	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  population	  in	  the	  drive	  for	  independence.	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The	  Bourguiba	  project:	  modernisation	  and	  secularisation	  	  
At	   independence	   in	   1956,	   Tunisia	   was	   considered	   an	   “established	   bureaucratic	   state.”206	  
Bourguiba	   was	   considered	   the	   architect	   and	   father	   of	   Tunisian	   modernity,	   as	   he	   carried	  
Tunisia	  and	  the	  Neo-­‐Destour	  Party	  through	  the	  tumultuous	  independence	  period	  to	  fight	  for	  
liberation	  from	  the	  French,	  with	  the	  period	  from	  1949	  to	  1954	  manifesting	  in	  both	  guerrilla	  
warfare	   in	   the	   countryside,	   as	   well	   as	   student	   and	   worker	   strikes	   in	   the	   cities.207	  Ben	  
Romdhane	   notes	   that	   for	   several	   years	   following	   the	   attainment	   of	   independence,	  
Bourguiba	  was	  the	  target	  of	  numerous	  coups	  and	  threats	  against	  his	  regime,	  with	  many	  of	  
these	   challenges	   directed	   by	   Salah	   Ben	   Youssef	   following	   his	   expulsion	   from	   the	   Neo-­‐
Destour	  Party	  in	  1955.	  	  A	  key	  figure	  in	  the	  movement	  for	  Tunisia’s	  autonomy	  from	  France,	  
and	   for	   independence,	  Ben	  Youssef	  was	   influenced	  by	   the	  pan-­‐Arab	  nationalism	   featuring	  
across	  the	  region	  in	  Egypt,	  Syria,	  and	  Iraq,	  and	  therefore	  advocated	  more	  militant	  methods	  
to	  achieve	  independence	  from	  the	  French	  in	  contrast	  to	  Bourguiba’s	  strategy	  of	  a	  transition	  
in	   stages.208	  Ben	   Youssef	   and	   the	   Youssefists	   instigated	   attacks,	   sabotage	   (including	   the	  
derailing	  of	   trains),	  and	  violence,	  whereby	  during	  a	  period	  of	  “total	  chaos”	  the	  entirety	  of	  
Tunisia	  was	   affected	  with	   over	   900	   deaths.209	  These	   initial	  moments	   of	   state	   fragility	   and	  
conflict	  over	  Bourguiba’s	  national	  project	  eventually	   contributed	   to	   the	  nature	  of	  how	  he	  
governed	   Tunisia,	   and	  more	   importantly,	   it	   is	   argued,	   greatly	   influenced	   his	  more	   severe	  
responses	  to	  perceived	  political	  opposition.	  Bourguiba’s	  determined	  and	  sustained	  strategy	  
of	   building	   national	   support	   through	   the	   broader	   appeal	   to	   patriotism	   to	   achieve	  
independence	   eventually	   succeeded	   in	   1956.	   His	   politics	   of	   “national	   unity”	   was	   aided	  
through	   the	   post-­‐colonial	   legacy	   of	   a	   highly	   efficient	   and	   highly	   centralised	   state	  
apparatus.210	  For	  example,	  Alexander	  writes,	  “Tunisia’s	  struggle	  did	  not	  involve	  a	  fight	  over	  
land	   or	   between	   two	   fundamentally	   different	   political	   orders.	   Rather,	   it	   was	   largely	   a	  
struggle	   over	   who	   would	   staff	   and	   lead	   the	   organs	   of	   a	   central	   government	   that	   had	  
developed	   steadily	   for	   more	   than	   a	   century.”211	  However,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   Bourguiba’s	  
politics	  of	  national	  unity	  left	  minimal	  space	  for	  opposition.	  This,	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  country	  that	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historically	   was	   characterised	   by	   the	   absence	   of	   popular	   participation	   in	   politics,	   set	   the	  
stage	  for	  authoritarian	  tendencies	  that	  would	  fully	  manifest	  at	  a	  later	  stage.	  Moreover,	  Ben	  
Romdhane	   highlights	   the	   period	   of	   instability	   and	   insecurity	   in	   the	   years	   that	   followed	  
independence	   as	   a	   series	   of	   key	   watershed	   moments	   that	   ultimately	   reinforced	   at	   the	  
highest	  level	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  Party	  an	  “authoritarian	  spiral.”212	  These	  initial	  experiences	  
of	   both	   civil	   war	   preceding	   independence,	   and	   the	   years	   of	   violence	   in	   its	   consolidation,	  
effectively	  eliminated	  the	  possibility	  for	  democratic	  pluralism	  in	  Tunisia	  for	  the	  decades	  that	  
would	  follow.	  	  
	  
During	   the	   1956-­‐1969	   period,	   the	   Bourguiba	   regime	   entered	   into	   what	   Ben	   Romdhane	  
refers	  to	  as	  a	  period	  of	  “national	  construction”	  through	  a	  process	  of	  firmly	  establishing	  the	  
state’s	   sovereignty	   and	   legitimacy—politically,	   economically,	   and	  militarily—alongside	   the	  
further	   institutionalisation	   of	   solid	   state	   infrastructure	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	  
modernisation	  measures.213	  With	   a	   French	   presence	   remaining	   on	   Tunisian	   territory	   even	  
following	   independence	   (the	   French	   army	   had	   bases	   in	   both	   the	   northern	   and	   southern	  
regions	  following	  independence),	  fragmented	  justice	  systems,	  French	  currency,	  and	  limited	  
education	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   population,	   only	   the	   state	   could	   lead	   such	   significant	  
reforms.	   Beji	   Caid	   Essebsi,	   a	   former	   minister	   under	   Bourguiba	   and,	   perhaps	   not	   without	  
coincidence,	  the	  democratically	  elected	  president	  of	  Tunisia	  in	  2014,	  remarked:	  
	  
It	  was	   through	  the	  mobilisation	  of	   the	  dual	  State-­‐Party	   that	  Bourguiba	  was	  able	   to	  
lead	  these	  reforms.	  It	  was	  by	  definition	  a	  reform	  from	  on	  high	  applied	  with	  a	  certain	  
authoritarianism.	   It	   necessitated	   a	   strong	   state,	   a	   strong	   competence,	   and	   at	   its	  
leadership,	   a	  man.…Habib	  Bourguiba	  was	   this	  man	   as	   a	   result	   of	   his	   incontestable	  
legitimacy,	   the	   sacrifices	   he	  made	   for	   his	   country	   and	   his	   own	   personal	   strength.	  
Bourguiba	   did	   not	   need	   pressure	   from	   a	   popular	   base	   nor	   democratic	   control	   to	  
undertake	  these	  grand	  reforms.214	  	  
	  
During	   the	  Bourguiba	   regime,	   political	   reform	  and	   social	   reform	  were	   also	   inseparable.215	  
Article	  1	  of	  the	  1959	  Tunisian	  constitution	  came	  to	  represent	  the	  “spinal	  cord”	  of	  Tunisian	  
political	  identity;	  it	  stated,	  “Tunisia	  is	  a	  free	  state,	  sovereign	  and	  independent;	  its	  religion	  is	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Islam,	  its	  language	  is	  Arabic	  and	  its	  regime	  is	  a	  republic.”216	  Article	  1	  inevitably	  became	  the	  
mechanism	   through	   which	   Bourguiba	   led	   and	   maintained	   an	   authoritarian	   regime	   in	  
Tunisia.217	  Article	  1	  was	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Bourguiba	  solution”	  with	  secularism	  
featuring	  as	  an	  underlying	  ideology	  for	  Tunisia	  during	  this	  period.218	  More	  importantly,	  in	  his	  
biography	  of	  Bourguiba,	  Samy	  Ghorbal	  explains	  that	  Bourguiba	  believed	  that	  a	  modern	  state	  
would	  not	  hold	   in	  a	  traditional	  society	  and	  thus	  the	  building	  of	  the	  modern	  state	   involved	  
not	   only	   the	   establishment	   of	   political	   structures	   but	   also	   the	   “vigorous	   targeting	   of	  
society.”219	  Integral	  to	  this	  was	  the	  Code	  of	  Personal	  Status	  (CPS)	  of	  1956	  that	  led	  Tunisia	  to	  
become	   the	   first	   country	   in	   the	  Arab–Muslim	  world	   to	   ban	  polygamy	   and	  which	   radically	  
changed	   women’s	   social	   position	   in	   the	   country. 220 	  As	   a	   result	   of	   these	   policies	   and	  
strategies,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s	  democracy	  seemed	  untenable	  as	  the	  top-­‐down	  process	  
of	  national	  construction	  left	  little	  room	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  political	  parties.	  Concurrently,	  
the	   institutions	   of	   civil	   society	   had	   become	  weak	   or	   non-­‐existent	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   gradual	  
process	  of	  co-­‐optation	  into	  the	  broader	  Parti	  Socialiste	  Destourien	  (PSD)	  State-­‐Party.221	  Ben	  
Romdhane,	   citing	  Caid	  Essebsi,	  writes,	   “A	   strictly	  democratic	   regime	  would	  have	  probably	  
had	  to	  abandon	  all	  of	  these	  progressive,	  liberal	  and	  absolutely	  decisive	  reforms	  to	  come	  out	  
of	  the	  archaic	  nature	  of	  Tunisian	  society	  of	  the	  1950s.”222	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  poor	  socioeconomic	  indicators	  of	  the	  1960s,	  which	  included	  
extreme	   levels	   of	   poverty	   across	   the	   country,	   high	   levels	   of	   illiteracy,	   the	  majority	   of	   the	  
population	  being	  located	  in	  rural	  or	  semi-­‐urban	  areas	  or	  in	  overpopulated	  town	  centres,	  and	  
with	  regular	  employment	  only	  available	   for	  a	  minority	  of	   the	  population,	   the	  1970s	  saw	  a	  
reversal	   of	   these	   trends.223	  Following	   a	   period	   of	   socialism	   under	   the	   direction	   of	   Ahmed	  
Ben	  Salah	   in	   the	  1960s,	   the	  Minister	  of	  Plan	  and	  National	  Economy,	   in	  which	   there	  was	  a	  
national	  endeavour	  toward	  import-­‐substituting	  industrialisation	  accompanied	  by	  significant	  
increases	  in	  foreign	  borrowing	  and	  consequently	  debt,	  the	  1970s	  experienced	  a	  sharp	  shift	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toward	   market	   reforms. 224 	  With	   a	   concerted	   focus	   on	   export-­‐oriented	   development	  
strategies	  to	  attract	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  investment,	  Tunisia	  effectively	  became	  one	  of	  the	  
first	   countries	   in	   the	   Middle	   East	   and	   North	   Africa	   to	   implement	   policies	   of	   infitah	   or	  
“opening.”225	  From	  1970–1974,	  Tunisia’s	  exports	  rose	  from	  98.8	  million	  dinars	  to	  398	  million	  
dinars.	  Growth	  rates	  increased	  to	  8–10	  percent,	  placing	  Tunisia	  among	  the	  world’s	  top	  ten	  
countries	  for	  GDP	  growth	  per	  person	  during	  that	  period.226	  Significant	   injections	  of	  private	  
sector	   resources	   in	   conjunction	   with	   increased	   international	   optimism	   for	   Tunisia’s	  
economic	   prosperity	   contributed	   to	   increases	   in	   the	   number	   of	   employees	   in	   both	   the	  
private	   and	   public	   sector,	   generating	   an	   estimated	   400,000	   new	   jobs.	   This	   growth	   also	  
raised	  per	  capita	   income	  by	  over	  70	  percent	  and	  reduced	  the	  overall	  poverty	   level	   to	   less	  
than	  13	  percent;	  also	  notable	  is	  the	  decrease	  in	  illiteracy	  from	  84.7	  percent	  in	  1956	  to	  47.5	  
percent	  by	  1980.227	  	  
	  
Simultaneously	   there	   emerged	   a	   more	   radical	   and	   combative	   educated	   young	   workers	  
movement,	  with	  UGTT	  eventually	  becoming	  autonomous	  from	  the	  PSD,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  active	  
and	   engaged	   student	   movement	   and	   nascent	   human	   rights	   advocacy	   culminating	   in	   the	  
creation	  of	  the	  National	  Council	  for	  the	  Defence	  of	  Public	  Liberties.	  However,	  subsequent	  to	  
economic	   deterioration	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   decade	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   European	   economic	  
recession	   and	   state	   overinvestment	   in	   public	   sector	   enterprises	   in	   order	   to	   continue	   to	  
provide	  employment,	  debt	  rose	  to	  74	  percent	  of	  GDP	   in	  1987.228	  A	  foreign	  exchange	  crisis	  
prompted	  the	  government	  to	  eventually	  negotiate	  a	  structural	  adjustment	  package	  with	  the	  
IMF	   and	   World	   Bank	   in	   1986.	   Moreover,	   increasing	   disenchantment	   with	   the	   Bourguiba	  
regime	  and	  greater	  calls	  for	  more	  representative	  institutions	  and	  democratic	  processes	  led	  
to	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  authoritarianism	  in	  Tunisia	  after	  discredited	  democratic	  elections	  in	  1981.	  
Ben	   Romdhane	   writes,	   “The	   institutions	   that	   civil	   society	   took	   years	   to	   create—the	  
syndicates,	   political	   parties,	   the	   League	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   etc…—were	   destroyed…As	   to	  
those	  who	  were	  responsible	  for	  protecting	  society—the	  systems	  of	  justice	  and	  the	  forces	  of	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order,	   they	   were	   charged	   with	   silencing,	   arresting,	   imprisoning	   and	   torturing.”229 	  This	  
crackdown	   on	   political	   opposition,	   collective	   activism,	   and	   secular	   as	   well	   as	   Islamic	   civil	  
society	  actors	  and	  groups	  eventually	  necessitated	  a	  space	  for	  political	  and	  civil	  alternatives	  
to	  emerge.	  
	  
The	  manifestation	  of	  political	  Islam	  
The	   exact	   role	   of	   religion	   in	   post-­‐independence	   Tunisia	  was	   ambiguous.	   Conscious	   of	   the	  
mobilising	   function	   of	   Islam,	   Bourguiba	   continued	   to	  make	   public	   references	   to	   Islam.230	  
Samy	   Ghorbal	   argues,	   “Bourguiba	   very	   neatly	   refused	   to	   disassociate	   political	   categories	  
from	   religion	   ones.	   To	   the	   contrary	   he	   in	   fact	   he	  worked	   to	   aggravate	   and	  maintain	   this	  
confusion.” 231 	  Ghorbal	   states	   that	   the	   Bourguiba	   regime	   in	   particular	   was	   driven	   to	  
domesticate	  religion,	  whereby	  the	  president	  interpreted	  and	  qualified	  religious	  text	  and	  law	  
when	  necessary,	  using	  religious	  law	  to	  justify	  his	  secularising	  reforms.	  Ghorbal	  in	  fact,	  goes	  
so	   far	  as	   to	   term	  this	  “Ijtihad	  Bourguibien.”232,233	  Bourguiba	  eventually	   took	  control	  of	   the	  
mosques	  and	  their	  personnel,	  integrated	  the	  Sharia	  courts	  into	  the	  secular	  legal	  system,	  and	  
combined	   the	   renowned	   University	   of	   Zaytouna—considered	   a	   dangerous	   obstacle	  
ideologically	   and	   politically 234—	   with	   Tunis	   University. 235 	  In	   1960,	   the	   president	   even	  
attempted,	  albeit	  unsuccessfully,	  to	  motivate	  people	  to	  abandon	  the	  Ramadan	  fast,	  alleging	  
that	   fasting	   could	   be	   harmful	   to	   Tunisia’s	   economic	   growth	   and	   efforts	   to	  modernise.	  He	  
famously	  drank	  a	  glass	  of	  orange	  juice	  during	  Ramadan	  following	  a	  public	  rally	  in	  1964.236	  	  
	  
Tunisia’s	  post-­‐independence	  drive	  to	  modernise	  cultural	  practices	  was	  considered	  the	  most	  
radical	   in	   the	   region,	   in	   large	  part	   because	   it	   came	  at	   the	   expense	  of	   the	  majority	   of	   the	  
public	  who	   remained	   relatively	   conservative.237	  Abdelkader	  Zghal	  explains	   that	   the	   Islamic	  
movement	   inevitably	   became	   “the	   product	   and	   the	   expression	   of	   this	   resistance	   to	   the	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modernisation	  policy	  of	   Bourguiba,	   a	   policy	  perceived	   as	   a	  mechanism	  of	   submission	   and	  
alienation	   to	   the	   West.”238	  He	   contends	   that	   the	   core	   strategic	   direction	   of	   the	   Islamic	  
movement	   was	   to	   “deal	   carefully	   and	   tactically”	   with	   traditional	   Islam,	   to	   incorporate	  
Salafist	   Islam	   into	   the	   Tunisian	   context,	   and	   to	   eventually	   “reconcile”	   Islam	   with	  
modernity.239	  The	  principal	  Islamist	  party	  in	  Tunisia,	  le	  Mouvement	  de	  la	  Tendance	  Islamique	  
(MTI),	  struggled	  throughout	  the	  Bourguiba	  regime	  to	  definitively	  determine	  how	  politically	  
engaged	  it	  should	  become	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  should	  become	  politically	  visible.	  The	  
leadership	  of	  the	  Islamist	  movement	  in	  Tunisia	  was	  well	  educated	  and	  highly	  motivated	  to	  
address	  the	  narrowly	  secular	  orientation	  of	  the	  Bourguiba	  government	  in	  particular.240	  One	  
of	   the	   key	   figures	   throughout	   the	   life	   of	   MTI	   and	   eventually	   the	   Ennahda	   party,	   Rachid	  
Ghannouchi,	   explained	   that	   Islam	   was	   a	   comprehensive	   methodology	   for	   liberation:	   “It	  
liberates	   humanity	   from	   the	   tyranny	   of	   dictatorship	   and	   exploitation;	   it	   is	   a	   call	   to	  
unitarianism	   and	   its	   attendant	   values	   of	   equality,	   fraternity,	   freedom	   and	   the	   love	   of	  
justice.”241	  However,	   the	   Tunisian	   Islamist	   movement	   did	   not	   necessarily	   adhere	   to	   the	  
promotion	  of	   the	  classical	  model	  of	   Islam.	  Moreover,	   the	  Tunisian	   Islamist	  movement	  did	  
not	  contain	  a	  reputable	  Islamist	  scholar,	  and	  over	  time,	   it	  moved	  away	  from	  “non-­‐political	  
concerns	   such	  as	  morality,	   faith	  and	   social	  harmony”	   to	   increasingly	   seeking	   to	  engage	   in	  
and	   influence	  political	  matters.242	  For	  example,	   in	  1978	   the	  movement	  began	   to	  publish	  a	  
weekly	  news	   journal	  entitled	  Al-­‐Mujtama	   (“The	  Society”)	   through	  which	  Tunisian	   Islamists	  
demonstrated	   their	   support	   for	   the	   Iranian	   revolution.	   Simultaneously,	   a	   widely	   growing	  
Islamist	   student	   movement	   was	   developing,	   expressing	   the	   call	   for	   a	   pro-­‐Islamic	   anti-­‐
Western	  revolution.243	  	  
	  
In	   1981,	  MTI	   organised	   a	   press	   conference	   to	   announce	   its	   intention	   to	   transform	   into	   a	  
legal	   political	   organisation	   “focused	   on	   restoring	   Tunisia’s	   Islamic	   identity.”244	  From	   here	  
Willis	   contends	   that	   the	   government	   response	   to	   discernible	   opposition	   became	   severe	  
whereby	  the	   leadership	  of	  MTI	  was	  arrested,	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publishing	   inaccurate	   information,	   and	   defaming	   the	   president;	   many	   members	   were	  
imprisoned	   and	   tortured,	   with	   some	   given	   life	   sentences	   and	   the	   death	   penalty.245	  This	  
period	  of	  a	  contraction	  of	  public	  spaces	  also	  involved	  the	  routine	  arrest	  and	  imprisonment	  
of	  MTI	  members	   throughout	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   Bourguiba	   regime,	  with	   the	   president	  
quoted	  as	  declaring,	  “The	  eradication	  of	  the	  Islamist	  poison	  will	  be	  the	  last	  service	  I’ll	  render	  
Tunisia.”246	  Nevertheless,	   some	   consider	   this	   period	   of	   repression	   as	   a	   beneficial	   tool	   for	  
MTI	   as	   it	   reaffirmed	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   Islamist	  movement,	   gave	   grounds	   for	   it	   to	   insist	   on	  
formal	   recognition,	  and	  “confirmed	   its	   commitment	   to	  peaceful	  and	  democratic	  means	  of	  
political	  action.”247	  Furthermore,	   throughout	   the	  1980s	   in	  particular,	   Islamic	  activists	  were	  
able	  to	  situate	  themselves	  as	  a	  vital	  voice	  for	  economic	  discontent	  as	  well	  as	  champions	  of	  
the	   politically	   marginalised.	   MTI	   was	   also	   able	   to	   benefit	   from	   growing	   popular	  
dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  secular	  direction	  of	  the	  government	  and	  its	  elites.248	  
	  
Despite	  scholars’,	  international	  donors’	  and	  policymakers’	  aspirations	  for	  Tunisia	  to	  become	  
one	   of	   the	   region’s	   best	   hopes	   for	   liberalism	   with	   Bourguiba’s	   earlier	   demonstration	   of	  
pluralistic	   tendencies	  accompanied	  by	  economic	  stability,	   soon	  his	   regime’s	   tacit	  attempts	  
to	  manage	  any	  dissent	  overshadowed	  these	  potential	  gains.249	  For	  almost	  three	  decades	  the	  
Bourguiba	   regime	   brought	   economic	   growth	   and	   stability	   while	   it	   concurrently	   increased	  
crackdowns	  and	  human	  rights	  abuses	  against	  perceived	  opposition.	  For	  Bourguiba,	  the	  drive	  
for	   ideological	   conformity	   towards	   an	   all-­‐encompassing	   modernising	   agenda	   eventually	  
overpowered	   forms	  of	   collective	   activism	   including	   from	  among	  both	   Islamist	   and	   secular	  
movements,	   which	   did	   not	   align	   with	   his	   vision	   of	   post-­‐independence	   Tunisia.	   In	   this	  
instance,	   the	   almost	   total	   state	   endeavour	   toward	   secularism	   and	   modernity	   inevitably	  
impacted	   upon	   the	   nature	   of	   Tunisian	   society.	   It	   also	   unwittingly	   permitted	   formidable	  
counter-­‐publics	  to	  be	  forged.	  	  
	  
The	  rise	  of	  Ben	  Ali	  and	  the	  retrenching	  of	  liberal	  authoritarianism	  
In	  what	  was	  considered	  a	  bloodless	  “medical	  coup”	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  deterioration	  in	  
his	  health	  and	  popularity,	  Bourguiba	  was	  succeeded	  as	  president	  by	  Zine	  El	  Abidine	  Ben	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his	   former	   interior	   minister	   and	   prime	   minister,	   in	   November	   1987.250	  With	   increasing	  
hostility	  and	   repression	  against	  all	   forms	  of	  opposition	  accompanied	  by	  eventual	  drops	   in	  
economic	   indicators	   and	   standards	   of	   living,	   Ben	   Ali’s	   ascendency	   to	   the	   presidency	   was	  
initially	  (and	  ironically)	  hailed	  by	  the	  media,	  members	  of	  the	  academic	  sector,	  and	  donors	  as	  
a	   Tunisian	   “revolution.”	   For	   Ben	   Ali,	   political	   stability	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  
neoliberal	  reforms	  through	  structural	  adjustment	  programmes	  previously	  negotiated	  under	  
Bourguiba	  in	  1986	  became	  one	  of	  the	  regime’s	  principal	  priorities.251	  During	  the	  1990s,	  the	  
government	  pursued	  strategies	  to	  stimulate	  private	  investment,	   including	  the	  privatisation	  
of	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   established	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s	   that	   previously	   benefited	  
from	  heavy	  injections	  of	  state	  investment.	  And	  while	  Western	  financial	  institutions	  praised	  
Ben	  Ali	   for	  his	  persistence	   in	   implementing	  market-­‐oriented	  reforms,	  he	  was	  nevertheless	  
criticised	   for	   the	   pace	   at	   which	   he	   implemented	   other	   key	   reforms	   such	   as	   these	  
privatisation	   measures.252	  In	   an	   effort	   to	   maintain	   political	   stability	   and	   preclude	   social	  
unrest,	  the	  goal	  of	  both	  the	  preservation	  and	  creation	  of	  new	  jobs	  was	  paramount	  for	  the	  
regime.253	  
	  
While	  Ben	  Ali	  was	  keen	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  commitment	  to	  neoliberal	  economic	  reform	  both	  
at	  home	  and	  abroad,	  he	  was	  equally	  committed	  to	  demonstrating	  his	  outward	  conviction	  in	  
liberal	   political	   reform.	   As	   early	   as	   the	   1990s,	   Ben	   Ali	   created	   perceptible	   openings	   for	  
political	   liberalisation;	   accompanying	   these	  measures	  was	  an	   international	  enthusiasm	   for	  
the	  democratic	   potential	   these	  new	  opportunities	   could	  offer	   Tunisian	  political	   society.254	  
The	  new	  president	  pardoned	  opposition	  leaders,	  allowing	  them	  to	  return	  from	  abroad,	  and	  
provided	   amnesty	   to	   a	   multitude	   of	   political	   prisoners; 255 	  liberalised	   press	   codes;	  
inaugurated	  human	  rights	  reforms	  (Ben	  Ali	  was	  even	  awarded	  an	  international	  human	  rights	  
prize	   in	   1989);	   and	   loosened	   the	   1959	   laws	   of	   association	   (no.	   59-­‐154).256	  In	   1988,	   the	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National	  Assembly	  passed	  a	   law	  authorising	  political	  parties	  (although	  it	  prohibited	  parties	  
based	  on	  “religion,	   language,	  race	  or	  religion”)	  and	  in	  1989	  presidential	  and	  parliamentary	  
elections	  were	  held	  with	   the	  Constitutional	  Democratic	  Rally	   (RCD)	  party	   receiving	  a	   total	  
vote	  of	  80	  percent.	  William	  Zartman	  writes,	  “The	  government	  announced	  its	  entry	  into	  the	  
democratic	   era	  with	  understandable	  pride	  and	  enthusiasm,	   since	  Tunisia	  had	   its	   first	   free	  
and	  fair,	  non-­‐violent,	  competitive	  multiparty	  elections.”257	  Ben	  Ali	  himself	  was	  elected	  with	  
a	  nearly	  unanimous	  vote	  of	   support	  of	  99.27	  percent,	   albeit	  only	   representing	  half	  of	   the	  
total	  4	  million	  potential	  voters	  (only	  2.1	  million	  Tunisians	  voted).258	  Scholars	  such	  as	  Susan	  
Waltz	   and	   Eva	   Bellin	   observed	   that	   despite	   these	   signs	   of	   optimism,	   the	   residue	   of	  
personalist	   rule	   would	   soon	   rematerialise.	   Rather	   than	   creating	   a	   system	   of	   multiparty	  
opposition,	   the	   regime	   was	   actually	   increasing	   its	   power	   and	   further	   embedding	  
authoritarian	  and	  repressive	  practices.259	  	  
	  
Events	  in	  neighbouring	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  directly	  influenced	  the	  approach	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  
regime	  would	  eventually	  adopt	  toward	  Islamist	  opposition,	  in	  particular	  as	  Ben	  Ali	  sought	  to	  
further	  establish	  his	   legitimacy	  as	  Tunisia’s	   leader.	  This	   included	   the	  victory	  of	   the	   Islamic	  
Salvation	   Front	   (FIS)	   in	   Algeria	   in	   the	   first	   round	   of	   parliamentary	   elections	   in	   December	  
1991,	   Islamist	   demonstrations	   against	   the	   US	   military	   in	   Saudi	   Arabia	   following	   Iraq’s	  
invasion	   of	   Kuwait	   earlier	   that	   year,	   and	   more	   locally	   in	   1991,	   the	   attack	   on	   the	   RCD’s	  
central	   offices	   in	   Tunis	   during	   which	   a	   security	   guard	   died	   and	   several	   were	   wounded	  
(despite	   being	   blamed	   by	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   government,	   Ennahda	   consistently	   denied	  
responsibility	   for	   event).260	  For	   example,	   MTI	   became	   a	   viable	   threat	   to	   the	   Bourguiba	  
regime	   when	   it	   eventually	   attained	   significant	   representation	   in	   the	   16th	   national	  
conference	  of	  UGTT;	   it	  had	   secured	  an	  executive	  committee	  position	  on	   the	  board	  of	   the	  
Tunisian	  League	  of	  Human	  Rights;	  it	  featured	  regularly	  in	  the	  media;	  and	  MTI	  witnessed	  its	  
student	  movement	   expand	   to	   over	   15,000	   students	   petitioning	   to	   hold	   a	   general	   student	  
MTI	  conference.261	  However,	  Ben	  Ali	   released	  several	   thousand	  MTI	  activists	   in	  prison	  and	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eventually	  released	  Rachid	  Ghannouchi	  and	  the	  movement’s	  core	  leaders	  in	  May	  1988.262	  In	  
a	   concerted	   attempt	   to	   develop	   a	   less	   confrontational	   relationship	  with	   the	   new	   regime,	  
Ghannouchi	  made	  clear	  that	  MTI	  only	  hoped	  to	  attain	  ten	  seats	  in	  the	  Assembly	  and,	  in	  an	  
effort	  to	  minimise	  explicit	  references	  to	  Islam,	  in	  1989	  MTI	  was	  renamed	  Hizb	  Ennahda,	  or	  
the	  Ennahda	  party,	  in	  its	  application	  to	  establish	  a	  formal	  political	  party.263	  The	  results	  of	  the	  
election	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  allocated	  all	  seats	  to	  Ben	  Ali’s	  RCD	  party,	  and	  no	  seats	  to	  
Ennahda.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   Ennahda	   attracted	   at	   least	   30	   percent	   of	   the	   popular	   vote	   in	  
reality,	   and	   therefore	   Ennahda	   publicly	   contested	   the	   election.264	  From	   this	   point,	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   government	   and	   Tunisia’s	   Islamist	  movement	   began	   to	  
take	  on	  the	  residue	  of	  the	  former	  regime’s	  approach	  to	  all	  political	  opposition.	  In	  May	  1989	  
Ghannouchi	  sought	  exile	  in	  Algeria	  and	  eventually	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  in	  protest	  against	  the	  
election	   results.	   Eventually	   Ennahda	   was	   banned	   and	   in	   1992	   its	   entire	   leadership	   was	  
imprisoned.265	  
	  
The	  threat	  of	  Islamist	  “extremism”	  as	  perceived	  more	  broadly	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  
Africa	  during	  this	  time	  effectively	  allowed	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  to	  repress	  significant	  sections	  
of	   the	   population	   as	   well	   as	   any	   form	   of	   collective	   activism	   understood	   as	   potential	  
opposition.266	  Soon	   the	   regime’s	   interior	   minister	   began	   a	   swift	   public	   opinion	   campaign	  
against	   Ennahda,	  which	   resulted	   in	   the	  arrest	  of	   the	   remainder	  of	   Ennhada’s	  members	   in	  
only	  a	  matter	  of	  months.	  Mohamed	  Hamdi	  writes:	  
	  
What	  followed	  later	  was	  a	  total	  attack	  on	  Ennahda	  and	  everything	  connected	  with	  it,	  
in	   almost	   every	   political	   and	   social	   aspect....The	   thousands	   of	   its	   leaders	   and	  
members	  arrested	  were	  put	  on	   trial	   and	  given	  various	   sentences	   ranging	   from	  the	  
death	  penalty...to	  life	  sentences	  for	  most	  of	  the	  political	  leaders.267	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Despite	   routine	   crackdowns	   on	   perceived	   Islamic	   activity,	   the	   Ben	  Ali	   regime	   emphasised	  
that	  such	  restrictive	  policies	  underpinned	  economic	  growth,	  improved	  living	  standards,	  and	  
“protected	  social	  advances	  such	  as	  the	  integration	  of	  women	  into	  the	  public	  and	  economic	  
life.”268	  The	  Ben	  Ali	  government	  also	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  associate	  Islamist	  movements	  
with	   intolerance	   and	   violence.	   Susan	   Waltz	   argues	   that	   were	   it	   not	   for	   the	   moral	   panic	  
shared	   in	   the	   perception	   of	   the	   “dangers	   of	   the	   Islamist	   movements”	   among	   political	  
leaders	  in	  the	  region	  as	  well	  as	  policymakers	  in	  the	  West,	  Western	  governments	  might	  have	  
worked	  more	   diligently	   to	   underscore	   the	   ongoing	   human	   rights	   abuses	   against	   Islamists	  
across	   North	   Africa.	   According	   to	   Waltz,	   “As	   it	   is,	   thanks	   to	   a	   Western	   revulsion	   at	   the	  
prospect	   of	   Islamists	   in	   power,	   assiduously	   cultivated	   by	  Algeria	   and	   Tunisia,	   the	   regimes	  
were	  not	  only	  permitted	  to	  revert	  to	  their	  authoritarian	  ways,	  they	  were	  also	  paid	  for	  it.”269	  
Some	  secular	   factions,	   including	  political	  parties	  and	  civil	   society	  organisations	  during	   this	  
time,	  supported	  and	  collaborated	  with	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  in	   its	  repression	  of	  the	  Islamists	  
because	   of	   their	   own	   fear	   of	   Islamism.270	  Consequently,	   these	   organisations	   began	   to	  
distance	  themselves	  from	  Islamist	  organisations.	  As	  Islamist	  organisations	  de	  facto	  could	  not	  
legally	   acquire	   the	   “associational	   visa,”	   organisations	   perceived	   as	   Islamist	   could	   not	  
establish,	   even	   at	   a	   minimum,	   social	   welfare	   organisations	   in	   their	   communities.	   This	  
ultimately	  had	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  Tunisian	  society	  that	  would	  emerge	  during	  
this	   period.	   Consequently,	   over	   time,	   civil	   society	   in	   Tunisia	   comprised	   mainly	   secular	  
organisations	  operating	  in	  an	  almost	  entirely	  uncontested	  field.	  John	  Entelis	  writes,	  “Sadly,	  
many	  of	  the	  country’s	  leading	  intellectuals,	  journalists	  and	  writers	  have	  collaborated	  in	  the	  
governmental	  effort	  (actively	  or	  by	  their	  silence)	  despite	  the	  severe	  limitations	  this	  has	  had	  
on	  basic	  civil	  and	  human	  rights	  including	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression.”271	  	  
	  
Beatrice	   Hibou,	   for	   example,	   quantifies	   the	   ubiquity	   of	   not	   only	   the	   police	   security	  
apparatus	  but	  also	  the	  omnipresence	  of	  the	  significant	  number	  of	  RCD	  party	  members	  and	  
cells	  across	  Tunisia	  during	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.	  She	  argues	  that	  after	  the	  police,	  the	  RCD	  cells	  
were	   the	   most	   systematic	   means	   of	   surveillance—citing	   7,500	   local	   cells	   and	   2,200	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professional	   cells	  with	   over	   2	  million	  members	   for	   Tunisia’s	   10	  million	   inhabitants.272	  She	  
states	  that	  many	  civil	  society	  associations	  effectively	  facilitated	  the	  government’s	  ability	  to	  
“keep	  the	  country	  under	  surveillance”	  because	  they	  were	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  RCD.273	  She	  
contends,	   “Matters	   are	   more	   complex	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   very	   dense	   network	   of	  
thousands	  of	  small	  associations	  of	  which	  hardly	  anything	  is	  known	  and	  whose	  creation	  was	  
suggested	  or	  fostered	  by	  political	  circumstances....The	  RCD	  has	  played	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  
their	  creation	  or	  the	  way	  they	  have	  been	  subjected	  to	  surveillance.”274	  Hibou	  notes	  that	  a	  
number	   of	   associations	   existed	   functionally	   to	   “discipline	   the	   population”	   by	   propagating	  
the	   ideas,	   goals,	   preoccupations,	   priorities,	   and	   moreover	   fears	   of	   the	   government.275	  
Inevitably	   demarcating	   and	   excluding	   the	   opposition	   became	   part	   of	   their	   designated	  
responsibilities.	  	  
	  
Despite	   encouraging	   signs	   that	   the	   “revolution”	   in	   1987	  would	  bring	   increased	   liberalism,	  
freedom	  and	  tolerance,	  the	  residue	  of	  personalist	  authoritarian	  rule	  did	  indeed	  resurface	  in	  
Tunisia.	  Earlier	  efforts	  to	  foster	  the	  impression	  of	  broadening	  liberal	  democratic	  reforms—
such	  as	  the	  lifting	  of	  restrictions	  on	  the	  media,	  in	  legal	  reforms,	  and	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  laws	  
of	   association—did	   not	   actually	   lead	   to	   a	   more	   politically	   active	   society.	  With	   increasing	  
crackdowns	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  space	  permitted	  for	  dissent,	  the	  Tunisian	  populace	  endured	  
an	   oppressive	   regime	   in	   part	   for	   economic	   and	   national	   security.	   In	   the	   next	   section	   the	  
simultaneous	  process	  of	  expanding	  and	  contracting	  the	  symbolic	  and	  physical	  public	  spaces	  
for	  civil	  society	  is	  further	  described	  under	  Ben	  Ali.	  It	  reveals	  in	  greater	  detail	  a	  regime	  that	  
went	   to	   great	   lengths	   to	   stifle	   emerging	   counter-­‐publics	   while	   often	   giving	   the	   outward	  
appearance	  of	  fostering	  and	  nurturing	  spaces	  for	  these	  different	  groups	  and	  actors.	  
	  
	  
	  
2.	  The	  consolidation	  of	  civil	  society	  	  
	  
The	  Ben	  Ali	   regime	  understood	   fully	   the	  efficacy	  and	  usefulness	  of	   adopting	   liberalisation	  
policies	   as	   this	   permitted	   the	   facade	   of	   government	   legitimacy	   domestically	   and	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internationally	  while	  allowing	   further	  control	  over	  perceived	  opposition.	   In	  particular,	  Ben	  
Ali	  grasped	  the	  benefits	  of	  embracing	  discourses	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  in	  lifting	  restrictions	  
on	  civil	  society,	  namely	  the	  formal	  laws	  of	  association.	  Tunisia	  was	  the	  first	  country	  in	  North	  
Africa	  to	  apply	  a	  human	  rights	  discourse	  and	  it	  is	  even	  argued	  that	  the	  regime’s	  legitimacy	  
was	   intrinsically	   linked	   to	  his	   adoption	  of	   the	  human	   rights	  platform.276	  Waltz	  details	   that	  
despite	   the	  arrest	  and	  detention	  of	   thousands	  of	   Islamists	   since	   the	  early	  1990s,	   “Ben	  Ali	  
was	  openly	  commended	  for	  introducing	  reforms	  by	  Tunisia’s	  western	  partners,	  and	  France	  
went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  award	  him	  a	  prestigious	  human	  rights	  prize.”277	  These	  idiosyncrasies	  also	  
manifested	   in	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   reforms	  were	   implemented	   in	   relation	   to	  civil	   society.	  
Throughout	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  amendments	  were	  made	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  association	  formerly	  
implemented	   under	   Bourguiba	   in	   1959.	   These	   amendments	   simultaneously	   permitted	  
expansions	  for	  some	  civil	  society	  organisations	  while	  strictly	  contracting	  room	  to	  manoeuvre	  
for	  others.	  For	  example,	  the	  law	  of	  7	  November	  1959	  on	  associations	  was	  amended	  in	  1992	  
to	  establish	  a	  system	  of	  classification	  for	  the	  associations	  and	  again	  in	  1998	  to	  establish	  the	  
procedures	  for	  the	  “declaration”	  of	  associations.278	  However,	  while	  the	  laws	  of	  association	  
in	  Tunisia	  were	  being	  gradually	  loosened	  by	  the	  regime,	  human	  rights	  violations	  continued	  
with	   Tunisia’s	   prisons	   being	   more	   populated	   in	   1991–1992	   than	   during	   any	   period	  
throughout	   colonial	   rule. 279 	  Furthermore,	   new	   freedoms	   in	   the	   media,	   such	   as	   the	  
restoration	   in	   1987	   of	   an	   independent	   press,	   overshadowed	   the	   removal	   of	   religious	  
literature	   in	   broader	   media.	   Eventually	   the	   political	   Al-­‐Mawkaf	   (published	   by	   the	  
Rassemblement	   Socialiste	   Progressiste	   (RSP))280	  and	   weekly	   independent	   journal	   Realités	  
also	  had	  their	  copies	  temporarily	  removed.281	  Waltz	  argues,	  “In	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  era,	  toleration	  in	  
widely	  publicised	  cases	  of	  press	  and	  associational	   freedoms	   is	   in	  some	  measures	  offset	  by	  
less	  well	   publicised	   but	   no	   less	   significant	   instances	  where	   the	   new	   freedoms	   have	   been	  
abridged.”282	  The	   following	  section	  describes	   the	  changes	   to	   the	   laws	  of	  association	  made	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during	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime	   to	   underscore	   how	   these	   organisations	   were	   undermined	   and	  
simultaneously	   brought	   under	   further	   control	   by	   the	   government.	   It	   then	   reflects	   the	  
corresponding	  modes	  of	  surveillance	  and	  repression	  applied	  by	  the	  state	  against	  civil	  society	  
organisations,	   such	   as	   the	   human	   rights	   and	   organisations	   working	   with	   marginalised	  
populations,	   when	   unacceptable	   forms	   of	   civic	   association	   or	   political	   opposition	   were	  
perceived.	  
	  
The	  law	  and	  life	  of	  the	  associations	  	  
It	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	  while	   although	   Islamist	  movements	   and	  organisations	  were	   a	  
primary	  target	  of	  repression	  throughout	  the	  two	  decades	  prior	  to	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  
Ali	   regime	   in	   2011,	   a	   number	   of	   secular	   civil	   society	   organisations	   also	   encountered	   the	  
brunt	   force	  of	   the	   regime’s	   repressive	   tactics	  against	  perceived	  political	  opposition.	   Some	  
civil	  society	  organisations	  during	  this	  period,	  rather	  than	  serving	  as	  a	  means	  to	  consolidate	  
democracy	   through	   the	   density	   of	   social	   capital	   growing	   in	   Tunisia,	   were	   being	  
instrumentalised	  by	  the	  government	  to	  further	  embed	  authoritarian	  practices.	  The	  regime	  
eventually	  used	  the	  laws	  of	  association,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  civil	  society	  organisations	  themselves,	  
to	  bring	  a	  host	  of	  actors	  and	  groups	  under	  greater	  governmental	  control	  and	  to	  undermine	  
their	   ability	   to	   function	   effectively.	   Clement	   Henry	   explains	   that	   for	   countries	   in	   North	  
Africa,	  civil	  society	  and	  its	  relegated	  associations	  are	  not	  entirely	  distinct	  from	  the	  state.	  He	  
writes:	  	  	  
	  
Informal	  as	  well	  as	   formal	   intermediaries	  are	   shaped	  by	   laws,	   regulations,	  and...by	  
historical	  legacies	  of	  conflict	  and	  cooperation	  with	  authorities.	  It	  is	  the	  modern	  state,	  
after	   all,	   that	   encourages	   or	   discourages	   intermediaries	   from	   becoming	   formal	  
associations,	  makes	  them	  legal	  or	  illegal,	  and	  gives	  them	  public	  space	  or	  drives	  them	  
underground.283	  
	  
In	  2007,	  there	  were	  9,132	  civil	  society	  organisations	  officially	  registered	  in	  Tunisia,	  with	  an	  
estimated	  9,600	   registered	  organisations	  at	   the	  end	  of	  2010.284	  The	  majority	  of	   these	  civil	  
society	  organisations	  were	  classed	  as	  artistic	  and	  cultural	   (6,005),	   sports	   (1,281),	   scientific	  
(495)	   or	   social	   (579).285	  Among	   the	   thousands	   of	   civil	   society	   organisations	   established	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  Gouvernance	  Environnementale	  Démocratique,”	  8,	  citing	  the	  2011	  IFEDA	  statistics	  (based	  on	  
2010	  data).	  See	  also:	  www.ifeda.org.tn/francais/statistiques.php.	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during	   this	   period,	   very	   few	   engaged	   in	   humanitarian	   development	   or	   the	   promotion	   of	  
women’s	   rights	   or	   broader	   human	   rights.	   The	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	   at	   the	   time	  
were	  characterised	  as	  timid,	  and	  were	  understood	  only	  to	  play	  a	  symbolic	  role	  to	  participate	  
in	   public	   events	   and	   occasionally	   provide	   social/support	   services	   to	   certain	   groups	   of	   the	  
population.286	  The	   laws	   of	   association	   throughout	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime	   were	   notoriously	  
constrained.	   The	   procedure	   to	   legalise	   an	   organisation	   was	   cumbersome	   and,	   for	   many,	  
simply	  registering	  an	  organisation	  brought	  uncertain	  risk.	  	  
	  
In	  August	  1988	  and	  April	  1992,	  Ben	  Ali	  amended	  the	   law	  of	  7	  November	  1959	  that	   legally	  
governed	  the	  formation	  and	  existence	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  in	  Tunisia.287	  After	  these	  
changes	   there	   were	   eight	   “associational”	   categories	   from	   which	   an	   organisation	   must	  
choose	  when	  submitting	  a	  written	  request	  for	  official	  “associational	  status”	  to	  the	  Ministry	  
of	   Interior,	   they	   were:	   women,	   sport,	   science,	   cultural	   and	   artistic,	   social,	   development,	  
friendly/social	  (amicales),	  and	  general.288	  The	  categories	  appear	  broad	  however	  their	  actual	  
application	  significantly	  limited	  the	  disparate	  kinds	  of	  organisations	  eligible	  to	  apply	  as	  the	  
law	   prohibited	   organisations	   of	   a	   political	   nature.	   The	   changes	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   association	  
during	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   era	   (in	   1988	   and	   1992)	   also	   detailed	   that	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Interior	  was	  
required	  to	  consider	  applications	  by	  political	  parties	  and	  organisations	  within	  three	  months	  
of	   receiving	   an	   application. 289 	  Once	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Interior	   approved	   a	   request,	   the	  
organisation	  could	  acquire	  its	  legal	  status.	  There	  was	  however	  no	  legal	  time	  limit	  to	  issue	  a	  
receipt	   of	   declaration	   from	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Interior,	   and	   some	   civil	   society	   organisations	  
would	   argue	   that	   “officials	   take	   advantage	   of	   that	   void	   to	   disrupt	   the	   process.”290	  This	  
measure	  could	  consequently	  prevent	  the	  required	  and	  formal	  notice	   in	  the	  Journal	  official	  
de	  la	  République	  Tunisienne	  (JORT)	  and	  hence	  the	  legal	  formation	  of	  an	  organisation.291	  The	  
result	  was	  that	  a	  number	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  were	  then	  forced	  to	  operate	  outside	  
the	   law	   as	   they	   were	   “unrecognised	   associations”	   by	   the	   government;	   this	   left	   the	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  Majoub,	  “La	  Gouvernance	  Environnementale	  Démocratique,”	  2.	  
287	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Human	  Rights	  Network,	  “Freedom	  of	  Association,”	  83.	  
288	  See	  Journal	  Officiel	  de	  la	  République	  Tunisienne	  :	  www.cnudst.rnrt.tn/index26e1.html?jort_fr.	  
289	  Bouandel,	  “Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Maghreb,”	  130	  and	  135.	  
290	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Human	  Rights	  Network,	  “Freedom	  of	  Association,”	  84.	  
291	  The	  association	  could	  not	  begin	  to	  operate	  before	  the	  three-­‐month	  period	  or	  before	  the	  publication	  of	  
notice	  (of	  organisational	  establishment)	  in	  the	  JORT.	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organisations	   in	   a	   challenging	   situation.292	  	   The	   civil	   society	   organisations	   that	   remained	  
officially	  unregistered	  also	  had	  limited	  access	  to	  the	  populations	  they	  sought	  to	  support.293	  
The	  ministry	   could	   also	   refuse	   the	   application	   simply	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   “contrary	   to	   the	  
law”	  without	  providing	  any	  further	  details.	  Moreover,	  the	  ministry	  could	  legally	  request	  the	  
court	  to	  dissolve	  an	  organisation	  whose	  activities	  were	  perceived	  to	  contravene	  the	  laws	  of	  
association.	   In	  practice	  the	  ministry	  routinely	  closed	  associational	  premises	  and	  prevented	  
members	   from	  meeting	  without	  having	   to	   seek	  permission	   from	   the	   courts.	   For	  example,	  
the	  ministry	   closed	   11	   regional	   offices	   of	   the	   Tunisian	  Human	  Rights	   League	   (LTDH)	   from	  
September	  2005	  without	  permission	  from	  the	  courts.294	  In	  effect,	  Moncef	  Ouannes	  argues	  
that	  during	  this	  period	  the	  North	  Africa	  regimes,	   including	  under	  Bourguiba	  and	  Ben	  Ali	   in	  
Tunisia,	  were	  never	  far	  from	  their	  ultimate	  distrust	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  public	  space.295	  These	  
deliberate	   openings	   were	   never	   without	   stringent	   safeguards	   in	   place	   to	   ensure	   any	  
autonomous	  action	  was	  contained.	  
	  
The	  deployment	  of	  surveillance	  and	  the	  repression	  of	  civil	  society	  
Between	  1990	  and	  1992	  the	  government	  is	  reported	  to	  have	  “hauled	  in”	  and	  arrested	  more	  
than	   8,000	   individuals	   following	   growing	   state	   crackdowns	   on	   perceived	   opposition.296	  
Alexander	   explains,	   “Most	   Tunisians	   tolerated	   the	   government’s	   repression.	   As	   the	   press	  
never	  ceased	  to	  remind	  them,	  a	  vigorous	  economy	  that	  could	  generate	  new	  jobs	  depended	  
on	  Tunisia’s	  ability	  to	  attract	  foreign	  investment.”297	  Strategies	  of	  infiltration	  and	  duplication	  
were	   increasingly	  applied	  by	   the	  government	   to	   further	  control	  or	  undermine	  civil	   society	  
actors	  and	  groups	  that	  were	  kept	  under	  permanent	  surveillance.	  Laila	  Alhamad	  argues	  that	  
a	  “repertoire	  of	  tactics”	  was	  perfected	  to	  “tie	  the	  hands	  of	  these	  organisations	  and	  prevent	  
them	   from	  posing	   any	   important	   threat	   to	   the	   state.”298	  In	   Tunisia,	   force	  or	   coercion	  was	  
mobilised	   when	   an	   autonomous	   organisation	   became	   a	   threat,	   for	   example	   through	   the	  
direct	  manipulation	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  elections	  or	  policy	  direction,	  or	  via	  the	  practice	  of	  
government	   officials	   attending	   the	   organisation’s	   general	   assemblies.	   Bellin	   notes,	  
“Consequently,	   the	   autonomy	   of	   associations	   in	   Tunisia	   is	  made	   strictly	   conditional	   upon	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Human	  Rights	  Network,	  “Freedom	  of	  Association,”	  84.	  
293	  Hibou,	  The	  Force	  of	  Obedience,	  101.	  
294	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Human	  Rights	  Network,	  “Freedom	  of	  Association,”	  84–85.	  
295	  Ouannes,	  Le	  Phénomène	  Associatif,	  28.	  
296	  Waltz,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Reform,	  72	  in	  Alexander,	  “Back	  from	  the	  Democratic	  Brink,”	  35.	  
297	  Alexander,	  “Back	  from	  the	  Democratic	  Brink,”	  35.	  
298	  Alhamad,	  “Formal	  and	  Informal	  Venues	  of	  Engagement,”	  38.	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their	  dedication	  to	  serving	  the	  ‘national	  interest’,	  with	  the	  ‘national	  interest’	  defined	  by	  the	  
regime	  itself.”299	  The	  civil	  society	  organisations	  perceived	  as	  threatening	  were	  also	  regularly	  
subjected	   to	   harassment	   by	   the	   security	   apparatus,	   the	   judiciary	   and	   government	  
officials.300	  Measures	  to	  silence	  opposition	  once	  again	  took	  on	  increasingly	  severe	  forms	  as	  
mechanisms	   for	   repression	   became	   further	   embedded	   in	   the	   power	   of	   the	   state	   and	  
shadow	  state.	  Beatrice	  Hibou	  describes	  a	  political	  economy	  of	  domination	   in	  Tunisia	  “that	  
mainly	  operates	  by	  means	  of	  the	  insertion	  of	  disciplinary	  and	  coercive	  techniques	  of	  power	  
into	   the	   most	   everyday	   economic	   and	   social	   structures	   and	   practices.”301 	  The	   regime	  
routinely	   practiced	   surveillance	   and	   phone	   tapping,	   threats	   against	   family	   members,	  
passport	   confiscation,	   and	   violence	   that	   included	   targeted	   assassinations.302	  Daily	   life	   in	  
Tunisia	   was	   soon	   characterised	   by	   the	   populace’s	   reluctant	   tolerance	   of	   a	   “constant	   and	  
intrusive	  police	  presence.”303	  For	  example,	  the	  number	  of	  police	  reported	  under	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  
regime	   was	   between	   80,000	   and	   133,000	   for	   approximately	   10	   million	   inhabitants.	   In	  
Tunisia	  the	  ratio	  of	  police	  to	  citizens	  at	  the	  higher	  end	  was	  1:112	  whereas	  in	  France	  during	  a	  
similar	  period	  (considered	  the	  most	  heavily	  policed	  state	  in	  Europe)	  the	  corresponding	  ratio	  
was	   1:265.304	  Hibou	   effectively	   describes	   a	   Foucauldian	   “political	   anatomy	   of	   the	   detail”	  
under	   Ben	   Ali	   to	   articulate	   an	   “inextricable	   interweaving	   between	   repression	   and	   social	  
control”	   whereby	   the	   state	   could	   derive	   knowledge	   at	   the	   finest	  micro-­‐level	   detail	   of	   its	  
subjects.305	  Of	   the	  descriptions	  of	   techniques	  of	   intimidation	  and	  manipulation	  applied	  by	  
the	   regime,	   Hibou	   manages	   to	   capture	   the	   repression	   inflicted	   upon	   associations	   at	   any	  
given	  time:	  
	  
Officially	  or	  not,	  they	  can	  prevent	  or	  interrupt	  meetings,	  follow	  and	  harass	  militants,	  
encircle	  meeting	   places,	   force	   their	   way	   into	   premises,	   attack	  militants	   physically,	  
call	   the	   relevant	   people	   in	   for	   questioning	   in	   police	   stations	   or	   at	   the	  Ministry	   of	  
Interior,	   organise	   tendentious	   and	   defamatory	   campaigns	   in	   the	   press,	   launch	  
prosecutions	  and	  institute	  proceedings,	  and	  organise	  break-­‐ins	  into	  professional	  and	  
private	  offices.306	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The	   more	   extreme	   examples	   of	   government	   distrust	   and	   repression	   of	   civil	   society	  
organisations	   in	   Tunisia	   were,	   for	   example,	   applied	   against	   the	   General	   Labour	   Union	   of	  
Tunisia	   (UGTT)—its	   leadership	  structure	  was	  eventually	  penetrated	  and	   taken	  over	  by	   the	  
government307—and	  against	  the	  Tunisian	  Human	  Rights	  League	  (LTDH),	  for	  which	  the	  1992	  
law	  of	  association	  was	  amended	   in	  order	   to	  circumvent	   its	  perceived	  oppositional	   role.308	  
However,	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  their	   initial	  establishment,	  many	  organisations	  experienced	  
disparate	  forms	  and	  levels	  of	  harassment,	  intimidation,	  and	  infiltration.	  	  
	  
There	   were	   approximately	   ten	   “rebel	   associations”	   that	   routinely	   experienced	   the	   blunt	  
force	  of	  the	  “political	  anatomy	  of	  the	  detail”	  under	  Ben	  Ali,	  including	  organisations	  focusing	  
on	  women’s	  rights	  and	  human	  rights	  more	  broadly.309	  Nine	  interviewees	  for	  the	  research	  for	  
this	   thesis	   were	   involved	   during	   this	   period	   in	   either	   human	   rights	   groups	   or	   other	   civil	  
society	  organisations	  or	  collective	  activism.	  All	  confirmed	  and	  described	  to	  varying	  degree	  
the	  disparate	  tactics	  the	  government	  applied	  through	  its	  “political	  anatomy	  of	  the	  detail”	  on	  
civil	  society	  (these	  interviewees	  do	  not	  include	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  associations	  
which	   are	   further	   described	   in	   the	   next	   section).310	  One	   interviewee	   for	   the	   research,	  
Naeema,	   began	   her	   career	   in	   journalism	   and	   eventually	   came	   to	   work	   with	   one	   of	   the	  
women’s	   rights	   organisations	   in	   Tunis.	   She	   described	   how	   her	   membership	   in	   various	  
human	  rights	  organisations	  came	  at	  a	  high	  cost	  both	  at	   the	  professional	  and	  the	  personal	  
level.	   The	   government	   eventually	   confiscated	   her	   right	   to	   work	   in	   journalism	   and,	  
subsequently,	   she	   could	   not	   find	   employment.	   She	   explained	   that	   she	   was	   denied	   work	  
because	  she	  was	  a	  member	  of	  Amnesty	  International,	  which	  she	  said	  under	  Ben	  Ali	  was	  one	  
of	  “the	  worst	  things	  you	  could	  do”	  as	  this	  was	  viewed	  negatively	  and	  with	  suspicion,	  even	  
though	   she	   felt	   the	   organisation	   did	   not	   engage	   in	   any	   activities	   that	   appeared	   in	   direct	  
opposition	  to	  the	  government.311	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307	  Under	  Ben	  Ali,	  the	  president	  appointed	  UGTT’s	  secretary-­‐general	  and	  often	  directly	  appointed	  members	  of	  
the	  executive	  committee.	  See	  Cavallo,	  “Trade	  Unions	  in	  Tunisia,”	  239–266.	  
308	  The	  April	  1992	  law,	  allowing	  for	  greater	  political	  supervision,	  specifies	  that	  an	  association	  “cannot	  refuse	  
membership	  to	  any	  person	  who	  is	  committed	  in	  his	  principles	  and	  his	  decisions.”	  Hibou,	  The	  Force	  of	  
Obedience,	  98-­‐99.	  See	  also	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Human	  Rights	  Network,	  “Freedom	  of	  Association,”	  84–85	  and	  
Waltz,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Maghreb,”	  75–92.	  
309	  Hibou,	  The	  Force	  of	  Obedience,	  98.	  
310	  Informant	  numbers:	  36,	  37,	  38,	  40,	  41,	  42,	  43,	  51	  and	  53.	  
311	  Informant	  40:	  Director,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  12	  Mar.	  2012.	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Several	  years	  later	  she	  was	  eventually	  able	  to	  acquire	  a	  position	  at	  the	  Tunisian	  Association	  
of	  Democratic	  Women	  (ATFD)	  but,	  she	  explained	  that	  in	  most	  places	  “you	  do	  not	  get	  a	  job	  
you	  apply	  for	  because	  you	  are	  not	  qualified	  or	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	  skills	  set,	  under	  Ben	  Ali	  
it	  was	  because	  of	  your	  activities	  and	  the	  groups	  you	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  affiliated	  with.”312	  The	  
police	   followed	   Naeema	   and	   even	   followed	   her	   family.	   I	   asked	   her	   whether	   she	  
acknowledged	  this	  sense	  of	  personal	  risk	  to	  herself	  during	  the	  time	  when	  she	  was	  followed	  
and	  harassed	  by	  the	  government.	  She	  replied,	  “No,	  I	  continued	  my	  activism	  because	  it	  was	  
the	  only	  way	  for	  me	  to	  breathe....I	  felt	  asphyxiated.”313	  She	  described	  what	  it	  was	  like	  when	  
she	  was	  eventually	  able	  to	  work	  for	  the	  prominent	  women’s	  rights	  organisation,	  noting	  that	  
the	  organisation’s	  phones	  were	   tapped,	   staff	   and	  members	  were	  prevented	  by	   the	  police	  
from	   leaving	   the	   organisation’s	   headquarters	   on	   several	   occasions,	   and	   members	   were	  
followed	   and	  watched	   routinely.	   For	   example,	   the	   organisation	   opened	   a	   young	   people’s	  
centre	   that	   was	   soon	   closed	   and	   boarded	   up	   by	   the	   police	   for	   six	   months.	   Naeema	  
explained:	  
	  	  
Before	  the	  revolution	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  did	  everything	  it	  could	  to	  prevent	  groups	  of	  
people	  from	  coming	  together	   in	   intimate	  spaces....There	  were	  no	  spaces	  for	  young	  
people	  or	  adults	  to	  come	  together	  as	  the	  regime	  tried	  to	  distance	  people	  from	  one	  
another....It	  was	  very	  difficult	  for	  the	  young	  people	  when	  this	  space	  was	  closed	  as	  it	  
affected	  the	  solidarity	  they	  had	  formed	  together.314	  
	  
In	  addition,	   if	   the	  organisation	  wanted	  to	  hold	  external	  meetings	  or	  conferences	  or	  plan	  a	  
seminar	  in	  a	  hotel,	  they	  always	  developed	  a	  “Plan	  B”	  in	  case	  the	  police	  tried	  to	  block	  them	  
by	  forcing	  the	  hotel	  to	  cancel	  the	  reservation	  at	  last	  minute.	  She	  explained	  that	  at	  the	  time	  
“no	  one	  even	  knew	  about	  the	  work	  of	  our	  organisation	  because	  we	  suffered	  extreme	  risks	  
when	  we	  tried	  to	  do	  anything	  publicly,	  such	  as	  working	  in	  the	  different	  sections	  outside	  of	  
Tunis.”315	  	  
	  
When	  speaking	  about	  the	  space	  for	  civil	  society	  organisations	  to	  operate	  during	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  
regime,	   it	  was	   not	   uncommon	   for	   interviewees	   to	   pinpoint	   the	   degree	   of	   knowledge	   the	  
government	   and	   security	   apparatus	   could	   ascertain	   on	   the	   organisation	   or	   the	   individual.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312	  Informant	  40:	  Director,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  12	  Mar.	  2012.	  
313	  Informant	  40:	  Director,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  12	  Mar.	  2012.	  
314	  Informant	  40:	  Director,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  12	  Mar.	  2012.	  
315	  Informant	  40:	  Director,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  12	  Mar.	  2012.	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For	   example,	   Wail,	   an	   interviewee	   for	   the	   research	   who	   worked	   with	   an	   international	  
human	  rights	  organisation	  in	  Tunis,	  said,	  “The	  police	  of	  the	  regime	  knew	  even	  the	  smallest	  
detail	  on	  the	  individual”—details	  on	  who	  your	  friends	  and	  family	  were,	  your	  conversations,	  
all	  at	  the	  micro-­‐level.316	  The	  different	  informants	  remarked	  how	  this	  form	  of	  intimidation	  by	  
the	  regime	  could	  reach	  down	  to	  a	  very	  personal	  level.	  The	  experience	  of	  another	  informant	  
for	  the	  research,	  Naila,	  a	  woman	  who	  worked	  within	  the	  main	  headquarters	  of	  a	  women’s	  
rights	   organisation	   that	   operated	   during	   both	   the	   Bourguiba	   and	   Ben	   Ali	   regimes,	   also	  
underscored	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   surveillance	   apparatus	   to	   infiltrate	   the	   micro-­‐level.	   She	  
described	   the	   incredible	   propensity	   among	   the	   population	   for	   “auto-­‐censure”	   and	   how	  
potent	  this	  was	  on	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  women	  they	  tried	  to	  work	  with.	  Naila	  stressed	  how	  the	  
Ben	  Ali	  regime	  managed	  to	  penetrate	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  that	  these	  techniques	  
were	  remarkably	  effective.	  “Ben	  Ali	  était	  partout	  et	  dans	   les	   têtes	  des	  gens”—Ben	  Ali	  was	  
everywhere	  and	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  people.317	  	  	  
	  
She	   spoke	   of	   a	   later	   time	   when	   the	   police	   actually	   physically	   prevented	   her	   and	   her	  
colleagues	  from	  leaving	  their	  offices	  to	  attend	  a	  demonstration	  and	  then	  closed	  their	  offices	  
for	   several	   months.	   Moreover,	   Dr	   Faiqa,	   one	   of	   the	   interviewees	   for	   the	   research,	   who	  
established	  her	  own	  association	  to	  advocate	  for	  a	  freer	  and	  more	  transparent	  media	  after	  
the	   uprising,	   explained	   that	   before	   the	   revolution	   there	   were	   so	   few	   civil	   society	  
organisations	   that	  even	   if	   they	  wanted	   to	  act	   they	   could	  not.	   She	   said	   their	  phones	  were	  
always	  tapped	  and	  that,	  most	   importantly,	   it	  was	  done	   in	  a	  way	  to	  ensure	  you	  knew	   they	  
were	   tapped,	   to	  annoy	  but	  also	   to	   scare	  you.	  Dr	  Faiqa	   remarked	  during	   the	   interview,	   “It	  
was	   done	   in	   a	   way	   which	   was	   so	   flagrant,	   it	   was	   meant	   to	   terrorise	   you.”318	  It	   was	   not	  
uncommon	  during	  the	  interviews	  with	  the	  disparate	  organisations,	  in	  particular	  the	  human	  
rights	  organisations,	  for	  individuals	  to	  express	  “on	  a	  beaucoup	  souffert”	  or	  “ça	  nous	  a	  coûté	  
cher”—we	  suffered	  considerably,	  these	  activities	  cost	  us	  dearly.	  
	  
Despite	  the	  risks	  several	  civil	  society	  organisations	  faced	  on	  a	  routine	  basis,	  some	  actors	  and	  
groups	   continued	   their	   activities	   in	   spaces	   where	   a	   perimeter	   to	   manoeuvre	   could	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316	  Informant	  41:	  Secretary	  general,	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  13	  Mar.	  2012.	  
317	  Informant	  42:	  Founder	  and	  secretary,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Mar.	  2012.	  
318	  Informant	  51:	  Co-­‐founder,	  association	  to	  support	  a	  free	  media;	  Tunis,	  2	  Apr.	  2012.	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detected.	  In	  a	  research	  interview	  with	  Soraya,	  a	  young	  woman	  working	  with	  an	  organisation	  
that	  acquired	  its	  legal	  “associational	  visa”	  just	  after	  the	  revolution	  in	  2011,	  she	  said,	  “Before	  
the	  revolution	  we	  did	  not	  have	  the	  desire	  or	  the	  need	  (to	  establish	  an	  association)	  because	  
we	  did	  not	   feel	   like	  we	  were	  citizens.	  Before	   this	  we	  were	  mainly	  a	  circle	  of	   close	   friends	  
who	  had	  the	  spirit	  to	  help	  others...so	  even	  before...we	  did	  this	   in	  an	  unorganised	  way.”319	  
Prior	  to	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising,	  this	  group	  of	  individuals	  collectively	  engaged	  in	  small	  activities	  
to	   help	  women	   affected	   by	   domestic	   violence	   in	   Kef,	   one	   of	   the	  more	   deprived	   areas	   of	  
Tunisia,	   through	  a	  group	  of	   friends	  coming	  together	   intermittently.	  This	   is	  one	  example	  of	  
how	   regardless	   of	   the	   risk	   of	   repression	   and	   despite	   not	   being	   able	   to	   establish	   a	   legal	  
formalised	   organisation,	   citizens	   would	   resort	   to	   informal	   networks	   to	   engage	   in	   their	  
communities.	  George	  Joffe	  contends	  that	  although	  the	  state	  was	  able	  to	  maintain	  ultimate	  
control	  over	  “this	  partially	   liberalised	  social	  space,”	  autonomous	  groups	  and	  organisations	  
that	   were	   not	   directly	   controlled	   by	   the	   state	   were	   able	   to	   emerge.	   These	   organisations	  
addressed	  primarily	  social	  concerns	  and	  at	  times	  took	  on	  more	  political	  activities.320	  	  
	  
Moreover,	  political	  participation	  exists	  in	  every	  political	  system	  regardless	  of	  regime	  type.321	  
This	  participation	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  informal	  or	  formal	  organisations	  engaging	  in	  human	  
rights,	  advocacy,	  or	  social	  welfare	  support.	  Individuals	  often	  explicitly	  acknowledge	  the	  risks	  
involved	  in	  engaging	  in	  a	  civil	  society	  organisation,	  in	  particular	  if	  the	  regime	  is	  authoritarian	  
and	   the	   nature	   of	   their	   work	   is	   perceived	   as	   “political.”	   However,	   an	   indeterminate	  
component	   deep	   within	   the	   inner	   resolve	   of	   the	   individual	   also	   accepts	   these	   risks	   in	  
exchange	  for	  the	  ability	  to	  engage	  in	  autonomous	  social	  action.	  Alhamad	  stipulates,	  “When	  
the	  state,	  through	  its	  formal	  institutions,	  represses,	  excludes,	  or	  fails	  to	  listen	  or	  respond	  to	  
people’s	  needs,	  people	  resort	  to	  the	  informal	  realm.”322	  The	  next	  section	  demonstrates	  that	  
even	  for	  legalised	  and	  formal	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  by	  accepting	  and	  internalising	  these	  
risks,	   some	   groups	   and	   actors	   were	   able	   to	   choose	   from	   an	   amalgamation	   of	   tactics	   to	  
advance	   their	   sociopolitical	   agendas.	   This	   was	   made	   possible	   through	   the	   application	   of	  
negotiation,	  discretion,	  and	  conservative	  advocacy	  towards	  and	  among	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐
state	  entities.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319	  Informant	  47:	  Programme	  coordinator,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  22	  Mar.	  2012.	  
320	  Joffe,	  “The	  Arab	  Spring	  in	  North	  Africa,”	  514.	  
321	  Albrecht,	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Political	  Participation,”	  15.	  
322	  Citing	  Lust-­‐Okar,	  “Taking	  political	  participation	  seriously,”	  8.	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3.	  Manipulating	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game:	  moving	  through	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  
	  
Discourses	  on	  civil	  society	  often	  attempt	  to	  delineate	  conceptually	  and	  empirically	  between	  
the	   state	   and	   society,	   the	   formal	   and	   informal	   realms,	   and	  between	  what	   is	   political	   and	  
apolitical.	  In	  fact,	  by	  looking	  specifically	  to	  civil	  society	  groups	  and	  actors	  in	  Tunisia	  prior	  to	  
the	  2010–2011	  uprising	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  observe	  that	  many	  of	  these	  actors	  habitually	  drifted	  
through	  and	  among	  these	  different	  domains	  via	  regular	  interaction	  with	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  
entities.	  Furthermore,	  civil	  society	  actors	  also	  simultaneously	  engaged	  in	  activities	  that	  were	  
formal	   (i.e.,	   accepted	   under	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   regime)	   and	   informal	   interventions,	   such	   as	  
those	  that	  had	  to	  be	  kept	  under	   the	  radar	   to	   reach	  more	  vulnerable	  groups.	  Moreover,	   it	  
can	  be	  argued	  that	  by	  choosing	  to	  work	  with	  marginalised	  communities	  and	  engaging	   in	  a	  
formal	  or	  legalised	  civil	  society	  organisation,	  these	  actors	  inherently	  chose	  to	  act	  on	  political	  
ground	  and	  were,	  in	  effect,	  political	  actors.	  	  
	  
The	   following	   section	  describes	   in	  more	  detail	   two	   sets	   of	   organisations,	   the	   rights-­‐based	  
organisations	   such	   as	   women’s	   rights	   and	   the	   broader	   human	   rights	   organisations	   that	  
operated	   during	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime,	   and	   the	   HIV/AIDS-­‐related	   organisations	   engaging	   in	  
both	  service	  provision	  and	  advocacy	  that	  were	  established	  soon	  after	  Ben	  Ali	  took	  office	  in	  
1987.	  This	  section	  examines	   in	  particular	   the	  different	  strategies	  both	  these	  sets	  of	  actors	  
and	   organisations	   adopted	   to	   manoeuvre	   tactically	   under	   and	   through	   an	   authoritarian	  
regime.	   This	   involved	   a	   range	   of	   strategies	   including	   negotiation,	   discretion,	   invisibility,	  
hyper-­‐visibility,	  and	  targeted	  advocacy	  to	  signal	  and	  address	  key	  issues	  for	  these	  actors.	  The	  
HIV/AIDS	   organisations,	   in	   particular,	   were	   able	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   disparate	   tactics	  
organisations	   working	   with	   marginalised,	   and	   often	   extremely	   vulnerable	   groups,	   would	  
employ.	   Finally,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   emphasise	   that	   these	   two	   sets	   of	   organisations	  
encountered	  disparate	  experiences	  with	   the	  government—some	  were	   intensely	   repressed	  
and	  ostracised	  while	  others,	  comfortably	  ignored	  by	  the	  state,	  faced	  their	  main	  challenges	  
at	  the	  sociocultural	  level	  rather	  than	  from	  the	  heaviness	  of	  the	  state	  security	  apparatus.	  	  
	  
Rights-­‐based	  organisations:	  confronting	  a	  dictator	  
There	   were	   only	   a	   handful	   of	   organisations	   that	   worked	   overtly	   in	   rights-­‐based	  
programming	  in	  Tunisia	  during	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.	  These	  organisations	  deliberately	  chose	  to	  
operate	  despite	  heavy	  crackdowns	  by	  the	  security	  apparatus.	  They	  included	  (but	  were	  not	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limited	   to)	   the	  Tunisian	  Association	  of	  Democratic	  Women	   (ATFD),	   the	  Tunisian	  League	  of	  
Human	   Rights	   (LTDH),	   and	   Amnesty	   International.	   Much	   has	   been	   written	   on	   these	  
organisations	   in	  the	  sociopolitical	   literature	  on	  Tunisia,	  so	  here	  the	  purpose	   is	   to	  reiterate	  
the	  degree	  of	  repression	  these	  groups	  experienced	  and	  to	  determine	  how	  they	  manoeuvred	  
through	   an	   authoritarian	   regime.	   For	   the	   research	   I	   interviewed	   four	   individuals	   working	  
specifically	  with	  human	  rights	  organisations	  during	   the	  Ben	  Ali	  presidency;323	  in	  addition,	   I	  
interviewed	   five	   additional	   participants	   who	   either	   explicitly	   chose	   not	   to	   establish	   an	  
association	  during	  this	  period	  or	  who	  worked	  with	  non-­‐human	  rights	  related	  organisations	  
but	   who	   also	   experienced	   harassment	   by	   the	   regime.324	  For	   example,	   for	   the	   research	   I	  
interviewed	  Najeeb,	  an	  individual	  who	  worked	  with	  a	  bilateral	  development	  agency	  in	  Tunis.	  
He	  said	  that	  before	  the	  revolution	  in	  2010–2011	  he	  had	  always	  been	  involved	  in	  volunteer	  
activities	   but	   had	   consistently	   refused	   to	   work	   with	   others	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   a	   civil	  
society	  organisation.	  He	  admitted	  that	  he	  was	  discouraged	  by	  the	  organisations	  that	  formed	  
under	   the	   RCD	   party,	  which	   he	   said	   “controlled	   these	   associations	   to	   such	   a	   degree	   that	  
they	  became	  extensions	  of	  the	  party	  itself.”325	  Najeeb	  explained	  during	  the	  interview:	  
	  
Very	   few	   associations	   were	   able	   to	   resist	   this	   control	   and	   those	   which	   did	   resist	  
(ATFD	  and	  LTDH)	  suffered....They	  were	  able	  to	  resist	   in	  the	  long	  run	  but	  their	  work	  
was	   rendered	   very	   difficult.	   The	   space	   for	   associative	   action	  was	   very	   constrained	  
and	  the	  government	  even	  had	  the	  habit	  of	  imposing	  members	  onto	  the	  association,	  
obliging	   the	   association	   on	   political	   occasions	   to	   sign	   something	   showing	   publicly	  
their	   support	   of	   the	   government.	   And	   financially	   these	   resources	   were	   very	  
controlled	   and	   virtually	   non-­‐existent...you	   were	   either	   with	   the	   system	   or	   against	  
it.326	  
	  
The	  Tunisian	  Association	  of	  Democratic	  Women	  (ATFD),	  for	  example,	  began	  as	  an	  informal	  
club	   to	   promote	   female	   autonomy	  where	  women	   came	   together	   each	   Saturday	   to	   speak	  
about	  issues	  related	  to	  women	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  space	  for	  reflection	  and	  discussion.	  
As	  the	  meetings	  grew	  (to	  over	  80	  women	  attending	  each	  week),	   the	  principal	   founders	  of	  
the	  club	  began	  to	  consider	  a	  strategy	  to	  allow	  women	  to	  participate	  more	  fully	  in	  public	  life.	  
Naila,	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  members	  of	  the	  association,	  observed	  during	  the	  interview	  that	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323	  Informant	  numbers	  37,	  40,	  41	  and	  42.	  
324	  Informant	  numbers	  36,	  38,	  43,	  51	  and	  53.	  
325	  Informant	  38:	  Senior	  expert	  on	  environment,	  bilateral	  and	  associational	  member;	  Tunis,	  6	  Mar.	  2012	  and	  
Mar.	  2013.	  
326	  Informant	  38:	  Senior	  expert	  on	  environment,	  bilateral	  and	  associational	  member;	  Tunis,	  6	  Mar.	  2012	  and	  
Mar.	  2013.	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the	   time	   there	   were	   two	   discourses—the	   “formal	   feminine	   discourse,”	   which	   was	   the	  
feminist	   discourse	   under	   Bourguiba	   on	   the	   CPS,	   and	   the	   “informal	   feminine	   discourse,”	  
which	  was	  much	   larger	  and	  even	  called	   into	  question	   the	  CPS.	  Naila	   remarked	  during	   the	  
research	  interview,	  “We	  called	  everything	  into	  question	  and	  most	  importantly	  this	  question	  
of	   power....From	   the	   beginning	   the	   role	   and	   the	   rights	   of	   women	   and	   the	   issue	   of	  
democracy	   were	   always	   intrinsically	   linked—how	   can	   you	   effectively	   have	   a	   democracy	  
without	   half	   the	   population?”327	  Soon	   after	   Ben	   Ali	   came	   to	   power	   in	   1987,	   the	   “7th	  
November	   Declaration”	   did	   not	   refer	   to	   women	   specifically	   so	   ATFD	   produced	   its	   own	  
declaration	  on	  the	  issue.	  This	  also	  coincided	  with	  ATFD’s	  first	  visible	  activities	  on	  solidarity	  
with	  Palestine	  after	  the	  Israeli	  attack	  on	  the	  Palestinian	  Liberation	  Organisation	  (PLO)	  base	  
in	  Lebanon	   in	  1987.	  Naila	  noted,	  “We	  were	  working	   internationally	  on	   issues	  of	   liberation	  
and	  solidarity	  with	  the	  women	  engaged	  on	  this.”328	  It	  was	  after	  these	  decisions	  and	  efforts	  
to	   increase	   their	   own	   visibility	   that	   the	   group	   of	   women	   decided	   to	   formalise	   their	  
association	  in	  1989.	  	  
	  
After	   acquiring	   legal	   associational	   status,	   the	   organisation	   worked	   increasingly	   on	   issues	  
central	   to	   women	   (rights,	   education,	   and	   health)	   through	   national,	   regional,	   and	  
international	  entities.	  A	  key	  moment	  for	  ATFD	  came	  when	  in	  1989	  a	  young	  girl	  came	  to	  the	  
association	  accompanied	  by	  her	  mother	  explaining	  she	  had	  been	  raped	  by	  12	  men.	  This	  was	  
the	   first	   time	   the	   association	   encountered	   the	   issue	   of	   violence	   against	   women	   to	   this	  
degree	  and	  so	  from	  this	  time	  they	  began	  a	  national	  campaign	  on	  the	  question	  of	  domestic	  
violence	   in	   Tunisia.	   During	   this	   period	   they	   received	   such	   a	   high	   number	   of	   calls	   from	  
women	  on	  the	  issue	  they	  had	  to	  recruit	  volunteers	  to	  answer	  the	  telephones	  in	  the	  office.	  
The	   campaign	   posters	   depicting	   violence	   against	  women	   soon	   created	   controversy	   at	   the	  
Ministry	   of	   Interior,	   which	   subsequently	   ordered	   the	   removal	   of	   the	   posters	   in	   Tunis.	  
Nevertheless	   the	   real	   challenge	   and	   confrontation	   with	   the	   government	   came	   in	   1992	  
during	   the	   growing	   attacks	   by	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime	   against	   the	   Tunisian	   League	   of	   Human	  
Rights	   (LTDH)—in	   response	   to	   which,	   as	   aforementioned,	   the	   laws	   of	   association	   were	  
explicitly	  amended	  in	  order	  to	  infiltrate	  the	  group’s	  membership.	  One	  of	  the	  roles	  of	  ATFD	  
soon	  became	   the	   larger	  defence	  of	  associations	  and	  civil	   society	   in	  Tunisia	  under	  Ben	  Ali.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327	  Informant	  42:	  Founder	  and	  secretary,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Mar.	  2012.	  
328	  Informant	  42:	  Founder	  and	  secretary,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Mar.	  2012.	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Naila	  remarked	  further,	  “We	  took	  on	  the	  issues	  of	  civil	  society	  at	  the	  time	  and	  this	  was	  not	  
easy	   as	   even	   internally	   this	   was	   a	   huge	   debate	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   political	   our	   association	  
would	  be.”329	  
	  
ATFD	  soon	  experienced	  the	  gamut	  of	  surveillance	  and	  intimidation	  mechanisms	  applied	  by	  
the	   government.	   Branches	   of	   ATFD	   opening	   outside	   of	   Tunis	   stopped	   their	   work	   as	   staff	  
members	   were	   harassed	   and	   intimidated	   by	   the	   police.	   Naila	   said	   during	   the	   interview,	  
“Everything	  was	  done	  on	  their	  part	  (the	  government)	  to	  discourage	  and	  they	  managed	  to	  do	  
this	  at	  a	  very	   ‘personal	   level’	  even	  at	   the	   level	  of	   the	   family.”330	  After	   this	   time,	  when	  the	  
association	   tried	   to	   hold	   larger	  meetings	   its	   staff,	  members,	   and	   participants	   were	   often	  
stopped	   (physically)	   by	   the	   government	   and	   the	  police.	   Two	  members	  of	  ATFD	   recalled	   a	  
period	  when	  they	  and	  other	  associational	  actors	  came	  together	  to	  monitor	  the	  presidential	  
elections	  in	  2009.	  Each	  said	  that	  within	  only	  a	  week,	  police	  came	  to	  the	  organisation,	  closed	  
the	  centre,	  and	  prevented	  them	  from	  working.	  Consequently	  their	  funding	  was	  blocked.331	  
During	  the	  research	  interview	  with	  Naila,	  I	  asked	  how	  the	  association	  eventually	  was	  able	  to	  
operate	  during	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  and	  how	  she	  and	  her	  colleagues	  managed	  to	  work	  more	  
than	  two	  decades	  in	  Tunisia	  is	  such	  a	  restrictive	  environment.	  She	  remarked:	  	  
	  
When	  we	  have	  solidarity	  and	  are	  unified	  and	  clear	  on	  our	  aims	   (internally)	  we	  can	  
make	  these	  gains.	  It	  is	  because	  of	  our	  strong	  unification	  internally	  that	  we	  were	  able	  
to	   do	   this	   with	   strong	   organisational	   leadership.	   We	   showed	   that	   the	   rights	   of	  
women	  are	  also	  political—the	  private	  sphere	  is	  indeed	  public....It	  is	  our	  association’s	  
perseverance	   on	   these	   issues	   that	   have	   allowed	   us	   to	   work	   more	   than	   20	   years	  
under	  a	  dictator....Everything	  we	  did	  was	  legal	  and	  we	  survived	  by	  sticking	  to	  what	  is	  
legal.332	  
	  
The	   experience	   of	   another	   informant,	   Wail,	   who	   worked	   with	   a	   smaller	   human	   rights	  
organisation	  (and	  who	  eventually	  went	  onto	  work	  with	  a	  larger	  international	  human	  rights	  
organisation	   in	   Tunis)	   before	   2011,	   also	   highlighted	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime’s	   predisposition	  
towards	   the	   repression	   of	   civil	   society	   organisations	   working	   in	   human	   rights	   related	  
initiatives.	   Before	   2009,	   the	   government	   imprisoned	  him	   three	   times	   due	   to	   his	   “political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329	  Informant	  42:	  Founder	  and	  secretary,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Mar.	  2012.	  
330	  Informant	  42:	  Founder	  and	  secretary,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Mar.	  2012.	  
331Informant	  40:	  Director,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  12	  Mar.	  2012	  and	  Informant	  42:	  Founder	  and	  
secretary,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Mar.	  2012.	  
332	  Informant	  42:	  Founder	  and	  secretary,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Mar.	  2012.	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activities”	   (which	  he	  did	  not	  venture	  to	  discuss).	  Wail	  explained	  that	  he	  was	   imprisoned	  a	  
fourth	  time	  in	  2009	  for	  acts	  he	  considered	  apolitical	  involving	  over	  150	  recordings	  and	  the	  
documentation	  of	  human	   rights	  abuses	   committed	  by	   the	   regime.333	  The	  documentary	  he	  
orchestrated	  featured	  poor	   living	  conditions	   in	  Nabeul	  (a	  small	  town	  approximately	  60	  km	  
[40	   miles]	   from	   Tunis)	   with	   exceptionally	   high	   pollution	   levels,	   a	   situation	   pointing	   to	  
failures	   in	   the	   regime’s	  urban	  development	  projects;	   he	  was	   imprisoned	   for	   four	  months.	  
Wail	   contended	   that	   the	   associations	  working	   in	   human	   rights	   always	   had	   problems	   and	  
remained	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  state.	  Many	  of	  these	  associations	  were	  assumed	  to	  have	  other	  
political	  agendas,	  as	  “L’opposition	  politique	  dans	  les	  habits	  des	  droits	  de	  l’homme”—political	  
opposition	  dressed	   in	   the	  clothing	  of	  human	  rights.	  He	  noted	  during	  the	   interview	  for	   the	  
research,	  “All	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  organisations	  were	  held	  in	  suspicion	  for	  this	  reason.”334	  	  
	  
ATFD	   and	   other	   actors	   engaging	   in	   human	   rights	   advocacy	   openly	   challenged	   the	  
government	   but	   also	   had	   a	   strong	   constituency	   base,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   support	   structure	   of	  
regional	  and	  international	  networks	  they	  could	  work	  through.	  From	  the	  research	  interviews	  
with	  the	  members	  of	  the	  different	  rights	  associations,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  they	  fluctuated	  
over	   the	   years	   between	   strategies	   of	   visibility	   and	   hyper-­‐visibility	   corresponding	   to	  
perceived	  openings	   such	  as	  national-­‐level	   anger	  over	   violence	  against	  women	   (ATFD),	   the	  
Israel–Palestine	   conflict,	   the	   attack	   on	   LTDH,	   and	   the	   national	   elections.	   In	   effect,	   these	  
organisations	  understood	  early	  on	  the	  “rules	  of	  the	  game”	  enforced	  by	  the	  regime,	  but	  also	  
pushed	   these	   boundaries	   when	   they	   were	   cognisant	   they	   were	   working	   within	   a	   larger	  
support	  structure,	  either	  in	  solidarity	  with	  other	  national	  associations	  or	  with	  regional	  and	  
international	   advocacy	   bodies.	   Rather	   than	   strategies	   of	   negotiation	   or	   discretion,	   these	  
actors	  at	  times	  operated	  on	  the	  side	  of	  hyper-­‐visibility	  openly	  challenging	  the	  government	  
to	  respond.	  	  
	  
The	  materialisation	  of	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  organisations	  	  
When	   I	   first	   encountered	   these	   organisations	   and	   consequently	   began	   to	   more	   fully	  
understand	  the	  nature	  and	  context	  in	  which	  they	  worked	  in	  Tunisia,	  I	  frequently	  came	  away	  
with	  an	  underlying	  question:	  how	  is	  it	  that	  these	  organisations,	  whose	  work	  is	  undoubtedly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333	  Informant	  41:	  Secretary	  general,	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  13	  Mar.	  2012.	  
334	  Informant	  41:	  Secretary	  general,	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  13	  Mar.	  2012.	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controversial	   (at	   the	  political	   and	   social	   level)	   and	   stigmatised	  by	   governments	   as	  well	   as	  
communities,	  were	  permitted	  to	  work	  in	  heavy	  authoritarian	  contexts?	  Was	  there	  a	  form	  of	  
pact	   between	   these	   organisations	   and	   the	   government,	   or	   did	   they	   conceal	   the	   actual	  
nature	  of	  their	  activities	  with	  vulnerable	  groups?	  It	  is	  in	  part	  to	  answer	  these	  questions	  that	  
I	   undertook	   this	   research	   among	   these	   actors.	   For	   the	   research,	   I	   interviewed	   27	  
participants	   who	   either	   had	   engaged	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   with	   work	   related	   to	   Tunisia’s	  
HIV/AIDS	   epidemic;	   this	   includes	   organisational	   staff	  members,	   outreach	  workers,	   people	  
living	   with	   HIV,	   regional	   and	   international	   donors	   and	   policy	   advisers,	   HIV/AIDS-­‐specific	  
consultants,	   and	   government	   spokespersons.335	  Prior	   to	   2011,	   there	   were	   a	   handful	   of	  
organisations	  working	  throughout	  Tunisia	  with	  people	  living	  with	  and	  affected	  by	  HIV/AIDS.	  
This	  work	  began	  officially	   in	  1987	  when	   the	  National	  AIDS	  Programme	   (NAP)	  was	  created	  
and	   a	   few	   small	   bio-­‐behavioural	   studies	  were	   conducted.	  336	  The	   Ben	  Ali	   government	   and	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	   routinely	   reported	   (nationally	   and	   internationally)	   that	   the	   country	  
was	   experiencing	   “low	  epidemics”	   among	   key	  populations	   at	   higher	   risk	   of	  HIV	   exposure,	  
with	  HIV	  prevalence	  only	   “approaching”	   a	   concentrated	  epidemic	   among	   some	  groups.337	  
This	  was	  against	  mounting	  evidence	  that	  Tunisia’s	  key	  populations	  were	  in	  fact	  experiencing	  
concentrated	   epidemics	   in	   some	   areas	   at	   or	   above	   5	   percent.338	  Despite	   lack	   of	   official	  
acknowledgement	  of	  the	  actual	  scale	  of	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  epidemic	  in	  the	  country,	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  
organisations	  were	  able	  to	  carry	  out	  prevention	  and	  education	  work	  mainly	  targeted	  to	  the	  
general	   population.	   From	   1985	   to	   December	   2011,	   there	   were	   1,706	   officially	   registered	  
cases	   of	   HIV	   in	   both	   adults	   and	   children	   in	   Tunisia.	   Of	   the	   1,706	   registered	   cases,	   982	  
individuals	  acquired	  AIDS	  and	  540	  died	  during	  that	  period.339	  Although	  HIV	  prevalence	  was	  
less	   than	   0.1	   percent	   of	   the	   population	   in	   Tunisia,	   there	   were	   concentrated	   epidemics	  
among	  Tunisia’s	  key	  populations.	  For	  example,	  bio-­‐behavioural	  surveys	  conducted	   in	  2009	  
and	  again	  in	  2011	  indicated	  0.43	  and	  0.61	  percent	  prevalence,	  respectively,	  in	  sex	  workers,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335	  Informant	  numbers:	  5,	  11,	  16–26,	  28,	  30,	  31,	  32,	  36,	  39,	  45,	  46,	  48,	  52,	  and	  54–57;	  and	  while	  not	  all	  of	  these	  
participants’	  words	  are	  reflected	  in	  this	  section,	  the	  reports	  and	  data	  they	  shared	  are	  presented	  throughout	  
the	  text.	  
336	  Le	  Programme	  National	  de	  Lutte	  Contre	  le	  Sida	  et	  les	  Maladies	  Sexuellement	  Transmissibles,	  8.	  
337	  The	  term	  “key	  populations”	  or	  “key	  populations	  at	  higher	  risk	  of	  HIV	  exposure”	  refers	  to	  those	  most	  likely	  
to	  be	  exposed	  to	  HIV	  or	  to	  transmit	  HIV.	  In	  all	  countries,	  key	  populations	  include	  people	  living	  with	  HIV.	  In	  
most	  settings,	  men	  who	  have	  sex	  with	  men,	  transgender	  persons,	  people	  who	  inject	  drugs,	  sex	  workers	  and	  
their	  clients,	  and	  seronegative	  partners	  in	  serodiscordant	  couples	  are	  at	  higher	  risk	  of	  HIV	  exposure	  to	  HIV	  
than	  other	  people.	  See:	  UNAIDS,	  Terminology	  Guidelines,	  18.	  
338	  Bastin,	  “La	  Révolution	  Militante,”	  11.	  
339	  Le	  Programme	  National	  de	  Lutte	  Contre	  le	  Sida	  et	  les	  Maladies	  Sexuellement	  Transmissibles,	  38.	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3.1	  and	  2.4	  percent	   in	  people	  who	   inject	  drugs,	  and	  4.9	  and	  13	  percent	  among	  men	  who	  
have	  sex	  with	  men	  (MSM).340	  	  
	  
From	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   there	   emerged	   three	   “HIV-­‐thematic” 341 	  organisations	   working	  
specifically	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   HIV/AIDS	  with	   a	   formal	   “associational	   visa”	   to	   do	   this	  work.	  
They	  were	  L’Association	  Tunisienne	  de	  Lutte	  Contre	  les	  Maladies	  Sexuellement	  Transmissible	  
et	   le	   SIDA	   (ATL	   MST	  /SIDA),	   created	   in	   1990	  ;	   l’Association	   Tunisienne	   d’Information	   et	  
d’Orientation	   sur	   le	   SIDA	   (ATIOS),	   established	   in	   1993	  ;	   and	   l’Association	   Tunisienne	   de	   la	  
Prévention	  de	   la	  Toxicomanie	   (ATUPRET),	   launched	   in	  1995.	  The	   three	  organisations	  were	  
initially	   established	   under	   the	   associational	   category	   of	   “scientific”	   (and	   so	   linked	   to	   the	  
Ministry	   of	   Health)	   and	   led	   by	   medical	   doctors.	   At	   the	   time	   the	   organisations	   were	  
established	   there	  was	  a	  weak	   tradition	  of	   local	   and	  private	   sector	   funding	   in	   Tunisia,	   and	  
while	   the	  government	  gave	  some	  financial	   support	   in	   the	   form	  of	  unrestricted	  grants,	   the	  
funding	  for	  this	  work	  was	  minimal.	  During	  this	  period	  there	  was	  also	  considerable	  scrutiny	  
of	   international	  donors	  and	  contributions	   to	  NGOs	  whereby	  all	   funding	  had	   to	  be	  directly	  
channelled	   through	  the	  government	  before	  dispersal	   to	   the	  association.	  Dr	  Zied,	  a	   former	  
employee	  of	  ATL	  Tunis,	  discussed	  the	  situation	  during	  the	  research	  interview:	  
	  
To	  receive	  funding	  in	  the	  past	  one	  had	  to	  show	  support	  to	  the	  government	  and	  this	  
actually	   penalised	   a	   lot	   of	   organisations.	   This	   was	   the	   key	   reason	   for	   the	   main	  
division	  between	  ATL	   in	  Tunis	  and	  ATL	   in	   Sfax.	   The	  president	   [Ben	  Ali]	   at	   the	   time	  
wanted	   support	   from	  ATL	  and	  each	  had	   to	   show	   this	   support	   through	  a	  published	  
article	  in	  the	  newspaper.	  ATL	  Tunis	  did	  not	  accept	  this	  and	  internally	  this	  created	  a	  
division	  between	  the	  organisations.342	  
	  
There	   were	   also	   increasing	   instances	   during	   this	   period	   of	   intentional	   co-­‐opting	   of	  
organisations	  by	  the	  government,	  infiltration	  of	  the	  association	  by	  government	  staff	  posing	  
as	   volunteers,	   and	   significant	   levels	   of	   harassment	   by	   the	   government	   and	   corruption.	  
However,	  the	  HIV-­‐thematic	  organisations	  were	  allowed	  to	  continue	  with	  their	  work	  virtually	  
uninterrupted	   during	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime	   within	   Tunis	   and	   throughout	   various	   sections	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340Ibid.,	  8.	  
341	  “HIV	  thematic”	  organisations	  refers	  to	  those	  organisations	  whose	  exclusive	  remit	  is	  to	  work	  in	  HIV/AIDS	  as	  
opposed	  to	  some	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  Red	  Cross	  or	  National	  Scouts	  who	  engage	  in	  a	  range	  of	  activities,	  
with	  intermittent	  HIV/AIDS	  awareness-­‐raising	  interventions.	  
342	  Informant	  19:	  Associate	  director,	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  health	  international	  NGO;	  telephone	  interview,	  20	  Dec.	  
2011.	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across	   Tunisia	   (Sfax,	   Nabeul,	   Sousse,	   etc.).	   This	   was	   due	   in	   part	   to	   the	   technocratic	   staff	  
within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  the	  National	  AIDS	  Programme	  who	  saw	  the	  need	  for	  this	  
work,	  and	  because	  this	  work	  was	  perceived	  as	  apolitical,	  and	  so	  therefore	  was	  understood	  
to	  pose	  minimal	  threat	  to	  the	  government.	  Most	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  three	  organisations	  fell	  
under	  the	  rubric	  of	  “prevention	  and	  public	  health”	  as	  this	  was	  the	  only	  porte	  d’entrée	  to	  be	  
able	   to	   work	   legally	   in	   HIV/AIDS	   in	   Tunisia.	   So	   in	   effect,	   the	   state	   sought	   to	   control	   and	  
thereby	   limit	   sanctioned	  elements	  of	   the	  HIV/AIDS	   interventions,	  but	  also	   relied	  on	   these	  
organisations	  to	  reach	  communities	  with	  key	  populations	  at	  risk	  of	  (spreading)	  infection.	  	  
	  
Working	  in	  HIV/AIDS:	  discretion	  and	  negotiation	  
In	  2006,	  the	  three	  organisations	  extended	  their	  scope	  beyond	  awareness-­‐raising	  campaigns	  
among	   the	   general	   population	   to	   work	   with	   more	   marginalised	   groups	   known	   as	   “key	  
populations,”	  specifically	  men	  who	  have	  sex	  with	  men,	  sex	  workers,	  and	  people	  who	  inject	  
drugs.	  This	  adaptation	  in	  the	  organisations’	  programmatic	  target	  groups	  also	  corresponded	  
simultaneously	   with	   the	   receipt	   of	   a	   sizeable	   grant	   (over	   US$17	   million)	   from	   the	  
international	  donor	  the	  Global	  Fund	  to	  Fight	  AIDS,	  Tuberculosis	  and	  Malaria	  (at	  the	  time	  a	  
UN	   initiative	   created	   by	   the	   former	   Secretary	   General	   Kofi	   Annan)	   to	   further	   engage	   in	  
interventions	  with	  key	  populations	  and	  sexual	  minorities	  in	  2007.343	  It	  is	  within	  this	  work	  in	  
particular	   that	   the	   organisations	   began	   to	   adopt	  more	   covert	   strategies	   in	   their	   outreach	  
work	  and	  where	  there	  was	  a	  distinct	  evolution	   in	  the	  strategies	   for	  reaching	  these	  groups	  
from	  negotiation	  and	  coordination	  to	  discretion.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  also	  in	  part	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
this	  new	  and	  sizeable	  funding	  that	  the	  organisations	  began	  to	  interact	  more	  regularly	  with	  
state	  entities.	  Kareem,	  a	  former	  staff	  member	  and	  consultant	  for	  ATL,	  said	  in	  the	  research	  
interview	  that	  the	  additional	  resources	  from	  the	  Global	  Fund	  permitted	  the	  organisations	  to	  
maintain	  offices,	  acquire	  vehicles,	  pay	  salaries	  to	  their	  staff,	  and	  in	  general	  brought	  a	  degree	  
of	  “professionalism”	  to	  these	  organisations.	  At	  this	  stage	  he	  explained	  that	  the	  government	  
was	  always	  engaged	  with	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  good	  will	  towards	  the	  work	  they	  were	  doing.	  He	  
said,	  “The	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  even	  the	  military	  were	  engaged	  and	  respected	  the	  work	  of	  
the	  associations	  at	  this	  time.”344	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343	  For	  more	  information	  and	  grant	  agreement	  details	  see:	  
http://portfolio.theglobalfund.org/en/Grant/Index/TUN-­‐607-­‐G01-­‐H.	  	  
344	  Informant	  28:	  Project	  coordinator,	  multilateral	  development	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  1	  Feb.	  2012.	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The	  government	  sanctioned	  this	  work	  albeit	  within	  limits—it	  would	  not	  fund	  this	  work	  itself,	  
and	  it	  did	  not	  want	  to	  appear	  to	  be	  endorsing	  this	  work	  in	  any	  way.	  Kareem	  noted	  further,	  
“There	  were	  never	  any	  blockages	  in	  trying	  to	  do	  this	  work,	  and	  the	  government	  was	  always	  
aware	  of	  what	  we	  were	  doing.	  There	  was	  always	  a	  certain	  laisser	  allez	  by	  the	  government	  in	  
terms	  of	  their	  approach	  to	  these	  associations,	  but	  the	  associations	  worked	  with	  discretion	  
and	  discreetly.”345	  The	  experience	  of	   another	   informant	   for	   the	   research,	  Walid,	   a	  human	  
rights	   lawyer	  working	   in	  HIV/AIDS,	  also	  highlighted	  that	  the	  scientific	  and	  health	  nature	  of	  
HIV/AIDS	  allowed	  the	  actual	  work	  of	  the	  organisations	  to	  proceed	  without	  much	  scrutiny	  by	  
the	  state.	  He	  added	  that	  before	  2011,	  the	  environment	  for	  civil	  society	  in	  Tunisia	  was	  very	  
controlled.	  According	  to	  Walid:	  
	  
ATL	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  courage	  as	  they	  were	  doing	  this	  work	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  HIV	  and	  
the	  fight	  against	  AIDS.	  The	  government	  was	  naturally	  aware	  of	  the	  work	  they	  were	  
doing	  but	  was	  okay	  with	  this	  work	  because	  it	  was	  not	  open	  and	  more	  importantly	  it	  
was	   not	   the	   state	   institutions	  which	   financed	   this	  work.	  We	  were	   always	  working	  
with	  the	  angle	  of	  HIV	  so	  this	  did	  not	  catch	  their	  attention.346	  
	  
These	   civil	   society	   organisations	   implicitly	   adopted	   a	   strategy	   of	   discretion	   bordering	   on	  
invisibility	   in	   their	   peer	   education	   and	   outreach	   work,	   as	   well	   as	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	  
condoms	  and	   clean	   syringes	   to	  populations	   at	   risk	   of	  HIV/AIDS	  exposure.	   For	   example,	   in	  
2010,	   among	   the	   188	   sex	  workers	  working	   in	  maisons	   closes	   in	   Tunis,	   Sousse	   and	  Gabes,	  
approximately	  99	  percent	  had	  at	   least	  one	  marker	  of	  a	  sexually	  transmitted	  infection	  (STI)	  
with	  a	  current	   infection	  found	  in	  86.7	  per	  cent	  of	  cases.347	  This	  signified	  that	  not	  only	  was	  
this	   an	   incredibly	   high-­‐risk	   group	   for	   acquiring	  HIV/AIDS	  but	   also	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   the	  
greater	  population,	  in	  particular	  the	  clients	  of	  sex	  workers	  and	  their	  families,	  were	  at	  risk	  for	  
spreading	   STIs	   and	   HIV.	   Two	   HIV/AIDS	   organisations	   worked	   with	   the	   women	   inside	   the	  
maisons	   closes	   with	   the	   permission	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   government	   to	   provide	   free	   STI	  
examinations	  and	  condoms;	  moreover,	  tests	  for	  HIV	  were	  administered	  intermittently	  when	  
funding	  permitted.	  In	  addition	  to	  sex	  work	  that	  was	  legally	  sanctioned,	  staff	  members	  from	  
the	  different	  HIV/AIDS	  organisations	  interviewed	  for	  the	  research	  reported	  that	  Tunisia	  was	  
also	   home	   to	   a	   number	   of	  women	  who	   engaged	   in	   clandestine	   sex	  work.	   The	   2012-­‐2016	  
Tunisian	  National	   Strategic	   Plan	   for	   HIV	   and	   STIs	   reported	   that	   clandestine	   sex	  work	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345	  Informant	  28:	  Project	  coordinator,	  multilateral	  development	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  1	  Feb.	  2012.	  
346	  Informant	  36:	  Founder	  and	  lawyer,	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Feb.	  2012.	  
347	  Znazen,	  Frikha-­‐Gargouri,	  and	  Berrajah,	  “Sexually	  transmitted	  infections,”	  500-­‐505.	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increasing	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  persistent	  exploitation	  of	  women	  and	  due	  to	  their	  own	  socio-­‐
economic	  vulnerability.	  In	  addition,	  the	  report	  provides	  a	  peculiar	  normative	  rationale	  citing	  
“A	   certain	   sexual	   liberation	   and	   reduction	   of	   social	   control	   exercised	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  
individual.” 348 	  Prior	   to	   the	   2010—2011	   uprising,	   it	   was	   reported	   that	   clandestine	   sex	  
workers	  were	  often	  paid	  more	  money	  and	  had	  more	  flexibility	  in	  choosing	  their	  clients	  and	  
when	  they	  engaged	  in	  sex.	  However,	  they	  were	  also	  more	  exposed	  to	  physical	  violence	  as	  
there	  was	  no	  matronne	  overseeing	  the	  exchange.	  The	  experience	  of	  one	  interviewee	  for	  the	  
research,	   Moazzam,	   whose	   remit	   was	   to	   engage	   in	   peer	   education	   with	   clandestine	   sex	  
workers,	   underscored	   the	   vital	   strategy	   of	   negotiation	   to	   reach	   the	   different	  women.	   He	  
explained	  that	  he	  worked	  through	  counterparts	  in	  the	  community	  who	  would	  introduce	  him	  
to	   different	   women	  who	  might	   be	   open	   to	   doing	   peer	   education	   work.	   He	   became	  well	  
recognised	   by	   the	   women	   as	   someone	   who	   accompanied	   them	   to	   different	   centres	   for	  
treatment	  or	  testing.	  He	  met	  the	  women	  in	  cafes	  and	  explained	  he	  himself	  had	  never	  felt	  a	  
sense	   of	   personal	   risk	   in	   doing	   this	   work	   with	   the	   women	   but	   that	   often	   the	   women	  
themselves	  were	   targeted	  by	   the	  police	  and	  arrested.349	  It	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	   there	  
were	  very	  few,	  if	  any,	  reportable	  statistics	  on	  clandestine	  sex	  work	  in	  Tunisia	  so	  it	  was	  not	  
possible	  during	  the	  research	  to	  determine	  just	  how	  widespread	  this	  issue	  was.	  Nevertheless,	  
for	  the	  organisations	  that	  worked	  with	  sex	  workers,	  either	  within	  the	  maisons	  closes	  or	  with	  
clandestine	  sex	  workers	  in	  different	  communities,	  whilst	  the	  state	  was	  aware	  of	  this	  work,	  
they	   were	   obliged	   to	   adopt	   tactics	   of	   discretion,	   invisibility	   and	   where	   necessary,	  
negotiation.350	  	  
	  
Another	   example	   concerns	   the	   experiences	   of	   the	   HIV/AIDS	   organisations	   that	   chose	   to	  
work	   with	   injecting	   drug	   user	   populations.	   Bio-­‐behavioural	   HIV	   surveillance	   studies	  
conducted	  among	  populations	  at	  higher	  risk	  of	  acquiring	  HIV	  in	  2009	  and	  2011	  indicated	  HIV	  
prevalence	   among	   individuals	   who	   injected	   drugs	   of	   3.1	   and	   2.4	   percent	   respectively351	  
During	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime,	   the	   trafficking	   of	   drugs	   was	   reported	   to	   have	   increased	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348	  The	  French	  translation	  reads	  :	  “...d’une	  certaine	  libération	  sexuelle,	  de	  l’allègement	  du	  contrôle	  social	  
exercé	  sur	  l’individu...”	  See	  Minister	  of	  Public	  Health	  and	  the	  National	  Program	  to	  Fight	  HIV,	  22.	  	  
349	  Informant	  23:	  Outreach	  worker	  with	  sex	  workers,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  Damj;	  Tunis,	  24	  Jan.	  
2012.	  
350	  While	  Tunisia	  has	  also	  been	  associated	  with	  sex	  tourism	  among	  men	  and	  male	  sex	  work,	  the	  organisations	  
interviewed	  for	  the	  research	  did	  not	  cite	  working	  with	  male	  sex	  workers	  or	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  Tunisia.	  
351	  Minister	  of	  Public	  Health	  and	  the	  National	  Program	  to	  Fight	  HIV,	  10.	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eventually	  injecting	  drug	  use	  became	  a	  significant	  issue	  in	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  main	  capital	  in	  
Tunis.	   The	   main	   drugs	   were	   Subutex	   (a	   drug	   typically	   used	   for	   opioid	   addiction)	   and	  
Temgesic	   (pain	   tablets),	   followed	   by	   heroin	   and	   cocaine.352	  From	   the	   year	   2000,	   the	   civil	  
society	   organisations	   in	   neighbouring	  Morocco	   began	   to	   increase	   work	   with	   people	   who	  
inject	  drugs.	  Not	  long	  after,	  Morocco	  became	  the	  first	  country	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  
Africa	  to	  introduce	  “harm	  reduction”	  programs	  including	  methadone	  maintenance	  therapy	  
and	   needle-­‐syringe	   programs.353	  The	   HIV/AIDS	   associations	   that	   worked	   in	   Tunisia	   at	   the	  
time	  participated	  in	  a	  series	  of	  workshops	  and	  conferences	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  harm	  reduction	  
in	  North	  Africa	  and	  in	  2009	  began	  advocacy	  work	  targeted	  to	  the	  government	  to	  introduce	  
similar	  programs	  to	  those	  being	   implemented	   in	  Morocco.354	  	  Drug	  use	  outside	  the	  capital	  
however	  began	  to	  increase	  and	  eventually	  in	  2007	  the	  association	  ATUPRET	  received	  a	  grant	  
from	  the	  Global	  Fund	  along	  with	  land	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture	  to	  open	  Tunisia’s	  first	  
in-­‐patient	  drug	   rehabilitation	   centre	   in	   the	   town	  of	   Sfax	   (it	   remains	   the	  only	   centre	  of	   its	  
kind	  in	  the	  country).	  Since	  its	  opening	  in	  2007,	  the	  centre	  hosted	  more	  than	  one	  thousand	  
individuals	   who	   were	   addicted	   to	   drugs	   (many	   of	   whom	   were	   injecting	   drug	   users).355	  
ATUPRET	   continued	   to	   work	   with	   drug	   users	   on	   the	   street	   through	   outreach	   work	   and	  
HIV/AIDS-­‐prevention	  messaging,	  however,	  because	  drug	  use	  was	   illegal	   in	  Tunisia	  some	  of	  
the	  outreach	  workers	  were	  arrested	  and	   threatened	  by	   the	  police.	  The	  experience	  of	  one	  
interviewee	   for	   the	   research,	   Fajr,	   a	   former	   staff	  member	  who	   conducted	   outreach	  work	  
with	  people	  who	   inject	   drugs	   in	   Tunis,	   also	  underscored	   the	   challenges	  outreach	  workers	  
that	  worked	  with	  key	  populations	  encountered.	  	  She	  remarked:	  
	  
They	   (outreach	   workers)	   were	   distributing	   clean	   syringes	   and	   condoms	   with	   the	  
approval	   of	   the	   government,	   but	   this	   does	   not	   necessarily	  mean	   the	   police	   knew	  
about	  this	  or	  were	  well	  informed...the	  peer	  educators	  were	  confronted	  with	  this	  risk	  
and	  were	  all	   along	  encouraged	   to	  do	   this	  work	   as	  discreetly	   as	  possible.	  We	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352	  Ibid.,	  22.	  
353	  See:	  UNAIDS,	  “Morocco	  Launches	  New	  National	  AIDS	  Strategy,”	  4	  Apr.	  2012.	  
354	  “Harm	  reduction”	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  a	  range	  of	  interventions	  designed	  to	  decreased	  vulnerability	  of	  
acquiring	  infection	  among	  people	  who	  inject	  drugs.	  Interventions	  include	  the	  provision	  of	  clean	  needles	  and	  
syringes,	  condom	  distribution,	  substitution	  drug	  therapy,	  HIV/AIDS	  testing	  and	  STI	  diagnosis	  and	  treatment	  in	  
affected	  communities.	  For	  additional	  information	  see:	  World	  Health	  Organisation	  (Europe),	  “Status	  Paper	  on	  
Prisons,	  Drugs	  and	  Harm	  Reduction,”	  May	  2005.	  
355	  Informant	  31:	  Programme	  manager	  and	  medical	  doctor,	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  harm	  reduction	  association;	  Sfax,	  9	  
Feb.	  2012.	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doing	  something	  that	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  law	  and	  the	  government,	  but	  the	  police	  
would	  challenge	  this	  especially	  with	  condoms.	  356	  
	  
In	  addition,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  considered	  drug	  abuse	  a	  “security”	  problem	  at	  the	  time.	  
Therefore	  working	   in	   prevention	   and	   treatment	  with	   people	  who	   use	   drugs	  was	   deemed	  
intrinsically	  a	  problematic	   issue	  for	  the	  police.	  One	  interviewee	  for	  the	  research,	  Dr	  Malik,	  
who	  was	  the	  executive	  director	  of	  one	  of	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  associations	  in	  Tunisia,	  explained	  “So	  
it	  was	  decided	  ATUPRET	  would	  do	  work	  in	  prevention	  only,	  and	  this	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  only	  way	  
they	   could	   secure	   their	   associational	   visa	   at	   the	   time,	   and	   so	   as	   not	   to	   upset	   the	  
minister.”357	  As	   a	   result	   of	   their	   decision	   to	   work	   with	   key	   populations	   at	   higher	   risk	   for	  
acquiring	   HIV,	   the	   HIV/AIDS	   organisations	   eventually	   also	   had	   to	   adopt	   a	   strategy	   of	  
communicating	  more	   with	   the	   local	   police	   in	   Sfax	   and	   Tunis	   to	   be	   able	   to	   conduct	   their	  
work.	  Consequently,	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  drug	  users,	  they	  had	  to	  simultaneously	  move	  the	  core	  
distribution	  of	  clean	  syringes	  into	  the	  drug	  rehabilitation	  centre	  and	  away	  from	  the	  streets	  
(in	  Sfax)—off	  the	  radar	  almost	  entirely.	  Finally,	  the	  experience	  of	  another	  informant	  for	  the	  
research,	  Dr	  Tawfiq,	  who	  worked	  as	  a	  medical	  professional	  for	  ATUPRET,	  highlighted	  further	  
the	  disregard	  by	   the	  government	  of	   increasing	   injecting	  drug	  use	  at	   the	  national	   level.	  He	  
explained	  that	  “There	  has	  been	  in	  general	  significant	  denial	  at	  the	  national	  and	  political	  level	  
of	   drug	   abuse	   in	   Tunisia	   up	   until	   now,	   with	   politicians	   saying	   there	   is	   no	   drug	   use	   in	  
Tunisia.”358	  Before	  2011,	   there	  had	  never	  been	  a	  national	  government	  strategy	  to	  address	  
drug	  use	  in	  Tunisia.	  Several	  of	  the	  HIV-­‐specific	  interviewees	  confirmed	  that	  to	  work	  with	  key	  
populations,	  the	  associations	  were	  in	  fact	  obligated	  to	  go	  through	  the	  issue	  of	  HIV	  to	  receive	  
funding	  and	  government	  consent.	  	  
	  
A	  primary	  and	  overarching	  challenge	  in	  carrying	  out	  work	  among	  key	  populations	  affected	  
by	  HIV/AIDS	  for	  the	  organisations	  was	  that	  while	  the	  government	  was	  aware	  of	  this	  work,	  
the	  police	  and	  security	  services	  were	  not.	   It	   is	  here	  where	  the	  organisations	  and	  outreach	  
workers	  encountered	  the	  most	  risks	  and	  challenges	   in	  actually	  being	  able	  to	  conduct	  their	  
work	   in	  higher	   risk	   communities.	  Often	  outreach	  workers	  were	   arrested,	   threatened	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356	  Informant	  32:	  Programme	  officer,	  democracy	  and	  civil	  society	  capacity	  building	  initiative;	  Tunis,	  10	  Feb.	  
2012.	  
357	  Informant	  18:	  Executive	  director,	  HIV/AIDS	  association;	  Tunis,	  13	  Jan.	  2012	  and	  5	  Mar.	  2013.	  
358	  Informant	  31:	  Programme	  manager	  and	  medical	  doctor,	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  harm	  reduction	  association;	  Sfax,	  9	  
Feb.	  2012.	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imprisonment,	  and	  harassed	  by	  local	  police	  officials.	  The	  level	  of	  personal	  risk	  they	  assumed	  
in	   this	   work	  was	   high.	   Twelve	   of	   the	   interviewees	   for	   the	   research	  working	   in	   HIV/AIDS-­‐
related	  policy,	  advocacy,	  or	  outreach	  (including	  multilateral	  donors	  and	  former	  employees	  
of	  the	  three	  associations)	  openly	  described	  the	  varying	  levels	  of	  risk	  for	  the	  organisations	  as	  
well	  as	  occasions	  of	  the	  harassment	  and	   intimidation	  they	  encountered	  at	  the	  community	  
level	  either	  by	  police	  or	   local	  government.359	  One	  informant	  from	  the	  research,	  Amir,	  who	  
had	   previously	   served	   as	   an	  HIV/AIDS	   outreach	  worker	   living	   in	   Tunis,	   said,	   “I	   have	   been	  
attacked,	  and	  the	  police	  have	  chased	  after	  me	  on	  several	  occasions.	  And	  it’s	  not	  the	  people	  
in	   these	  neighbourhoods	  who	  scare	  me,	   it’s	  mainly	   the	  police.”360	  In	  particular,	   it	  was	   this	  
element	  of	  clear	  and	  direct	  personal	  risk	  assumed	  by	  the	  volunteers	  and	  outreach	  workers	  
in	  this	  work—with	  often	  uncertain	  consequences—that	  I	  sought	  to	  analyse	  further.	  Amir	  for	  
example,	  like	  many	  of	  his	  peers,	  began	  working	  with	  ATL	  as	  a	  young	  volunteer	  not	  long	  after	  
the	   association	   was	   established;	   he	   knew	   little	   at	   the	   time	   about	   HIV/AIDS.	   He	   soon	  
transitioned	   to	   outreach	   work	   where	   he	   committed	   himself	   completely	   to	   working	   with	  
marginalised	   communities	   sur	   le	   terrain	   (on	   the	   ground).	   He	   explained	   that	   he	   had	   been	  
raised	   in	   a	   popular	   neighbourhood	  where	   he	   experienced	   this	   element	   of	   risk	   on	   a	   daily	  
basis.	   But	   even	   then	   he	   admitted	   that	   he	   took	   this	   risk	   in	   his	  work,	   remarking,	   “Pour	   les	  
choses	   interdites,	   si	   on	   ne	   prend	   pas	   de	   risques,	   on	   n’avance	   pas”—for	   that	   which	   is	  
considered	  forbidden,	  if	  we	  do	  not	  take	  risks,	  we	  cannot	  make	  any	  progress.361	  	  
	  
For	   the	   three	   organisations	   there	   were	   two	   primary	   challenges.	   The	   first	   was	   the	   legal	  
environment	   in	  which	  they	  operated—the	  majority	  of	  behaviours	  of	  key	  populations	  were	  
legally	  penalised	  through	  existing	  national	  penal	  codes,	  such	  as	  bans	  on	  same-­‐sex	  behaviour	  
and	  sex	  work.	  The	  experience	  of	  an	   informant	   for	   the	  research,	  Nasser,	  who	  worked	  with	  
men	  who	  have	  sex	  with	  men,	  highlighted	  the	  restrictive	  legal	  context	  in	  which	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  
organisations	   worked.	   He	   explained	   that	   consequently	   vulnerable	   groups	   simply	   want	   to	  
know,	  “If	   I	  am	  put	   in	   jail,	  what	  can	  you	  do	  for	  me?”362	  The	  second	  greatest	  challenge	  was	  
the	  sociocultural	  environment	  or	  “la	  réalité	  du	  terrain.”	  During	  this	  period	  there	  were	  high	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359	  Informant	  numbers:	  18,	  19,	  20,	  21,	  23,	  25,	  26,	  30,	  31,	  32,	  36,	  45.	  
360	  Informant	  21:	  Executive	  coordinator,	  HIV/AIDS	  association;	  Tunis,	  18	  Jan.	  2012.	  
361	  Informant	  21:	  Executive	  coordinator,	  HIV/AIDS	  association;	  Tunis,	  18	  Jan.	  2012.	  
362	  Informant	  25:	  Supervisor	  of	  peer	  educators	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  founder	  of	  Damj;	  Tunis,	  27	  Jan.	  2012	  and	  
14	  Mar.	  2013.	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degrees	   of	   stigma	   by	   communities	   against	   people	   who	   were	   vulnerable	   to	   acquiring	  
HIV/AIDS	   and	   this	   stigma	   could	   have	   the	   effect	   of	   setting	   the	   work	   of	   the	   organisation	  
behind	  months,	   either	   through	   inflammatory	   articles	   in	   the	   press	   or	   from	   discrimination	  
among	   community	   caregivers.	   Organisations	   knew	   they	   would	   have	   to	   take	   their	   work	  
forward	  in	  a	  more	  underground	  and	  informal	  manner	  to	  advance	  at	  either	  of	  these	  levels.	  
Strategies	   of	   caution	   became	   vital	   to	   the	   work	   of	   the	   organisations	   at	   this	   time.	   Nasser	  
stated:	  	  
	  
We	  are	  successful	  in	  doing	  our	  work	  in	  part	  because	  we	  are	  courageous	  and	  in	  part	  
because	  of	  our	  discretion,...We	  know	  that	  there	  are	  risks	  but	  we	  also	  want	  to	  live	  as	  
equal	  citizens	  in	  Tunisia,	  this	  is	  primordial	  for	  me.	  We	  are	  conscious	  of	  these	  risk	  but	  
we	  have	  to	  go	  far	  and	  advance.	  We	  have	  the	  will	  to	  go	  above	  and	  beyond	  these	  risks.	  
However	  I	  also	  realise	  that	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  put	  others	  in	  danger.	  We	  try	  to	  measure	  
these	  risks	  and	  take	  precautions.363	  	  
	  
During	   the	   research	   interviews,	   a	   significant	   number	   of	   the	   informants	   were	   open	   (to	  
varying	  degrees)	   about	  difficult	   experiences	   they	   (or	   their	   colleagues)	   encountered	  at	   the	  
political	  and	  sociocultural	   level	   in	  Tunisia	  as	  employees	  of	   the	  HIV/AIDS	  associations	  or	  as	  
individuals	   engaging	   in	   policy	   and	   advocacy	   in	   this	   domain	   during	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime.364	  
They	   highlighted	   the	   risk	   of	   conducting	   this	   work	   but	   also	   described	   the	   multiplicity	   of	  
strategies	   they	   used	   to	   be	   able	   to	   manoeuvre	   through	   what	   often	   was	   perceived	   to	   be	  
uncertain	   terrain.	   This	   uncertainty	   had	   its	   origins	   in	   the	   personalist	   regimes	   of	   Bourguiba	  
and	  Ben	  Ali,	  which	  both	  relied	  upon	  authoritarianism	  to	  implement	  liberal	  sociopolitical	  and	  
socioeconomic	  reforms	   in	  the	  drive	  for	  “modernisation”	  and	  stability.	  The	   implementation	  
of	  neoliberal	  economic	  reform	   in	  Tunisia	  necessitated	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  political	   legitimacy	  
on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.	  In	  order	  to	  secure	  and	  maintain	  this	  legitimacy,	  liberalising	  
reforms	  were	   adopted	   to	   provide	   the	   national	   and	   international	   impression	   that	   genuine	  
democratic	   pluralism	  was	   underway.	   To	   the	   contrary,	   authoritarianism	  was	   being	   further	  
embedded	   through	   a	   combination	   of	   sustained	   oppression	   of	   perceived	   opposition	   and	  
networks	   of	   neopatrimonial	   relationships,	   effectively	   allowing	   the	   regime	   to	   stifle	   public	  
spaces	  for	  political	  and	  collective	  activism.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  many	  Tunisian	  citizens	  prior	  to	  
the	  uprising	  in	  2010	  were	  only	  marginally	  involved	  in	  their	  country’s	  governance	  (either	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363	  Informant	  25:	  Supervisor	  of	  peer	  educators	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  founder	  of	  Damj;	  Tunis,	  27	  Jan.	  2012	  and	  
14	  Mar.	  2013.	  
364	  Informant	  numbers:	  18-­‐26,	  30,	  31,	  32,	  36,	  45,	  48	  and	  57	  (16	  research	  participants).	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the	   national	   or	   local	   level).	   Nevertheless,	   both	   the	   Bourguiba	   and	   Ben	   Ali	   regimes	  
unwittingly	  and	  ultimately	  provided	  the	  conditions	  for	  autonomous	  social	  action	  to	  arise,	  in	  
part	  through	  the	  instillation	  of	  political	   liberalisation	  measures	  that	  granted	  legal	  status	  to	  
many	  of	  these	  organisations.	  This	  formal	  as	  well	  as	  informal	  social	  action	  endured	  in	  spite	  of	  
tacit	  measures	  by	   the	  government	  and	   security	   apparatus	   to	   control	   and	   repress	   through	  
intimidation,	  force,	  and	  violence.	  	  
	  
	  
Conclusion	  
The	  experience	  of	   initial	  state	  building	  during	  Ottoman	  control	   from	  the	  sixteenth	  century	  
gradually	  moved	  Tunisia	   to	  more	  established	  and	  centralised	   forms	  of	  government.	  These	  
particular	  origins	  and	  initial	  structures	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  provided	  the	  opportunity	  to	  not	  
only	  consolidate	   the	  bureaucratic	  apparatus	  necessary	   to	  govern	  and	  maintain	   legitimacy,	  
but	  also	  to	  bring	  peripheral	  regions	  and	  tribal	  populations	  under	  greater	  state	  social	  control	  
by	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	  Moreover,	   the	   relatively	   uninterrupted	  period	  of	  
state-­‐building	   and	   centralisation	   encountered	   throughout	   French	   colonial	   rule	   effectively	  
afforded	   the	   post-­‐independence	   leadership	   a	   highly	   efficient	   and	   highly	   centralised	   state	  
apparatus	   from	   which	   to	   govern.	   Through	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   unified	   nationalist	  
movement,	  Bourguiba	  was	  able	  to	  lead	  Tunisia	  to	  independence	  from	  French	  colonial	  rule—
and	   from	   1956,	   he	   ruled	  what	  was	   already	   considered	   an	   established	   bureaucratic	   state.	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   Tunisian	   state	   consolidated	   under	   Bourguiba	   quickly	   entered	   into	  what	  
Ben	  Romdhane	  refers	  to	  as	  an	  “authoritarian	  spiral.”	  Bourguiba	  not	  only	  had	  to	  manage	  and	  
pre-­‐empt	   the	   conflicts	   that	   emerged	   immediately	   prior	   to	   and	   following	   his	   ascent	   to	  
leadership—for	   example,	   through	   the	   confrontations	   taking	   place	   from	   within	   the	   Neo-­‐
Destour	  Party	  with	  Salah	  Ben	  Youssef	  and	  the	  Youssefists—but	  also	  he	  drove	  through	  the	  
implementation	  of	   controversial	   sociopolitical	   reform	  such	  as	   the	  Code	  of	  Personal	  Status	  
(CPS)	  and	  austere	  socioeconomic	  reform	  in	  the	  face	  of	  extreme	  poverty	  across	  the	  country.	  
These	   crisis	   moments	   in	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   state	   represent	   critical	   watersheds	   in	  
Tunisia’s	  institutional	  development.	  Moreover,	  the	  vigour	  with	  which	  the	  Bourguiba	  regime	  
implemented	  these	  economic	  and	  social	  reforms	  effectively	  allowed	  the	  project	  of	  national	  
construction	  to	  supersede	  opportunities	  for	  political	  pluralism	  and	  liberalism.	  Over	  time,	  the	  
legitimacy	   of	   the	   Bourguiba	   regime	   became	   increasingly	   tied	   to	   economic	   stability	   and	  
success.	   Nevertheless,	   growing	   authoritarian	   and	   repressive	   measures	   for	   state	   social	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control	  soon	  came	  to	  overshadow	  possibilities	   for	  genuine	  democratic	  pluralism	  in	  Tunisia	  
and	   inevitably	   influenced	   the	   nature	   of	   Tunisian	   society	   that	   would	   develop	   from	   this	  
period.	  	  
	  
This	  “authoritarian	  spiral”	  continued	  well	   into	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  from	  1987	  despite	   initial	  
optimism	  for	  democratic	  reform.	  The	  regime’s	  preoccupation	  with	  both	  the	  implementation	  
of	   neoliberal	   economic	   reform	   and	   political	   stability	   and	   security,	   eventually	   necessitated	  
even	  harsher	  crackdowns	  on	  perceived	  unrest	  and	  opposition.	  Nevertheless,	   from	  1987	  to	  
2010	  more	  than	  9,000	  civil	  society	  organisations	  were	  established	  through	  the	  1959	  laws	  of	  
association	   modified	   under	   Ben	   Ali,	   allowing	   a	   range	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   organisations	  
working	  with	  marginalised	  groups	  to	  be	  created.	  Tunisia’s	  laws	  of	  association	  were	  regularly	  
amended,	   expanded,	   and	   contracted,	   to	   correspond	   to	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   the	   regime	  
sensed	  potential	  opposition,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  create	  the	  impression	  of	  legitimacy	  nationally	  and	  
internationally.	  This	  was	  as	  opposed	  to	  attempts	  to	  genuinely	  create	  spaces	  for	  civil	  society	  
groups	   and	   actors	   to	   play	   a	   consequential	   role	   in	   the	   way	   Tunisia	   was	   governed.	   Actors	  
looking	  to	  engage	  in	  civil	  society	  organisations	  knowingly	  accepted	  certain	  risks	  to	  engage	  in	  
even	   benign	   activities,	   including	   the	   risk	   of	   harassment,	   intimidation,	   and	   repression.	   To	  
quash	  opposition	  the	  security	  apparatus	  under	  Ben	  Ali	  even	  extended	  this	  repression	  to	  the	  
personal-­‐level,	  where	  friends	  and	  family	  members	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  were	  also	  met	  with	  
hostility.	   The	   eventual	   cumbersome	   laws	   of	   association,	   practices	   of	   co-­‐optation	   and	  
infiltration,	  and	  the	  frequent	  obligation	  to	  declare	  one’s	  allegiance	  to	  the	  RCD	  party	  not	  only	  
instrumentalised	   these	   actors	   and	   groups,	   but	   also	   discouraged	   many	   individuals	   from	  
engaging	   in	   collective	   activism.	   More	   importantly,	   a	   body	   of	   individuals,	   namely	   the	  
Islamists,	   were	   denied	   the	   opportunity	   to	   be	   active	   in	   public	   spaces	   at	   any	   level.	   These	  
authoritarian	   and	   exclusionary	   practices	   of	   some	   segments	   of	   the	   population	   eventually	  
impacted	  upon	  the	  nature	  of	  Tunisian	  society	  during	  this	  period.	  Moreover,	  over	  time	  these	  
practices	  restricted	  many	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  to	  the	  role	  initially	  demarcated	  for	  
them	  within	  the	  neoliberal	  framework—as	  providers	  of	  social	  welfare	  services.	  
	  
The	  civil	   society	  organisations	   that	   chose	   to	   formally	   legalise	   their	  work	  had	   to	  outwardly	  
accept	   and	   abide	   by	   the	   “rules	   of	   the	   game”	   set	   by	   the	   regime.	   The	   organisations	   that	  
engaged	   in	  women’s	   rights	   and	   broader	   human	   rights	   took	   greater	   risks	   than	   the	   groups	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working	  in	  HIV/AIDS	  as	  their	  work	  was	  often	  more	  visible	  but	  more	  importantly,	  the	  issue	  of	  
human	   rights	   represented	  a	   significantly	   contentious	   issue	  at	   the	  political	   level.	  However,	  
these	   organisations	   also	   had	   arguably	   more	   support	   from	   national,	   regional	   and	  
international	   bodies.	   The	   rights-­‐based	   organisations	   were	   also	   strategic	   in	   linking	   their	  
activities	   and	   advocacy	   to	   other	   broader	   issues	   such	   as	   solidarity	   with	   Palestine	   and	   the	  
greater	  defence	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  region.	  Despite	  the	  often	  brutal	  encounters	  with	  the	  
regime,	   these	   external	   links	   offered	   the	   organisations	   a	   degree	   of	   protection,	   but	   more	  
importantly	  a	  principal	  means	  to	  subvert	  state	  control.	  For	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  organisations	  that	  
later	  sought	  to	  support	  and	  work	  with	  key	  populations	  at	  higher	  risk	  of	  acquiring	  HIV,	  the	  
challenge	   was	   not	   necessarily	   the	   overt,	   brunt	   force	   of	   the	   government	   or	   security	  
apparatus.	  Instead,	  the	  greatest	  barrier	  was	  often	  the	  local	  police	  and	  communities	  through	  
which	   outreach	   workers,	   researchers,	   and	   medical	   staff	   needed	   to	   manoeuvre	   to	   reach	  
clandestine	  and	  illegal	  communities.	  	  	  
	  
The	   symbolic	   and	   physical	   public	   spaces	   for	   civil	   society	   actors	   became	   increasingly	  
constrained	   throughout	   the	   five	   decades	   following	   independence,	   a	   period	   during	   which	  
both	  an	   intolerance	   for	  political	  opposition,	  against	  both	   Islamist	  and	  secular	  movements,	  
and	  a	  predilection	   for	   the	   implementation	  of	  “modernising”	   reforms	  virtually	   transformed	  
civil	   society	   into	  a	  homogenous	  entity	  of	   secular-­‐liberal	  actors.	  Moreover,	   the	  vigour	  with	  
which	   neoliberalism	   was	   at	   times	   applied	   eventually	   afforded	   many	   of	   these	   actors	   an	  
unquestioned	  legitimacy	  eventually	  allowing	  for	  the	  control	  and	  repression	  of	  those	  groups	  
(and	  ideas)	  that	  did	  not	  align	  with	  secular	  norms	  and	  the	  vision	  of	  “modern”	  Tunisia.	  In	  the	  
drive	   to	  maintain	   secular-­‐liberal	  public	   spaces,	   the	  conflicts	  and	  contentions	  among	   these	  
actors	   and	   groups	   were	   increasingly	   de-­‐emphasised	   and	   overlooked.	   Throughout	   the	  
remainder	  of	   the	   thesis,	   this	   research	  will	  underscore	  how	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  both	   the	  
Bourguiba	  and	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regimes	  manipulated	  spaces	  for	  civil	  society	  groups	  and	  actors	  to	  
manoeuvre	  has	  left	  its	  residue	  on	  these	  actors	  today.	  Moreover,	  it	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  
Bourguiba	  and	  Ben	  Ali	   regimes	  unwittingly	  provided	  the	  conditions	   for	   independent	  social	  
action	   to	   arise	   through	   the	   repression	   of	   emerging	   counter-­‐publics.	   What	   materialised	  
following	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising	   in	   2010	   was	   a	   virtual	   breathing	   space	   and	   unrelenting	  
momentum	  to	  participate	  in	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces,	  or	  what	  many	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  rebirth	  
of	  muwatana	  or	  citoyenneté,	  following	  the	  revolution.	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The	  next	  chapter	  examines	  what	  happens	  when	  a	  space	  opens	  up	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  
a	  dictator,	  and	  in	  particular	  which	  actors	  and	  groups	  rush	  to	  fill	   this	  space.	  Effectively,	  the	  
residue	  of	  authoritarian	  rule	   left	  on	  many	  of	   these	  organisations	   that	  existed	  before	  2010	  
had	  a	  substantial	  impact	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationships	  that	  would	  emerge	  among	  civil	  
society	  actors	  during	  Tunisia’s	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  rule.	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Chapter	  IV:	  Civil	  society	  and	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  public	  space	  	  
	  
	  
	  
Before	  Ben	  Ali,	  people	  were	  not	  free	  to	  do	  this	  (establish	  an	  association)	  for	  fear	  of	  engaging	  
directly	  or	  indirectly	  in	  the	  political	  system	  with	  the	  regime;	  but	  now	  this	  spirit	  of	  
“electorism”	  is	  resurfacing	  and	  in	  a	  way,	  the	  creation	  of	  all	  these	  associations	  is	  a	  symbol	  of	  
resisting	  a	  dictatorship.	  
	  
-­‐-­‐Director,	  United	  Nations	  human	  rights	  organisation,	  Tunis365	  
	  
This	  space	  was	  wide	  open—there	  were	  no	  police,	  no	  government,	  the	  political	  groups	  were	  
not	  structured,	  anything	  was	  possible.	  
	  
-­‐-­‐Journalist,	  TunisiaLive.Net366	  
	  
	  
The	  downfall	   of	   a	  dictator	   following	  almost	   three	  decades	  of	   authoritarian	   rule	   in	   Tunisia	  
opened	  a	  space.	  In	  the	  months	  that	  followed	  the	  departure	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime,	  this	  space	  
swelled,	   harnessing	   a	  multitude	  of	   visions	   and	  priorities	   for	   post-­‐revolution	   Tunisia.	   From	  
the	  moments	  of	  national	  solidarity	  of	  having	  brought	  down	  a	  dictator	  to	  the	  redefining	  of	  
national	   priorities,	   numerous	   battles	   unfolded	   in	   Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces	   unmasking	   the	  
complex	   and	   unstable	   nature	   of	   democratisation.	   During	   this	   period	   one	   witnesses	   the	  
moments	  of	  the	  “popular	  upsurge”	  in	  which	  thousands	  occupied	  the	  historic	  public	  spaces	  
of	   Tunis	   such	   as	   in	   front	   of	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Interior	   along	   Avenue	   Bourguiba,	   the	   almost	  
instantaneous	   measures	   for	   political	   liberalisation	   put	   into	   effect	   under	   the	   transition	  
governments,	   and	   finally	   the	   “resurrection	   of	   civil	   society”	   so	   frequently	   described	   in	   the	  
literature	  on	  transitions	  from	  authoritarian	  rule.	  However,	  what	  are	  often	  absent	  from	  this	  
literature	  are	  accounts	  of	   the	  conflicts	  and	  contestations	   taking	  place	  among	  these	  actors	  
and	   groups	   manoeuvring	   within	   these	   different	   spaces.	   Following	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising,	  
numerous	  contestations	  manifested	  alongside	   the	  unattainable	  expectations	  among	  many	  
for	   a	   higher	   or	   different	   standard	   of	   democracy,	   as	  well	   as	   for	   consensus	   on	  what	   those	  
national	  priorities	  should	  be.	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  Informant	  34:	  Director,	  multilateral	  human	  rights	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  15	  Feb.	  2012.	  
366	  Informant	  27:	  Co-­‐founder	  and	  journalist,	  English	  news	  website/media;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	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From	   2011–2013,	   the	   landscape	   for	   civil	   society	   actors	   in	   Tunisia	   expanded	   with	   the	  
establishment	  of	   several	   thousand	  new	  and	   legal	   civil	   society	  organisations.	  Following	   the	  
deregulation	  of	   the	   former	   laws	  of	   association	   initially	   promulgated	  under	  Bourguiba	   and	  
eventually	  amended	  by	  Ben	  Ali,	  civil	  society	  organisations	  were	  able	  to	  work	  more	  openly	  in	  
a	  wider	   range	  of	  activities	   including	  civic	  activism,	  human	   rights,	   social	  welfare	   initiatives,	  
and	  direct	  outreach	  work	  with	  deprived	  communities	  across	  the	  country.	  From	  January	  to	  
October	  2011	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  1,700	  new	  organisations	  were	  created,	  with	  a	  further	  600	  
civil	   society	  organisations	   registering	  between	  October	  2011	  and	  March	  2012.367	  The	  new	  
organisations	   were	   also	   acting	   alongside	   the	   more	   than	   9,000	   civil	   society	   organisations	  
established	  during	  the	  Bourguiba	  and	  Ben	  Ali	  regimes,	  termed	  soon	  after	  the	  revolution	  the	  
“historic”	   associations.	   As	   Tunisia	   moved	   to	   initiate	   political	   liberalisation	   measures	  
following	  the	  departure	  of	  Ben	  Ali	  in	  January	  2011,	  the	  symbolic	  and	  physical	  public	  spaces	  
for	  a	  multitude	  of	  actors	  and	  groups	  critically	  widened.	  	  
	  
One	  also	  began	  to	  observe	  a	  powerful	  sense	  of	  muwatana	  or	  citoyenneté	  emerging	  not	  only	  
among	  the	  various	  civil	  society	  actors,	  but	  also	  among	  the	  broader	  population	  following	  the	  
uprising.	  As	  the	  numerous	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  moved	  to	  the	  forefront,	  spaces	  for	  
political	   liberalisation	  opened	  with	   fresh	  avenues	   for	   civic	  participation.	  The	  organisations	  
and	  the	  actors	  that	  inhabited	  these	  expanding	  spaces	  interacted	  with	  each	  other	  through	  a	  
web	   of	   relations	   and	   confrontations.	   Every	   opening	   also	   brought	   competing	   agendas	   and	  
visions	   for	  who	  exactly	   should	   fill	   the	  public	   space	  and	  what	  nature	   this	   changing	  domain	  
should	  take.	  
	  
Through	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  public	  space	  during	  the	  two	  
years	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  regime,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  locate	  the	  different	  
conflicts	   that	   emerge	   between	   civil	   society	   groups	   and	   actors.	   In	   addition	   to	   locating	   the	  
specific	  areas	  of	  these	  conflicts	  during	  what	  is	  often	  characterised	  as	  a	  tumultuous	  period	  of	  
the	   transition,	   the	   actual	   consequences	   of	   these	   contestations	   become	   more	   apparent.	  
Drawing	  on	  field	  research,	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  first	  core	  theme	  of	  the	  thesis,	  namely	  
the	   “illiberal”	   effects	   of	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   public	   space(s).	   It	   looks	   specifically	   to	   the	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  Union	  Européenne,	  “Rapport	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  5.	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moments	  when	  this	  space	  opened	  in	  Tunisia	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  actors	  who	  were	  included	  and	  
excluded	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  this	  space.	  It	  begins	  with	  a	  narrative	  of	  the	  events	  
immediately	   following	   the	   departure	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime	   in	   January	   2011,	   such	   as	   the	  
initial	   steps	   taken	   by	   the	   transition	   government(s)	   to	   implement	   political	   liberalisation	  
measures	   including	   the	   drafting	   of	   election	   road	   maps	   and	   the	   realisation	   of	   a	   National	  
Constituent	  Assembly.	   It	  then	  looks	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  rule	  
on	  the	  remnant	  political	   institutions	  as	  well	  as	   the	  manifold	  expectations	  and	  contentions	  
that	  emerge	  among	  various	  actors	  during	  this	  period	  through	  key	  public	  contestations,	  for	  
example	  on	  the	  status	  of	  women	  and	  freedom	  of	  the	  press.	  This	  chapter	  then	  depicts	  the	  
“resurrection	  of	  civil	  society”	   in	  Tunisia	  when	  thousands	  of	  new	  organisations	  were	  legally	  
allowed	  to	  register	  through	  the	  newly	  expanded	  laws	  of	  association.	  Finally,	  it	  traces	  the	  (re-­‐
)emergence	  of	   the	  notion	  of	  muwatana	  or	  citoyenneté	   and	  considers	  whether	   this	  notion	  
reflected	   the	   self-­‐determination	   and	   self-­‐management	   agendas	   prevalent	   earlier	   in	   the	  
social	  movements	   of	   the	   1980s	   or	   later	   neoliberal	   understandings	   of	   good	   governance	   in	  
donor-­‐led	   development	   discourses.	   I	   argue	   that	   Tunisia’s	   efforts	   to	   implement	   political	  
liberalisation	  to	  initiate	  democratisation	  did	  not	  automatically	  entail	  an	  automatic	  “liberal”	  
opening	  of	  the	  public	  space.	   In	  fact,	  one	  begins	  to	  observe	  groups	  and	  actors	  traditionally	  
characterised	   by	   solidarity	   and	   good	   will,	   acting	   against	   the	   democratic	   virtues	   often	  
attributed	  to	  them.	  
	  
	  
	  
1.	  	  Political	  liberalisation	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  space	  
	  
With	   the	   disappearance	   of	   fear,	   Tunisians	   who	   previously	   would	   have	   characterised	  
themselves	   as	   politically	   apathetic	   would	   express	   their	   newfound	   interest	   and	   thirst	   for	  
news,	   information,	   and	   for	   political	   engagement.	   Sami	   Zemni,	   tracing	   the	   moments	  
following	  the	  departure	  of	  Ben	  Ali,	  contends	  that	  from	  January	  2011	  political	  developments	  
were	   largely	   shaped	   by	   tensions	   between	   the	   desire	   for	   “institutional	   continuity”	   by	   the	  
legal	  government	  and	  the	  “revolutionary	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  popular	  mass	  mobilisations.”368	  
In	  what	  Zemni	  describes	  as	  a	  moment	  of	   “extraordinary	  politics”	  Tunisia	  entered	   into	   the	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  Zemni,	  “The	  Extraordinary	  Politics	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  Revolution,”	  4.	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“re-­‐constitutive	   phase	   of	   the	   political.”369	  This	   process	   started	   with	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  
“Front	  of	  January	  14th”	  involving	  already	  existing	  and	  newer	  political	  parties,	  young	  people	  
who	   participated	   in	   the	   revolution,	   and	   civil	   society	   actors.	   The	   Front	   articulated	   the	  
demand	  for	  elections	  in	  order	  to	  form	  a	  constituent	  assembly	  within	  the	  year	  and	  argued	  for	  
the	  suspension	  of	  political	  parties	  linked	  to	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.370	  By	  4	  March,	  the	  Tunisian	  
constitution	   was	   suspended	   and	   later	   that	   same	   month	   Tunisia	   officially	   recognised	   45	  
political	   parties,	   in	   comparison	  with	   only	   8	   prior	   to	   January	   2011.371	  By	  May,	   an	   electoral	  
committee	  was	  put	  in	  place	  (L’Instance	  Superieure	  Independante	  pour	  les	  Elections	  (ISIE))	  to	  
hold	  elections	   for	  members	   to	  serve	  on	   the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly.	  The	  space	   for	  
political	   participation	   was	   opening	   and	   Tunisians	   were	   embracing	   their	   commitment	   to	  
shape	  a	  different	  Tunisia.	  During	  the	  period	   from	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising	  until	  May	  2011,	  
when	  the	  dates	  for	  elections	  to	  the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly	  were	  announced,	  Tunisia	  
experienced	  several	  weeks	  of	   temporary	  political	  appointments	   characterised	  by	   frequent	  
ministerial	  and	  RCD	  party	  member	  resignations.	  Zemni	  argues	  against	   the	  notion	  that	   this	  
period	  was	  marked	  by	  political	  instability:	  
	  
Looked	   at	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	   revolutionary	   effort	   to	   radically	   change	   the	  
regime,	   the	   high	   levels	   of	   collective	   mobilisations,	   the	   demand	   for	   fundamental	  
change,	  the	  emergence	  of	   informal	  public	  political	  spaces	  and	  even	  the	  emergence	  
of	   extra-­‐institutional	   movements...should	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   phase	   of	   extraordinary	  
politics.372	  
	  
Approximately	   three	  months	   after	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising,	   two	   institutions	   created	   following	  
the	  revolution	  merged.	  The	  Committee	  for	  Political	  Reform	  and	  the	  National	  Council	  for	  the	  
Protection	   of	   the	   Revolution	   (CNPR)	   joined	   to	   initiate	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   the	   transition	   by	  
establishing	   the	   High	   Authority	   for	   the	   Realisation	   of	   the	   Objectives	   of	   the	   Revolution,	  
Political	  Reform	  and	  Democratic	  Transition.	  Led	  by	  the	  renowned	  scholar	  Yadh	  Ben	  Achour,	  
the	  High	  Authority	  was	  created	  to	  oversee	  the	  transition	   from	  revolution	  to	  elections	  and	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  High	  Authority	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  after	  the	  
revolution,	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  Politics	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  Tunisian	  Revolution,”	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  6.	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was	   charged	   with	   drafting	   new	   laws	   to	   organise	   the	   October	   2011	   elections.	   Moreover,	  
Zemni	  observes,	  “The	  High	  Authority	  claimed	  co-­‐decision	  on	  all	  governmental	  matters.”373	  
	  
On	   23	   October	   2011,	   Tunisia	   became	   the	   first	   country	   to	   hold	   democratic	   elections	  
following	  the	  uprisings	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa.	  Total	  voter	  turnout	  on	  the	  day	  
was	   52	   percent	   of	   eligible	   voters	   (86	   percent	   of	   registered	   voters	   and	   16	   percent	   of	  
unregistered	  voters),	  and	  the	  Ennahda	  party	  won	  37.04	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  and	  89	  (41.01	  
percent)	  of	   the	  217	  seats	  on	  the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly.374	  In	  addition,	  58	  women	  
secured	   seats	   on	   the	   Constituent	   Assembly,	   (39	   of	  whom	  were	  members	   of	   Ennahda)	   to	  
hold	  27	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  seats.375	  Despite	  a	  relatively	  low	  voter	  turnout,	  the	  
National	  Democratic	   Institute	   final	   report	   on	   the	  National	   Constituent	  Assembly	   elections	  
concluded,	  “Although	  no	  party	  won	  a	  majority	  of	  seats	  Ennahda	  emerged	  as	  the	  strongest	  
political	  force	  in	  the	  country	  winning	  more	  votes	  than	  the	  next	  eight	  parties	  combined	  and	  
garnering	  a	  plurality	  of	  seats	  in	  the	  NCA.”376	  Issandr	  El	  Amrani	  and	  Ursula	  Lindsey	  note,	  “Not	  
only	   did	   the	   party	  win	   a	   plurality	   of	   seats	   nationwide,	   it	   won	   a	   plurality	   in	   almost	   every	  
district	   in	   the	   country,	   including	   in	   Tunis....In	   other	   words,	   not	   only	   is	   Ennahda	   clearly	  
Tunisia’s	  strongest	  party,	  it	  appears	  to	  have	  deeper	  support,	  more	  evenly	  spread	  across	  the	  
country,	  than	  any	  other	  party.”377	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  voters	  for	  
Ennahda	  were	  located	  in	  the	  marginalised	  regions	  of	  Tunisia	  in	  the	  centre,	  south,	  and	  west	  
of	   the	   country	   and	   were	   mainly	   composed	   of	   the	   lower-­‐middle	   classes.	   This	   included	  
unemployed	  youths	  and	  employees	  of	  the	  service	  sectors	  who,	  Habib	  Ayeb	  remarks,	  were	  
“mostly	  conservative	  and	  non-­‐Francophone,	  and	  have	  strong	  ties	  to	  traditional	  values	  and	  
religion.”378	  However,	   he	   argues	   that	   the	   voter	   choice	   of	   Ennahda	   was	   based	   less	   on	  
ideological	  conviction,	  but	  rather	  in	  line	  with	  the	  “social	  expectations”	  of	  the	  revolution,	  and	  
against	   the	   immorality	   and	   corruption	   associated	   with	   the	   former	   regime.	   According	   to	  
Ayeb,	  “It	  seems	  the	  vote	  has	  been	  precisely	  against	  leftists	  and	  liberals	  more	  than	  it	  was	  for	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Ennahda.	   One	   can	   argue	   that	   it	   was	   largely	   a	   protest	   vote,	   or	   a	   vote	   of	   resistance.”379	  
Following	   the	   election,	   Rachid	   Ghannouchi,	   co-­‐founder	   and	   president	   of	   Ennahda,	   was	  
quoted	  as	   saying,	   “This	   is	   an	  historic	  day.	   Tunis	  was	  born	  again	   today.	   The	  Arab	  Spring	   is	  
born	   again	   today—not	   in	   a	   negative	   way	   of	   toppling	   dictators	   but	   in	   a	   positive	   way	   of	  
building	   democratic	   systems,	   a	   representative	   system	   which	   represents	   the	   people.”380	  
Eventually,	  Ennahda	  went	  on	  to	  form	  a	  coalition	  with	  two	  secular	  parties—the	  Congress	  for	  
the	  Republic	  (29	  seats)	  and	  Ettakatol	  (20	  seats)—to	  secure	  a	  majority,	  creating	  what	  would	  
come	   to	   be	   known	   as	   the	   “Troika.”381	  The	   compromises	   required	   by	   all	   participants	   in	   a	  
coalition	  involving	  secular	  and	  Islamist	  parties	  became	  a	  critical	  source	  of	  tension	  within	  the	  
government	  whereby	  a	  virtual	  stalemate	  between	  the	  parties	  continued	  until	   the	  October	  
2014	  parliamentary	  elections.	  
	  
The	   principal	   task	   for	   the	   National	   Constituent	   Assembly	   was	   in	   effect	   to	   remodel	   and	  
package	  Tunisia’s	  post-­‐revolution	  national	  identity.	  This	  would	  not	  be	  an	  easy	  task	  given	  the	  
manner	   in	   which	   the	   country	   appeared	   to	   be	   increasingly	   divided	   between	   the	   secular	  
elements	  of	  the	  population	  and	  a	  vast	  range	  of	  Islamist	  actors.	  Maaike	  Voorhoeve	  observes,	  
“While	  the	  first	  slogans	  of	  the	  revolution	  invoked	  employment	  and	  dignity,	  the	  relationship	  
between	   the	   state	   and	   religion	   quickly	   came	   to	   the	   fore	   in	   debates	   on	   what	   ‘the	   new	  
Tunisia’	  should	  look	  like,	  and	  the	  future	  constitutional	  reference	  to	  religion	  played	  a	  crucial	  
role.”382	  Consequently,	   one	  of	   the	  main	   issues	   for	   the	  National	   Constituent	  Assembly	  was	  
Article	  One	  of	  the	  previous	  1959	  constitution,	  which	  stated,	  “Islam	  is	  Tunisia’s	  religion.”	  The	  
National	  Constituent	  Assembly	  chose	  to	  copy	  Article	  One	  from	  the	  previous	  constitution—a	  
choice	  that	  Voorhoeve	  argues	  reflected	  “continuity”	  over	  “transformation”	  and	  in	  effect,	  for	  
Ennahda,	   represented	   a	   political	   strategy	   to	   avoid	   an	   exacerbation	   of	   tension	   between	  
Islamist	  and	  secular	  factions.383	  Nevertheless,	  one	  of	  the	  contentions	  concerning	  Article	  One	  
was	   the	   vagueness	   with	   which	   it	   was	   applied	   in	   the	   past,	   and	   with	   which	   it	   could	   be	  
potentially	   applied	   through	   an	   Islamist	   majority;384	  of	   particular	   focus	   was	   the	   issue	   of	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whether	  or	  not	  there	  was	  a	  role	  for	  Sharia	  in	  the	  Tunisian	  Constitution.	  Voorhoeve,	  citing	  a	  
Tunisian	  Law	  professor,	  argues,	  “although	  the	  text	  of	  Article	  One	  has	  remained	  the	  same,	  its	  
meaning	   may	   change	   significantly	   as	   new	   governments	   interpret	   it.”385	  Ennahda	   in	   fact	  
embodied	  a	  host	  of	  disparate	   interpretations	  of	   Islam,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  moderate	  and	  
others	  that	  represented	  stricter	  understandings	  of	  Sunnism.	  	  
	  
For	   example,	   in	   March	   2012	   thousands	   of	   Salafis	   demonstrators	   called	   for	   the	  
implementation	  of	  Sharia	  into	  Tunisia’s	  Constitution.	  Protesters	  voiced	  cries	  of	  “takbir”—an	  
affirmation	   of	   the	   greatness	   of	   god—and	   “the	   people	   want	   the	   implementation	   of	  
Sharia.”386	  A	   female	   protester	   remarked,	   “Sharia	   is	   what	   we	   need.	   It	   is	   our	   salvation.	  
Secularists	  know	  so	  little	  about	  Sharia;	  they	  only	  hear	  how	  men	  are	  allowed	  to	  marry	  four	  
women	  or	  how	  thieves’	  hands	  are	  cut.	  This	  is	  not	  what	  Sharia	  is	  about,	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  life.”387	  
Moreover,	   more	   than	   100	   associations	   under	   the	   umbrella	   organisation	   of	   the	   Tunisian	  
Front	  of	  Islamic	  Associations	  delivered	  a	  formal	  petition	  calling	  for	  Islamic	  law.388	  Opponents	  
were	   also	   active.	   Approximately	   one	   week	   later,	   on	   20	   March	   2012,	   Tunisia’s	   day	   of	  
independence,	  thousands	  of	  secular	  Tunisians	  marched	  to	  demonstrate	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  “civil	  
state.”	  One	  of	  the	  protesters	  with	  a	  Tunisian	  flag	  wrapped	  around	  her	  waist	  asserted,	  “We	  
will	  not	  allow	  a	  minority	  that	  was	  not	  even	  present	  before	  January	  14th	  to	  impose	  its	  views	  
on	   us,	   it	   is	  wrong	   that	   after	   56	   years	   of	   independence	  we	   are	   still	   here	   calling	   for	   a	   civil	  
state.”389	  From	  2011–2013,	  a	  range	  of	  similar	  demonstrations	  and	  protests	  across	  Tunisia’s	  
public	  spaces	  exposed	  the	  different	  priorities	  and	  visions	  for	  post-­‐uprising	  Tunisia.	  
	  
Expectations	  for	  the	  transition	  	  
The	  perception	  of	  disorder	  or	  chaos	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  can	  
eventually	   transform	   former	   sentiments	   of	   mutual	   solidarity	   and	   unity	   into	   what	   can	   be	  
conflictual	  and	  consequential	  “us”	  versus	  “them”	  distinctions.	  These	  distinctions	   in	  Tunisia	  
manifested	   in	   both	   the	  political	   debates	  of	   the	  National	   Constituent	  Assembly,	   as	  well	   as	  
within	   the	  public	   space	  among	  civil	   society.	   The	  “us”	  versus	   “them”	  demarcation	  perhaps	  
most	   sharply	   and	   critically	   emerged	   in	   debates	   regarding	   the	   free	   press	   and	   media,	   the	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status	   of	   women,	   and	   key	   national	   symbols	   such	   as	   the	   Tunisian	   flag.	   These	   debates	  
underscored	   more	   importantly	   the	   perception	   of	   a	   growing	   divide	   between	   Islamist	   and	  
secular	   factions	   of	   Tunisia’s	   post-­‐uprising	   population	   as	   well	   a	   moral	   panic	   manifesting	  
among	  disparate	  civil	  society	  activists.	  	  
	  
Tunisians	  debated	  a	  host	  of	   issues	  during	  the	  two	  years	  following	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising,	  
including	  several	  issues	  that	  some	  thought	  were	  debates	  resolved	  in	  the	  period	  immediately	  
following	   independence	   in	   1956.	   These	   issues	   included	  discussions	  on	   the	   veil,	   polygamy,	  
traditional	   (or	   temporary)	  marriage,	  a	  woman’s	   right	   to	  divorce,	   single	  mothers,	  abortion,	  
and	  even	  female	  genital	  mutilation.390	  Political	  discourses	  concentrated	  on,	  for	  example,	  the	  
status	  of	  women	  at	  a	  time	  when	  many	  thought	  urgent	  political	  debates	  should	  focus	  instead	  
on	   issues	   such	   as	   the	   state	   of	   the	   economy,	   rising	   food	   prices,	   and	   unemployment.391	  In	  
“The	  Uprisings	  will	  be	  Gendered,”	  Maya	  Mikdashi	  notes,	  “Such	  a	  selective	  focus	  on	  sexual	  
and	  bodily	  rights	  obfuscates	  power	  dynamics	  and	  contexts	  that	  are	  always	  also	  at	  play	  when	  
discussing	   a	   particular	   political,	   historical,	   or	   economic	   issue.” 392 	  This	   sudden	   shift	   in	  
discourse	  invoked	  a	  sustained	  moral	  panic	  among	  many	  secular-­‐liberal	  women	  who	  grew	  up	  
in	   the	   era	   of	   the	   Code	   of	   Personal	   Status	   (CPS).	   The	   CPS	   outlawed	   polygamy,	   set	   an	  
obligatory	   minimum	   age	   for	   marriage	   (15	   years	   of	   age	   for	   women	   and	   18	   for	   men),	  
stipulated	   consent	   of	   both	   spouses	   for	   the	   validity	   of	   the	  marriage,	   and	   created	   a	  more	  
rigorous	  divorce	  procedure	  required	  in	  court.	  
	  
This	  moral	  panic	  was	  also	  accompanied	  by	  an	  overarching	  sentiment	  of	  being	  “let	  down	  by	  
the	   revolution,”	   in	   particular	   among	   women	   who	   participated	   in	   the	   Tunisian	   uprising	  
alongside	  men	  in	  very	  public	  spaces.	  With	  their	  male	  counterparts	  they	  called	  for	  “freedom,	  
dignity,	  and	  employment,”	  but	  following	  the	  revolution	  they	  perceived	  they	  were	  at	  a	  real	  
risk	   of	   losing	   some	   of	   the	   rights	   they	   had	   acquired	   through	   the	   former	   regimes.393	  Many	  
secular-­‐liberal	  women	  were	   arguably	   angry	   and	   fearful	   over	   the	   future	   direction	   of	   post-­‐
revolution	  Tunisia.	   Some	  women	  were	  also	  nervously	   looking	  over	   their	   shoulders	   to	   Iran	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390	  See	  Meziou-­‐Dourai,	  “A	  Propos	  du	  Mariage	  Coutumier,”	  and	  Khalsi,	  “Excision...ou	  les	  Prédictions	  d’un	  
Psychopathe.”	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and	  Afghanistan	  for	  examples	  of	  what	  could	  happen	  to	  the	  status	  of	  women	  after	  an	  Islamic	  
Revolution,	   and	   even	   to	   Iraq	   following	   the	   targeted	   killing	   in	   early	   2012	   of	   young	   people	  
perceived	   to	   be	   homosexual	   with	   “emo-­‐like”	   features	   (including	   tight	   fitting	   clothes	   and	  
alternative	   hairstyles).	   For	   example,	   in	   an	   article	   featured	   in	   Le	   Temps	   in	   March	   2012	  
entitled	  “What	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  sexuality	  by	  the	  Salafists?,”	  Yasser	  Maarouf,	  referring	  to	  
the	  targeted	  killings	  in	  Iraq,	  writes:	  
	  
These	   different	   dramatic	   events	   and	   the	   contradictory	   statements	   from	   those	  
responsible	   in	   the	   government	   have	   caused	   us	   to	   bring	   up	   an	   unanticipated	  
question,	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   absurdity:	   what	   sexuality	   is	   the	   Salafists	   promoting,	   so	  
present	   in	   the	   media	   for	   the	   last	   several	   weeks?	  What	   is	   the	   future	   for	   Tunisian	  
women	   in	   the	   face	  of	   these	  provocations?	  What	  will	   be	   the	   life	   for	   those	   children	  
born	  out	  of	  these	  marriages	  (traditional)	  without	  security?394	  
	  
This	   fear	   of	   “moving	   backwards”	   not	   only	   invoked	   anxiety,	   but	   also	   a	   degree	   of	   disdain	  
among	  secular-­‐liberal	  women	  towards	  Islamist	  women	  demonstrating	  a	  visible	  commitment	  
to	  Islam,	  such	  as	  by	  wearing	  the	  hijab	  or	  the	  niqab.395	  Mikdashi	  points	  out	  that	  as	  Islamists	  
gained	   increasing	   support	   in	   Egypt,	   Tunisia,	   and	   Syria,	   concerns	   over	   gender	   policies	  
increasingly	  manifested.	  She	  argues:	  
	  
Gender	  equality	  and	  justice	  should	  be	  a	  focus	  of	  progressive	  politics	  no	  matter	  who	  
is	  in	  power.	  A	  selective	  fear	  of	  Islamists	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  women’s	  and	  LGBTQ	  rights	  
has	   more	   to	   do	   with	   Islamophobia	   than	   a	   genuine	   concern	   with	   gender	   justice.	  
Unfortunately,	   Islamists	  do	  not	  have	  an	  exclusive	  licence	  to	  practice	  patriarchy	  and	  
gender	  discrimination/oppression	  in	  the	  region.396	  	  
	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   point	   out	   that	   it	  was	   not	   simply	   the	   secular	   discourse	   on	   the	   status	   of	  
women	  igniting	  debate,	  but	  a	  range	  of	  voices	  equally	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  to	  advocate	  against	  
the	  CPS	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  more	  Islamist	  system	  to	  guarantee	  the	  rights	  of	  women.	  For	  example,	  
just	  before	   International	  Women’s	  Day	   in	  March	  2012,	   three	  women	  were	   interviewed	  by	  
the	  new	  online	  journal	  Tunisia-­‐Live.	  Nesrine	  Bouthafi,	  a	  member	  of	  Hizb	  Ettahrir	  (reportedly	  
a	  legally	  unrecognised	  Islamist	  party),	  argued,	  “We	  condemn	  the	  CPS.	  Women	  in	  Tunisia	  are	  
suffering	  because	  of	  this	  code—it	  is	  the	  source	  of	  their	  pain	  now….The	  code’s	  principles	  are	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not	   derived	   from	   Islamic	   ones,	   and	   are	   only	   harming	   Tunisian	   women.”397	  In	   the	   post-­‐
revolution	   discourse	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   status	   of	   women	   and	   the	   CPS	   became	   “fully	  
politicised.”398	  Moreover,	  conflicts	  over	  the	  future	  of	  Tunisia’s	  national	  identity	  grew	  during	  
the	  two	  years	  following	  the	  uprising.	  Contestations	  over	  some	  of	  the	  more	  critical	  issues	  for	  
Tunisia,	  at	  times,	  resulted	  in	  public	  confrontations	  and	  even	  violence	  between	  activists.	  The	  
consequence	  of	   these	  conflicts	  would	  either	   serve	   to	  close	  down	   these	  nascent	   spaces	  or	  
the	   contrary,	   open	   the	   field	   far	   wider	   to	   newer	   and	   different	   forms	   of	   discursive	  
contestation.	  	  
	  
Persepolis	  and	  Manouba	  University:	  uncomfortable	  confrontations	  
On	   7	   October	   2011,	   only	   weeks	   ahead	   of	   the	   first	   post-­‐revolution	   election	   for	   Tunisia’s	  
National	   Constituent	   Assembly,	   the	   private	   television	   station	   Nessma	   TV	   broadcast	   the	  
animated	   film	   Persepolis	   dubbed	   into	   Tunisian	   dialect.	   The	   2007	   film	   was	   based	   on	   the	  
writer	  and	  co-­‐director	  Marjane	  Satrapi’s	  autobiographical	  graphic	  novel,	  which	   followed	  a	  
young	  girl	   as	   she	  and	  her	   family	   experienced	   the	   consequences	  of	   the	   Iranian	   revolution.	  
Subsequent	   to	   its	   release,	   the	   film	  was	   labelled	  as	  “blasphemous”	  by	  a	  number	  of	   Islamic	  
critics	   for	   its	  depiction	  of	  a	   representation	  of	  Allah	   in	  a	  dream	  sequence	  where	   the	   film’s	  
protagonist	  imagines	  a	  conversation	  with	  God.	  The	  immediate	  outcome	  of	  the	  broadcasting	  
of	   the	   film	   involved	   a	   firebomb	   attack	   on	   the	   head	   of	   the	   station’s	   home	  on	   14	  October	  
2011	  as	  well	  as	  protests	  by	  several	  hundred	  Salafis	  in	  front	  of	  the	  station’s	  offices.399	  More	  
importantly,	   soon	   after	   these	   events,	   the	   station	   head	   went	   on	   trial	   for	   “undermining”	  
sacred	   Islamic	   values	   and	   “disturbing	   the	  public	   order,”	   thus	  placing	  him	  at	   risk	   for	   three	  
years	  in	  prison.	  A	  suit	  filed	  by	  more	  than	  130	  lawyers	  called	  for	  the	  persecution	  of	  the	  head	  
of	  the	  station	  as	  well	  as	  two	  of	  his	  employees	  who,	  in	  the	  months	  that	  followed	  during	  my	  
research,	  were	  required	  to	  appear	   in	  court.	  The	  Court	  of	  First	  Degree	  of	  Tunis	  announced	  
that	  it	  would	  open	  a	  criminal	  investigation.400	  After	  arriving	  at	  the	  courtroom	  in	  November	  
2011,	   the	  head	  of	   the	  station,	  Nabil	  Karoui,	   said,	  “I	   feel	  an	   immense	  sadness	  because	   the	  
people	  who	  wanted	   to	  destroy	   the	  channel	  are	   free	  and	   I	   am	  here	  because	   I	  broadcast	  a	  
film.”401	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The	  fallout	  from	  the	  broadcasting	  of	  the	  film	  involved	  a	  number	  of	  attacks	  on	  journalists	  and	  
violent	  confrontations	  outside	  the	  courtroom	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	   Interior.	  For	  example,	   in	  
January	  2012	  Tunisian	  journalist	  Zied	  Krichen	  and	  university	  professor	  Hamadi	  Redissi	  were	  
physically	  and	  verbally	  assaulted	  outside	  the	  courthouse.	  Krichen	  responded,	  “If	  the	  physical	  
safety	  of	  journalists	  is	  jeopardised,	  we	  cannot	  start	  talking	  about	  freedom	  of	  the	  press.	  The	  
priority	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  individuals	  and	  pursue	  the	  offenders.”402	  These	  acts	  of	  aggression,	  
which	   invoked	   limited	   initial	   response	   from	   the	   government,	   led	   many	   in	   the	   press	   and	  
greater	  population	  to	  conclude	  a	  complicity	  of	  Ennahda	  with	  more	  conservative	  groups	  such	  
as	   the	   Salafis.	   Moreover,	   the	   arrest	   of	   Nabil	   Karoui	   and	   his	   employees	   sparked	   a	   more	  
vicious	  debate	  concerning	  the	  future	  of	  a	  liberalised	  press	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  greater	  questions	  
regarding	  freedom	  of	  speech	  in	  the	  post-­‐revolution	  environment.403	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  
the	  arrest	  and	  eventual	  prosecution	  of	  the	  head	  of	  Nessma	  TV	  (in	  May	  2012	  he	  was	  officially	  
charged	   with	   “undermining	   sacred	   Islamic	   values”	   and	   obliged	   to	   pay	   a	   fine	   of	   2,400	  
Tunisian	  dinars)404	  sparked	  public	  concerns	  over	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  Ennahda	  would	  seek	  to	  
incorporate	   and	   heed	   the	   stricter	   perspectives	   of	   the	   Salafis,	   and	   therefore	   intensified	  
concerns	  over	  just	  how	  Islamist	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia	  would	  become.	  	  
	  
The	  next	  event	  that	  came	  to	  occupy	  considerable	  public	  space	  across	  the	  media	  and	  among	  
civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	  was	   in	   fact	   a	   series	   of	   events,	   demonstrations,	   and	   public	  
confrontations	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Manouba	  in	  Tunis.	  From	  the	  end	  of	  2011	  well	  into	  2012,	  
groups	  of	  students	   (although	  some	  argue	  they	  were	  not	   in	   fact	  students)	  chose	  to	  occupy	  
the	  university	  to	  protest	  a	  stipulation	  that	  banned	  female	  students	  from	  wearing	  the	  niqab	  
on	  campus	  and	  a	  student	  union	  by-­‐law	  that	  prohibited	  the	  wearing	  of	  the	  niqab	  during	  the	  
sitting	  of	  exams.	  While	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  students	  post-­‐revolution	  would	  
have	   chosen	   to	   wear	   the	   niqab,	   the	   demonstrators	   occupied	   the	   university	   for	   several	  
months	  and	  distributed	   leaflets	  proclaiming,	   “Sister,	  what	   is	  preventing	  you	   from	  wearing	  
the	  Niqab?”405	  It	   is	  reported	  they	  threatened	  professors	  and	  students,	  making	  the	  learning	  
environment	  generally	  unpleasant	  for	  many.	  The	  University	  of	  Manouba	  events	  culminated	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when	  two	  female	  students	  wearing	  the	  niqab	  attacked	  the	  school’s	  dean	  by	  throwing	  books	  
at	   this	   face	  and	  breaking	  his	  nose.406	  In	   response,	   secular-­‐liberal	  members	  of	   the	  national	  
students’	   union	   organised	   a	   demonstration.	   This	   demonstration	   was	   simultaneously	   met	  
with	   a	   Salafist	   demonstration	   calling	   for	   the	   right	   for	   females	   to	   wear	   the	   niqab	   during	  
exams,	  while	  brandishing	   the	  black	  Salafist	   flag	   inscribed	   in	  Arabic	  with	  “la	   ilaha	   illa	  Allah	  
Muhammad	  rasul	  Allah”	  –There	  is	  no	  God	  but	  God	  and	  Muhammad	  is	  His	  Prophet.	  	  
	  
In	   March	   2012,	   a	   young	   male	   Salafist	   student	   (now	   identified	   as	   a	   third-­‐year	   mechanics	  
student)	  climbed	  the	  rooftop	  of	  the	  university.	  He	  removed	  the	  Tunisian	  flag	  and	  replaced	  it	  
with	   the	   Salafist	   flag.	   Soon	   after,	   a	   female	   student	   climbed	   the	   wall	   and	   attempted	   to	  
replace	  the	  Salafist	  flag	  with	  the	  Tunisian	  national	  flag—the	  secular	  woman	  in	  confrontation	  
with	  the	  Islamist	  male.	  Before	  she	  could	  change	  the	  flag,	  she	  was	  pushed	  off	  the	  wall	  by	  the	  
young	  Salafist	  (she	  did	  not	  suffer	  any	  critical	  injuries).	  This	  event	  was	  soon	  highlighted	  as	  a	  
primary	   moment	   in	   the	   post-­‐revolution	   battle	   for	   national	   identity.	   Moreover,	   this	   very	  
public	   confrontation	   took	   place	   the	   day	   before	   International	  Women’s	   Day	   during	   which	  
thousands	   of	  women	  marched	   on	  Avenue	  Bourguiba	   underscoring	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  
CPS.	   The	   young	   woman	   was	   celebrated	   on	   International	   Women’s	   Day	   and	   praised	   by	  
politicians	   including	   the	  general	   secretary	  of	   the	  Progressive	  Democratic	  Party	   (PDP),	  who	  
stated,	  “I	  salute	  the	  bravery	  of	  this	  young	  lady,	  who	  did	  not	  hesitate	  for	  a	  second	  to	  defend	  
her	  nation’s	  flag.”407	  	  
	  
The	   young	   woman	   also	   became	   a	   symbol	   as	   she	   personified	   the	   fears	   of	   some	   Tunisian	  
citizens	  at	  the	  time.	  One	  of	  the	  fears	  was	  that	  the	  history	  and	  “progress”	  of	  Tunisia	  would	  
be	   replaced	  by	  Sharia	  and	  hence	  women’s	   rights	  and	  a	  woman’s	   role	   in	   society	  would	  be	  
violently	   removed	   from	   this	  platform,	   in	   a	   very	  public	  way.	   It	   also	   further	   symbolised	   the	  
battle	   of	   “us”	   versus	   “them”	   and	   the	   confrontation	   and	   polarisation	   of	   the	   secular	   and	  
Islamists	   factions	   in	   post-­‐revolution	   Tunisia.	   The	   same	   week	   members	   of	   the	   National	  
Constituent	  Assembly	  placed	  small	  Tunisian	  flags	  on	  their	  desks	  to	  express	  their	  displeasure	  
with	   the	  mistreatment	  of	   the	   flag,	  while	   the	   interior	  minister	  at	   the	   time,	  Ali	   Laarayyedh,	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rather	  than	  reproaching	  the	  Salafis	  activists,	  assigned	  blame	  to	  the	  dean	  of	  the	  University	  of	  
Manouba	  for	  having	  mishandled	  the	  initial	  conflict.408	  
	  
For	   many	   Tunisians,	   symbols	   of	   identity	   such	   as	   the	   flag	   assumed	   greater	   importance	  
following	   the	   2010–2011	   uprising.	   These	   acts	   of	   identity	   recovery	   could	   not	   only	   be	  
witnessed	   in	   the	   re-­‐appropriation	   of	   certain	   symbols,	   but	   also	   in	   the	  dis-­‐appropriation	   of	  
symbols	  and	  institutions	  associated	  with	  the	  former	  regime.	  In	  the	  two	  years	  following	  the	  
revolution,	   this	   sense	  of	   identity	   recovery	  manifested	   in	   various	   forms	  at	   the	   level	   of	   the	  
street.	  Not	  only	  was	   the	  subject	  of	  women	  through	  the	  symbols	  of	   the	  headscarf	  and	  the	  
niqab	   “strategic	   terrain”	   for	   national	   identity	   recovery,	   but	   marginalised	   groups	   and	  
behaviours	  also	  became	  targets	  for	  purifying	  the	  nation	  of	  the	  “impiety”	  associated	  with	  the	  
former	  regime.409	  For	  example,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  attacks	  on	  the	  maisons	  closes	  in	  February	  
2011,410	  the	   power	   of	   the	   street	   was	   also	   responsible	   for	   the	   closing	   down	   of	   bars	   and	  
stores,	   as	   Salafis	   gathered	   in	   Sidi	   Bouzid	   in	  May	   2012	   to	   burn	   down	   bars	   and	   physically	  
threaten	  the	  owners	  in	  protest	  against	  the	  sale	  of	  alcohol	  in	  the	  town.411	  Moreover,	  it	  was	  
reported	   that	   between	   2012	   and	   2013	   more	   than	   100	   cases	   of	   fire	   and	   looting	   were	  
targeted	  at	  zawiyas	   (Sufi	   lodges)	  by	  Salafist	   forces.412	  These	   instances,	   led	  by	  members	  of	  
communities	   rather	   than	   a	   formal	   government	   authority,	   resonated	   with	   many	   Tunisian	  
communities	   (secular	   and	   Islamist)	   who	   before	   were	   afraid	   of	   the	   police,	   but	   were	   now	  
more	  concerned	  by	  the	  power	  of	  the	  mob	  who	  arguably	  faced	  no	  visible	  consequences	  for	  
its	  actions.	  In	  September	  2012,	  the	  public	  opinion	  and	  marketing	  firm	  3C	  Etudes	  highlighted	  
in	  its	  press	  release	  the	  results	  of	   its	  political	  barometer	  survey	  entitled	  “Neuvième	  Vague”	  
indicating	   at	   the	   time	   that	   60	   percent	   of	   Tunisians	   were	   dissatisfied	   with	   the	   security	  
situation	   in	   the	   country,	   with	   42	   percent	   indicating	   “total	   dissatisfaction.”413	  This	   study	  
reflected	   in	   part	   the	   increasing	   sense	   of	   insecurity	   being	   felt	   across	   the	   country	   by	  
individuals	  and	  communities	  from	  2011.	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Finally,	   in	   February	   2013,	   Chokri	   Belaid,	   a	   Tunisian	   politician	   and	   lawyer	   who	   was	   a	   key	  
opposition	   leader	  with	   the	   secular-­‐left	   Democratic	   Patriot’s	  Movement,	   was	   assassinated	  
outside	   his	   home	   in	   Tunis.	   Only	   five	   months	   later	   in	   July	   2013,	   Mohamed	   Brahmi,	   the	  
founder	  and	  former	  leader	  of	  the	  People’s	  Movement,	  was	  also	  shot	  (14	  times)	  outside	  his	  
home.414	  As	   the	   two	   men	   were	   vocal	   critics	   of	   Ennahda,	   many	   not	   only	   considered	   the	  
assassinations	  a	  direct	  attack	  on	  political	  liberalism	  but	  also	  a	  perceived	  re-­‐manifestation	  of	  
the	  residue	  of	  authoritarian	  rule	  in	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia.	  The	  prime	  minister	  at	  the	  time,	  
Ali	  Larayedh,	  blamed	  the	  Salafist	  organisation	  Ansar	  al-­‐Sharia	  for	  the	  two	  murders.415	  From	  
the	   time	   of	   the	   elections	   in	   October	   2011	   when	   Ennahda	   gained	   power	   through	   the	  
formation	   of	   the	   Troika	   to	   the	   murder	   of	   Belaid	   15	   months	   later,	   increasing	   intolerance	  
between	   the	   secular	   and	   Islamist	   factions	   could	   be	   perceived	   at	   the	   political	   and	  
sociocultural	   levels	   throughout	   Tunisia.	   The	   mounting	   tension	   between	   the	   two	   sides	  
provided	  the	  impression	  of	  a	  country	  mired	  in	  sociopolitical	  stagnation	  in	  the	  critical	  phase	  
of	   the	   transition	   two	   years	   later.	   The	   assassinations	   of	   two	   very	   public	   members	   of	   the	  
opposition	  aggravated	  the	  intense	  transition	  climate.	  
	  
Reflecting	  on	  events	  that	  took	  place	  during	  this	  tumultuous	  period,	  it	  becomes	  a	  challenge	  
to	  untangle	   instances	   that	  were	  directed	  by	  political	   factions	  and	  those	  which	  were	  being	  
instigated	  by	  sociocultural	  actors	  and	  groups.	  This	  haziness	  or	  flou	  reflects	  the	  notion	  that	  
during	   a	   transition	   from	   authoritarian	   rule,	   a	   country	   not	   only	   experiences	   a	   remarkable	  
political	   transition	   but	   arguably,	   the	   changes	   that	   appear	   to	   be	   happening	   at	   the	  
sociocultural	  level	  merit	  equal	  scrutiny.	  These	  events,	  and	  the	  rumours	  accompanying	  them,	  
take	  on	  even	  greater	  importance	  in	  particular	  within	  the	  context	  of	  loosened	  state	  capacity	  
associated	  with	   transitions	   away	   from	   authoritarian	   rule.	   It	   is	  worth	   highlighting	   that	   the	  
security	   apparatus	   and	   the	   judiciary	   systems	   had	   been	   crippled	   since	   January	   2011.	  
Moreover,	   conflicting	   statements	   on	   the	   government’s	   post-­‐uprising	   priorities	  were	  often	  
exacerbated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  for	  many	  years	  the	  leadership	  and	  members	  of	  Ennahda	  were	  
either	   imprisoned	  or	   in	  exile	   in	  Europe,	  and	  therefore	  experienced	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  of	  
limited,	  if	  any,	  communication.	  Articulating	  a	  coherent	  stance	  or	  policies	  on	  critical	  national	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issues	  following	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising	  would	  undoubtedly	  reflect	  this	  lack	  of	  cohesion.416	  
Therefore,	   popular	   perceptions	   of	   inadequate	   responses	   to	   these	   events	   accompanied	  by	  
hostile	   confrontations	   and—on	   some	   occasions—violence,	   evoked	   suspicions	   of	   a	   “silent	  
complicity”	  rather	  than	  encouraged	  more	  open	  opportunities	  for	  genuine	  dialogue	  on	  how	  
to	   repair	   incapacitated	   infrastructure	   fraught	   by	   decades	   of	   abuse	   from	   its	   regulators.	  
Inevitably,	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  events	  occurring	   at	   the	  political	   and	   sociocultural	   levels	   and	  
which	   manifested	   in	   Tunisia’s	   expanding	   public	   spaces	   fostered	   a	   terrain	   of	   uncertainty,	  
suspicion,	   and	   at	   times	   even	   hostility	   among	   and	   between	   its	   actors,	   alongside	   the	  
multiplicity	  of	  emotions	  unleashed	  after	  the	  revolution.	  	  
	  
The	  next	  section	  examines	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  specific	  actors	  and	  groups	  that	  emerged	  to	  fill	  
the	   expanding	   public	   spaces	   following	   the	   amendments	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   association.	  
Reflecting	   back	   on	  what	   is	   general	   to	   transitions	   from	   authoritarian	   rule,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  
observe	   a	   quantitative	   and	  qualitative	   re-­‐birth	  of	   civil	   society	   actors	   in	   Tunisia	   during	   the	  
two	   years	   subsequent	   to	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   regime.	   Throughout	   this	   period	   one	   can	  
observe	   not	   only	   the	   self-­‐management,	   self-­‐organisation,	   and	   agency-­‐centred	   approaches	  
adopted	  by	  civil	  society	  actors	  in	  the	  social	  movements	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America,	  
but	   also	   evidence	   of	   the	   hegemony	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   understanding	   of	   the	   roles	   of	   civil	  
society	   organisations	   as	   service	   providers	   and	   as	   critical	   agents	   in	   the	   transition	   to	   and	  
consolidation	   of	   democracy.	   Is	   it	   possible	   that	   these	   two	   quite	   disparate	   models	   and	  
conceptual	   understandings	   of	   civil	   society	   are	   a	   fundamental	   source	   of	   the	   conflicts	   and	  
disharmony	  between	  these	  actors	  and	  groups	  today?	  
	  
	  
	  
2.	  The	  resurrection	  of	  civil	  society	  	  
	  
Almost	   immediately	   after	   the	   revolution	  during	   the	   first	   phase	  of	   the	   transition,	   the	  High	  
Authority	   for	   the	   Realisation	   of	   the	   Objectives	   of	   the	   Revolution,	   Political	   Reform	   and	  
Democratic	   Transition	   was	   established	   to	   oversee	   the	   transition	   from	   revolution	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416	  Ennhanda	  was	  banned	  in	  Tunisia	  from	  1991	  to	  2011;	  See	  Gray,	  “Tunisia	  after	  the	  Uprising,”	  291	  and	  293.	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elections.417	  Among	  its	  many	  remits,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  and	  
constitution	   for	   the	   next	   elections,	   was	  modifying	   the	   text	   on	   the	   laws	   of	   association	   in	  
Tunisia.418	  These	  measures	   for	  political	   liberalisation,	   implemented	  before	   the	  elections	   to	  
the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly,	  came	  as	  a	  result	  of	  critical	  and	  sustained	  pressure	  from	  
the	  popular	  masses	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  regime	  on	  14	  January	  2011.419	  Moreover,	  
the	  amendments	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  association	  would	  allow	  a	  new	  range	  of	  organisations	  to	  be	  
formally	  and	  legally	  established	  in	  Tunisia.	  In	  March	  2012,	  the	  newly	  appointed	  Minister	  for	  
Women	  and	  the	  Family	  Sihem	  Badi	  stated,	  “The	  goal	  of	  an	  association	  is	  to	  defend	  certain	  
rights	   and	   liberties,	   and	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   consolidation	   of	   democracy.	   In	   effect,	   it	   (the	  
association)	  permits	  a	  citizen	  to	  be	  better	   informed	  of	  his	   rights	  and	  his	  obligations.”420	  In	  
early	  2013	   the	  Foundation	   for	   the	  Future	  presented	   the	   results	  of	  a	   study	   that	  concluded	  
that	   at	   the	   end	   of	   2010,	   a	   total	   of	   9,969	   associations	   were	   formally	   registered	   with	   the	  
government.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  2012,	  this	  number	  rose	  by	  approximately	  5,000	  to	  14,966.421,422	  
Figures	   for	   the	   number	   of	   new	   civil	   society	   organisations	   established	   in	   the	   two	   years	  
following	  the	  revolution	  range	  from	  between	  2,000	  and	  5,000.	  And	  although	  qualitatively	  it	  
is	  a	  challenge	  to	  evaluate	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  newer	  organisations	  from	  the	  existing	  
mappings,	  quantitatively	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  organisations	  within	  a	  
short	  period	  of	  time	  is	  noteworthy.	  423	  	  
	  
Reshaping	  the	  framework	  for	  civil	  society	  
The	  2011	  amendments	  to	  the	  1959	  law	  of	  associations	  allowed	  a	  civil	  society	  organisation	  
with	  as	  few	  as	  six	  members	  to	  be	  created	  without	  authorisation,	  accompanied	  by	  a	  simple	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417	  The	  High	  Authority	  was	  created	  through	  the	  fusion	  of	  two	  institutions	  established	  immediately	  after	  the	  
revolution,	  the	  Committee	  for	  Political	  Reform	  and	  the	  National	  Council	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Revolution	  
(CNPR).	  See	  Zemni,	  “The	  Extraordinary	  Politics	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  Revolution,”	  6.	  
418	  See	  decree	  laws	  no.	  14	  of	  23	  March	  2011	  and	  no.	  27	  of	  18	  April	  2011	  and	  Guellali,	  “Pathways	  and	  Pitfalls.”	  
419	  Zemni,	  “The	  Extraordinary	  Politics	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  Revolution,”	  4.	  
420	  Emphasis	  added.	  Nemlaghi,	  “Associations	  et	  Embrigadement.”	  
421	  For	  additional	  information	  see:	  www.foundationforfuture.org/en/WebPresence/Latestnews1.aspx	  and	  Ben	  
Salem,	  “Flagrant	  Deficit	  au	  Niveau	  des	  Capacités.”	  
422	  Although	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  mappings	  on	  the	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  civil	  society	  associations	  in	  Tunisia	  
for	  the	  period	  from	  January	  2011	  to	  July	  2013,	  the	  mappings/inventories	  have	  limitations	  as	  most	  were	  
conducted	  in	  an	  unsystematic	  manner,	  focusing	  on	  only	  certain	  typologies	  of	  organisations,	  or	  done	  within	  
disparate	  contexts.	  Therefore,	  existing	  mappings	  are	  only	  able	  to	  capture	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  associative	  
environment	  during	  this	  period.	  
423	  Mappings	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  conducted	  during	  this	  period	  include	  WWF,	  l’Institut	  Francais	  de	  
Tunisie,	  the	  British	  Council,	  I+UNICEF,	  ENDA	  Inter-­‐Arabe,	  VNGI,	  IFEDA,	  the	  European	  Union	  Delegation,	  the	  
office	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  and	  the	  mapping	  initiatives	  conducted	  by	  two	  NGO	  
initiatives:	  CAWTAR,	  MEPI	  and	  MERCY	  CORPS,	  and	  le	  Réseau	  Euro-­‐Méditerranéen	  des	  Droits	  de	  l’Homme	  
(REMDH).	  Sited	  in	  Union	  Européenne,	  “Rapport	  de	  Diagnostic,”	  10.	  
	   Page	  |	  140	  
letter	  “to	   inform”	  that	   the	  association	  has	  been	  established.	  Newer	  organisations	  that	  did	  
not	   receive	   a	   response	   to	   their	   application	  within	   three	  months	   could	   interpret	   this	   as	   a	  
positive	  outcome	  for	  their	  “associational	  visa.”	  Furthermore,	  the	  eight	  categories	  previously	  
necessary	  for	  an	  associational	  application	  were	  dismantled.	  The	  newer	  organisations	  could	  
be	   political	   and	   could	   represent	   or	   directly	   support	   political	   parties.	   In	   addition,	   in	  
September	  2011	  the	  laws	  of	  association	  were	  once	  again	  amended,	  this	  time	  to	  allow	  civil	  
society	  organisations	  free	  access	  to	  information	  and	  judiciary	  representation	  (whereby	  the	  
association	   could	   go	   before	   the	   justice	   tribunals	   themselves).	   Following	   the	   2010–2011	  
uprising,	   a	   key	   transformation	   for	  many	   aspiring	   organisations	  was	   that	   the	   associational	  
remit,	   formerly	   situated	  within	   the	  obscure	   crevices	  of	   the	  Ministry	  of	   Interior	  under	  Ben	  
Ali,	  moved	  to	  become	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  under	  the	  Centre	  
d’Information,	  de	  Formation	  d’Etudes	  et	  de	  Documentation	  sur	  les	  Associations	  (IFEDA).	  This	  
could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  symbolic	  shift	  towards	  an	  increased	  openness	  and	  transparency	  in	  
approach	  toward	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
The	   table	  below	  sets	  out	   the	  modifications	   to	   the	   law	  of	  association	  59-­‐154	   (7	  November	  
1959)	  finalised	  September	  2011.424	  
	  
Law	  59-­‐154	   Law	  2011-­‐88	  
Declaration	  of	   association	  made	   to	   the	  Ministry	  
of	  Interior	  
Declaration	  made	  to	  the	  secretary-­‐general	  of	  the	  
government	  
The	  Ministry	  of	   Interior	   can	   reserve	  up	   to	   three	  
months	   to	   announce	   the	   acceptance	   of	   the	  
creation	  of	  the	  association.	  
	  The	  prime	  minister	  has	  30	  days	  to	  announce	  the	  
acceptance	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  association.	  	  
The	   law	   provides	   eight	   associational	   categories	  
and	  applies	  limits	  to	  their	  field	  of	  intervention.	  
	  There	  is	  no	  longer	  any	  classification	  or	  limitation	  
for	  the	  field	  of	  intervention	  of	  the	  association.	  	  
The	   associations	   falling	   under	   the	   rubric	   of	  
“general”	   character	   are	  not	  permitted	   to	   refuse	  
any	  demand	   for	  membership;	   if	   so,	   they	  can	  be	  
pursued	  juristically.	  
The	   association	   itself	   is	   permitted	   to	   establish	  
criteria	  for	  membership.	  
No	  age	  limit	  for	  the	  founders	  or	  members	  of	  the	  
association	  
Individuals	   under	   the	   age	   of	   16	   cannot	  
establish/found	   an	   organisation,	   and	   members	  
have	  to	  be	  at	  least	  the	  age	  of	  13.	  
Implicitly,	   associations	   can	   only	   be	   constituted	  
by	  Tunisians	   (as	   the	  state	  demands	  the	  national	  
identity	   card	   to	   open	   a	   new	   application	   for	  
associational	  status).	  	  
Associations	   can	   be	   created	   and	   constituted	   by	  
Tunisian	  nationals	  or	  residents	  of	  Tunisia.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424	  Table	  featured	  in	  the	  report	  Union	  Européenne.	  “Rapport	  de	  Diagnostic,”	  7–8.	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As	   a	   result	   of	   these	   changes,	   civil	   society	   organisations	   were	   also	   able	   to	   create	   larger	  
networks	   of	   organisations	   working	   along	   similar	   domains	   or	   with	   similar	   interests,	  
something	   that	   was	   not	   allowed	   before	   2011.	   Furthermore,	   smaller	   civil	   society	   groups	  
could	  also	  be	  legally	  created,	  for	  example	  support	  groups	  and	  associations	  for	  people	  living	  
with	  HIV,	  which	  were	  previously	  denied	  access	  to	  an	  “associational	  visa.”	  These	  changes	  in	  
the	   legal	   framework	   were	   adopted	   almost	   immediately	   after	   the	   revolution,	   and	   were	  
revised	  and	  made	  more	  pliant	  again	   in	  September	  2011.	  This	  phase	  could	  be	  described	  as	  
the	   initial	  post-­‐revolution	  stage	  whereby	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  was	  perceived	  allowing	  
disparate	  actors	  to	  pass	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  reforms.	  	  
	  
The	  re-­‐birth	  of	  citoyenneté	  
Tunisian’s	  post-­‐revolution	   “resurrection	  of	   civil	   society”	   following	   the	  amendments	   to	   the	  
1959	  laws	  of	  association	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  renewed	  understanding	  and	  application	  of	  
the	   concept	   of	   citoyenneté.	   The	   word	   citoyenneté	   means	   “citizenship”	   in	   French,	   and	  
through	   its	   Arabic	   understanding	   with	   the	   word	   muwatana	   (ﺔﻨطﻁاﺍﻮﻣ)	   “fellow	  
citizens/compatriot”	   is	   a	   concept	   that	   embodies	   Tunisia’s	   intrinsic	   spirit	   of	   volunteerism	  
alongside	   a	   profound	   commitment	   to	   support	   communities	   denied	   dignity	   and	   humanity	  
under	   the	   former	   regimes.	   The	   concept	   itself	   represents	   a	   fundamental	   drive	   among	   the	  
population	   towards	   reshaping	   a	   better	   and	  more	   inclusive	  post-­‐revolution	   Tunisia.	  Of	   the	  
approximately	   15,000	   associations	   formally	   registered	   through	   IFEDA,	   30.9	   percent	   were	  
schools	  or	  educational	  programmes,	  15.4	  percent	  represented	  artistic	  or	  cultural	  NGOs,	  and	  
12.2	  percent	  were	  social	  welfare	  and	  charity	  organisations.	  The	  Foundation	  for	  the	  Future	  
press	  release	  also	  highlighted	  that	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  the	  charity	  associations	  “adopt	  a	  
religious	  ideology.”	  Some	  of	  the	  nascent	  organisations	  also	  represented	  “new	  causes”	  such	  
as	   democracy,	   women’s	   rights	   and	   broader	   human	   rights,	   local	   development,	   and	   the	  
environment.425	  	  
	  
While	   there	  are	   likely	   a	  multitude	  of	  explanations	   for	   the	   robust	  post-­‐revolution	   sense	  of	  
Tunisian	  citoyenneté	  that	  many	  interviewees	  referred	  to	  during	  the	  research	  interviews,	  two	  
reasons	  are	  noted	  herein.426	  The	  first	  explanation	  relates	  to	  the	  levels	  of	  force,	  intimidation,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425	  See:	  www.foundationforfuture.org/en/WebPresence/Latestnews1.aspx.	  
426	  The	  French	  word	  citoyenneté	  is	  featured	  more	  in	  this	  research	  rather	  than	  the	  Arabic	  muwatana	  as	  most	  of	  
the	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  the	  French	  language.	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and	  repression	  applied	  by	  the	  former	  regimes,	  in	  particular	  against	  Islamist	  actors	  who	  were	  
denied	  a	  public	  or	  associational	  role	  in	  Tunisia	  for	  several	  decades.	  The	  second	  explanation	  
for	  this	  renewed	  sense	  of	  citoyenneté	  stemmed	  from	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  Tunisia’s	  
revolution	   took	   place	   following	   an	   immediate	   state	   of	   emergency	   and	   consequently,	   a	  
complete	   vacuum	   in	   political	   power	   in	   the	   weeks	   following	   the	   revolution.	   Tunisia	   was	  
considered	  the	  only	  country	   in	   the	  region	   to	   fall	   into	  a	  political	  power	  vacuum	  during	   the	  
Arab	  uprisings	  following	  the	  departure	  of	  Ben	  Ali	  and	  his	  family	  on	  14	  January	  2011.	  After	  
Ben	   Ali	   fled	   for	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   Tunisia	   experienced	   several	   weeks	   of	   temporary	   political	  
appointments	  characterised	  by	  frequent	  ministerial	  and	  RCD	  party	  member	  resignations.427	  
For	   approximately	   three	  months	   (from	   14	   January	   to	   3	  March	   2011,	   when	   the	   date	  was	  
announced	   for	   the	   elections	   to	   the	   National	   Constituent	   Assembly)	   there	   were	   very	   few	  
active	  police	  or	  security	  forces.	  El	  Amrani	  and	  Lindsey	  gave	  this	  account:	  
	  
In	  the	  days	  immediately	  after	  the	  14	  January	  departure	  of	  Zine	  El	  Abidine	  Ben	  Ali...	  
the	  country’s	  future	  did	  not	  look	  so	  promising.	  Ben	  Ali’s	  former	  ministers	  attempted	  
to	  provide	  continuity	  without	  popular	  legitimacy,	  the	  economy	  was	  in	  shambles,	  and	  
protests	   and	   insecurity	   continued.	   It	   took	   three	   months	   for	   a	   government	   more	  
representative	  of	  the	  revolution	  to	  be	  appointed,	  the	  former	  ruling	  party	  disbanded,	  
and	  the	  former	  regime	  elements	  sniping	  at	  passers-­‐by	  rounded	  up.428	  
	  
With	  the	  police	  absent	   from	  the	  streets,	  citizens	  took	   it	  among	  themselves	  to	  set	  up	   local	  
security	  checks	  and	  blockades	  into	  and	  out	  of	  the	  different	  neighbourhoods;	  they	  organised	  
community	   patrols	   and	   occasionally	   arrested	   looters	   to	   hand	   over	   to	   the	   military. 429	  
Therefore,	   members	   of	   communities	   soon	   assumed	   this	   responsibility	   and	   accountability	  
themselves	   at	   the	   local	   level	   to	   safeguard	   their	   own	   neighbourhoods.	   Could	   this	  
indeterminate	  period	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  civil	  society	  that	  forged	  ahead	  with	  
this	   sense	   of	   total	   citizen	   engagement,	   or	   citoyenneté,	   seen	   in	   Tunisia	   after	   14	   January	  
2011?	  Najeeb,	  a	  founder	  and	  member	  of	  several	  different	  associations,	  noted	  the	  following	  
in	  the	  research	  interview,	  “The	  rights	  of	  individuals	  have	  had	  an	  extraordinary	  advance.	  Now	  
there	  is	  everything—young	  people,	  women,	  political	  associations,	  charities...everything.”	  He	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427	  El	  Amrani	  and	  Lindsey,	  “Tunisia	  Moves	  to	  the	  Next	  Stage”	  and	  Zemni,	  “The	  Extraordinary	  Politics	  of	  the	  
Tunisian	  Revolution,”	  4.	  
428	  El	  Amrani	  and	  Lindsey,	  “Tunisia	  Moves	  to	  the	  Next	  Stage.”	  
429	  Beinin	  and	  Vairel,	  “Afterword:	  Popular	  Uprisings	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt,”	  241.	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added,	  “With	  this	  new	  climate	  of	  liberty,	  everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  an	  association,	  from	  the	  
extreme	  left	  to	  the	  extreme	  right.”430	  	  	  
	  
Different	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  soon	  emerged	  to	  exhibit	  a	   long-­‐repressed	  spirit	  of	  
volunteerism	  and	  citoyenneté	  further	  served	  by	  the	  immediate	  expansion	  of	  the	  1959	  laws	  
of	   association.	   However,	   for	   numerous	   reasons	   the	   terrain	   upon	  which	   these	   groups	   and	  
actors	  operated	  following	  the	  revolution	  was	  uncertain.	  This	  uncertainty	  was	  aggravated	  by	  
crippled	   state	   institutions,	   a	   sudden	   influx	   of	   new	   international	   donors,	   an	   inability	   to	  
ascertain	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  newly	  elected	  government,	  and	  more	  “conservative”	  
actors	  operating	  at	   the	   sociocultural	   level	   as	  well	   as	   the	   complexity	  of	   rumour	  and	  myth-­‐
making	  that	  can	  manifest	  during	  sociopolitical	  transformations	  following	  authoritarian	  rule.	  
This	  murkiness	  not	  only	  clouds	  the	  political	   landscape,	  but	   it	  also	  renders	   it	  a	  challenge	  to	  
determine	   the	   genuine	  nature,	   disparate	   groups,	   and	   functioning	  of	   civil	   society	   acting	   in	  
both	  symbolic	  and	  physical	  public	  spaces.	  	  
	  
The	   following	   two	   sections	   examine	   the	   various	   actors	   who	   considered	   themselves	  
members	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  two	  years	  following	  the	  2010–2011	  Tunisia	  uprising.	  The	  first	  
section	  looks	  to	  the	  situation	  for	  some	  of	  the	  historic	  civil	  society	  organisations	  established	  
during	  the	  Bourguiba	  and/or	  Ben	  Ali	   regimes.	   It	  describes	  a	  host	  of	  organisations	  that	   felt	  
paralysed	  as	  the	  new	  “rules	  of	  the	  game”	  were	  blurred	  and	  as	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  attempted	  
to	  ascertain	  just	  how	  “conservative”	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisian	  society	  really	  was.	  The	  second	  
section	  looks	  to	  the	  newer	  organisations	  formed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  loosening	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  
association,	  including	  their	  perceived	  expectations	  and	  challenges,	  as	  they	  too	  operated	  on	  
indeterminate	   terrain.	   Both	   sets	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	   were	   affected	   (and	   responded)	   in	  
distinct	   ways	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   they	   interpreted	   this	   unfolding	   environment.	   The	  
consequences	   of	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   public	   space	   would	   bring	   fresh	   opportunities	   to	  
participate	  in	  the	  design	  of	  Tunisia’s	  new	  national	  identity;	  however,	  in	  addition	  to	  bringing	  
fresh	  inclusions	  to	  this	  space,	  it	  would	  also	  bring	  new	  exclusions.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430	  Informant	  38:	  Senior	  expert	  on	  environment,	  bilateral	  and	  associational	  member;	  Tunis,	  6	  Mar.	  2012	  and	  
Mar.	  2013.	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3.	  Old	  actors	  and	  new	  spaces	  
	  
Before	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising	  a	  majority	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  were	  the	  instruments	  of	  
power	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  and	  many	  were	  simply	  perceived	  as	  democratic	  decoration.431	  
Mounir	  Majoub	  writes,	  “In	  this	  mode	  of	  statist	  governance,	  civil	  society	  played	  a	  relatively	  
timid	  role...the	  organisations	  of	  civil	  society	  were	  often	  forced	  to	  play	  a	  rather	  symbolic	  role	  
whereby	  the	  essential	  consisted	  in	  the	  participation	  of	  events	  and	  sporadic	  sensitisation	  of	  
certain	  groups	  of	  the	  population.”432	  After	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising,	  a	  number	  of	  civil	  society	  
organisations	   shifted	   their	   focus	   to	  democratisation,	   civic	  education,	   the	  election	  process,	  
and	   engagement	   in	   political	   advocacy	   directed	   toward	   the	   various	   political	   parties.	  
However,	  despite	   the	  new	  opportunities	  afforded	  by	   the	  opening	  of	   the	  public	   space,	   the	  
reality	  for	  many	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  in	  Tunisia	  was	  marked	  by	  a	  heavy	  inheritance	  
from	  the	  former	  regime	  capable	  of	  putting	  the	  brakes	  on	  democratisation.433	  	  
	  
With	  the	  perception	  of	  an	  immediate	  change	  in	  how	  business	  is	  conducted	  for	  the	  historic	  
organisations	   in	   particular,	   many	   organisations	   found	   themselves	   on	   competitive	   terrain	  
with	   the	   newer	   associations—as	   they	   were	   also	   required	   to	   establish	   fresh	   relationships	  
with	   the	  new	  government	   and	   to	   cultivate	  existing	   and	  new	  donors	   for	   financial	   support.	  
Many	   civil	   society	   organisations	   had	   previously	   adapted	   to	   working	   in	   their	   own	   domain	  
without	   considerable	   competition	   from	  other	  organisations.	   Some	  were	  unaccustomed	   to	  
partnering	  with	  organisations	  or	  competing	  alongside	  similar	  associations	  for	  donor	  funding.	  
This	  perception	  was	  shared	  by	  at	  least	  five	  of	  the	  interviewees	  who	  had	  each	  either	  acted	  as	  
previous	  employees	  of	  one	  of	   the	   three	  HIV/AIDS	  associations	  or	   served	  as	  donors.434	  For	  
example,	  during	  the	  research	  interview	  with	  Fajr,	  a	  woman	  who	  recently	  began	  working	  for	  
a	   German-­‐funded	   NGO	   to	   support	   transparency	   in	   the	   democratic	   process	   and	   who	  
previously	  worked	  for	  one	  of	  the	  larger	  historic	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  she	  emphasised	  
the	   challenge	   of	   competition	   between	   the	   different	   organisations.	   She	   remarked,	   “Some	  
[historic	  associations]	  were	  harassed	  by	  the	  political	  regime	  under	  Ben	  Ali	  but	  now	  they	  find	  
themselves	   in	  a	  situation	  where	  there	   is	  no	  real	   fear	  of	   the	  political	  environment	  but	   in	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431	  Le	  Réseau	  Euro-­‐méditerranéen	  des	  Droits	  de	  l’Homme,	  “Contribution	  de	  la	  Mission,”	  3.	  
432	  Majoub,	  “La	  Gouvernance	  Environnementale	  Démocratique,”	  2.	  
433	  Ibid.,	  10.	  
434	  Informant	  numbers:	  16,	  20,	  28,	  32	  and	  34.	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much	   more	   competitive	   environment	   with	   the	   newer	   associations;	   for	   many	   this	   is	   a	  
destabilising	   and	   new	   terrain.”435	  She	   further	   noted	   that	   before	   the	   uprising	   they	   were	  
working	  in	  a	  less	  than	  favourable	  environment,	  but	  one	  in	  which	  these	  organisations	  knew	  
and	   understood	   the	   “rules”—and	   with	   the	   multiplication	   of	   NGOs	   following	   Ben	   Ali’s	  
departure,	  many	  of	  the	  groups	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  adapt	  as	  quickly	  and	  were	  not	  used	  to	  
working	  with	   volunteers	   (due	   to	   past	   fears	   of	   infiltration	   by	   government	   officials).	   These	  
organisations	  were	  now	  required	  to	  evolve	  rapidly	  and	  they	  were	  not	  accustomed	  to	  doing	  
this.	  This	  view	  was	  also	  shared	  by	  Mohammed,	  a	  policy	  adviser	  from	  a	  recently	  established	  
UN	  initiative	  in	  Tunis,	  who	  during	  the	  interview	  stated:	  
	  
We	   are	   in	   a	   way	   faced	   with	   a	   dire	   reality,	   there	   is	   this	   division	   of	   civil	   society	   in	  
Tunisia,	   and	   so	   this	   is	   hard	   to	   bring	   them	   together....We	   are	   having	   a	   hard	   time	  
bringing	  them	  together	  under	  the	  same	  action.	  The	  organisations	  now	  are	  working	  in	  
isolation	  from	  each	  other	  and	  even	  if	  their	  work	  is	  the	  same	  there	  is	  a	  resistance	  to	  
this	  collaboration.436	  
	  
The	  degree	  of	   paralysis	   that	   affected	   some	  of	   these	  historic	   organisations	   stemmed	   from	  
two	  possible	  factors.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  organisations	  to	  the	  
donors	  and	  the	  overall	  donor	  climate	  following	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising.	  The	  second	  was	  the	  
creeping	   transformations	  occurring	  at	   the	  sociocultural	   level	  and	   the	  subsequent	  sense	  of	  
insecurity	   this	   brought	   as	   both	   individuals	   and	   organisations	   attempted	   to	   gauge	   the	  
environment	  they	  would	  now	  manoeuvre	  in.	  
	  
Donors	  in	  transition	  
The	  events	  of	   the	  “Arab	  Spring,”	  which	   featured	  a	   swift	  domino	  effect	  of	  uprisings	  across	  
parts	   of	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	  North	  Africa,	   caught	  many	   international	   donors	   by	   surprise.	  
Some	  existing	  donors	  cautiously	  maintained	  their	  activities	  after	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising	  while	  
waiting	   to	   see	   how	   events	   in	   the	   wider	   region	   would	   unfold.	   However,	   given	   Tunisia’s	  
positionality	  between	  Algeria	   and	   Libya—two	  countries	  perceived	  as	  potentially	   volatile—
many	  international	  donors	  also	  saw	  Tunisia	  as	  a	  new	  opportunity	  to	  “support	  the	  process	  of	  
democratic	   transition.”437	  For	   example	   in	  March	  2011,	   the	  Commissioner	   for	   Enlargement	  
and	  European	  Neighbourhood	  Policy	   committed	   to	  doubling	   the	   financial	   aid	  provided	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435	  Informant	  32:	  Programme	  officer,	  democracy	  and	  civil	  society	  capacity	  building	  initiative;	  Tunis,	  10	  Feb.	  
2012.	  
436	  Informant	  34:	  Policy	  adviser,	  multilateral	  human	  rights	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  15	  Feb.	  2012.	  
437	  Hibou,	  Meddeb,	  and	  Hamdi,	  “Tunisia	  after	  14	  January,”17.	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the	  European	  Commission,	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  strengthening	  civil	  society	  and	  supporting	  
the	   development	   of	   underprivileged	   regions.	   Furthermore	   in	   April	   the	   same	   year,	   the	  
European	  Union	  announced	  a	  pledge	  of	  €258	  million	   (US$355	  million	  as	   calculated	  at	   the	  
end	   of	   2013)	   between	   2011	   and	   2013.438	  Beatrice	   Hibou,	   Hamza	  Meddeb	   and	  Mohamed	  
Hamdi	  point	  out	  the	  haste	  with	  which	  a	  range	  of	  donors	  made	  commitments	  so	  early	  after	  
the	  Arab	  uprisings,	  with	  no	  real	  or	  genuine	  assessment	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  donor	  policies	  
pursued	  up	  until	  that	  point.	  They	  argue	  that	  this:	  	  
	  
…Demonstrates	  a	   certain	   confusion	  among	  European	   institutions	  when	  confronted	  
with	   the	   new	   situation.	  More	  worryingly,	   it	   seems	   that	   there	   is	   a	   drift	   to	   a	  mere	  
continuation	   of	   the	   policies	   already	   being	   pursued,	   with	   a	   few	   day-­‐by-­‐day	  
adjustments	  to	  cope	  with	  future	  eventualities;	  and	  that	  many	  of	  the	  announcements	  
presented	  as	  support	  for	  the	  ‘new	  Tunisia’	  are	  in	  actual	  fact	  the	  (new)	  presentation	  
of	  previous	  commitments	  already	  ratified.439	  
	  
In	   addition,	   following	   the	   elections	   in	   October	   2011,	   several	   newer	   donors	   arrived	   in	  
Tunisia—some	  with	  no	  experience	  of	  working	  in	  the	  country	  and	  with	  no	  clear	  strategies	  or	  
mandates.	   Some	   former	  donors,	   however,	  waited	   to	   recommence	   activities	   in	   Tunisia	   for	  
when	  “the	  transition	  ended.”	  So	  while	  there	  were	  newer	  donors	  coming	  into	  Tunisia,	  there	  
was	  also	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  traditional	  international	  donors	  were	  paralysed,	  including	  
the	  multilateral	  donors	  who	  seemed	  to	  have	  adopted	  a	  “let’s	  wait	  and	  see”	  approach.	  In	  the	  
research	  interview	  with	  Dr	  Saqib,	  the	  director	  of	  a	  UN	  initiative	  established	  in	  Tunis	  after	  the	  
Tunisia	   uprising,	   he	   stated,	   “Many	   are	   waiting	   to	   see	   what	   happens	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
transition	  period....This	  reluctance	  among	  donors	  to	  engage	  is	  not	  helping,	  because	  mainly	  if	  
you	   are	   looking	   to	   see	   a	   strong	   democratic	   presence	   these	   organisations	   must	   be	  
engaged...at	   the	   moment	   there	   is	   no	   funding.”440	  Moreover,	   the	   experience	   of	   another	  
informant,	   Tawfiq,	   a	   programme	   manager	   and	   medical	   doctor	   with	   an	   HIV/AIDS	  
organisation	   in	  Sfax,	  also	  highlighted	  the	  challenge	  of	  an	   indeterminate	  donor	  climate.	  He	  
said,	   “The	  environment	   is	   favourable	   for	  associations	  but	   the	  main	  problems	  now	  are	   the	  
economy	   and	   financing,	   especially	   with	   a	   very	   weak	   state....The	   associations	   look	   to	   the	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  Hibou,	  Meddeb,	  and	  Hamdi,	  “Tunisia	  after	  14	  January,”17.	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  Ibid.	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  Informant	  34:	  Director,	  multilateral	  human	  rights	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  15	  Feb.	  2012.	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state	   to	   give	   but	   the	   state	   cannot	   give	   a	   budget	   to	   associations	   when	   it	   is	   in	   economic	  
crisis.”441	  	  
	  
After	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising,	   the	   amendments	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   association	   also	   stipulated	  
changes	   in	   the	   regulation	   of	   the	   financing	   of	   civil	   society	   organisations.	   This	   followed	   a	  
previously	  constrained	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  international	  donors	  operated	  during	  the	  
Ben	   Ali	   regime.	   Kristina	   Kausch	   in	   “Foreign	   Funding	   in	   Post-­‐Revolution	   Tunisia”	   claims,	  
“Before	  the	  uprisings,	  Tunisia	  had	  not	  been	  a	  favourite	  destination	  for	  international	  donors	  
due	   to	  both	   its	  narrow	  strategic	   significance	  and	   the	   limited	   impact	  potential	   in	   a	  heavily	  
repressive	   political	   environment.” 442 	  Decree-­‐law	   88	   of	   24	   September	   2011	   however	  
permitted	   associations	   to	   receive	   membership	   fees,	   public	   subsidies,	   and	   financial	   and	  
material	   donations,	   including	   from	   foreign	   countries.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Tunisian	   state	   was	  
obligated	  to	  set	  aside	  an	  unspecified	  amount	  of	  funding	  to	  NGOs,	  even	  though	  it	  has	  been	  
argued	   that	   this	   funding	  was	  minimal.443	  More	   importantly,	   from	   2011,	   donations	   to	   civil	  
society	   organisations,	   including	   foreign	   donations,	   required	   no	   prior	   approval	   by	   the	  
government.	  
	  
An	  additional	  factor	  responsible	  for	  inhibiting	  the	  historic	  organisations	  was	  that	  many	  had	  
evolved	   over	   time	   from	   activists	   to	   providers	   of	   services.	   This	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	  
decline	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  under	  Ben	  Ali	  and	  the	  functionalist	  role	  assigned	  to	  civil	  society	  
through	   neoliberal	   policies	   adopted	   by	   the	   regime.	   This	   contributed	   to	   the	   sense	   of	  
destabilisation	   and	   hesitation	   some	   of	   the	   historic	   organisations	   experienced	   in	   not	   only	  
being	  able	  to	  solicit	  support	  from	  new	  donors,	  but	  also	  in	  articulating	  the	  specific	  direction	  
their	  organisation	  would	  take	  after	  2011.	  During	  the	  research	  interview	  with	  Kareem,	  who	  
served	  as	  a	  volunteer	  and	  eventual	  consultant	  with	  one	  of	   the	  HIV	  organisations	  based	   in	  
Tunis,	  he	  stated:	  	  
	  
NGOs	  now	  are	  mainly	  the	  providers	  and	  deliverers	  of	  services	  rather	  than	  involved	  in	  
advocacy....They	  are	  losing	  their	  ability	  to	  do	  this	  kind	  of	  work	  because	  they	  are	  so	  
busy	  delivering	  services...if	   they	  continue	  only	   to	  deliver	  services	   they	  will	   lose	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441	  Informant	  31:	  Programme	  manager	  and	  medical	  doctor,	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  harm	  reduction	  association;	  Sfax,	  9	  
Feb.	  2012.	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  Kausch,	  “’Foreign	  Funding’	  in	  Post-­‐Revolution	  Tunisia,”	  2.	  
443	  Ibid.,	  3.	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place	   they	   have	   gained	   next	   to	   the	   government.	   They	   need	   to	   learn	   to	   do	   this	  
advocacy	  again.444	  
	  
	  
Conflicting	  priorities,	  contentious	  visions	  
The	  Arab	  uprisings	  not	  only	  brought	  political	  regime	  change	  across	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  in	  
the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	   it	  also	  carried	  with	  it	  a	  tide	  of	  sociocultural	  change	  with	  
disparate	  attitudes	  and	  behaviours	  rising	  to	  the	  very	  visible	  surface.	  One	  informant	  for	  the	  
research,	  Radi,	  an	  activist	  and	  sociologist	  based	  in	  Sfax	  who	  undertook	  a	  series	  of	  HIV	  bio-­‐
behavioural	   surveys	   across	   Tunisia,	   noted,	   “The	   major	   issues	   now	   are	   not	   just	   Tunisia’s	  
issues,	  but	   larger	   regional	   issues	  concerning	   the	   liberals	  and	   the	  conservatives,	  happening	  
all	  around	  us,	  and	  this	  has	  a	  big	  effect	  on	  what	  we	  do.”445	  What	  were	  also	  actual	  and	  what	  
were	   perceived	   changes	   across	   this	   terrain	   forced	   some	   of	   the	   historic	   civil	   society	  
organisations	   to	   revert	  back	   to	   strategies	  of	   caution,	  discretion	  and	   invisibility—strategies	  
which	  served	  them	  well	  under	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.	  	  
	  
During	  periods	  of	   sociopolitical	   turmoil,	   the	  changes	   taking	  place	  at	   the	  political	   level	   can	  
often	   overshadow	   the	   rapid	   transformations	   occurring	   at	   the	   sociocultural	   level.	   Rikke	  
Haugbolle	  and	  Francesco	  Cavatorta	  describe	  a	  revival	  of	  the	  practices	  of	  Islam	  in	  Tunisia	  that	  
began	  more	  explicitly	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  as	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  practice	  under	  both	  Bourguiba	  
and	   Ben	   Ali	   of	   excluding	   Islam	   from	   public	   life.	   They	   explained,	   “Since	   public	   space	   was	  
monopolised	   by	   the	   regime,	   there	   was	   a	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   personal	   morality	   and	  
comportment....Crucially,	   pious	   Tunisians	   also	   became	   more	   involved	   in	   public	   activism,	  
which	   was	   perceived	   as...an	   ethical	   choice	   implicitly	   condemning	   the	   regime	   as	  
unethical.”446	  The	  revival	  at	  the	  sociocultural	  level	  deepened	  further	  after	  the	  revolution	  as	  
individuals	  and	  communities	  were	  able	  to	  overtly	  condemn	  the	  corruption	  and	   immorality	  
associated	  with	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.	  	  
	  
The	  combined	  challenges	  of	  a	  broken	  post-­‐revolution	  economy	  (and	  global	  economic	  crisis),	  
disrupted	   state	   systems	   and	   infrastructure,	   uncertain	   donor	   commitment	   and	   mounting	  
(more	   flagrant)	   “conservative”	   attitudes	   that	   were	   not	   always	   favourable	   towards	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444	  Informant	  28:	  Project	  coordinator,	  multilateral	  development	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  1	  Feb.	  2012.	  
445	  Informant	  30:	  Academic,	  HIV	  and	  Gender;	  Tunis,	  7	  Feb.	  2012.	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  Haugbolle	  and	  Cavatorta,	  “Beyond	  Ghannouchi.”	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marginalised	   groups	   and	   minorities,	   sharply	   marked	   expectations	   for	   the	   post-­‐revolution	  
period	  in	  Tunisia.	  Of	  immediate	  concern	  to	  the	  historic	  organisations	  working	  in	  for	  example	  
HIV/AIDS	  and	  for	  those	  who	  were	   largely	  dependent	  upon	  the	  support	  of	  the	  government	  
(i.e.,	  for	  treatment	  of	  HIV,	   including	  procurement	  of	  necessary	  drugs),	  was	  whether	  or	  not	  
the	  gains	   they	  made	   in	  effectively	   reaching	  most	  at-­‐risk	  populations	  could	  be	  maintained,	  
and	  if	  the	  work	  to	  date	  could	  be	  sustained	  amid	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  governmental	  and	  donor	  
priorities	   in	   the	   transition	   and	  post-­‐revolution	   context.	  One	   interviewee	   for	   the	   research,	  
Kader,	  who	  worked	  as	   the	  supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  workers	   for	  one	  of	  
the	  HIV/AIDS	  organisations	  in	  Tunis,	  spoke	  of	  how	  the	  dilemma	  of	  both	  not	  having	  assured	  
funding	  from	  his	  group’s	  primary	  donor,	  the	  Global	  Fund,	  after	  2013,	  and	  of	  no	  immediate	  
signs	  of	  commitment	  from	  the	  newly	  elected	  government,	  left	  the	  work	  of	  his	  organisation	  
in	  a	  precarious	  position.	  He	  noted,	  “This	  is	  a	  real	  problem	  and	  so	  far	  it	   is	  not	  a	  priority	  for	  
the	  state	  to	  take	  forward	  this	  work;	  sustaining	  this	  work	  is	  going	  to	  be	  very	  difficult.”447	  This	  
perception	  was	  also	  shared	  by	  another	  informant,	  Ouroub,	  a	  country	  officer	  for	  one	  of	  the	  
UN	  offices	  in	  Tunis,	  who	  stated,	  “It	  will	  be	  more	  difficult	  than	  before.	  We	  could	  say	  before	  
‘we	  have	  a	  public	  health	  problem’	  but	  now	  all	  that	  work	  done	  before	  has	  to	  be	  redone.	  They	  
(the	  government)	  might	   surely	  have	  other	  priorities.	   It	   is	   a	  worry.	  We	  hope	   to	  be	  able	   to	  
convince	  them	  but	  there	  is	  now	  a	  predominance	  for	  the	  conservative.”448	  
	  
This	  concern	  over	  the	  future	  of	  working	  with	  marginalised	  groups	  affected	  by	  HIV	  in	  Tunisia	  
also	  trickled	  over	  to	  international	  donors	  and	  regional	  multilateral	  organisations	  who	  shared	  
the	  pessimism	  of	  some	  of	  their	  civil	  society	  colleagues.	  Of	  the	  donors	  who	  spoke	  of	  future	  
HIV-­‐specific	  interventions	  in	  Tunisia	  for	  the	  research,	  five	  were	  explicit	  about	  concerns	  over	  
the	   priority	   HIV	   would	   have	   with	   the	   new	   government,	   in	   comparison	   to	   other	   post-­‐
revolution	   transition	  priorities.449	  For	  example,	  one	  of	   the	   informants	   for	   the	   research,	  Dr	  
Hajjar,	  a	  leading	  HIV/AIDS	  activist	  and	  former	  director	  of	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  UN	  led	  HIV/AIDS	  
programmes	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  observed	  the	  following:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447	  Informant	  26:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  workers,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	  
448	  Informant	  20:	  Country	  officer,	  multilateral	  development	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  16	  Jan.	  2012	  and	  13	  Mar.	  
2013.	  
449	  Informant	  numbers:	  17,	  20,	  28,	  52	  and	  55.	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I	  am	  not	  at	  all	  optimistic	  for	  the	  next	  few	  years.	  The	  whole	  political	  context	  with	  the	  
Arab	  Spring	  has	  meant	  that,	  of	  course,	  HIV/AIDS	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  priority.	  AIDS	  is	  not	  a	  
priority	  now	  on	  anybody’s	  agenda	  and	  I	  would	  even	  have	  trouble	  getting	  anyone	  to	  
talk	  about	  HIV.	   In	  addition,	   there	   is	  almost	  no	  more	   funding,	   there	   is	   less	  and	   less	  
now	  and	  this	  has	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  everyone’s	  work....	  There	  are	  also	  new	  political	  
players	  now	  in	  all	  of	  these	  governments	  and	  they	  have	  no	  clue	  on	  HIV,	  so	  we	  almost	  
have	  to	  start	  from	  scratch	  again!...But	  the	  UN	  no	  longer	  has	  the	  luxury	  to	  go	  to	  the	  
government	  to	  speak	  about	  HIV	  as	  a	  priority.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  am	  not	  optimistic,	  it	  is	  not	  
easy.450	  	  
	  
So	   in	  effect,	   the	  historic	  organisations	  working	   in	  HIV/AIDS	  became	   increasingly	   cognisant	  
that	  their	  work	  would	  no	  longer	  feature	  because	  as	  an	  initial	  priority,	  donors	  might	  be	  more	  
interested	   in	   securing	   big	   “public”	   wins	   to	   satisfy	   constituents	   at	   home	   rather	   than	   over	  
perceived	   peripheral	   issues	   such	   as	   HIV/AIDS.	   Second,	   with	   an	   uncertain	   sociocultural	  
terrain	   the	  government	  would	  no	   longer	  necessarily	  be	   in	   a	  position	   to	   visibly	   fund	  more	  
contentious	   work	   in	   an	   increasingly	   divided	   society.	   The	   secular	   historic	   civil	   society	  
organisations	   perceived	   the	   divergence	   as	   situated	   directly	   between	   the	   conservative	  
“extreme”	   right	   and	   the	   secular	   (at	   times	   equally	   as	   extreme)	   left.	   For	   example,	   the	  
supervisor	   of	   outreach	   work	   with	   key	   populations	   interviewed	   for	   the	   research,	   Kader,	  
posited,	   “The	   opening	   will	   come	   but	   Tunisian	   society	   will	   divide	   itself	   between	   the	  
progressives	  and	   the	  conservatives	  who	  are	  very	  closed.	  The	  Salafists	  here	  are	  now	  really	  
showing	  their	  power	  but	  the	  progressives	  are	  also	  trying	  to	  show	  that	  they	  have	  this	  power”	  
(referring	   to	   the	   demonstration	   for	   freedom	   of	   expression	   in	   which	   8,000	   Tunisians	  
participated	  on	  27	  January	  2012).451	  This	  implicit	  pessimism	  for	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia	  was	  
also	   underscored	   by	  Mohid,	   a	   person	   living	   with	   HIV,	   who	   engaged	   in	   outreach	   work	   in	  
affected	   communities	   across	   Tunis.	   During	   the	   interview	   she	   expressed	   her	   doubtful	  
expectations	   for	   the	   future	  yet	  nevertheless	   re-­‐emphasised	  her	  commitment	   to	   the	  work.	  
She	   said,	   “I	   see	   a	   degradation	   in	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	   people	   here,”	   noting	   as	   well	   that	  
because	  people	  living	  with	  HIV	  continue	  to	  call	  up	  her	  and	  need	  her	  help	  every	  day,	  “these	  
needs	   are	   not	   decreasing	   at	   all.”452	  Finally,	   in	   a	   research	   interview	   with	   Dr	   Malik,	   the	  
executive	  director	  of	  one	  of	  the	  associations	  working	  in	  HIV/AIDS	  in	  Tunis,	  he	  remarked:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450	  Informant	  55:	  Former	  director,	  multilateral	  development	  and	  HIV	  organisation;	  telephone	  interview,	  10	  
May	  2012.	  	  
451	  Informant	  26:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  workers,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	  
452	  Informant	  24:	  PLHIV	  representative	  and	  PLHIV,	  HIV/AIDS	  association;	  Tunis,	  24	  Jan.	  2012	  and	  7	  Mar.	  2013.	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To	   see	   one’s	   own	   country	   regress	   several	   centuries	   in	   just	   a	   few	   months	   is	   very	  
difficult.	  This	  is	  going	  to	  take	  time....When	  you	  have	  such	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people	  
living	  in	  poverty,	  they	  are	  not	  really	  free.	  This	  level	  of	  poverty	  and	  the	  choices	  people	  
will	   make	   in	   this	   situation	   will	   not	   lead	   to	   genuine	   democracy....Ennahda	   has	   the	  
money	  and	  they	  have	  lies...in	  the	  name	  of	  God.453	  
	  
Not	  only	  was	  there	  a	  polarisation	  between	  the	  secular	  elements	  of	  the	  population	  and	  the	  
Islamists,	  but	  emotions	  were	  also	  divided	  between	  the	  euphoria	  of	  being	  able	  to	  bring	  down	  
a	  dictator	  and	  fear	  over	  how	  the	  country	  would	  be	  governed	  in	  the	  future.	  Dr	  Malik	  further	  
observed:	  
	  
Religion	  has	  become	   the	  most	   important—and	   this	  understanding	  of	   religion	   is	   an	  
obstacle	   for	   HIV/AIDS.	   If	   the	   government	   were	   now	   secular	   it	   would	   be	   much	  
easier...I	  predict	  that	  our	  work	  will	  not	  be	  very	  easy.	  Not	  because	  of	  the	  government	  
but	   because	   of	   the	   people.	   	   Before,	   it	   was	   enough	   to	   be	   correct	   with	   a	   certain	  
number	  of	  people;	  we	  were	  tolerated.	  Now,	  it	  is	  less	  obvious...there	  is	  an	  intolerance	  
which	  is	  being	  manifested.454	  	  
	  
The	   civil	   society	  organisations	   established	  before	   the	  Tunisia	  uprising	   in	   2010–2011	   faced	  
challenges	  that	  many	  of	   the	  newer	  organisations	  would	   likely	  be	  spared.	   In	  particular,	   the	  
historic	  organisations	  previously	  manoeuvred	  in	  a	  comparatively	  constrained	  public	  space—
they	   either	   learned	   to	   adapt	   to	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   game	   or	   risked	   encounters	  with	   the	   full	  
weight	   of	   the	   security	   apparatus	   often	   intolerant	   to	   perceived	   opposition.	   These	  
organisations	  also	  operated	  during	  a	  time	  in	  which	  Islamist	  associations	  and	  overt	  Islam	  as	  a	  
political	  discourse	  was	  largely	  restricted.	  Therefore,	  the	  public	  terrain	  was	  relatively	  isolated	  
from	  competing	  views	  and	  counter	  discourses.	   Following	   the	  Tunisia	  uprising,	   the	  historic	  
civil	  society	  organisations	  stood	  in	  a	  problematical	  position	  as	  they	  inadvertently	  continued	  
to	  apply	  the	  same	  strategies	  they	  used	  under	  Ben	  Ali	  of	  discretion	  and	  invisibility	  while	  they	  
waited	  for	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  post-­‐revolution	  topography	  to	  reveal	   itself.	  As	  the	  newer	  civil	  
society	  organisations	  emerged	  to	  claim	  both	  old	  and	  new	  spaces,	   the	  historic	  associations	  
appeared	  to	  be	  at	  a	  clear	  disadvantage	  based	  largely	  on	  the	  political	  residue	  they	  inherited.	  
However,	   among	   many	   of	   the	   historic	   civil	   society	   organisations	   there	   was	   a	   discernible	  
acceptance	   that	  with	   the	  complete	   rupture	   from	  decades	  of	   repressive	  authoritarian	   rule,	  
genuine	   political	   liberalisation	   would	   take	   time.	   Many	   were	   experienced	   activists	   who	  
aspired	   for	   a	   higher	   standard	   of	   democracy	   in	   Tunisia	   following	   the	   uprising.	   During	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453	  Informant	  18:	  Executive	  director,	  HIV/AIDS	  association;	  Tunis,	  13	  Jan.	  2012	  and	  5	  Mar.	  2013.	  
454	  Informant	  18:	  Executive	  director,	  HIV/AIDS	  association;	  Tunis,	  13	  Jan.	  2012	  and	  5	  Mar.	  2013.	  
	   Page	  |	  152	  
research	  interview	  with	  Nasser,	  the	  supervisor	  of	  peer	  education	  with	  one	  of	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  
associations,	  he	   said,	   “But	  eventually	   this	  will	   lead	  us	   to	   something	  more	  democratic	   and	  
real.	  It’s	  a	  long	  process,	  but	  this	  is	  our	  process.”455	  
	  
	  
	  
4.	  The	  emergence	  of	  the	  new	  
	  
Tunisia	  not	  only	  experienced	  an	  almost	  total	  re-­‐composition	  of	  civil	  society	  actors,	  but	  also	  
individuals	  and	  groups	  were	  genuinely	  trying	  to	  set	  up	  a	  system	  of	   local	  democracy.	  Many	  
new	  associations	  focused	  on	  national	  solidarity	  and	  mobilising	  citizens;	  moreover,	  they	  were	  
not	  waiting	  for	  the	  state	  to	  determine	  their	  role.	  In	  fact,	  there	  was	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  to	  this	  
work.	   One	   of	   the	   research	   interviewees,	   Soraya,	   a	   woman	   who	   helped	   to	   create	   an	  
association	  in	  Kef	  (a	  deprived	  region	  of	  Tunisia),	  said	  that	  her	  group	  organised	  meetings	  in	  
her	  garage	   since	   it	   first	   received	   its	  associational	   visa.456	  Following	   the	  uprising,	   she	   spent	  
most	   of	   her	   time	   in	   Tunis	   attending	   civil	   society	   strengthening	   workshops	   and	   training	  
meetings.	   Several	  of	   the	  newer	  associations	  were	   involved	   in	   citizen	  mobilisation	  and	   the	  
promotion	   of	   democracy.	   The	   newer	   associations	   also	   engaged	   in	   service	   provision	   and	  
social	  welfare/humanitarian	  initiatives	  both	  within	  Tunis	  and	  in	  the	  poorer	  regions	  outside	  
of	  the	  major	  urban	  areas.	  Moreover,	  many	  of	  these	  organisations	  preferred	  to	  remain	  hors	  
politique	   and	   non-­‐conflictual,	   in	   part	   given	   the	   inherited	   residue	   from	   the	   approach	   to	  
associations	  by	  the	  former	  regime.	  	  
	  
This	  section	  examines	  more	  in-­‐depth	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  public	  space,	  namely	  
the	   environment	   for	   civil	   society	   organisations	   to	   manouevre,	   immediately	   following	   the	  
Tunisia	   uprising.	   The	   research	   focused	   on	   three	   new	   organisations	   that	   acquired	   their	  
associational	   visa	   after	   January	   2011:	   Al	   Madanya,	   Femmes	   et	   Citoyenneté,	   and	  
L’Association	   de	   Recherches	   sur	   la	   Démocratie	   et	   le	   Développement.	   It	   includes	   the	  
perceptions	   and	   expectations	   of	   these	   newer	   organisations	   following	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	  
Ben	  Ali	   regime.	   Subsequently,	   this	   section	  also	  presents	   some	  of	   the	  key	   identified	   issues	  
and	  challenges	  for	  the	  newer	  organisations,	  including	  significant	  capacity	  and	  skills	  gaps	  as	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  and	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  founder	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well	   as	   the	   relatively	   recent	   emergence	   of	   a	   counter-­‐public	   in	   Tunisia’s	   expanding	   public	  
spaces.	   Finally,	   in	   reflecting	   back	   to	   similar	   liberalisation	   and	   expansion	   measures	  
implemented	   immediately	   after	   Ben	   Ali	   assumed	   the	   presidency	   in	   1987,	   was	   this	   post-­‐
revolution	  period	  in	  Tunisia	  to	  be	  marked	  by	  a	  similar	  rapid	  expansion,	  followed	  by	  a	  sharp	  
contraction	   in	   the	   face	   of	   opposition	   and	   division?	   Or	   was	   the	   spirit	   of	   citoyenneté	  
embodied	  in	  many	  Tunisians	  during	  this	  period,	  to	  remain	  a	  permanent	  feature	  of	  Tunisia’s	  
public	  spaces?	  
	  
Citoyenneté	  in	  practice	  
The	   three	  organisations	  could	  be	  characterised	  as	  secular-­‐liberal	  organisations.	  They	  were	  
created	   in	   the	   immediate	  post-­‐revolution	  environment	   and,	   approximately	  one	   year	   after	  
the	   revolution,	  were	   still	   in	   the	   process	   of	   refining	   their	   strategic	   objectives,	   in	   particular	  
how	  their	  work	  would	  sit	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  newly	  elected	  government.	  Similar	  to	  the	  historic	  
associations,	  the	  newer	  civil	  society	  organisations	  also	  situated	  conflicts	  within	  civil	  society	  
between	   their	   envisioned	   activities	   and	  what	   they	   perceived	   as	   the	  mounting	   political	   as	  
well	   as	   sociocultural	   conservative	   discourses.	   As	   can	   be	   observed	   from	   the	   research	  
interviews,	   some	   civil	   society	   actors	   were	   antagonistic	   to	   emerging	   counter-­‐publics	   that	  
were	   Islamist,	  while	  others	  accepted	  with	  reluctance	  that	  the	  new	  public	  space	  was	  by	   its	  
nature	   contentious	  with	   varied	   ideologies	   and	  perceptions	  of	  how	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia	  
should	  be	  modelled.	  	  
	  
Al	  Madanya:	  
The	  association	  Al	  Madanya	  was	  established	  immediately	  after	  the	  revolution	  by	  Uday	  and	  
his	  brother.	  During	   the	  research	   interview,	  Uday	  explained	  that	  he	  had	  previously	   lived	   in	  
the	   United	   States	   in	   Florida	   and	  worked	   in	   business	  management	   (trade	   in	   textiles	   from	  
Morocco	  and	  Tunisia)	  for	  over	  ten	  years.	  After	  the	  uprising	  in	  2010	  he	  returned	  to	  Tunisia	  to	  
become	  more	   engaged	   in	   his	   country	   following	   the	   departure	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime.	   He	  
remarked	   that	   he	   and	   his	   brother	   had	   always	   wanted	   to	   establish	   a	   similar	   kind	   of	  
organisation,	   but	   “had	   no	   interest	   in	   engaging	   in	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   system.”457	  Despite	   their	  
admitted	   lack	  of	  experience	   in	  humanitarian	  development,	  Uday	  and	  his	  brother	   travelled	  
throughout	  Tunisia	  to	  conduct	  an	  informal	  needs	  assessment	  of	  lower-­‐income	  communities	  
outside	  of	  Tunis.	  Based	  on	  the	  needs	  assessment	  they	  developed	  the	  ideas	  and	  priorities	  for	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their	  organisation	  such	  as	  helping	  unemployed	  young	  people	  qualify	  for	  their	  driving	  license	  
(as	  this	  is	  something	  still	  quite	  expensive	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  which	  prevents	  many	  people	  from	  
qualifying	   for	   employment),	   a	   skills	   transfer	   programme	   in	   agriculture,	   and	   a	   cultural	  
heritage	  programme	  with	  a	  website	  for	  all	  the	  different	  sections	  across	  Tunisia.	  The	  aim	  was	  
to	   support	   and	   reinforce	   the	   sociocultural	   aspects	   they	   felt	   were	   lost	   over	   the	   last	   few	  
decades	  in	  Tunisia.	  Uday	  remarked	  in	  the	  interview	  that	  he	  was	  hoping	  this	  work	  would	  in	  
fact	  make	  people’s	  daily	  lives	  easier.	  Although	  Uday	  continued	  some	  of	  his	  work	  in	  business	  
management,	   his	   humanitarian	   work	   in	   Tunisia	   following	   the	   uprising	   was	   what	   he	  
considered	  his	   full-­‐time	  employment.	  As	  he	  and	  his	  brother	  were	  “well-­‐connected”	  to	  the	  
business	  community	  both	   inside	  and	  outside	  of	  Tunisia	  they	  were	  able	  to	  rely	  on	  financial	  
donations	  from	  diaspora	  overseas.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interview	  they	  had	  also	  been	  able	  to	  
acquire	  some	  funding	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  Germany,	  and	  Scandinavian	  countries.	  	  
	  
When	  I	   interviewed	  Uday	   little	  over	  one	  year	  after	  the	  revolution,	  he	  and	  his	  organisation	  
had	  already	  been	  able	  to	  sign	  an	  agreement	  to	  support	  the	  transport	  costs	  for	  young	  people	  
to	   attend	   school	   in	   rural	   areas	   outside	   Tunis	   with	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Development	   for	   their	  
work.	   I	  was	  conscious	  that	  the	  historic	  organisations	  working	  in	  HIV/AIDS	  had	  not	  had	  this	  
opportunity	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  new	  members	  of	  government	  at	  the	  time.	  I	  asked	  Uday	  if	  Al	  
Madanya	   had	   been	   reaching	   out	   to	   some	   of	   the	   other	   humanitarian	   development	  
associations	  working	   now	   in	   Tunisia	   since	   the	   revolution.	   He	   acknowledged	   that	   some	   of	  
these	   organisations	   wanted	   to	   work	   with	   them	   because	   they	   have	   been	   able	   to	   acquire	  
funding;	   however,	   he	   perceived	   there	   was	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   competition	   already	  
among	   the	   newer	   organisations.	   He	   said,	   “There	   is	   already	   a	   lot	   of	   competition	   and	   I	  
perceive	  that	  these	  organisations	  want	  more	  power....There	  are	  problems	  with	  bureaucracy	  
and	  many	  people	  are	  still	  perceiving	  NGOs	  as	  political	  entities.”458	  He	  went	  on	  to	  add	  that	  
many	  organisations	  were	  created	  with	  humanitarian	  aims	  but	   then	  as	   the	  political	  parties	  
became	  officially	  created	  and	  more	  organised,	  the	  political	  parties	  would	  “use	  their	  people”	  
to	  set	  up	  NGOs	  or	  work	  through	  the	  NGOs	  to	  be	  more	  visible	  in	  communities.	   I	  asked	  him	  
how	  they	  were	  being	   received	   in	   the	  different	  communities	   they	  worked	   in.	  He	  explained	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that	   overall	   the	   communities	   were	   very	   positive	   because	   of	   the	   need	   to	   improve	   the	  
available	  services	  there—such	  as	  transport	  to	  schools	  for	  their	  children.	  	  
	  
Femmes	  et	  Citoyenneté:	  
What	   began	   as	   a	   book	   club	   between	   women	   soon	   transformed	   into	   an	   organisation	   to	  
support	  greater	  rights	  for	  women	  in	  Tunisia	  based	  on	  the	  spirit	  of	  helping	  others.	  Femmes	  et	  
Citoyenneté	   received	   its	   associational	   visa	   in	  April	   2011	   and	   immediately	   began	  providing	  
support	  to	  lower-­‐income	  communities	  in	  Kef	  (a	  poorer	  region	  in	  the	  country’s	  North-­‐West),	  
in	   particular	   to	   women	   who	   had	   suffered	   domestic	   violence,	   individuals	   affected	   by	   the	  
heavy	  snowfall	  and	  floods	  in	  that	  region	  in	  2011–2012,	  and	  communities	  in	  need	  during	  Eid	  
al-­‐Fitr.	  Nevertheless,	  supporting	  the	  greater	  rights	  of	  women	  was	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  the	  
organisation.	  Soraya,	  one	  of	  the	  officers	  of	  the	  organisation,	  explained	  during	  the	  interview	  
for	  the	  research	  that	  the	  association	  felt	  the	  rights	  of	  women	  were	  threatened	  following	  the	  
revolution	  and	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  equality	  was	  very	  important	  during	  this	  transitionary	  phase	  
for	   Tunisia.	   She	   stated,	   “We	   are	   really	   balancing	   on	   the	   line	   of	   inequality	   at	   the	  
moment...we	  feel	  seriously	  threatened.”459	  I	  interviewed	  Soraya,	  whose	  mother	  established	  
the	   organisation,	   together	  with	   her	   younger	   sister	  who	  was	   applying	   to	   university	   at	   the	  
time,	  at	  a	  busy	  cafe	  in	  Tunis	  on	  Avenue	  Bourguiba.	  They	  stressed	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  rights	  
of	  women	  was	   paramount	   to	   them	  as	   the	   younger	   sister	   claimed,	   “There	   is	   this	   risk	   that	  
extremists	  could	  take	  away	  our	  rights	  and	  we	  have	  never	  had	  this	  or	  experienced	  this	  here.”	  
Soraya	   followed	  on	  her	   sister’s	  words,	  acknowledging	   that	  with	  democracy	   she	   should	  be	  
tolerant	  of	  all	  views	  and	  extremism	  but	  adding	  that	  she	  refused	  to	  be	  “threatened	  verbally	  
or	  physically,	  this	  is	  not	  democracy.”460	  	  
	  
Only	  two	  weeks	  before	  I	  interviewed	  Soraya	  and	  her	  sister,	  the	  organisation’s	  headquarters	  
were	  based	  in	  their	  home	  garage.	  They	  had	  since	  acquired	  an	  office	  in	  Kef.	  Soraya	  explained	  
that	  the	  association	  had	  a	  horizontal	  structure	  and	  that	  through	  this	  they	  tried	  to	  exercise	  
democracy	  and	  democratic	  principles	  throughout	  their	  organisation—“Everything	  we	  do	   is	  
put	   to	   a	   vote.” 461 	  They	   remarked	   that	   they	   had	   a	   good	   relationship	   with	   the	   other	  
organisations	   and	   that	   network	   associations	   were	   being	   created	   to	   allow	   smaller	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organisations	   to	   become	   stronger.	   Soraya	   noted	   during	   the	   research	   interview	   that	  
increasingly	  they	  were	  becoming	  connected	  with	  other	  organisations	  doing	  similar	  work	  and	  
that	   the	   Internet	   helped	   them	   to	   find	   out	   what	   is	   going	   on,	   stating,	   “Word	   of	   mouth	   is	  
essential	   at	   the	   moment.”	   They	   were	   primarily	   working	   on	   issues	   concerning	   violence	  
against	  women,	  the	  incarceration	  of	  women,	  leadership	  and	  training	  for	  women	  from	  low-­‐
income	  environments,	  and	  microcredit	  projects	  for	  young	  people	  out	  of	  school.	  One	  of	  the	  
main	   goals	   for	   the	   organisation	   was	   to	   create	   an	   area	   for	   women	   who	   had	   suffered	  
domestic	  violence	  to	  have	  a	  safe	  space	  as	  well	  as	  services	  for	  psychological	  follow-­‐up	  with	  
the	  women,	  children,	  and	  their	  spouses.	  They	  also	  explained	  that	  they	  had	  recently	  acquired	  
funding	   from	   the	   Spanish	   and	   German	   bilateral	   institutions	   to	   fund	   some	   of	   their	  
organisational	   activities.	   In	   addition,	   alongside	   initiatives	   to	   support	   the	   rights	   of	  women,	  
Femmes	  et	  Citoyenneté	  organised	  smaller	  activities	  such	  as	  a	  recent	  collection	  of	  books	  and	  
school	   supplies	  and	  clothes	   for	  poorer	  areas	   in	  Kef.	  Soraya	  stated,	   “We	  put	  up	  posters	   to	  
mobilise	  people	  and	  everyone	  became	  engaged.	  There	  was	  no	  resistance	  to	  our	  activities;	  
where	  there	  is	  a	  will	  one	  can	  find	  all	  means	  to	  succeed,	  and	  this	  can	  be	  done	  without	  a	  lot	  of	  
money.”462	  
	  
L’Association	  de	  Recherches	  sur	  la	  Démocratie	  et	  le	  Développement	  (ARDD):	  
ARDD	   was	   established	   immediately	   after	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising	   in	   February	   2011.	   For	   the	  
research	   I	   interviewed	  Ghilzlan,	  one	  of	   the	   founders	  of	   the	  organisation.	  She	  explained	  at	  
the	  outset	  of	  our	   interview,	  “We	  all	   lived	  the	  revolution	  and	  cried	  out	   for	  our	  dignity	  and	  
liberty,	  as	  we	  engaged	  ourselves	  then	  in	  the	  future	  of	  our	  country.	  We	  suffered	  years	  under	  
the	  family	  of	  Ben	  Ali	  as	  they	  betrayed	  the	  social	  and	  political	  objectives	  of	  the	  country.”463	  
Ghilzlan	  and	  her	  colleagues	  established	  the	  association	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  wanting	  to	  open	  the	  
consciousness	  of	  individuals	  and	  to	  expand	  opportunities	  for	  them	  in	  what	  she	  considered	  a	  
period	  of	   emergency	   for	   the	   country.	  Of	   the	   founders,	   two	   specialised	   in	   economics,	   one	  
was	  a	  human	  resources	  expert,	  and	  the	  other	  was	  working	  as	  an	  environment	  specialist	  for	  
a	  bilateral	  organisation.	  Early	   in	  the	   life	  of	  the	  organisation	  they	  held	  a	  conference	  on	  the	  
“democratic	  transition.”	  She	  said	  that	  from	  here	  their	  work	  intensified	  as	  people	  started	  to	  
become	  more	   and	   more	   aware	   of	   the	   repression	   applied	   under	   the	   former	   regime.	   She	  
described	  how	  during	  her	   former	  humanitarian	  work	  before	   the	  uprising	   the	  police	  often	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462	  Informant	  47:	  Programme	  coordinator,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  22	  Mar.	  2012.	  
463	  Informant	  53:	  Secretary	  general,	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  3	  Apr.	  2012.	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visited	   her	   as	   her	   work	   was	   thought	   to	   tread	   on	   political	   areas.	   Now	   she	   believes,	   “It	   is	  
necessary	  that	  civil	  society	  is	  present	  in	  all	  of	  these	  domains,	  that	  they	  are	  present	  in	  all	  of	  
these	  institutions	  so	  that	  finally	  things	  change.”464	  	  
	  
ARDD	  also	  organised	  events	  on	  “the	  media	  and	  the	  revolution,”	  “the	  environment	  and	  the	  
revolution,”	   and	   the	   rights	   of	   women,	   each	   of	   which	   involved	   a	   series	   of	   roundtable	  
discussions	   with	   different	   experts	   from	   political	   and	   civil	   society.	   The	   organisation	   also	  
prioritised	   work	   with	   young	   people,	   in	   particular	   on	   how	   they	   themselves	   perceived	   the	  
aftermath	   of	   the	   uprising	   was	   unfolding.	   ARDD	   also	   held	   a	   seminar	   on	   the	   “issue	   of	  
Islamists”	  following	  the	  October	  2011	  elections.	  Ghilzlan	  acknowledged,	  “Now	  we	  learn	  we	  
will	   have	   to	   live	   together.	   As	   a	   woman	   I	   felt	   threatened	   in	   my	   personal	   as	   well	   as	  
associational	   life,	   as	   all	   this	   now	   comes	   into	   the	   public	   life….Even	   if	   the	   results	   of	   the	  
elections	  are	  not	  what	  I	  wanted,	  I	  also	  do	  not	  want	  to	  lose	  my	  liberty,	  we	  feel	  a	  bit	  cornered	  
at	   the	  moment.”465	  She	   raised	   the	   issue	   that	   the	  CPS	  was	   at	   risk	   in	   Tunisia,	   and	   gave	   the	  
example	  of	  emerging	  debates	  on	   temporary	  marriage	  at	   the	   time,	  noting,	  “We	  are	  seeing	  
things	   we	   have	   never	   seen	   here	   before.	   Religion	   is	   something	   personal	   that	   no	   one	   can	  
oblige	   of	   the	   other.” 466 	  Despite	   her	   personal	   feelings	   concerning	   Islam,	   Ghilzlan	  
acknowledged	   that	   the	   Islamists	   suffered	   enormously	   under	   the	   former	   regime.	   She	  
passionately	  declared	  during	  the	  interview,	  “No	  to	  repression,	  no	  to	  making	  judgements	  of	  
them;	  yes	  to	  freedom	  and	  the	  diversity	  of	  opinion!”	  In	  what	  she	  considered	  “l’apprentissage	  
de	   la	   democratie”	   she	   expressed,	   “We	   are	   learning	   to	   live	   together.”	   ARDD	   has	   since	  
organised	   roundtables	   to	   bring	   together	   Islamists	   and	   oppositional	   political	   figures	   to	  
discuss	  emerging	  issues	  for	  the	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  rule	  in	  Tunisia.	  Despite	  her	  and	  
the	   organisation’s	   general	   efforts	   towards	   inclusion	   she	   remarked,	   “It	   is	   a	   mutual	   and	  
reciprocal	   apprenticeship	  but	   I	   am	   from	   the	   left—yes	   to	   the	   separation	  of	   the	   state	   from	  
religion!”467	  
	  
A	   majority	   of	   the	   informants	   from	   the	   newer	   organisations	   (including	   the	   three	   above	  
examples)	  expressed	  a	  remarkable	  enthusiasm	  to	  be	  able	  to	  engage	  fully	   in	  the	  expanding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464	  Informant	  53:	  Secretary	  general,	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  3	  Apr.	  2012.	  
465	  Informant	  53:	  Secretary	  general,	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  3	  Apr.	  2012.	  
466	  Informant	  53:	  Secretary	  general,	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  3	  Apr.	  2012.	  
467	  Informant	  53:	  Secretary	  general,	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  3	  Apr.	  2012.	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public	  space,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  and	  conviction	  to	  the	  work	  they	  were	  doing.468	  
The	   objectives	   of	   the	   organisations,	   while	   not	   entirely	   clear	   or	   strategic,	   in	   one	   way	   or	  
another	   evolved	   around	   the	   shaping	   of	   a	   better,	   more	   inclusive,	   and	   supportive	  
environment,	  in	  particular	  for	  many	  marginalised	  and	  deprived	  groups	  living	  across	  Tunisia.	  
Throughout	   the	   interviews	  with	   the	  newer	  organisations,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	  was	   rarely	  
discussed,	   as	   it	   appeared	   that	   post-­‐uprising	   civil	   society	   sought	   to	   vigilantly	   protect	   itself	  
from	   the	   intrusions	   of	   the	   state.	   The	   research	   points	   to	   the	   self-­‐management	   and	   self-­‐
organisation	  agendas	  explicit	  in	  Baker’s	  description	  of	  the	  new	  Latin	  American	  left	  with	  the	  
notion	   of	   the	   “defence	   of	   freedom	   from	   outside	   the	   state”	   present	   during	   the	   social	  
movements	  across	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America.	  The	  research	  also	  brings	  into	  relief	  a	  
set	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  filling	  the	  social	  contract	  the	  state	  was	  arguably	  not	  able	  to	  provide	  
during	   the	   transition	   from	   authoritarian	   rule.	   Finally,	   several	   of	   the	   interviewees	   for	   the	  
research	   suggested	  a	   “civil	   society	  utopia”	  with	   a	   strong	  underlying	  normative	   suggestion	  
that	   at	   the	   least	   the	   post-­‐revolution	   public	   space	   would	   be	   a	   domain	   of	   solidarity,	  
voluntarism,	  and	  altruism.	  	  
	  
Following	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising,	   some	   members	   of	   civil	   society	   were	   also	   relatively	  
antagonistic	   to	   newer	   emerging	   counter-­‐publics	   representing	   disparate	   ideologies	   and	  
visions	   for	   the	   emerging	   public	   space.	   Five	   of	   the	   eight	   interviewees	   among	   newer	  
associations	   expressed	   degrees	   of	   concern	   or	   opposition	   with	   regard	   to	   Islamist	  
organisations	  also	  manoeuvring	  within	  public	  spaces	  (this	  will	  be	  further	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  
V).	  At	  the	  same	  time	  many	  of	  these	  actors	  expressed	  reluctance	  to	  sharing	  new	  spaces	  with	  
organisations	  whose	  visions	  and	  objectives	  were	  perceived	  as	  disparate	  to	  their	  own.	  This	  
point	  was	  stressed	  during	  a	  research	  interview	  with	  Muammar,	  an	  online	  media	  journalist,	  
who	   remarked	   that	   2011	   was	   a	   good	   time	   to	   “push	   the	   agenda.”	   He	   further	   observed,	  
“Everything	   is	   changing	   really	   fast	   and	   for	   those	  who	  manage	   to	   occupy	   that	   space	   first,	  
after	  that	  it’s	  hard	  to	  keep	  them	  out.	  There	  will	  be	  more	  difficult	  times	  for	  the	  liberals	  here	  
in	   Tunisia	   as	   they	   are	   not	   organised	   politically	   at	   all	   and	   they	   are	   not	   infiltrating	   the	  
organisations	  which	  are	  active.”469	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468	  Informant	  numbers:	  33,	  38,	  43,	  47,	  49,	  51	  and	  53	  (a	  total	  of	  8	  individuals	  working	  with	  newer	  associations	  
were	  interviewed	  for	  the	  research).	  
469	  Informant	  27:	  Co-­‐founder	  and	  journalist,	  English	  news	  website/media;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	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Emerging	  issues	  for	  the	  newer	  associations:	  freedom	  from	  the	  state?	  
While	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  civil	  society,	  and	  the	  newer	  organisations	  in	  particular,	  operated	  
within	  a	  climate	  of	  relative	   freedom	  following	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising,	   they	  also	  began	  to	  
encounter	  challenges.	  These	  challenges	  were	  compounded	  by	  fragile	  state	  infrastructure,	  a	  
crippled	   economy,	   and	   political	   deadlock	   aggravated	   by	   in-­‐fighting	   among	   the	   political	  
parties.	  Apart	  from	  these	  extemporaneous	  factors,	  however,	  civil	  society	  was	  also	  impacted	  
by	   the	   indeterminacy	   of	   the	   transition	   itself	   that	   affected	   some	   organisations’	   ability	   to	  
mobilise	  resources	  from	  private,	  regional,	  or	  international	  donors.	  More	  importantly,	  newer	  
civil	  society	  organisations	  had	  to	  evolve	  from	  a	  singular	  or	  insular	  focus	  on	  democratisation	  
to	   more	   strategic	   longer-­‐term	   objectives	   for	   their	   organisational	   activity.	   The	   synthesis	  
mapping	  conducted	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  indicated	  that	  many	  of	  the	  organisations	  were	  
at	  a	  rudimentary	  stage	  of	  development	  with	  few	  members,	  reduced	  capacity	  in	  financial	  and	  
human	   resources,	   a	   lack	   of	   strategic	   vision	   of	   their	   role,	   and	   limitations	   in	   achieving	  
sustainability	   in	   their	  work.470	  A	   number	   of	   organisations	  were	   created	   to	   respond	   to	   the	  
precise	   needs	   of	   the	   transition	   from	   authoritarian	   rule	   such	   as	   the	   fostering	   of	   citizen	  
engagement,	  monitoring	  the	  election	  process,	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
new	   constitution.	   However,	   it	   was	   only	   recently	   that	   civil	   society	   organisations	   began	   to	  
shift	   their	   focus	   to	   further	   engagement	   in	   economic	   and	   humanitarian	   development	  
activities.471	  	  
	  
The	   two	   core	   challenges	   for	   the	   newer	   civil	   society	   organisations	   were	   issues	   associated	  
with	   organisational	   capacity	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   experience,	   both	   of	   which	   were	   perceived	   to	  
exacerbate	   susceptibility	   to	   political	   co-­‐optation	   and	   instrumentalisation.	   During	   the	  
research	   interview	  with	   Fajr,	  who	  was	   formerly	   a	  member	   of	   a	   larger	   historic	   association	  
and	   who	   was	   working	   with	   a	   new	   German-­‐funded	   democracy	   strengthening	   initiative	  
following	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising,	  she	  underscored	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  newer	  organisations	  
held	   a	   relatively	   narrow	   focus	   at	   the	   outset.	   She	   opined	   that	   the	   newer	   NGOs	   were	  
inexperienced	  structurally	  and	  strategically	  and	  stated	  as	  well:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470	  Union	  Européenne,	  “Rapport	  de	  Diagnostic,”	  12.	  
471	  Le	  Réseau	  Euro-­‐méditerranéen	  des	  Droits	  de	  l’Homme,	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Before	  the	  elections	  all	  the	  interest	  was	  focused	  on	  the	  first	  democratic	  elections	  in	  
Tunisia	   but	   this	  was	   time	   limited	   and	   everyone	   could	   rally	   and	   focus	   on	   this.	   And	  
now	  they	  are	  having	  to	  think	  much	  more	  long	  term	  and	  they	  see	  they	  do	  not	  have	  
the	   capacities	   necessary	   or	   the	   strategic	   vision....Everyone	   is	   still	   in	   the	   post-­‐
revolutionary	  euphoria...we	  are	  only	  just	  planning	  now.472	  
	  
Some	   attributed	   the	   lack	   of	   capacity	   and	   strategic	   vision	   to	   the	   residue	   of	   the	   former	  
regime,	   during	   which	   period	   many	   NGOs	   were	   dependent	   on	   financing	   from	   various	  
embassies	  and	  bilateral	  donors.	  One	  interviewee	  for	  the	  research,	  Dr	  Saquib,	  the	  director	  of	  
a	  recently	  established	  UN	  initiative	  in	  Tunisia,	  remarked:	  
	  
The	  strategic	  skills	  required	  for	  obtaining	  and	  managing	  funds	  with	  both	  the	  NGOs	  of	  
before	   and	   now	   are	   not	   strong—and	   this	   inability	   to	   reach	   out	   to	   donors	   is	   a	  
consequence	  of	  severe	  repression	  under	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.	  This	  is	  the	  nature	  that	  
95	  percent	  of	  the	  NGOs	  are	  currently	  operating	  in.	  All	  of	  them	  are	  badly	  in	  need	  of	  
capacity	  building.	  They	  are	  also	  badly	  in	  need	  of	  internal	  democracy	  building	  as	  they	  
are	  used	   to	  being	  a	  one	  man	  or	  one	  woman	  show....The	  civil	   society	  organisations	  
have	   no	   experience	   in	   capacity	   building	   and	   therefore	   this	   spirit	   of	   volunteerism	  
ends	  with	  the	  distribution	  of	  services	  and	  material	  items.473	  
	  
One	   additional	   area	   of	   contention	   for	   the	   newer	   organisations	   as	   well	   as	   the	   historic	  
associations	   was	   in	   determining	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	   in	   social	   welfare	   and	   humanitarian	  
development—in	  particular	  as	  Tunisia	  was	  undergoing	  an	  economic	  crisis.	  The	  remarkable	  
spirit	  of	  volunteerism	  that	  emerged	  after	  the	  revolution	  overshadowed	  the	  necessity	  for	  the	  
state	   also	   to	   redefine	   its	   role.	   For	   example,	   in	   February	   2012	   the	   North-­‐West	   region	   of	  
Tunisia—a	   relatively	   deprived	   region—experienced	   unusual	   degrees	   of	   heavy	   snowfall	  
whereby	   entire	   communities	   were	   left	   without	   food,	   water,	   or	   heating;	   a	   host	   of	  
associations	  rushed	  to	  deliver	  aid	  to	  these	  communities	  before	  the	  state	  could	  act.	  During	  
the	  research	  interview,	  Fajr	  expressed	  frustration	  that	  the	  newer	  organisations	  appeared	  to	  
be	  led	  by	  emotion	  rather	  than	  to	  be	  pursuing	  a	  more	  long-­‐term	  vision	  for	  social	  welfare	  and	  
humanitarian	  development.	  She	  argued:	  
	  
At	   the	  moment	   the	  NGOs	   should	  be	   advocating	   that	   the	   state	   takes	  on	   its	   proper	  
function	   and	   roles	   with	   regard	   to	   social	   services,	   but	   instead	   it’s	   the	   NGOs	  
themselves	  taking	  on	  these	  services;	  and	  this	  is	  not	  a	  stable	  situation	  or	  sustainable.	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  Informant	  32:	  Programme	  officer,	  democracy	  and	  civil	  society	  capacity	  building	  association;	  Tunis,	  10	  Feb.	  
2012.	  
473	  Informant	  34:	  Director,	  multilateral	  human	  rights	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  15	  Feb.	  2012.	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They	   seem	   to	  be	  directed	  by	  emotions	  at	   the	  moment....The	  NGOs	  are	   supporting	  
these	  communities	  [in	  the	  North-­‐West]	  rather	  than	  pressuring	  the	  state	  to	  act.474	  
	  
However,	   given	   the	   historical	   residue	   left	   on	   civil	   society	   by	   the	   Bourguiba	   and	   Ben	   Ali	  
regimes,	  it	  was	  perhaps	  understandable	  that	  the	  newer	  organisations	  in	  particular	  would	  be	  
pursuing	   self-­‐management	   agendas,	   and	   would	   not	   be	   waiting	   for	   the	   state	   to	   act.	   The	  
experience	   of	   another	   informant	   for	   the	   research,	   Najeeb,	   an	   employee	   of	   a	   bilateral	  
organisation	  and	  civil	  society	  member,	  underscored	  the	  rationale	  underneath	  the	  approach	  
of	   the	   newer	   organisations.	   He	   sympathised	  with	   the	   seemingly	   haphazard	   approach	   the	  
associations	  seemed	  to	  be	  taking,	  noting	  for	  example:	  	  
	  
The	   country	   lived	   under	   the	   total	   control	   of	   the	   state—a	   centralised	   state—and	  
during	  this	  period	  the	  “local	  collectivity”	  or	  associational	  actors	  had	  no	  authority	  or	  
autonomy	  of	   resources...they	  were	  primarily	   there	  to	  accompany	  the	  action	  of	   the	  
government	   and	   of	   the	   party	   [RCD].	   It	   was	   a	   relation	   of	   subordination.	   These	  
associations	   could	   not	   organise	   themselves	   without	   permission	   from	   the	   state	  
previously.475	  
	  
Therefore,	  given	  the	  tangible	  remains	  of	  repression,	  one	  comprehends	  the	  subjective	  desire	  
for	   civil	   society	   to	   act	   autonomously,	   as	  well	   as	   its	   caution	   toward	  both	   state	   institutions	  
and	  Ennahda	   in	   the	  expanding	  post-­‐uprising	  public	   space.	   In	   the	   two	  years	   subsequent	   to	  
the	   downfall	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime,	   Tunisia	   was	   on	   course	   for	   the	   incorporation	   and,	  
moreover,	  acceptance	  of	  two	  parallel	  systems	  in	  which	  the	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  would	  act	  
independently	  from	  one	  another.	  	  
	  
The	  sudden	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  and	  vibrant	  civil	  society	  immediately	  following	  the	  2010–
2011	   uprising	   highlighted	   the	   dynamic	   spirit	   of	   volunteerism	   and	   citoyenneté	   embodied	  
deep	  within	   Tunisians	   despite	   decades	   of	   repression	   under	   authoritarian	   rule.	   During	   the	  
interview,	  the	  director	  of	  Al	  Madanya	  observed,	  “In	  a	  way,	  it	  was	  a	  huge	  step	  for	  the	  NGOs	  
to	  come	  forward	  and	  be	  able	  to	  overcome	  these	  historical	  precedents	  and	  barriers	  to	  their	  
participation.”476	  Nevertheless,	   the	  newer	  organisations	  were	  also	  beginning	   to	  encounter	  
challenges	   of	   their	   own,	   those	   which	   were	   both	   endogenous	   and	   exogenous	   to	   their	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  Informant	  32:	  Programme	  officer,	  democracy	  and	  civil	  society	  capacity	  building	  association;	  Tunis,	  10	  Feb.	  
2012.	  
475	  Informant	  38:	  Senior	  expert	  on	  environment,	  bilateral	  and	  associational	  member;	  Tunis,	  6	  Mar.	  2012	  and	  
Mar.	  2013.	  
476	  Informant	  33:	  Co-­‐Director,	  development	  association;	  Tunis,	  13	  Feb.	  2012.	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organisations.	   Internally,	   they	   had	   to	   adapt	   their	   core	   activities	   to	   more	   realistic	  
expectations	  beyond	  strategies	  of	  hyper-­‐visibility	   for	  activities	   such	  as	   citizen	  mobilisation	  
for	  elections	  and	  monitoring	  of	  the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly.	  They	  also	  had	  to	  reflect	  
strategically	  on	  how	  to	  engage	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  donors	  in	  a	  competitive	  and	  
uncertain	  transition	  climate,	  as	  well	  as	  anticipate	  organisational	  capacity	  needs.	  Externally,	  
the	  newer	  associations	  had	  to	  manoeuvre	  within	  the	  context	  of	  fragile	  state	  institutions,	  a	  
delicate	  economic	  landscape,	  and	  in-­‐fighting	  between	  secular	  and	  Islamist	  political	  parties.	  
Overall,	   a	   number	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	   interviewed	   for	   the	   research	   accepted	   that	  
democratisation	  could	   take	  time	  and	  that	  many	  uncomfortable	  debates	  and	  contestations	  
would,	   by	  necessity,	   be	  had.	  Many	  also	  highlighted	   in	   a	  positive	  manner	   that	   the	   current	  
landscape	  for	  civil	  society	  in	  Tunisia	  at	  the	  time	  was	  exceptional,	  something	  that	  could	  have	  
never	   been	   imagined	   in	   the	   previous	   decades	   of	   authoritarian	   rule.	   Therefore,	   they	  
accepted	  that	  the	  transformations	  occurring	   in	  the	  political	  as	  well	  as	  public	  spaces	  would	  
incur	   gains	   and	   losses,	   with	   one	   respondent	   noting,	   “C’est	   un	   processus	   en	   cours	   pour	  
l’instant”—It	  is	  an	  ongoing	  process	  for	  the	  moment.477	  
	  
	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Following	  the	  departure	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  in	  January	  2011,	  the	  High	  Authority	  instituted	  
measures	  for	  political	  liberalisation	  that	  included	  the	  expansion	  of	  laws	  permitting	  political	  
parties	   to	   register	   and	   amendments	   to	   the	   formal	   laws	   of	   association	   allowing	   for	   the	  
creation	   of	   thousands	   of	   new	   civil	   society	   organisations.	   The	   sociopolitical	   space	   had	  
expanded	  and	  a	   range	  of	  actors	  and	  groups	  emerged	   to	  claim	   their	   right	   to	  participate	   in	  
post-­‐uprising	  Tunisia.	  From	  the	  October	  2011	  elections	  in	  which	  the	  political	  party	  Ennahda	  
led	   the	   transition	   government	   through	   the	   Islamist-­‐secular	   coalition	   the	   Troika,	   a	   host	   of	  
historic	  and	  new	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  came	  to	  occupy	  these	  bourgeoning	  spaces.	  
Moreover,	  a	  multitude	  of	  views	  and	  priorities	  were	  tabled	  for	  discursive	  contestation,	  such	  
as	  issues	  concerning	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  and	  media	  (or	  the	  limits	  of),	  issues	  regarding	  the	  
status	  of	  women,	   support	  and	   recognition	  of	   vulnerable	  but	  also	   criminalised	  populations	  
such	  as	  people	  affected	  by	  HIV/AIDS	  (including	  sex	  workers	  and	  homosexual	  communities),	  
and	  finally,	  a	  key	  symbol	  of	  national	  identity,	  the	  Tunisian	  flag.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477Informant	  43:	  Treasurer	  and	  former	  coordinator,	  urban	  development	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Mar.	  2012.	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This	  chapter	  examined	  the	  first	  core	  theme	  of	  the	  research,	  specifically	  the	  “illiberal”	  effects	  
of	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  public	  space(s).	  In	  particular	  it	  analysed	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  opening	  
up	  of	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces	  during	  the	  two	  years	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  
regime	   to	  determine	  how	  conflict	   is	  manifested	  between	  different	  civil	   society	  actors	  and	  
groups.	   It	   locates	   the	  areas	  over	  which	  there	   is	  sharp	  discursive	  contestation	  within	   these	  
expanding	  public	  spaces,	  as	  well	  as	  underscores	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  conflicts	  on	  the	  
actors	  manoeuvring	  in	  these	  spaces.	  During	  what	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  “resurrection	  
of	  civil	  society”	  thousands	  of	  new	  civil	  society	  organisations	  were	  legally	  created	  to	  not	  only	  
provide	   support	   to	   deprived	   communities	   in	   the	   different	   regions	   of	   Tunisia,	   but	   to	   also	  
participate	   in	   Tunisia’s	   efforts	   toward	   democratisation.	   The	   thousands	   of	   newer	  
organisations	  created	  would	  also	  be	  acting	  alongside	  and	  sharing	  the	  same	  symbolic	  as	  well	  
as	   physical	   public	   spaces	   with	   Tunisia’s	   historic	   civil	   society	   organisations,	   created	   in	   the	  
decades	   prior	   to	   the	   2010–2011	   uprising.	   Each	   set	   of	   organisations	   would	   encounter	  
opportunities	   and	   challenges	   as	   they	   endeavoured	   to	   ascertain	   the	   nature	   of	   Tunisia’s	  
expanding	  public	  spaces.	  	  
	  
The	   historic	   civil	   society	   organisations,	   formed	   prior	   to	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   regime,	  
encountered	   challenges	   that	  many	   of	   the	   newer	   associations	  would	   likely	   be	   spared.	   For	  
example,	   after	   the	   revolution	   donor	   funding	   from	   bilateral	   and	   multilateral	   institutions	  
became	   temporarily	   uncertain	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   regional	   uprisings	   and	   the	   overall	   global	  
financial	   recession.	   While	   it	   was	   argued	   a	   “tsunami”	   of	   donors	   flocked	   to	   Tunisia	   after	  
January	   2011,	   some	   previously	   existing	   donors	   halted	   their	   activities	   until	   a	   more	   stable	  
political	   climate	   could	  emerge.	  Alternatively,	   some	  newer	  donors	   committed	   to	   initiatives	  
without	   perhaps	   fully	   comprehending	   the	   wider	   implications	   of	   Tunisian’s	   political	  
inheritance.	  In	  addition,	  the	  sociocultural	  terrain	  became	  murky	  as	  a	  range	  of	  debates	  and	  
attitudes	  proliferated,	  in	  particular	  what	  were	  conceived	  as	  more	  “conservative”	  discourses	  
around	   the	   future	   role	   of	   Islam	   in	   the	   country.	   Uncertain	   financing	   and	   a	   contentious	  
environment	  contributed	   to	  many	  historic	  organisations’	   sense	  of	  paralysis	  with	   regard	   to	  
their	   former	   activities	   in	   various	   communities	   across	   Tunisia.	   In	   addition,	   these	  
organisations	   were	   unaccustomed	   to	   competition	   for	   resources,	   having	   operated	   in	   a	  
relatively	   restricted	   public	   space	   under	   Ben	   Ali.	   Prior	   to	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   regime,	   this	  
space	  was	   largely	  modelled	  based	  on	  neoliberal	  policies	   that	  afforded	   legitimacy	   to	   these	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organisations	  as	  primarily	  cost-­‐effective	  providers	  of	  services.	  The	  consequence	  for	  many	  of	  
the	  historic	  civil	  society	  organisations	  would	  be	  their	  incapacity	  to	  engage	  in	  Tunisia’s	  post-­‐
uprising	   public	   spaces	   beyond	   the	   provision	   of	   social	   welfare	   services	   and	   support	   to	  
marginalised	  communities.	  	  
	  
More	   importantly,	   before	   2011	   the	   historic	   civil	   society	   organisations	   manoeuvred	   in	   a	  
relatively	   limited	   public	   space	   where	   the	   regime	   was	   intolerant	   to	   perceived	   opposition.	  
These	   organisations	   also	   operated	   during	   a	   time	   in	   which	   legal	   Islamist	   associations	   and	  
political	   Islam	  were	   restricted.	   They	   previously	   inhabited	   a	   space	   relatively	   isolated	   from	  
competing	   views	   and	   counter	   discourses.	   After	   January	   2011,	   some	   historic	   civil	   society	  
organisations,	  in	  particular	  those	  working	  with	  vulnerable	  communities,	  faced	  a	  dilemma	  as	  
they	   inadvertently	   continued	   to	   apply	   the	   same	   strategies	   discretion	   and	   invisibility	   they	  
used	  under	  Ben	  Ali	  while	  they	  waited	  for	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  post-­‐revolution	  topography	  to	  be	  
further	  revealed.	  As	  the	  newer	  organisations	  charged	  to	  the	  forefront	  to	  claim	  both	  old	  and	  
new	  spaces,	  the	  historic	  associations	  appeared	  to	  be	  at	  a	  clear	  disadvantage	  based	  in	  part	  
on	   the	   political	   residue	   they	   inherited.	   Accustomed	   to	   strategies	   of	   discretion	   and	  
negotiation,	  some	  understandably	  maintained	  caution	  as	  the	  customary	  modus	  operandi.	  	  	  
	  
And	   while	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   the	   newer	   organisations	   operated	   within	   a	   more	   fertile	  
expanding	  public	  space,	  some	  also	  began	  to	  encounter	   their	  own	  set	  of	  challenges.	  These	  
challenges	  were	  only	  compounded	  by	  fragile	  state	  infrastructure,	  a	  dwindling	  economy,	  and	  
political	   in-­‐fighting	  between	  the	  “liberal”	  and	  the	  “conservative”	  members	  of	  the	  National	  
Constituent	  Assembly.	  Civil	  society	  was	  also	  impacted	  by	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  the	  transition	  
period	   itself	   affecting	   some	   organisations’	   ability	   to	   mobilise	   resources	   from	   private,	  
regional,	  or	  international	  donors.	  More	  importantly,	  civil	  society	  organisations	  had	  to	  evolve	  
from	  a	  singular	  or	  insular	  focus	  on	  democratisation,	  in	  large	  part	  led	  by	  the	  euphoria	  of	  the	  
revolution,	   to	   more	   strategic	   longer-­‐term	   objectives	   for	   their	   activities.	   With	   many	  
organisations	  lacking	  in	  organisational	  experience	  and	  capacity,	  developing	  clear	  visions	  and	  
goals	   in	   a	   turbulent	   environment	   became	   problematic.	   In	   addition,	   similar	   to	   the	   historic	  
associations,	  some	  of	  the	  newer	  members	  of	  civil	  society	  situated	  a	  conflict	  between	  their	  
envisioned	   activities	   and	   mounting	   political	   as	   well	   as	   sociocultural	   “conservative”	  
discourses.	  Some	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  expressed	  resistance	  to	  emerging	  counter-­‐
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publics	  that	  were	  Islamist.	  Others	  reluctantly	  accepted	  that	  Tunisia’s	  widening	  public	  spaces	  
would	  be	  contentious	  with	  varied	  ideologies	  and	  perceptions	  of	  how	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia	  
could	  be	  modelled.	  	  
	  
Finally,	   the	  newer	   civil	   society	  organisations	   in	  particular	   exhibited	   the	   self-­‐determination	  
and	  self-­‐management	  agendas	  underscored	  by	  the	  new	  Latin	  American	  left	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  
1980s	  described	  in	  Chapter	  II.	  Moreover,	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  regime	  these	  actors	  
came	  to	  closely	  resemble	  the	  nature	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  understood	  by	  Gramsci.	  Civil	  society	  
emerged	  as	  an	  entity	  believing	  itself	  capable	  of	  restoring	  agency	  through	  self-­‐rule	  but	  also	  in	  
subverting	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  state.	  This	  was	  most	  evidenced	  in	  the	  materialisation	  of	  the	  
concept	   of	   citoyenneté	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   popular	   upsurges	   and	   social	   movements	   in	  
Eastern	   Europe	   and	   Latin	   America	   in	   the	   1980s.	   Some	   of	   these	   actors,	   consequently	   and	  
perhaps	   unwittingly,	   alluded	   to	   a	   civil	   society	   utopia	   free	   from	   the	   state	   following	   the	  
uprising,	  without	  necessarily	  acknowledging	  the	  limitations	  of	  a	  self-­‐determination	  agenda.	  
Alternatively,	   under	   Ben	  Ali	   in	   particular,	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   reflected	   a	  Hegelian	  
understanding	   in	   which	   the	   state	   was	   ultimately	   responsible	   for	   the	   ordering	   of	   the	  
disharmonies	  within	   civil	   society,	   and	  whereby	   these	   actors	  were	   reliant	   on	   the	   state	   for	  
their	   existence.	   Following	   the	   2010–2011	   uprising,	   the	   historic	   civil	   society	   organisations	  
carried	   with	   them	   the	   residue	   of	   decades	   of	   authoritarian	   rule,	   but	   perhaps	   more	  
importantly	   a	   neoliberal	   inheritance.	   Were	   the	   “illiberal”	   battles	   unfolding	   in	   Tunisia’s	  
expanding	  public	   spaces	  a	   result	  of	   the	   incompatibility	  between	   these	   two	  very	  disparate	  
ideological	  understandings	  and	  manifestations	  of	  civil	  society?	  
	  
The	   opening	   of	   space	   following	   the	   downfall	   of	   an	   authoritarian	   regime	   can	   create	   new	  
opportunities	  for	  participation	  in	  sociopolitical	  processes,	  as	  well	  as	  establish	  fresh	  priorities	  
as	  the	  state	  transitions	  to	  an	  uncertain	  something	  else.	  The	  landscape	  of	  the	  public	  space	  is	  
profoundly	   affected	   by	   three	   factors—the	   practices	   and	   nature	   of	   the	   state	   prior	   to	   the	  
expansion,	   the	   different	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	   inhabiting	   the	   spaces	   prior	   to	   the	  
downfall	  of	  the	  regime,	  and	  the	  new	  actors	  and	  organisations	  that	  emerge	  to	  fill	  the	  space	  
thereafter.	   In	   answer	   to	   the	   research	   question,	   conflict	   is	   manifested	   within	   civil	   society	  
when	   the	  public	   space	   suddenly	  widens	   to	   accommodate	  a	   vast	   range	  of	  new	  actors	   and	  
disparate,	  often	  competing,	   ideologies.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  Tunisia,	   this	  space	  opened	  following	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the	   amendments	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   association	   in	   early	   2011.	   However,	   the	   residue	   of	  
authoritarian	  rule	  left	  on	  the	  different	  webs	  of	  relationships	  forged	  throughout	  the	  former	  
regime	  significantly	  influenced	  how	  these	  actors	  responded	  to	  change—the	  disruption	  and	  
transformation	   brought	   by	   the	   transition.	   Having	   operated	   within	   relatively	   homogenous	  
and	   constricted	   public	   spaces	   before	   the	   uprising,	   the	   historic	   civil	   society	   actors	   in	  
particular	  found	  this	  new	  terrain	  unstable	  and	  uncertain.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  newer	  civil	  society	  
organisations	   not	   only	   had	   to	   establish	   nascent	   organisations	   but	   also	   decide	   where	   to	  
target	  their	  post-­‐revolution	  efforts—to	  service	  provision	  or	  democratisation—and	  consider	  
the	   nature	   of	   their	   relationship	   to	   the	   state.	   I	   argue	   here	   that	   there	   is	   a	   tumultuous	   but	  
definitive	   period	   following	   political	   liberalisation	   measures	   during	   which	   actors	   can	   take	  
maximum	   advantages	   of	   these	   expanding	   spaces,	   and	   where	   the	   field	   for	   discursive	  
contestation	  is	  at	  its	  widest.	  The	  consequence	  of	  these	  new	  and	  vast	  public	  spaces,	  and	  the	  
multiplicity	  of	  different	  conflicts	  which	  emerge,	  can	  result	  in	  an	  uncivil	  and	  illiberal	  jostling	  
of	   views,	   visions,	   and	   ideologies.	   These	   sites	   of	   contestation	   reveal	   a	   crowded	   terrain	   of	  
actors,	  but	  also	  give	  evidence	  that	  discursive	  contestation	  is	  indeed	  taking	  place.	  
	  
The	  next	  chapter	  examines	  the	  second	  core	  theme	  of	  the	  research	  concerning	  the	  emerging	  
sociocultural	  and	  socioreligious	  divisions,	   including	   the	   rise	  of	  associational	  or	   social	   Islam	  
following	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime	   in	   2011.	   Following	   the	   initial	   expansion	   in	  
Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces,	  disparate	  social	  divisions	  are	  made	  more	  apparent	  as	  the	  delineation	  
between	   “us”	   versus	   “them”	   becomes	  more	   embedded	   among	   the	   different	   civil	   society	  
actors	  and	  groups.	  Over	  the	  two	  years	  following	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising,	  further	  decisions	  were	  
made	  concerning	  which	  actors	  would	  be	   included	  and	  which	  would	  be	  excluded	  from	  civil	  
society.	  The	  emergence	  of	  varying	  understandings	  of	  Islam	  accompanied	  by	  a	  rise	  in	  Islamic	  
associations	   in	   Tunisia	   during	   this	   period	  would	   become	   a	   primary	   source	   of	   these	   social	  
divisions	  within	  civil	  society.	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Chapter	  V:	  Rising	  social	  division	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  social	  Islam	  
	  
	  
	  
They	  were	  nowhere	  and	  they	  were,	  in	  effect,	  forbidden	  to	  lead	  their	  lives	  and	  gain	  a	  living—
they	  could	  not	  be	  in	  the	  media	  and	  they	  could	  not	  be	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  they	  could	  not	  be	  
represented	  anywhere—they	  were	  only	  allowed	  in	  small	  commercial	  activities.	  Ben	  Ali	  
emptied	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  structures	  of	  the	  Islamists.	  
	  
-­‐-­‐Association	  member,	  Tunis478	  
	  
	  
In	   2013,	   two	   vocal	   critics	   of	   Ennahda,	   Chokri	   Belaid	   and	   Mohamed	   Brahmi,	   were	  
assassinated	  within	  the	  span	  of	  only	  a	  few	  months.	  Many	  Tunisians	  not	  only	  considered	  the	  
assassinations	  of	  the	  two	  men	  a	  direct	  attack	  on	  democratisation,	  but	  also	  a	  perceived	  re-­‐
manifestation	   of	   the	   residue	   of	   authoritarian	   rule.	   From	   the	   time	   of	   the	   democratic	  
elections	   in	   October	   2011	   to	   the	   murder	   of	   Belaid	   just	   over	   one	   year	   later,	   increasing	  
intolerance	  between	  secular	  and	  Islamist	  viewpoints	  could	  be	  perceived	  at	  the	  political	  and	  
sociocultural	   levels	   in	  post-­‐uprising	   Tunisia.	   The	  mounting	   tension	  between	   the	   two	   sides	  
gave	  the	   impression	  of	  a	  country	  mired	   in	  sociopolitical	   stagnation	   in	   the	  critical	  phase	  of	  
the	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  rule	  two	  years	  on.	  John	  Voll,	  alluding	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  one-­‐
party	   state	   in	   Algeria	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   and	   the	   secularist	   state	   of	   Habib	   Bourguiba	   in	  
Tunisia	   in	   the	   1980s,	   in	   a	   sense	   foretells	   the	   challenge	   once	   again	   facing	   the	   region.	   He	  
writes,	   “The	   crisis	   is	   not	   only	   one	   of	   trying	   to	   decide	   which	   group	   will	   control	   existing	  
structures;	  the	  battle	  is	  to	  decide	  which	  worldview	  will	  define	  the	  fundamental	  structures	  of	  
the	  social	  and	  political	  order.”479	  One	  outcome	  of	  the	  2010–2011	  Tunisia	  uprising	  was	  that	  a	  
multitude	  of	  unstable	  and	  reversible	  hegemonies	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  host	  of	  visible	  as	  well	  as	  less	  
perceptible	   publics	   and	   counter-­‐publics	   emerging	   to	   fill	   Tunisia’s	   new	   public	   spaces.	   The	  
different	   publics	   each	   sought	   to	   control	   the	   dominant	   discourse	   within	   these	   spaces	  
increasingly	  denoting	  a	  domain	  of	  marginalisation	  rather	  than	  inclusion	  and	  solidarity	  as	  the	  
term	  civil	  society	  belies.	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There	  were	  two	  simultaneously	  occurring	  processes	  leaving	  their	  mark	  on	  the	  sociopolitical	  
transformations	  following	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising.	  The	  first	  was	  a	  battle	  for	  political	  space	  and	  
control	  over	  hegemonic	  discourses	  as	  Tunisia	  endeavoured	   to	   re-­‐determine	   the	  nature	  of	  
the	  “modern”	  state	  after	  the	  revolution.	  This	  concerned	  questions	  of	  identity,	  religion,	  and	  
the	  Arab-­‐Muslim	  nature	  of	   the	  nation.480	  The	  second	  process,	  and	   the	  process	  with	  which	  
we	   are	   concerned	   here,	  was	   the	   battle	   emerging	   among	   secular	   and	   Islamist	   civil	   society	  
actors	  and	  groups.	  These	  battles	  mirrored	  the	  rivalries	  and	  divergences	  manifesting	   in	  the	  
political	  arena	  among	  Ennahda	  representatives,	  other	  members	  of	  the	  National	  Constituent	  
Assembly,	   and	   other	   oppositional	   political	   parties.	   The	   conflicts	   occurring	   among	   civil	  
society	   actors	   eventually	   revealed	   a	   constrained	   sociocultural	   imagination	   affected	   by	  
several	  decades	  of	   repression	   in	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces	  whereby	  a	  dedicated	  campaign	  to	  
tacitly	  shift	  public	  opinion	  against	   the	   Islamists	  was	  applied	  by	  the	  regime.	  These	  conflicts	  
also	   exposed	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   dual	   discourse	   in	   which	   civil	   society	   was	   discussed	   in	  
contrast	  to	  Islam	  in	  Tunisian	  society.	  Not	  long	  after	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising,	  the	  opening	  of	  
Tunisia’s	  symbolic	  and	  physical	  public	  spaces	  uncovered	  a	  multitude	  of	  different	  civil	  society	  
actors	  with	  disparate	  aims	  and	  priorities—some	  of	  these	  groups	  would	  embody	  the	  spirit	  of	  
volunteerism	   and	   citoyenneté,	   while	   others,	   including	   both	   secular	   and	   Islamist	   actors,	  
would	  demonstrate	  tendencies	  toward	  intolerance	  and	  exclusion	  in	  the	  name	  of	  democracy.	  	  
	  
This	   chapter	   examines	   the	   second	   core	   theme	   of	   the	   research,	   namely	   the	   emerging	  
sociocultural	  and	  socioreligious	  divisions,	   including	   the	   rise	  of	  associational	  or	   social	   Islam	  
following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  in	  2011.	  It	  analyses	  in	  more	  depth	  the	  emerging	  
conflicts	   and	   divisions	   between	   the	   secular	   and	   Islamist	   actors	   and	   groups	   to	   further	  
determine	   how	   conflict	   is	   manifested	   within	   and	   among	   civil	   society.	   Drawing	   on	   field	  
research,	   it	   continues	   to	  map	   the	   areas	  where	   this	   conflict	  materialises	   and	   analyses	   the	  
consequences	  of	  these	  contestations	  for	  both	  these	  actors	  as	  well	  as	  on	  democratisation	  in	  
Tunisia	  following	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising.	  Therefore,	  the	  chapter	  begins	  by	  briefly	  detailing	  
the	  emergence	  of	  Salafism	   in	  Tunisia	  and	  the	  historical	  approach	  of	   the	  Ben	  Ali	   regime	  to	  
Islamist	  opposition,	  namely	  the	  Mouvement	  de	  la	  Tendance	  Islamique	  (MTI)	  that	  eventually	  
evolved	   into	   the	   Ennahda	   party	   in	   1989.	   This	   context,	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   historical	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materials	   from	   Chapter	   III,	   demonstrates	   how	   over	   several	   decades	   the	   regime	  
endeavoured	   to	   detach	   Islam	   from	   the	   public	   imagination.	   Second,	   the	   chapter	   examines	  
the	   different	   civil	   society	   actors	   manoeuvring	   in	   Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces	   following	   the	  
uprising—for	  example,	   Islamists	  who	  were	  denied	   the	  opportunity	   to	  engage	   in	   legal	   civil	  
society	  organisations	  under	  Ben	  Ali	  who	  now	  chose	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  momentum	  of	  post-­‐
uprising	   Tunisia.	   Finally,	   it	   looks	   to	   the	   key	  matters	   of	   conflict	   and	   contestation	   between	  
Islamist	  and	  secular	  organisations,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  reactions	  from	  organisations	  operating	  
on	   the	  periphery	  with	  marginalised	  and	  vulnerable	   groups	   to	  new	  actors	   inhabiting	   these	  
spaces.	  	  
	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   demonstrate	   that	   civil	   society	   became	  more	   contentious	   and	   conflictual	  
following	  the	  initial	  expansion	  of	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces	  and	  during	  the	  two	  years	  following	  
the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  as	  a	  result	  of	  two	  core	  factors.	  First,	  civil	  society	  became	  
more	   divided	   during	   this	   period	   based	   on	   the	   sociopolitical	   residue	   it	   inherited	   from	   the	  
Bourguiba	   and	   Ben	   Ali	   regimes,	   during	   which	   civil	   society	   was	   both	   constructed	   in	  
opposition	   to	   Islam	   and	   operated	   in	   a	   relatively	   constrained	   public	   space	   for	   several	  
decades.	   Second,	   civil	   society	   became	  more	   contested	   across	   its	   different	   elements	   as	   a	  
rush	   of	   new	   actors	   filled	   the	   public	   space—these	   actors	   were	   secular	   and	   Islamist,	  
embodying	  often	  vastly	  different	  visions	  and	   ideologies	   for	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia.	  As	   the	  
stakes	  for	  shaping	  Tunisia’s	  national	  identity	  intensified,	  the	  conflicts	  within	  civil	  society	  not	  
only	  reinforced	  social	  divisions	  but	  also	  legitimised	  exclusions	  in	  the	  name	  of	  democracy.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
1.	  The	  making	  of	  a	  counter-­‐public	  
	  
In	  the	  run	  up	  to	  and	  following	  the	  social	  protests	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  in	  2010	  
and	   across	   2011,	   Islamists	   were	   not	   the	   primary	   force	   behind	   the	   demonstrations.	  
According	  to	  Jane	  Kinninmont,	  “They	  were	  not	  absent	  but	  rather	  constituted	  just	  a	  part	  of	  
the	   much	   broader	   social	   and	   political	   coalition	   that	   came	   onto	   the	   streets	   to	   demand	  
political	   change.” 481 	  Nevertheless,	   due	   to	   decades	   of	   visible	   and	   invisible	   political	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manoeuvring	   and	   organisation,	   Islamist	   organisations	   and	   political	   parties	   were	   able	   to	  
mobilise	  mass	   support	   in	   Tunisia	   to	   eventually	   gain	   the	   political	  majority	   in	   the	   elections	  
after	   the	  uprising.	  Historically	   the	  path	  of	  political	   Islam	   in	  Tunisia	  was	  met	  routinely	  with	  
contestation	  by	  the	  government.	  Accompanying	  each	  rise	  in	  public	  support	  for	  the	  Islamist	  
agenda	   was	   repression,	   including	   imprisonment,	   torture,	   exile,	   and	   a	   comprehensive	  
political	  campaign	  to	  turn	  public	  opinion	  against	  Islamists	  across	  different	  levels	  of	  society.	  
Aziz	  Al-­‐Azmeh	  explains	  that	  the	  eventual	  means	  by	  which	  the	  notion	  civil	  society	  was	  used	  
by	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  intelligentsia	  was	  related	  directly	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  Islamism.	  In	  Tunisia,	  
the	   notion	   of	   civil	   society	   increasingly	   became	   applied	   as	   an	   exclusionary	   term,	  which	   by	  
1989	   directly	   marginalised	   political	   Islam	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   it	   was	   “at	   variance	   with	  
national	  civil	  consensus.”482	  	  
	  
The	  revival	  of	  Islam	  in	  Tunisia	  
Subsequent	   to	   and	   perhaps	   in	   conjunction	   with	   post-­‐independence	   and	   pro-­‐nationalist	  
movements,	  Islamists	  movements	  began	  to	  play	  the	  principal	  oppositional	  role	  across	  North	  
Africa	   in	  Morocco,	  Tunisia,	  and	  Algeria.	   In	  each	  of	  these	  countries	   Islam	  represented	  what	  
Michael	   Willis	   considers	   “the	   most	   significant	   political	   challenge”	   the	   three	   regimes	  
encountered	  since	   independence	  given	  the	  ability	  of	   Islamist	  organisations	  to	  mobilise	  the	  
population,	   in	   particular	   marginalised	   and	   deprived	   groups,	   across	   each	   country.483	  Two	  
main	  factors	  account	  for	  the	  rise	  in	  popularity	  of	  Islam	  following	  independence	  movements	  
in	  North	  Africa.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  concurrent	  emergence	  of	  Salafiyyah	  or	  Salafi	  movements	  
in	   the	   nineteenth	   and	   twentieth	   centuries,	   with	   prominent	   Islamist	   thinkers	   such	   as	  
Mohammed	  Abdu	  visiting	  Algeria	  and	  Tunisia	  during	  this	  period.484	  Salafist	  ideas	  at	  the	  time	  
represented	  a	  return	  to	  the	  teachings	  of	  Islam	  to	  address	  European	  colonialism.	  Willis	  says	  
they	  “provided	  a	  vital	  ideological	  and	  organisational	  strand	  to	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  movement	  in	  
both	   countries.”485	  Furthermore,	   many	   of	   the	   Islamist	   movements	   in	   the	   Maghreb	   were	  
strongly	   influenced	  by	  the	  model	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  in	  Egypt.	  Salafi	  
movements	   rose	   in	   response	   to	   both	   external	   antagonism	   and	   perceived	   threats	   to	   local	  
culture	  and	  beliefs.486	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The	   second	   factor	   responsible	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   Islamist	   movements	   simultaneously	  
with	  post-­‐independence	  movements	  was	  the	  ambition	  and	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Bourguiba	  
regime	  sought	  to	  adopt	  and	  impose	  secular	  modernising	  reforms	  in	  Tunisia.	  While	  Islam	  was	  
established	  as	  the	  official	  state	  religion	  at	   independence	  in	  Tunisia,	  significant	  areas	  of	   life	  
were	  secularised	  during	  this	  period.	  Willis	  contends	  the	  state	  took	  control	  “over	  issues	  and	  
tasks	   that	   had	   traditionally	   been	   the	   preserve	   of	   independent	   religious	   institutions.”487	  
Moreover,	  Abdelbaki	  Hermassi	  analyses	  the	  situation	  as	  follows:	  
	  
Of	   all	   the	   Arab	   countries,	   Tunisia	   was	   unique	   in	   the	   public	   manner	   in	   which	   its	  
modernist	  elites	  attacked	   institutional	   Islam	  and	  dismantled	   its	  basic	   institutions	   in	  
the	  name	  of	  systematic	  social	  and	  cultural	  reform—the	  result	  was	  to	  dismantle	  the	  
whole	   old	   cultural	   order...accompanied	   by	   a	   very	   negative	   and	   contemptuous	  
position	  toward	  traditional	  Islam.488	  
	  
This	   position	   against	   Islam	   in	   the	   name	   of	   modernisation	   and	   political	   liberalisation	  
reinforced	   an	   entire	   movement	   dedicated	   to	   safeguarding	   Arab-­‐Muslim	   identity	   and	   the	  
stronghold	  of	  traditional	  Islamist	  institutions	  in	  Tunisia.	  	  
	  
The	  ambition	  of	  the	  government	  to	  rid	  the	  country	  of	  what	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  “radical”	  
Islam	  persisted	  throughout	  the	  Bourguiba	  and	  Ben	  Ali	  regimes	  both	  as	  a	  drive	  to	  uphold	  the	  
“modern”	   nation-­‐state	   based	   on	   secular	   values	   and	   to	   eliminate	   perceived	   political	  
opposition	   to	   the	   incumbent	   regime.	   At	   various	   points	   during	   the	   governance	   of	   both	  
regimes,	  the	  main	  Islamist	  party	  in	  Tunisia,	   le	  Mouvement	  de	  la	  Tendance	  Islamique	  (MTI),	  
which	  eventually	  evolved	  into	  Hizb	  Ennahda	  or	  the	  Renaissance	  Party,	  experienced	  political	  
openings	   with	   opportunities	   for	   more	   visibility,	   as	   well	   as	   contractions	   in	   the	   space	   to	  
manoeuvre	  in	  the	  political	  arena.	  The	  routine	  repression	  and	  exclusion	  of	  the	  Islamists	  from	  
most	   political	   and	   social	   domains	   in	   Tunisia	   over	   time	   led	   to	   a	   growing	   Islamist	   counter-­‐
public	   looking	   to	   restore	  human	  dignity,	   for	   redress	   to	  human	   rights	  abuses	   including	   the	  
routine	  torture	  and	  harassment	  of	  family	  members,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  to	  put	  forward	  
an	  alternative	  view	  for	  the	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisian	  state.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487	  Willis,	  Politics	  and	  Power,	  157.	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  As	  cited	  in	  Hamdi,	  The	  Politicisation	  of	  Islam,	  16.	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What	  existed	  for	  decades	  as	  a	  counter-­‐public	  with	  limited	  power	  soon	  began	  to	  emerge	  into	  
a	  group	  of	  heterogeneous	  actors	  looking	  to	  design	  and	  influence	  Tunisia’s	  national	  identity.	  
While	   the	   Bourguiba	   and	   Ben	   Ali	   regimes	   acted	   to	   remove	   Islam	   from	   the	   political	   and	  
sociocultural	   imagination,	   several	   formal	   and	   informal	   Islamist	   groups	   continued	   to	  
manoeuvre	  before	  2010.	  Haughbolle	  and	  Cavatorta	  describe	  a	  “religious	  awakening”	   from	  
even	  the	  early	  2000s	  in	  Tunisia	  during	  which	  a	  new	  identity	  model	  was	  being	  formed.	  This	  
model	  was,	  they	  write:	  
	  
A	   rejection	   of	   both	   Bourguiba’s,	   which	   excluded	   Islam	   from	   public	   life,	   whether	  
policymaking	  or	  regular	  communal	  prayer,	  and	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime’s,	  which	  seemed	  
to	   celebrate	   conspicuous	   consumption	   and	   corruption	   in	   the	   name	   of	  
progress....Crucially,	   pious	   Tunisians	   also	   became	  more	   involved	   in	   social	   activism,	  
which	   was	   perceived	   not	   only	   as	   a	   religious	   duty,	   but	   also	   as	   an	   ethical	   choice	  
implicitly	  condemning	  the	  regime	  as	  unethical.489	  
	  
Concurrently,	   Ennahda	   relocated	   its	   structure	   and	   leadership	   overseas.	   From	   this	   period,	  
the	   movement	   concentrated	   on	   maintaining	   the	   organisation,	   providing	   support	   to	   its	  
imprisoned	  members	   in	  Tunisia,	  and	  campaigning	   to	  underscore	  human	  rights	  abuses	  and	  
the	   lack	   of	   genuine	   democracy	   in	   Tunisia	   under	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime.	   The	  movement	   also	  
established	   social	  welfare	   networks,	   an	   internet	   site	   and	   satellite	   television	   channel.490	  In	  
addition,	   from	  the	   late	  1990s	   the	   television	  news	  network	  Al	   Jazeera	  went	   into	  operation	  
and	   featured	   a	   range	   of	   political	   opponents	   of	   existing	   Arab	   regimes,	   including	   Tunisian	  
dissidents.491 	  Achcar	   writes,	   “Millions	   of	   viewers	   saw,	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   the	   faces	   of	  
opponents	  of	  their	  governments	  who	  had	  been	  forced	  into	  exile.	  Some	  even	  learned	  for	  the	  
first	  time	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  these	  dissidents,	  their	  compatriots.”492	  This	  effectively	  allowed	  
groups	   such	   as	   Ennahda	   a	   political,	   as	   well	   as	   public,	   platform	   to	   promote	   their	   social	  
welfare	  and	  reform	  agendas.	  After	  the	  events	  of	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising	  these	  various	  networks	  
of	  Tunisian	  Islamist	  diaspora	  materialised	  to	  reveal	  a	  motivated	  group	  of	  actors	  seeking	  to	  
become	  more	   formally	   involved	   in	  Tunisia’s	   civil	   society.	  After	   the	  events	   from	  December	  
2010	  to	  January	  2011,	  this	  counter-­‐public	  acquired	  the	  freedom	  to	  emerge	  and	  claim	  new	  
spaces,	  albeit	  not	  without	  contestation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489	  Haugbolle	  and	  Cavatorta,	  “Beyond	  Ghannouchi.”	  
490	  Willis,	  Politics	  and	  Power,	  196.	  
491	  Achcar,	  The	  People	  Want,	  135–137.	  
492	  Ibid.,	  137.	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Islamist	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  faced	  a	  multitude	  of	  confrontations	  as	  several	  of	  the	  
former	   historic	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   newer	   associations	   were	   not	   necessarily	   open	   to	  
sharing	  Tunisia’s	  expanding	  public	  spaces.	  Bin	  ‘Isa	  al-­‐Dimni	  argues	  that	  secularists	  in	  fact	  had	  
instrumentalised	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  to	  forge	  an	  argument	  against	  Islamic	  society.493	  
Furthermore,	  as	  aforementioned,	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  was	  subsequently	  used	  across	  
the	  two	  regimes	  as	  a	  weapon	  to	  exclude	  the	  Islamists	  in	  Tunisia.494	  	  
	  
After	   the	   Islamist	   party	   Ennahda	   gained	   the	   post-­‐election	   majority	   in	   the	   National	  
Constituent	  Assembly	   through	  the	  Troika,	  Tunisians	  were	  also	  considering	  what	   role	   Islam	  
would	  play	   in	   its	   future	  political	  and	  sociocultural	   identity.	  The	  post-­‐revolution	  debates	   in	  
Tunisia	  were	  often	  polarised	  between	   the	   secular	   and	   Islamist	   factions	  of	   the	  population,	  
whereby	   the	   “middle	   ground”	   appeared	   to	   have	   evaporated.495	  Considerable	   academic	   as	  
well	   as	   media	   attention	   following	   the	   election	   in	   October	   2011	   was	   also	   devoted	   to	  
understanding	   the	   relationship	   (if	   any)	   between	   Ennahda	   and	   the	   Salafi	   movement	   in	  
Tunisia.496	  In	   an	   article	   entitled	   “The	   Terrorist	   Threat	   is	   Not	   High	   in	   Tunisia,	   but…,”	   a	  
professor	  of	   contemporary	  history	  argued	   that	  approximately	  50	  percent	  of	  Ennahda	  was	  
composed	   of	   the	  more	   conservative	   Salafist	   elements.497	  He	   wrote,	   “And	   this	   explains	   in	  
part	   the	   accusations	   of	   a	   double	   language	   which	   often	   surrounds	   Ennahda.”	   This	   and	  
subsequent	  articles	  such	  as	  “Que	  mijote	  Ennahda?”—what	   is	  Ennahda	  plotting,	  advocated	  
the	  need	  for	  Ennahda	  “to	  make	  clear	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  Salafis.”498	  Some	  members	  
of	   the	   public	   voiced	   concern	   through	   the	   media	   of	   a	   “silent	   complicity”	   between	   the	  
majority	  party	  Ennahda	  and	  the	  Salafis	  assumed	  by	  virtue	  of	  Ennahda’s	  silence	  on	  instances	  
of	  disorder	  and	  violence	  occurring	  after	  the	  uprisings	  (these	  specific	   instances	  are	  detailed	  
in	  Chapter	   IV).	  Mehrez	  Bensaid,	  who	  wrote	   about	   such	   issues	   in	   an	   article	   featured	   in	  La	  
Presse,	  stated:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493	  Al-­‐Dimni,	  Bin	  ‘Isa.	  1991.	  “Bahthan	  ‘an	  al-­‐majtama	  ‘al-­‐madani	  al-­‐manshud”	  (In	  Search	  of	  the	  Desired	  Civil	  
Society).	  Al-­‐mustaqbal	  al-­‐‘alim	  al-­‐islami	  1,	  no.4:	  225–37	  in	  Browers,	  Democracy	  and	  Civil	  Society,	  131.	  
494	  Zghal,	  A	  (1992).	  “al-­‐Mujtama	  ‘al-­‐madani	  wa	  al-­‐sira	  min	  ajl	  al-­‐haymanat	  al-­‐iydiyulujiyya	  fi	  al-­‐maghrib	  al-­‐
‘arab”	  in	  al-­‐Mujtama	  ‘al-­‐madani	  fi	  al-­‐watan	  al-­‐‘arabi	  wa	  dawruhu	  fi	  tahqiq	  al-­‐dimuqratiyya,	  edited	  by	  Sa’id	  Bin	  
Sa’id,	  431–66	  cited	  in	  Browers,	  Democracy	  and	  Civil	  Society,	  131.	  
495	  Suleiman,	  “The	  Disintegrating	  Fabric	  of	  Tunisian	  Politics.”	  
496	  See	  El	  Amrani	  and	  Lindsey,	  “Tunisia	  Moves	  to	  the	  Next	  Stage,”	  and	  Ayeb,	  “Understanding	  the	  rise	  of	  
Tunisia’s	  Islamists.”	  See	  also	  Kinninmont,	  “The	  Next	  Fight	  will	  be	  Among	  the	  Islamists.”	  	  
497	  “La	  Menace	  Terroriste	  n’est	  pas	  Très	  Elevée	  en	  Tunisie,	  mais…”	  	  	  
498	  Nemlaghi,	  “Que	  Mijote	  Ennahdha?”	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It	   is	  necessary	  that	  the	  government	  take	  firm	  decisions	  and	  apply	  the	   law	  in	  a	  way	  
which	  dissuades	  those	  who	  want	  to	  bring	  harm	  to	  our	  identity.	  Liberty	  has	  its	  limits	  
and	  one	  should	  not	  be	  lax	  in	  the	  face	  of	  those	  who	  behave	  like	  brutes....We	  do	  not	  
need	  these	  apostles	  coming	  from	  elsewhere	  to	  sow	  confusion	  and	  to	  bring	  peril	   to	  
our	   union	   through	   their	   particular	   way	   of	   conceiving	   our	   tolerant	   religion.	   The	  
Tunisian	   society	   is	   horrified	   by	   extremes,	   ladies	   and	   gentlemen,	   our	   people	   are	  
moderate,	  and	  no	  one	  can	  deceive	  them.499	  
	  
In	   February	   2012,	   thousands	   of	   Salafis	   marched	   to	   protest	   the	   government’s	   negative	  
comments	   regarding	   a	   visit	   by	   the	   Egyptian	   Imam	   Wajdi	   Ghonaim,	   who	   reportedly	  
advocated	  the	  introduction	  of	  female	  excision;	  the	  Tunisian	  president	  at	  the	  time,	  Moncef	  
Marzouki,	   referred	   to	   the	   imam	   as	   a	   “microbe.”500	  The	   size	   of	   the	   protest	   signalled	   the	  
discernible	   presence	   of	   Salafis	   in	   Tunisia	   at	   the	   time. 501 	  In	   an	   article	   entitled	   “The	  
Turbulence	  of	  a	  Storm,”	  Albert	  Jacquard	  wrote:	  
	  
What	   are	   they	  waiting	   for?	  How	  much	   time	  must	   they	  wait	   to	   stop	   this	   infamous	  
masquerade,	   this	   spectacle	  of	   indignity	  and	  shame,	   this	  hideous	  cycle	   in	  which	  we	  
find	  ourselves?	  How	  many	  times	  must	  we	  wait,	  breathless	  and	  hoping	  for	  a	  word,	  a	  
declaration,	  a	  gesture,	  a	  clear	  position	  to	  be	  taken,	  without	  any	  ambiguity?	  For	  what	  
reason	  do	  they	  play	  deaf?...Why	  do	  all	  the	  actions	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  Salafis	  go	  and	  
remain	  without	  punishment?502	  
	  
The	  imagined	  (or	  real)	  complicity	  of	  Ennahda	  and	  the	  Salafis,	  alongside	  perceptions	  that	  acts	  
of	   violence	   were	   going	   unpunished,	   could	   as	   aforementioned	   be	   attributed	   to	   damaged	  
internal	   security	   systems	   and	   the	   judicial	   systems	   in	   Tunisia	   at	   the	   time,	   or	   the	   lack	   of	  
communication	   among	   its	   leadership	   and	  members	   (due	   to	   imprisonment	  or	   exile)	   in	   the	  
decades	   prior	   to	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   regime.	   Therefore,	   what	   was	   publicly	   perceived	   as	  
complicity	   could	   also	   be	   a	   consequence	   of	   weakened	   state	   institutions	   and	   nascent	  
communication	  platforms	   following	  over	   two	  decades	  of	  authoritarian	   rule	  and	  an	  abrupt	  
revolution	  in	  which	  many	  of	  these	  institutions	  were	  temporarily	  abandoned.	  
	  
Situating	  power:	  the	  manifestation	  of	  Salafism	  
By	   virtue	   of	   the	   perceived	   complicity	   on	   the	   part	   of	   Ennahda,	   there	  was	   a	   belief	   among	  
some	  that	  power	  was	  situated	  in	  a	  minority	  that	  was	  neither	  legally	  legitimate	  nor	  acting	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499	  Bensaid,	  “Le	  Gouvernement	  Progresse.”	  	  
500	  “Tunisie:	  Marzouki	  S’Excuse	  pour	  Avoir	  Traite	  Wajdi	  Ghanim	  de	  ‘Microbe.’”	  
501	  Baeder,	  “Controversial	  Cleric,	  Advocate	  of	  Female	  Genital	  Mutilation,”	  and	  “Le	  Predicateur	  Wajdi	  Ghonaiem	  
Annonce.”	  
502	  Jacquard,	  “Les	  Turbulences	  d’un	  Cyclone.	  ”	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behalf	  of	  the	  majority.	  However,	  this	  minority	  occupied	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  physical,	  
social,	   and	  media	   space	   in	   the	   two	  years	   following	   the	   revolution,	   and	   therefore	  perhaps	  
power	  was	  imagined	  in	  what	  was	  visible—the	  Salafis.	  Salafis	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  strict	  or	  
literalist	   adherence	   to	   and	   application	   of	   Sunnism	   and	   had	   become	   more	   present	   in	  
Tunisia’s	   symbolic	   and	  physical	   public	   spaces	   since	   the	  2010–2011	  uprising.	   From	   January	  
2011	  individuals	  were	  more	  perceptibly	  able	  to	  indicate	  which	  form	  of	  Islam	  they	  supported	  
through	   their	   dress	   and	   social	   behaviour.	   A	   more	   “visible”	   Islam	   could	   be	   observed	   in	  
increasing	   numbers	   of	   both	   younger	   and	   older	   men,	   often	   branded	   simply	   as	   “Salafis”	  
because	  they	  were	  wearing	  loose	  trousers	  and	  longer	  tops,	  accompanied	  by	  long	  beards.	  In	  
addition,	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  women	  were	  seen	  in	  the	  streets	  wearing	  the	  niqab	  and	  full	  
burqa.503 	  Members	   of	   the	   Francophone	   Tunisian	   press	   expressed	   alarm	   at	   these	   very	  
discernible	   forms	   of	   Islam	   they	   would	   now	   see	   in	   Tunisian	   everyday	   life.	   For	   example,	  
articles	  in	  two	  Tunisian	  journals—“To	  Those	  who	  still	  Persist	  on	  Wearing	  the	  Burqa,”504	  in	  Le	  
Temps,	  and	  one	  in	  La	  Presse,	  “The	  Rights	  of	  Women	  are	  a	  Red	  Line,”505	  which	  was	  written	  by	  
the	   Secretary	   General	   of	   the	   General	   Labour	   Union	   of	   Tunisia	   (UGTT)—underscored	   the	  
dangers	   of	   more	   conservative	   understandings	   of	   Islam	   to	   women’s	   rights.	   Evie	   Soli	   and	  
Fabio	  Merone	   cite	   blog	   reports	   in	  which	   some	  members	   of	   the	   secular	   parts	   of	   Tunisian	  
society	  expressed	  the	  belief	  that	  “Tunisia	  is	  not	  the	  same	  country	  as	  they	  once	  knew.”506	  
	  
Since	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising,	   Salafism	   had	   also	   become	   increasingly	   synonymous	   with	   the	  
rejection	   of	  modernity,	   violence,	   and	   extremism.	   For	   example,	   in	   an	   article	   entitled	   “The	  
Return	   of	   an	   Occupation	   not	   like	   the	   Others”	   the	   author	   wrote,	   “The	   Salafis	   recognise	  
neither	   negotiation	   nor	   mediation.	   They	   are	   adept	   at	   force...they	   derive	   their	   existence	  
through	   a	   rejection	   of	  modernity	   and	   the	   democratic	  matrix...and	   thus	   in	   the	   name	   of	   a	  
totalising	  religion,	  a	  process	  of	  the	  ‘Talibanisation’	  of	  our	  society	  has	  begun.”507	  In	  addition,	  
politically	  controversial	  decisions	  taken	  by	  Ennahda,	  such	  as	  the	  decision	  in	  February	  2012	  
to	   evict	   the	   Syrian	   ambassador	   from	   Tunisia,	   raised	   questions	   concerning	   Ennahda’s	  
relationship	   with	   the	   West,	   in	   particular	   with	   France,	   in	   influencing	   its	   post-­‐uprising	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503	  Gray,	  “Tunisia	  after	  the	  Uprising,”	  286.	  
504	  Khalfi,	  “A	  Celles	  qui	  s’Obstinent	  Encore	  a	  Porter	  la	  Burqa.	  ”	  
505Cheffi,	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  Soli	  and	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  Associative	  System.”	  
507	  Sayah,	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  sur	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  Occupation	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  Comme	  les	  Autres.”	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positions	  on	  key	  political	  matters.508	  Unfortunate	  however	  was	  the	  conflation	  among	  some	  
members	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  media	  between	  the	  myriad	  Islamist	  actors.	  Rarely	  did	  one	  hear	  
the	  distinction	  between	  various	  Salafis	  elements	  in	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia,	  when	  in	  fact	  this	  
was	  a	  remarkably	  heterogeneous	  group	  of	  organisations	  and	  individuals.509	  For	  example,	   it	  
is	   important	   to	   make	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   “scientific-­‐Salafis”	   and	   the	   “jihadis	  
Salafis,”	   whereby	   the	   former	   invest	   in	   associative	   activities	   with	   vulnerable	   communities	  
and	  seek	  to	  influence	  the	  political	  realm	  while	  the	  latter	  are	  more	  predicated	  upon	  armed	  
resistance	   against	   non-­‐Muslim	   military	   and	   political	   forces.510 	  It	   is	   estimated	   that	   the	  
number	   of	   either	   “scientific-­‐Salafis”	   or	   “jihadis	   Salafis”	   in	   Tunisia	   during	   this	   period	   was	  
approximately	  50,000;	  these	  individuals	  were	  not	  necessarily	  part	  of	  a	  formal	  organisation	  
or	   based	  within	   a	   political	   group.511	  It	   is	   however	  worth	   noting	   that	   two	  weeks	   after	   the	  
departure	   of	   Ben	   Ali,	   the	   interim	   government	   released	   prisoners	   incarcerated	   under	   the	  
anti-­‐terrorist	   law	   of	   2003;	   it	   was	   estimated	   that	   1,200	   Salafis—of	   whom	   300	   fought	   in	  
Afghanistan,	   Iraq,	   Yemen,	   or	   Somalia—were	   liberated	   at	   this	   time.	   Moreover,	   several	  
Tunisian	  Salafis	   imams	  (both	  scientific	  and	  jihadis)	  who	  had	  been	  living	  in	  Western	  Europe	  
during	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  returned	  to	  Tunisia	  after	  January	  2011.512	  
	  
It	   is	  also	  argued	  that	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  young	   Islamists	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  15	  and	  35	  
was	  emerging	  across	  Tunisia,	  composed	  of	  unemployed	  men	  who	  did	  not	  necessarily	  know	  
Ennahda	   but	   who	   saw	   themselves	   as	   participants	   in	   a	   resistance	   movement	   across	   the	  
region,	   alongside	   their	   Chechen,	   Iraqi,	   or	   Afghan	   counterparts.513	  However,	   it	   is	   worth	  
noting	  that	  while	  spectacular,	  the	  instances	  of	  violence	  attributed	  to	  Salafis	  in	  Tunisia	  from	  
2011–2013	  were	  of	  relatively	  low	  intensity.	  Overall,	  of	  the	  individuals	  harmed	  in	  the	  various	  
events,	  most	   casualties	  were	   among	   Salafis	   themselves	   (there	  were	   14	   Salafis	   casualties,	  
two	  of	  whom	  were	  as	  a	  result	  of	  hunger	  strikes).514	  And	  although	  these	  and	  similar	  acts	  of	  
violence	   raised	   important	   questions	   in	   Tunisia	   around	   the	   unauthorised	   circulation	   of	  
weapons	  and	   juvenile	  delinquency,	   Islamists	   and	   their	   Salafis	   counterparts	  were	   routinely	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509	  See	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  Crisis	  Group,	  “Tunisie:	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  et	  Défi	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510	  See	  Jebnoun,	  “Salafi	  Trouble	  in	  Tunisia’s	  Transition”	  and	  International	  Crisis	  Group	  “Tunisie:	  Violences	  et	  
Défi	  Salafiste,”	  9–10.	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  International	  Crisis	  Group,	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  Défi	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  Ibid.,	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blamed	  for	  a	  host	  of	  incivilities	  and	  wrongdoing	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  acts	  were	  politically,	  
religiously,	   or	   socially	   motivated.	   Often	   these	   acts	   served	   to	   underscore	   the	   governing	  
party’s	   inadequacy	   to	   rule	   rather	   than	   to	   advance	   genuine	   dialogue	   on	   democratic	   and	  
economic	   reforms.	   Despite	   the	   relatively	   small	   number	   of	   actual	   individuals	   practicing	  
Salafism	  either	  in	  political	  or	  public	  spaces,	  some	  Tunisians	  feared	  an	  “Islamic	  dictatorship”	  
was	   in	   the	  midst	  of	  being	   instated,	  and	  that	  potentially,	   real	  power	  could	  be	  exercised	  by	  
Salafis	  inside,	  as	  well	  as	  external	  to,	  Ennahda.	  	  
	  
It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   power	   was	   situated	   everywhere	   but	   within	   the	   party	   in	   the	  
government	   majority.	   This	   was	   further	   exacerbated	   by	   a	   perceived	   fragility	   of	   individual	  
members	   of	   Ennahda	   as	   many	   party	   members	   were	   known	   to	   have	   suffered	   extreme	  
physical	  and	  psychological	  torture	   in	  prison	  under	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.515	  Again,	  apart	  from	  
attributions	  of	   a	  moral	   legitimacy	   to	   govern,	   this	   perception	  by	   some	  of	   the	  weakness	  of	  
Ennahda	  suggested	  that	  power	  could	  be	  imagined	  elsewhere.	  Was	  real	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  
of	   those	   who	   were	   occupying	   Tunisia’s	   symbolic	   and	   physical	   public	   spaces	   such	   as	   the	  
institutions	  associated	  with	  the	  state?	  Was	  it	  situated	  in	  the	  democratically	  elected	  majority	  
of	  the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly?	  Or	  was	  this	  power	  most	  potent	  in	  an	  imagined	  form	  
entangled	   in	   rumour	   and	   myth-­‐making	   within	   greater	   society?	   A	   transition	   from	  
authoritarian	  rule	  can	  also	  be	  characterised	  by	  the	  rapidly	  shifting	  power	  relations	  between	  
state	   and	   society	   during	   this	   period—and	   the	   ultimate	   obscurity	   by	   which	   these	  
relationships	  are	  typified.	  	  
	  
Finally,	   Tunisia’s	   leaderless	   revolution	   highlighted	   common	   economic	   grievances	   such	   as	  
high	   rates	   of	   unemployment,	   low	   wages,	   high	   rates	   of	   inflation,	   and	   significant	   income	  
disparities	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  poor	  whereby	  the	  neoliberal	  architecture	  was	   in	  part	  
held	  responsible.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  revolution	  was	  promulgated	  by	  the	  stifled	  aspirations	  
of	  unemployed	  young	  people	  under	   the	  age	  of	   30	  as	  well	   as	  by	   the	   “left	  behinds”	  of	   the	  
northern	   interior	   regions	   of	   the	   country.516	  After	   the	  October	   2011	   elections,	   despite	   the	  
economic	   crisis	   having	  been	  a	  primary	   and	   foremost	   feature	  of	   the	  Tunisian	  uprising,	   the	  
interim	   government	  was	   reluctant	   to	   develop	   definitive	   policies	   on	   socioeconomic	   issues.	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  Succès	  Populaire	  en	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516	  Beinin	  and	  Vairel,	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  238	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This	  meant	  that	  two	  years	  after	  the	  revolution	  declining	  growth,	  growing	  inflation	  and	  food	  
prices	   continued	   to	   destabilise	   the	   economy.	   Inflation	   rose	   to	   6.5	   percent	   in	  March	   2013	  
and	   GDP	   growth	   flat-­‐lined	   in	   the	   first	   quarter	   of	   2013	   at	   2.7	   percent.517	  Furthermore,	  
following	   the	   October	   2011	   elections	   to	   the	   National	   Constituent	   Assembly,	   Tunisia	   was	  
governed	   through	   the	   Islamist-­‐secular	   coalition,	   the	   Troika. 518 	  Tasked	   with	   drafting	   a	  
constitution	  and	  forming	  an	  interim	  government	  until	  presidential	  elections	  could	  be	  held,	  
the	   National	   Constituent	   Assembly	   was	   destabilised	   by	   oppositional	   infighting	   and	  
prolonged	  negotiations.	  Hamadi	  Redissi	  argued	  through	  one	  of	  many	  of	  Tunisia’s	  new	  online	  
press	  sites,	  “All	  of	  a	  sudden,	  political	  life	  has	  become	  polarised.	  At	  the	  Assembly,	  the	  Troika	  
has	  imposed	  a	  ‘mini-­‐Constitution,’	  organising	  public	  powers	  until	  the	  next	  elections.…Hence,	  
the	  malaise:	  the	  Troika	  believes	  that	  it	  has	  been	  mandated	  to	  govern,	  while	  the	  opposition	  
continues	   to	   criticise	   its	   divisiveness.” 519 	  The	   assassinations	   of	   the	   two	   prominent	  
oppositional	   political	   figures,	   Chokri	   Belaid	   and	   Mohamed	   Brahmi,	   in	   2013	   served	   to	  
exacerbate	  the	  tensions	  between	  Tunisia’s	  secular	  parties	  and	  the	  Troika	  over	  the	  national	  
economic	   crisis	   and	   the	   emerging	   Salafist	  movement.	   One	   of	   the	   principal	   challenges	   for	  
Ennahda	  in	  the	  two	  years	  following	  the	  uprising	  was	  that	  it	  regularly	  found	  itself	  ensnared	  
between	  Salafis	  contestations	  and	  the	  secular	  opposition’s	  drive	  to	  accentuate	  the	  party’s	  
inability	   to	   govern.520	  Moreover,	   the	   growing	   divisions	   manifesting	   at	   the	   political	   level	  
reflected	   across	   to	   the	   emerging	   social	   divisions	   between	   the	   multitude	   of	   civil	   society	  
actors	  and	  groups	  manoeuvring	  in	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
2.	  Social	  Islam:	  claiming	  new	  spaces	  
	  
Thousands	  of	  new	  civil	  society	  organisations	  were	  established	  after	  January	  2011	  due	  to	  an	  
immediate	   expansion	   in	   the	   laws	   of	   association	   after	   the	   departure	   of	   Ben	   Ali	   following	  
decades	   of	   arbitrary	   repression	   and	   intimidation	   (directed	   at	   both	   secular	   and	   Islamic	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  Blibech,	  Driss,	  and	  Longo,	  “Citizenship	  in	  Post-­‐Awakening	  Tunisia,”	  
518	  Following	  the	  October	  2011	  elections,	  Ennahda	  formed	  a	  coalition	  with	  two	  secular	  parties—the	  Congress	  
for	  the	  Republic	  (29	  seats)	  and	  Ettakatol	  (20	  seats)—to	  secure	  a	  majority,	  creating	  what	  would	  come	  to	  be	  
known	  as	  the	  “Troika.”	  
519	  Redissi,	  “Tunisia:	  The	  Difficulties	  of	  the	  Coalition.”	  
520	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  “Tunisie:	  Violences	  et	  Défi	  Salafiste,”	  8.	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organisations)	   by	   the	   previous	   regime.	  While	   even	   two	   years	   after	   the	   revolution	   it	   is	   a	  
challenge	   to	   disaggregate	   the	   data	   on	   the	   orientations	   of	   the	   different	   registered	  
organisations,	   informants	   for	   the	   research	   cite	   that	   several	   hundred	   Islamist	   associations	  
were	  established	  from	  2011.	  Many	  of	  these	  organisations	  were	  charitable	  or	  humanitarian	  
organisations	  working	  in	  poverty	  alleviation	  directly	  with	  deprived	  communities.	  A	  number	  
of	   Islamist	  associations	  during	  this	  period	  were	  also	  educational	  and	  cultural;	  for	  example,	  
there	  existed	  a	  range	  of	  organisations	  providing	  classical	  Qur’anic	  education	  and	  literacy	  to	  
women	   in	  mosques	   across	   the	   country	   such	   as	   the	   Saheb	   Ettabaa	   Association	   of	   Islamic	  
Culture	  in	  Tunis,	  where	  I	  attended	  Qur’anic	  recitation	  lessons	  with	  my	  host	  family.	  Evie	  Soli	  
and	  Fabio	  Merone	  reflect	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
The	  opening	  of	  this	  social	  space	  was	  the	  chance	  for	  many	  new	  actors	  to	  come	  onto	  
the	   Tunisian	   scene.	   Tunisian	   classical	   social	   entrepreneurs,	   mostly	   secular	   and	  
western-­‐oriented,	  discovered	  that	  a	  large	  and	  highly	  motivated	  new	  group	  of	  actors	  
were	  now	  occupying	   a	   space	   in	   society,	   provoking	  widespread	   suspicion	   regarding	  
these	  organisations.521	  	  
	  
Soli	  and	  Merone	  contend	  that	  this	  new	  social	  activism	  developed	  through	  a	  “dual	  process	  of	  
internal	  and	  external	  networking”	  that	  allowed	  for	  these	  emerging	  organisations	  to	  nourish	  
a	   resource	   base	   to	   undertake	   this	   work	   in	   Tunisia’s	   expanding	   public	   spaces.522	  Many	   of	  
these	  actors	  and	  groups	  worked	  in	  deprived	  areas,	  operating	  at	  the	  local	   level	  to	  supplant	  
broken	   state	   systems.	   In	   the	   International	   Crisis	   Group	   report	   “Tunisie:	   Violences	   et	   Défi	  
Salafiste”	   it	  was	   reported	   that	  Salafist	  militias	   in	  particular	  became	  essential	   actors	   in	   the	  
economic	   life	   of	   post-­‐revolution	   Tunisia,	   providing	   academic	   support	   to	   young	   scholars,	  
conflict	   resolution	   between	   neighbours	   and	   help	   with	   local	   administrative	   problems.	   In	  
many	   villages	   and	   neglected	   urban	   areas	   these	   groups	   had	   “inserted”	   themselves	   in	   the	  
informal	  and	  underground	  economy.523	  
	  
Social	  activism	  and	  associational	  Islam	  in	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia	  
For	   the	   research	   I	   interviewed	   Dr	   Dema	   who,	   together	   with	   ten	   female	   colleagues	   and	  
friends,	  received	  their	  formal	  associational	  visa	  to	  establish	  the	  Islamic	  association	  Al-­‐Usra	  
al-­‐Amina	   (The	   Secure	   Family)	   in	   June	   2011.	   She	   perceived	   that	   for	   many	   years	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521	  Soli	  and	  Merone,	  “Tunisia:	  the	  Islamic	  Associative	  System,”	  1.	  	  
522	  Ibid.,	  3.	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  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  “Tunisie:	  Violences	  et	  Défi	  Salafiste,”	  ii.	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population	  in	  more	  deprived	  areas	  outside	  of	  Tunis	  lacked	  information	  on	  education,	  health,	  
and	   hygiene.	   She	   said	   because	   she	  was	   a	  medical	   doctor	   she	   liked	   helping	   individuals	   in	  
need.	   She	   remarked	   during	   the	   interview	   for	   the	   research,	   “During	   those	   years	  when	  we	  
were	   not	   free	   at	   all	   we	   could	   not	   start	   an	   association	   because	   everything	   had	   to	   pass	  
through	   the	   party,	   everything	   had	   to	   pass	   under	   ‘them’	   and	   in	   ‘their’	   name.	   We	   were	  
Islamists	  and	  so	  otherwise	  we	  were	  marginalised.	  We	  never	  tried	  to	  work	  under	  them.”524	  
The	   organisation	   worked	   during	   Ramadan	   and	   Eid	   to	   help	   poorer	   families	   with	   food,	  
clothing,	  and	  material	  support.	  Dr	  Dema	  and	  her	  colleagues	  also	  maintained	  their	  full-­‐time	  
roles	   in	   the	  medical	   profession.	   She	   eventually	   changed	   her	  work	   schedule	   to	   be	   able	   to	  
work	  earlier	  in	  the	  mornings	  to	  accommodate	  the	  organisation’s	  activities	  in	  the	  afternoons	  
and	   on	   weekends.	   She	   acknowledged	   that	   having	   never	   worked	   in	   a	   humanitarian	  
organisation	  she	  was	  relatively	  inexperienced,	  so	  with	  her	  friends	  and	  colleagues	  “they	  are	  
learning.”	  The	  association	  also	  relied	  on	  some	  60	  volunteers	  because	  they	  were	  dependent	  
on	  small	  local	  private	  donations	  from	  the	  community.	  
	  
A	   core	   part	   of	   the	   work	   of	   Al-­‐Usra	   al-­‐Amina	   focused	   on	   the	   family	   at	   the	   health	   and	  
psychosocial	   levels,	   such	   as	   on	   conflict	   resolution	   and	   issues	   for	   young	   people.	   Dr	   Dema	  
noted,	  “The	  areas	  outside	  Cap	  Bon	  are	  particularly	  poorer	  areas—just	  the	  infrastructure	  of	  
the	   houses,	   how	   people	   are	   living...absolutely	   catastrophic	   situations.”525	  The	   principal	  
activities	  of	   the	  organisation	  as	   set	  out	   in	   its	   constitution	  stipulated	   the	   following:	   to	  give	  
social,	  material,	  and	  educational	  aid	  to	  families;	  to	  educate	  stay-­‐at-­‐home	  women	  and	  heads	  
of	  household;	  to	  help	  prepare	  young	  women	  for	  their	  future	  role	  as	  mother	  and	  head	  of	  the	  
family;	   and	   to	  undertake	   sociocultural	   sanitation	  and	  environmental	   interventions.	  During	  
the	  interview	  with	  Dr	  Dema	  and	  eventually	  her	  other	  colleagues	  engaged	  in	  setting	  up	  their	  
own	  organisations,	  it	  became	  a	  challenge	  practically	  and	  conceptually	  to	  delineate	  precisely	  
what	   makes	   an	   association	   such	   as	   Al-­‐Usra	   al-­‐Amina	   Islamist	   and	   aforementioned	  
organisations	  such	  as	  Femmes	  et	  Citoyenneté,	  secular.	  They	  each	  carried	  out	  several	  of	  the	  
same	  activities	  in	  deprived	  communities	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  women,	  though	  it	  could	  
be	  argued	   the	   Islamic	  associations	  were	  employing	  a	   “moral	   value	   system”	  entrenched	   in	  
the	  core	  values	  of	  Islam.	  Furthermore,	  these	  organisations	  were	  considered	  Islamic	  because	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  Informant	  49:	  Founder	  and	  president,	  development	  and	  education	  association;	  Tunis,	  28	  Mar.	  2012.	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  Informant	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  development	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  education	  association;	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  Mar.	  2012.	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they	   relied	   on	   the	   application	   of	   different	   Islamic	   values,	   including	   zakat	   and	   religious	  
piety.526	  
	  
Dr	  Dema	  explained	  during	   the	   interview	   for	   the	   research	   that	  her	  understanding	  of	   Islam	  
was	  not	  just	  through	  the	  five	  pillars	  of	  ibadat	  (religious	  obligations)	  but	  also	  as	  a	  way	  of	  life.	  
Her	   commitment	   to	  working	  with	   deprived	   communities,	   she	   perceived,	   comes	   from	   her	  
religion.	  She	  explained,	  “We	  do	  this	  for	  God—Fee	  Sabeel	  Allah—or	  for	  the	  pleasure	  of	  God.	  
When	  we	  work	  as	  volunteers	  we	  do	  this	  for	  a	  moral	  satisfaction.	  We	  do	  not	  know	  why	  they	  
do	   it,	   but	   we	   know	   God	   will	   be	   very	   pleased	   with	   us.”527	  The	   notion	   of	   the	   “us”	   versus	  
“them”	  social	  divide	  was	  also	  underscored	  by	  another	   informant	  for	  the	  research,	  Najeeb,	  
who	   himself	   established	   his	   own	   civil	   society	   organisation	   after	   the	   uprising.	   He	   spoke	  
already	   of	   this	   divide	   between	   the	   activities	   and	   core	   target	   populations	   of	   the	   newer	  
associations.	   In	   his	   analysis,	   secular	   organisations	   were	   doing	   more	   information	   and	  
awareness-­‐raising	   meetings	   (concerning	   democratisation)	   and	   the	   Islamist	   organisations	  
were	  doing	  more	  “on-­‐the-­‐ground”	  work.	  He	  stated:	  
	  
The	  Islamist	  associations	  are	  much	  less	  visible	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  media,	  
and	   are	   engaging	   in	  work	   on	   the	   ground	   and	  more	   of	   a	   social-­‐focused	  work	  with	  
poorer	  populations,	  the	  unemployed,	  and	  they	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  are	  now	  occupying	  
the	  terrain	  with	  the	  people	  themselves....They	  are	  doing	  outreach	  work	  and	  gaining	  
the	  sympathy	  and	  favour	  of	  these	  populations.528	  
	  
However,	  during	  the	  research	  interview	  he	  contested	  the	  notion	  advocated	  by	  members	  of	  
the	  population	  who	  claimed	  these	  organisations	  “are	  buying	  the	  favour	  of	  the	  people.”	  He	  
also	  recognised	  that	  following	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising,	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  
society	  or	  al	  mujtama	  al-­‐madani,	  was	  called	  into	  question.	  He	  argued:	  
	  
This	  notion	  was	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  regime	  and	  was	  almost	  presented	  in	  opposition	  
to	   the	   Islamists	   and	   even	   this	   discourse	   on	   terrorism.	   This	   was	   on	   the	   side	   of	  
security,	   cultural,	   economic	   and	   social	   and	   they	   all	   came	   out	   (the	  media	   and	   the	  
administration)	  with	   this	   notion	  of	   civil	   society	   in	   opposition	   to	   all	   things	   religious	  
and	   religion	   (al-­‐mujtama	   al-­‐dini).	   But	   this	   was	   a	   political	   distinction	   between	  
politicians	  trying	  to	  draw	  a	  line	  under	  the	  state	  and	  religion....This	  in	  fact	  lasted	  over	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526	  Soli	  and	  Merone,	  “Tunisia:	  The	  Islamic	  Associative	  System,”	  1–4.	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  Informant	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  expert	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  and	  associational	  member;	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  6	  Mar.	  2012	  and	  
Mar.	  2013.	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twenty	   years	   and	  has	   definitely	  marked	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   population.	   This	   sense	   of	  
civil	  society	  was	  without	  religious	  organisations.	  The	  churches	  and	  the	  mosques	  are	  
civil	  society	  but	  whether	  or	  not	  people	  accept	  them	  is	  another	  question.529	  
	  
Najeeb,	   whose	   sister	   also	   founded	   an	   Islamist	   association,	   directly	   attributed	   the	   post-­‐
revolution	  polarisation	  between	   the	  secular	  and	   Islamist	  organisations	  currently	  operating	  
in	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces	  to	  decades	  of	  concerted	  repression	  under	  the	  Bourguiba	  and	  Ben	  
Ali	  regimes.	  He	  further	  explained:	  
	  
The	   Islamists	  and	  their	   ideology	  on	  politics	  was	  banned	  and	  all	  activities	  related	  to	  
the	  social,	  political,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  sphere	  in	  Tunisia	  were	  banned,	  and	  the	  
individuals	  involved	  were	  put	  in	  prison	  or	  exiled	  for	  more	  than	  20	  years—even	  under	  
Bourguiba.	  So	  in	  a	  way,	  how	  do	  you	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  well	  represented	  in	  societal	  
structures	  now?	  	  
	  
During	  the	  research	  interview,	  Najeeb	  expressed	  a	  clear	  sympathy	  with	  Ennahda,	  as	  well	  as	  
a	   significant	   admiration	   for	   the	   different	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	   emerging	   to	  
participate	  in	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces,	  and	  in	  which	  he	  was	  able	  to	  take	  part.	  Nevertheless,	  
he	   found	   one	   of	   the	   principal	   obstacles	   to	   democratisation	   and	   a	   critical	   element	  
responsible	   for	   exacerbating	   social	   divisions	   in	   post-­‐uprising	   Tunisia	   was	   the	   media.	   A	  
substantial	   proportion	   of	   the	   journalists	   operating	   during	   the	   Ben	  Ali	   regime	  were	   still	   in	  
their	   posts	   following	   the	   revolution	   and	   so	   there	  was	   a	   perception	   that	   these	   journalists	  
were	  not	  independent	  but	  were	  also	  continuing	  to	  encourage	  anti-­‐Islamist	  attitudes.	  Najeeb	  
contended,	  “Objectively	  the	  principle	  of	  defending	  and	  protecting	  the	  liberty	  of	  the	  press	  is	  
absolute	  but	  on	   the	  ground	  and	   in	   reality	   this	   is	   something	  else.”530	  He	  argued	   that	  many	  
members	   of	   Ennahda,	   some	   of	   whom	   spent	   more	   than	   15	   years	   in	   prison,	   suffered	  
enormously.	  However,	   now	   they	  believed	   that	   they	   are	   legitimate.	  His	  main	   concern	  was	  
that	  despite	  mass	  support	  for	  the	  party,	  the	  media	  were	  only	  willing	  to	  show	  the	  contrary.	  
This	  frustration	  with	  the	  media	  was	  also	  highlighted	  by	  another	  informant	  for	  the	  research,	  
Muammar,	   who	   founded	   an	   online	   media	   site	   after	   the	   revolution.	   He	   argued,	   “The	  
journalists’	   line	   during	   Ben	   Ali	   was	   ‘be	   afraid	   of	   the	   Islamists’	   and	   so	   far	   they	   are	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529	  Informant	  38:	  Senior	  expert	  on	  environment,	  bilateral	  and	  associational	  member;	  Tunis,	  6	  Mar.	  2012	  and	  
Mar.	  2013.	  
530	  Informant	  38:	  Senior	  expert	  on	  environment,	  bilateral	  and	  associational	  member;	  Tunis,	  6	  Mar.	  2012	  and	  
Mar.	  2013.	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covering	  the	  issues	  around	  the	  Salafis	  very	  objectively.	  This	  is	  a	  very	  biased	  press...it	  borders	  
on	  provocation!”531	  
	  
Dr	  Faiqa,	  who	  I	  interviewed	  for	  the	  research,	  also	  described	  the	  challenge	  of	  the	  media	  and	  
its	  residue	  from	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime,	   in	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia.	  A	  full-­‐time	  gynaecologist	   in	  
Tunis,	   she	  was	  working	   to	   create	   an	  organisation	   to	   support	   a	   freer	   (more	  pluralist	   view)	  
media	  whereby	  young	  people	  could	  become	  more	   involved.	  The	  activities	  would	   focus	  on	  
media	  training	  and	  sensitisation.	   I	  was	  put	   in	  contact	  with	  Dr	  Faiqa	  as	  she	  was	  also	   in	  the	  
process	  of	  establishing	  an	  Islamist	  association.	  She	  explained	  that	  under	  Ben	  Ali	  they	  did	  not	  
have	   a	   free	   media,	   and	   now	   they	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   transform	   the	   media	   into	   an	  
independent	   agent	   that	   “reflects	   the	   image	   of	   the	   revolution.”532	  Arguing	   that	   the	  media	  
had	  not	  changed	  since	  the	  revolution,	  she	  also	  believed	  the	  content	  of	  the	  various	  sources	  
of	  media	  did	  not	   reflect	   the	  ethics	  of	   Islam	  or	  humanitarian	  values.	  She	  stated	  during	   the	  
research	  interview:	  
	  
Islam	   should	   be	   in	   direct	   relation	   to	   the	   individual	   and	   guide	   him	   on	   the	   path	   to	  
citizen	  engagement	   (muwatana)....The	  Qur’an	   should	  be	  a	  part	  of	   life	  and	   through	  
rahman	   (compassion)	  everyone	  should	  find	  their	  place	  in	  society	  so	  that	  people	  do	  
not	   suffer	   and	   there	   is	   this	   equality,	   economic	   equality.	   Islam	   came	   to	   hold	   the	  
hands	  of	  the	  poor	  and	  to	  help	  them	  live	  in	  dignity.533	  
	  
Dr	   Faiqa	   also	   expressed	   during	   the	   interview	   a	   drive	   to	   embrace	   her	   citoyenneté	   and	   to	  
participate	   in	   civil	   society,	   something	   she	   argued	   she	   could	   never	   have	   done	   before	   the	  
revolution.	  She	  stated:	  
	  
Now	  we	  are	  free	  to	  act,	  totally	  free	  and	  have	  no	  constraints	  as	  before	  we	  could	  not	  
act.	  Before	  the	  revolution	  there	  were	  so	  few	  associations	  and	  even	  if	  we	  wanted	  to	  
act	   we	   could	   not....If	   you	   were	   not	   in	   the	   party	   [RCD],	   you	   were	   considered	   the	  
enemy....We	  were	  like	  animals,	  we	  worked,	  we	  ate,	  we	  slept,	  that	  is	  all.	  But	  now	  we	  
are	  on	  the	  horizon	  of	   liberty,	  to	  act,	  to	  say	  what	  we	  think,	  without	  fear	  of	  going	  to	  
prison.534	  
	  
The	  Islamist	  organisations	  quickly	  moved	  to	  participate	  in	  Tunisia’s	  expanding	  public	  spaces.	  
They	  were	  able	  to	   implement	  an	  approach	  alongside	  their	  programmes	  based	  on	  morality	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  Informant	  27:	  Co-­‐founder	  and	  journalist,	  English	  news	  website/media;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	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  Informant	  51:	  Co-­‐founder,	  association	  to	  support	  a	  free	  media;	  Tunis,	  2	  Apr.	  2012.	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  Informant	  51:	  Co-­‐founder,	  association	  to	  support	  a	  free	  media;	  Tunis,	  2	  Apr.	  2012.	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  to	  support	  a	  free	  media;	  Tunis,	  2	  Apr.	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and	   piety	   with	   deprived	   communities—a	   formal	   participation	   denied	   to	   them	   under	   the	  
former	   regimes.	  And	  while	   this	   space	  was	  open	   for	  a	   range	  of	  different	  activities,	  a	   sharp	  
social	   delineation	   could	   soon	   be	   perceived	   between	   the	   secular	   organisations	   and	   their	  
Islamist	   counterparts.	   The	   secular-­‐Islamist	   divisions	   within	   civil	   society	   in	   post-­‐revolution	  
Tunisia	  were	  aggravated	  due	  to	  a	  myriad	  of	  factors,	  with	  two	  noted	  herein.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  
former	   concerted	  efforts	   by	  both	   the	  Bourguiba	   and	  Ben	  Ali	   regimes	   to	   erase	   all	   political	  
opposition	   through	   targeted	   campaigns	  of	   repression,	  marginalisation	  and	  violence	  at	   the	  
political	   and	   sociocultural	   levels.	   The	   second	   was	   the	   role	   of	   the	   media,	   which	   arguably	  
played	   a	   part	   in	   reinforcing	   social	   divisions	   during	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   presidency	   and	   which,	  
following	  the	  uprising,	  continued	  to	  feed	  a	  secular	  moral	  panic	  concerning	  the	  ramifications	  
of	   an	   “Islamist	   revolution”	   as	   perceived	   in	   neighbouring	   Iran.	   Rather	   than	   exclusively	   a	  
domain	  of	  expanding	  opportunities	  and	  solidarity,	  civil	  society	  also	  became	  characterised	  by	  
growing	  social	  divisions	  alongside	  conflicting	  views	  regarding	  the	  transformation	  of	  Tunisian	  
national	  identity.	  
	  
Who	  is	  in	  and	  who	  is	  out:	  obscure	  actors	  and	  contested	  agendas	  
Following	   the	  2010–2011	  uprising,	  Tunisia’s	  public	   spaces	  were	   initially	  characterised	  by	  a	  
rapid	  expansion	  that,	  only	  two	  years	  later,	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  ambiguous	  as	  a	  result	  
of	   a	   multitude	   of	   hidden	   and	   uncertain	   priorities	   among	   some	   actors	   and	   groups.	   One	  
prominent	  example	   is	   the	  emergence	  of	   the	  organisation	   the	   League	  of	   the	  Protection	  of	  
the	  Revolution,	  legalised	  through	  Tunisia’s	  laws	  of	  association	  in	  June	  2011,	  whose	  primary	  
aim	  was	  for	  the	  “revolution	  to	  succeed.”535	  The	  members	  of	  the	  League(s)	  were	  Islamist	  and	  
some	  of	   the	  members	  were	   imprisoned	  under	  Ben	  Ali	   for	   their	   “Islamist	   sympathies”	  and	  
public	   critique	   of	   the	   former	   regime.	   Many	   of	   the	   members	   were	   also	   young	   and	  
unemployed,	  expressing	  a	  strong	  aversion	  to	  the	  secular	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  idealised	  under	  
the	  Ben	  Ali	  government.	  One	  of	  the	  members	  stated:	  
	  
Our	   objective	   is	   to	   completely	   dissolve	   the	   system	   created	   under	   Ben	   Ali,	   who	  
inflicted	   considerable	   suffering	   on	   young	   Tunisians....One	   day	   we	   will	   be	   able	   to	  
install	  an	   Islamic	  regime.	  But	   first,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  neutralise	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
RCD	  and	  to	  eliminate	  them.536	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  Auffray,	  “Ces	  Ligues	  qui	  Protègent	  La	  Révolution	  Tunisienne.”	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After	   2011,	   there	   were	   a	   number	   of	   different	   League	   committees	   across	   Tunisia,	   in	  
particular	   in	   the	   more	   deprived	   areas.	   In	   the	   different	   neighbourhoods	   where	   the	  
committees	   were	   active,	   they	   organised	   cultural	   demonstrations,	   participated	   in	   the	  
organisation	  of	  local	  elections	  (to	  replace	  mayoral	  posts),	  the	  collection	  of	  rubbish	  when	  the	  
civil	   servants	   were	   on	   strike,	   and	   financially	   supported	   poorer	   families;	   for	   example,	   a	  
member	  of	  the	  League	  reported	  that	  they	  give	  960	  families	  50	  euro	  per	  month.537	  
	  
Despite	  the	  League	  committees’	  support	  to	  deprived	  communities,	  there	  was	  a	  perception	  
among	  some	  groups	  that	  an	  organisation	  such	  as	  the	  League	  represented	  a	  more	  menacing	  
presence,	   capable	   of	   harassing	   and	   threatening	   the	   secular	   civil	   society	   organisations	  
operating	   in	   Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces—for	   example,	   those	  working	   to	  monitor	   the	   debates	  
and	  decisions	  of	  the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  follow-­‐up	  interview	  
with	  Najeeb	  one	   year	   after	   the	   initial	   field	   research,	   his	   enthusiasm	   for	   the	   dynamism	  of	  
Tunisia’s	   new	   and	   more	   heterogeneous	   civil	   society	   had	   diminished.	   In	   our	   previous	  
interview	   he	   was	   a	   keen	   supporter	   of	   Ennahda	   and	   had	   been	   able	   to	   establish	   and	  
participate	   in	   a	   range	   of	   different	   civil	   society	   organisations	   following	   the	   2010—2011	  
uprising.	  The	   increasing	  visibility	  of	   the	  conflicting	  aims	  and	  voices	  emerging	   in	   the	  public	  
space—in	   particular,	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   League	   committees	   onto	   this	   terrain—had	  
diminished	  his	  enthusiasm.	  He	  said:	  
	  
The	   largest	   period	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   associations	  was	   between	  March	   2011	  
and	  May	   2012....The	   second	   period	   was	   from	   the	   elections	   in	   October	   2011	   until	  
today,	   in	   which	   there	   appeared	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   association	   known	   as	   the	  
Committee	   for	   the	  Protection	  of	   the	  Revolution....They	  are	  a	  group	  of	  associations	  
which	   formed	   this	   committee	   to	   act	   in	   opposition	   to	   the	   Troika...and	   they	   are	   a	  
genuine	  problem	  today.	  This	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  has	  marked	  the	  year	  2012.538	  
	  	  
In	  2012	  and	  2013,	  The	  League	  had	  a	  considerable	  internet	  presence	  with	  a	  Facebook	  page	  
regularly	  featuring	  former	  RCD	  members,	  calling	  for	  their	  capture.	  Najeeb	  reported	  during	  
the	   research	   interview	   that	   the	   committees	   prevented	   certain	   political	   parties	   and	   civil	  
society	   organisations	   from	   engaging	   in	   their	   activities.	   The	   committees	  were	   reported	   to	  
interfere	   with	   and	   intimidate	   secular	   organisations	   from	   working	   in	   gender	   and	   human	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  Auffray,	  “Ces	  Ligues	  qui	  Protègent	  La	  Révolution	  Tunisienne.”	  
538	  Informant	  38:	  Senior	  expert	  on	  environment,	  bilateral	  and	  associational	  member;	  Tunis,	  6	  Mar.	  2012	  and	  
Mar.	  2013.	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rights,	   for	   example.	   The	   committees	   could	   prevent	   the	   associations	   from	  organising	   their	  
meetings	  and	  were	  alleged	  to	  have	  used	  threats	  and	  violence	  to	  propagate	  their	  messages	  
(such	   as	   in	  October	   2012,	  when	   one	   of	   their	   demonstrations	   resulted	   in	   the	   throwing	   of	  
Molotov	  cocktails).539	  The	  use	  of	  violence	  resulted	  in	  a	  number	  of	  actors	  and	  groups	  calling	  
for	  the	  formal	  dissolution	  of	  the	  League	  committees.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  committees	  were	  
linked	   to	  Ennahda,	  as	   they	  actively	   supported	   the	  party	   in	  public	  demonstrations,	   such	  as	  
calling	  for	  the	  government	  to	  “serrer	  la	  vis”	  (reign	  in	  or	  become	  tougher)	  on	  members	  of	  the	  
former	  regime.	  Ghannouchi	  was	  reported	  to	  have	  said,	  “The	  League	   [committees]	  are	   the	  
conscience	  of	   the	   revolution.”540	  Alongside	   the	   call	   for	   the	  dissolution	  of	   the	   committees,	  
there	  was	  a	  sentiment	  growing	  across	  the	  secular-­‐left	  members	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  former	  
Ennahda	  supporters	  that	  the	  committees	  were	  “protected	  by	  Ennahda	  as	  the	  justice	  system	  
does	  nothing	  to	  address	  their	  transgressions.”541	  	  
	  
Not	  only	  were	  the	  conflicts	  and	  cleavages	  between	  these	  different	  groups	  growing,	  but	  also,	  
as	  a	  consequence	  of	  political	   liberalisation	  measures,	  these	  contestations	  were	  now	  public	  
and	   visible.	   Coincidentally	   some	   of	   the	   different	   actors	   were	   applying	   some	   of	   the	   same	  
tactics	   of	   intimidation	   and	   harassment	   as	   the	   former	   authoritarian	   regime	   against	  
organisations	   whose	   aims	   and	   principles	   did	   not	   align	   with	   their	   own.	   Najeeb	   made	   the	  
following	  observations	  during	  the	  research	  interview:	  
	  
These	  committees	  form	  a	  part	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  legal	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  but	  they	  
have	  dominated	  and	  marked	  the	  events	  of	  the	  year.	  The	  committee	  mainly	  targets	  
the	  media	  and	  journalists,	  opposition	  parties,	  and	  civil	  society	  organisations	  that	  are	  
for	   the	   defence	   of	   human	   rights	   and	  women’s	   organisations.	   This	   has	  marked	   the	  
landscape	  of	  civil	  society	   in	  Tunisia.	  This	  shows	  that	  civil	  society	   is	  not	  all	  the	  same	  
colour	   and	   that	   it	   can	   always	   be	   infiltrated	  by	   political	   parties	   at	   the	  national	   and	  
international	   level,	   it	   is	   significant....We	   cannot	   speak	   of	   civil	   society	   without	   also	  
speaking	  of	  this	  phenomenon....What	  is	  perceptible	  now	  is	  that	  the	  associations	  with	  
the	  most	  liberty	  to	  act	  and	  to	  manoeuvre	  are	  the	  religious	  associations.542	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  Jebnoun,	  “Salafi	  Trouble	  in	  Tunisia’s	  Transition.”	  
540	  Auffray,	  “Ces	  Ligues	  qui	  Protègent	  La	  Révolution	  Tunisienne.”	  	  
541	  Informant	  38:	  Senior	  expert	  on	  environment,	  bilateral	  and	  associational	  member;	  Tunis,	  6	  Mar.	  2012	  and	  
Mar.	  2013.	  
542	  Informant	  38:	  Senior	  expert	  on	  environment,	  bilateral	  and	  associational	  member;	  Tunis,	  6	  Mar.	  2012	  and	  
Mar.	  2013.	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Some	   secular	   organisations	   actively	   sided	  with	   the	  Ben	  Ali	   regime	   in	   its	   efforts	   to	   deny	   a	  
proportion	   of	   the	   population	   the	   opportunity	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   political	   or	   sociocultural	  
landscape	   of	   Tunisia,	   such	   as	   the	   formal	   establishment	   of	   a	   civil	   society	   organisation.	  
Therefore,	  one	  must	  ask	  who	  the	  organisations	  considered	  as	  civil	  society	  represent	  and	  in	  
whose	   interest	   they	   are	   working.	   Abdelrahman	   and	   Fraser	   both	   echo	   and	   engage	   in	  
untangling	  the	  aims	  of	  civil	  society.	  Both	  writers	  distinctly	  recognise	  the	  inherent	  conflictual	  
nature	   of	   civil	   society	   as	  well	   as	   the	   pervasive	   tensions	   between	   “bourgeois”	   publics	   and	  
“other.”543	  Abdelrahman	  writes,	  “Civil	  society	  has	  become	  an	  arena	  for	  political	  conflict	  and	  
its	   organisations	  have	  been	   seized	  by	   representatives	  of	   contending	  political	   programmes	  
that	  often	  resort	  to	  violence	  and	  repression	  to	  suppress	  other	  groups	  within	  civil	  society.”544	  
Similarly,	  Fraser	  argues,	  “Thus,	  not	  only	  were	  there	  always	  a	  plurality	  of	  competing	  publics	  
but	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   bourgeois	   publics	   and	   the	   other	   publics	   were	   always	  
conflictual....The	   public	   sphere	   was	   always	   constituted	   by	   conflict.” 545 	  Abdelrahman	  
emphasises	   in	   particular,	   in	   her	   examination	   of	   the	   evolving	   notion	   of	   civil	   society	   in	   the	  
Egyptian	  context,	  that	  competition	  among	  these	  actors	  continues	  to	  be	  polarised	  between	  
the	   Islamists	   and	   the	   secular	   intellectuals.546	  She	   contends,	   “The	   rivalry	  between	   Islamists	  
and	   secularists	   has	   increasingly	   been	   expressed	   in	   the	   space	   provided	   by	   the	   newly	  
expanded	  organisations	  of	  civil	  society,	  for	  example,	  professional	  syndicates	  and	  NGOs.”547	  	  
	  
Arguing	   in	   a	   similar	   vein	   as	   Jane	   Mansbridge,	   Fraser	   asserted,	   “Subordinate	   groups	  
sometimes	  cannot	   find	  the	  right	  voice	  or	  words	   to	  express	   their	   thoughts,	  and	  when	  they	  
do,	  they	  discover	  they	  are	  not	  heard.	  [They]	  are	  silenced,	  encouraged	  to	  keep	  their	  wants	  
inchoate,	   and	  heard	   to	   say	   ‘yes’	  when	  what	   they	  have	   said	   is	   ‘no.’”548	  In	   discussions	  with	  
secular	  (self-­‐identified)	  organisations	  and	  multilateral	  donors,	  as	  well	   Islamist	  associations,	  
there	  was	  a	  prominent	  dual	  discourse	   significantly	   centred	  around	  an	   “us”	   versus	   “them”	  
perception.	  Fraser	  muses:	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  See	  Abdelrahman,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  ‘Uncivil’	  Society	  in	  Egypt,”	  21–35;	  Abdelrahman,	  Civil	  Society	  Exposed	  and	  
Fraser,	  “Rethinking	  the	  Public	  Sphere.”	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  Abdelrahman,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  ‘Uncivil’	  Society	  in	  Egypt,”	  21.	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  Fraser,	  “Rethinking	  the	  Public	  Sphere,”	  61.	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  Abdelrahman,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  ‘Uncivil’	  Society	  in	  Egypt,”	  25.	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  Ibid.,	  26.	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  Jane	  Mansbridge,	  “Feminism	  and	  Democracy,”	  The	  American	  Prospect,	  no.	  1	  (Spring	  1990)	  p.	  127	  in	  Fraser,	  
“Rethinking	  the	  Public	  Sphere,”	  64.	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We	   should	   question	   whether	   it	   is	   possible	   even	   in	   principle	   for	   interlocutors	   to	  
deliberate	   as	   if	   they	   were	   social	   peers	   in	   specially	   designated	   discursive	   arenas,	  
when	   these	   discursive	   arenas	   are	   situated	   in	   a	   larger	   societal	   context	   that	   is	  
pervaded	  by	  structural	  relations	  of	  dominance	  and	  subordination.549	  
	  
Despite	   the	   conflicts	   and	   contentions	   between	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups,	   Fraser	  
underscores	  the	  value	  of	  these	  ongoing	  contestations,	  namely	  that	  multiple	  counter-­‐publics	  
actually	  allow	  for	  the	  eventual	  expansion	  of	  discursive	  spaces.	  She	  stipulates,	  “In	  principle,	  
assumptions	   that	  were	  previously	   exempt	   from	  contestation	  will	   now	  have	   to	  be	  publicly	  
argued	  out.	   In	  general,	   the	  proliferation	  of	  subaltern	  counter-­‐publics	  means	  a	  widening	  of	  
discursive	  contestation,	  and	  that	   is	  a	  good	  thing	   in	  stratified	  societies.”550	  Fraser	  perceives	  
this	   polarisation	   as	   one	   of	   the	   few	   effective	   means	   to	   expand	   the	   discursive	   arena—a	  
relatively	  isolated	  and	  uncontested	  space	  in	  Tunisia	  up	  until	  now.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
3.	  Contestation	  from	  the	  periphery:	  growing	  cleavages	  among	  civil	  society	  	  
	  
From	   2011—2013,	   the	   interactions	   between	   civil	   society	   groups	   and	   actors	   could	   be	  
characterised	  with	   instances	   of	   respectful	   tolerance	   as	   well	   as	   discursive	   dominance	   and	  
hostility	  with	  regard	  to	  perceptions	  of	  difference.	  As	  Tunisia’s	  public	  space	  grew	  into	  more	  
and	  more	  of	  a	  contested	  space,	  conflicts,	  competition,	  and	  contentions	  emerged	  between	  
not	   only	   the	   historic	   and	   newer	   actors	   within	   civil	   society,	   but	   also	   among	   secular	   and	  
Islamist	   associations	   (which	   cannot	   be	   homogenised	   into	   definitive	   factions).	   Through	   an	  
examination	   of	   the	   discursive	   content	   of	   some	   of	   the	   print	  media	   and	   interviews	   for	   the	  
research,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  observe	  how	  the	   language	   individuals	  adopted	  as	  they	  reasoned	  
together	  favoured	  one	  discourse	  and	  discouraged	  others.551	  This	  section	  looks	  more	  closely	  
to	   the	  polarised	   language	  of	   the	  different	   civil	   society	  actors	  and	  groups	   in	   the	   two	  years	  
following	   the	   revolution	   to	   further	  underscore	   the	   tensions	  and	   conflicts	  unfolding	  across	  
this	  terrain.	  It	  analyses	  the	  words	  of	  the	  secular	  organisations	  that	  at	  times	  were	  found	  to	  
contain	   reactionary	   sentiments	   and	   intolerance;	   it	   also	   looks	   to	   some	   of	   the	   Islamic	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  Fraser,	  “Rethinking	  the	  Public	  Sphere,”	  65.	  
550	  Ibid.,	  67.	  
551	  Ibid.,	  64.	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associations	   which,	   while	   adopting	   a	   similar	   “us”	   versus	   “them”	   discourse,	   arguably	  
considered	  themselves	  vital	  members	  of	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
The	  compatibility	  between	  civil	  society	  and	  Islam	  
In	  Abdelrahman’s	   research	   into	   further	  understanding	   the	  concept	  and	  application	  of	   civil	  
society	  within	  the	  Egyptian	  context,	  she	  exposes	  the	  degrees	  of	  violence	  and	  repression	  that	  
have	  been	  used	   to	   suppress	  other	   groups	  within	   civil	   society.	  Moreover,	   she	  underscores	  
the	  tendency	   in	  academic	   literature	  as	  well	  as	  the	  media	  to	  portray	   Islamist	  groups	  as	  the	  
only	  groups	  demonstrating	  intolerance	  for	  other	  political	  and	  sociocultural	  missions.552	  She	  
argues	  that	  “members	  of	  secular	  ‘liberal’	  associations	  have	  also	  shown	  extreme	  intolerance	  
to	  individuals	  and	  groups,	  usually	  Islamists,	  who	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  their	  political	  project.”553	  
Most	  poignantly,	  she	  advocates	  for	  a	  more	  precise	  empirical	  examination	  of	  the	  problems	  
within	  civil	  society	  itself	  and	  recognition	  of	  the	  “inherent	  contradictions”	  of	  this	  concept.554	  
As	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Egypt,	   by	   observing	   the	   interactions	   between	   these	   groups	   before	   and	  
after	  the	  2010–2011	  events	  in	  Tunisia,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  discern	  a	  similar	  intolerance	  among	  
the	  disparate	  actors	  manoeuvring	  in	  Tunisia’s	  expanding	  public	  spaces.	  Moreover,	  the	  post-­‐
revolution	   period	   itself	   highlights	   the	   intensity	   of	   these	   conflicts	   in	   the	   drive	   toward	  
democratisation.	  
	  
Soon	   after	   the	   elections	   to	   the	   National	   Constituent	   Assembly	   whereby	   the	   Islamist	  
Ennahda	   party	   ruled	   through	   the	   Troika,	   a	   moral	   panic	   quickly	   set	   into	   a	   significant	  
proportion	  of	  the	  secular-­‐liberal	  factions	  of	  the	  population,	  particularly	  in	  Tunis.	  This	  moral	  
panic	  was	   reflected	   in	   some	  of	   the	  print	  and	   television	  media,	  and	  was	  manifested	   in	   the	  
nature	  and	  aims	  of	  the	  public	  demonstrations	  that	  took	  place	  from	  this	  period.	  The	  moral	  
panic	  fed	  on	  the	  perception	  that	  “radical”	  Islamic	  ideology	  and	  practice	  would	  soon	  acquire	  
a	   much	   more	   politicised	   role	   in	   Tunisian	   society.	  555	  Ambiguous	   political	   statements	   on	  
behalf	   of	   Ennahda,	   accompanied	   by	   a	   visibly	   changing	   sociocultural	   street	   environment,	  
aggravated	   these	   mounting	   fears	   among	   secular-­‐liberal	   populations.	   This	   anxiety	   equally	  
transferred	   across	   to	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	   where	   many	   of	   the	   historic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
552	  Abdelrahman,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  ‘Uncivil’	  Society	  in	  Egypt,”	  29.	  
553	  Ibid.	  
554	  Ibid.,	  23.	  
555	  Ajmi,	  “More	  Than	  4,000	  People	  Descend”	  and	  Noueihed,	  “Tunisian	  Protesters	  demand	  Islamic	  State.”	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organisations	   and	   newer	   organisations	   encountered	   uncertain	   terrain	   and	   unanswered	  
questions.	  Organisations	   that	  considered	  themselves	  members	  of	  civil	   society	  were	  asking	  
just	   how	   “civil”	   were	   the	   newer,	   Islamist	   associations	   that	   legally	   could	   acquire	   the	  
associational	   visa.	   Historic	   and	   newer	   organisations	   would	   come	   to	   share	   not	   only	   a	  
widening	  and	  ambiguous	  discursive	  space	  but	  also	  a	  very	  physical	  space	  (for	  example,	  both	  
secular	   and	   Islamist	   demonstrations	   were	   being	   organised	   on	   the	   same	   day	   in	   the	   same	  
place	   on	   a	   number	   of	   occasions).	  Moreover,	   some	   of	   the	   historic	   and	   the	   newer	   secular	  
organisations	  perceived	  actual	  danger	  of	  violence	  from	  Salafis	  factions	  that	  also	  emerged	  to	  
participate	  in	  this	  public	  space—some	  expressed	  feeling	  threatened,	  having	  been	  harassed,	  
and	   having	   faced	   uncomfortable	   confrontations. 556 	  Finally,	   the	   secular	   organisations	  
questioned	   the	   autonomy	  of	   the	   Islamist	   associations,	   namely	   from	  where	   and	   how	   they	  
acquired	  their	  funding	  to	  operate.	  	  
	  
There	   is	   often	   the	   argument	   that	   Islam	   and	   democracy	   are	   incompatible,	   and	  within	   this	  
linear	   trajectory	   that	   civil	   society	   and	   Islam	   therefore	   are	   equally	   incompatible.	   This	  
perception	   has	   relied	   over	   time	   on	   often	   unquestioned	   binaries	   including	  modern	   versus	  
traditional,	  West	   versus	   East,	   and	   liberal	   versus	   illiberal.	   For	   example,	  Michaelle	   Browers	  
explores	   in	  great	  depth	   the	   inherent	  challenge	  of	  exporting	   the	  concept	  of	  civil	   society	   to	  
Islamic	  societies,	  noting	  for	  example,	  “The	  path	  of	  the	  contemporary	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  civil	  
society	   alongside	   democracy	   is	   fraught	   with	   the	   talk	   of	   the	   ‘clash	   of	   civilizations.’”557	  
Furthermore,	   she	  highlights	  over	   time	  civil	   society’s	  conceptual	  manipulation	   to	   represent	  
that	  which	   is	   against	   Islamist	   society.	   She	   attempts	   to	   situate	  more	  precisely	   from	  where	  
this	  moral	  panic	  is	  derived	  by	  stating:	  	  
	  
The	   fear	   is	   that	   this	   Islam,	   once	   legitimated	   as	   the	   source	   of	   political	   and	   social	  
norms,	  will	  prove	  repressive	  for	  individual	  liberties,	  especially	  for	  non-­‐Muslims,	  non-­‐
practicing	   Muslims,	   Muslim	   minority	   groups,	   and	   Muslims	   with	   new	   or	   different	  
interpretations	  of	  their	  religion.	  Women	  from	  all	  of	  those	  categories	  also	  express	  a	  
particular	  concern	  about	  Islamic	  rule.558	  
	  
After	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  October	  2011	  elections	  would	  yield	  an	  Islamist	  majority	  in	  the	  
National	  Constituent	  Assembly,	  secular	  organisations	  questioned	  whether	  the	  principles	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
556	  See:	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  “Tunisie:	  Violences	  et	  Défi	  Salafiste,”	  2.	  
557	  Referring	  to	  Huntington	  (1996)	  in	  Browers,	  Democracy	  and	  Civil	  Society,	  6.	  
558	  Browers,	  Democracy	  and	  Civil	  Society,	  147.	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more	   radical	   Islam,	  or	   a	   strict	   adherence	   to	   Sharia,	  were	   compatible	  with	  democracy	  and	  
political	   liberalisation,	   including	   civil	   society.	  As	  between	  hundreds	  and	   thousands	  of	  new	  
organisations	   qualified	   for	   the	   associational	   visa	   in	   under	   two	   years,	   some	   associations	  
queried	   the	   nature	   and	   aims	   of	   the	   organisations	   perceived	   as	   Islamist	   with	   which	   they	  
shared	   this	   topography,	   such	  as	   the	  new	  network	  of	  over	  200	  nurseries	   run	  by	  women	   in	  
niqabs	  providing	  religious	  education	  to	  young	  children.559	  For	  example,	  an	  article	  featured	  in	  
Le	  Temps	   in	  2012	  expressed	  alarm	  at	   the	  numerous	   illegal	   “extreme	  Salafist”	  associations	  
being	  run	  across	  Tunisia.	  The	  article	  proposed,	  “It	  is	  also	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  authorities,	  
the	   media	   and	   all	   members	   of	   civil	   society,	   to	   battle	   against	   these	   phenomena	   and	   to	  
prevent	  above	  all,	  that	  the	  men	  of	  tomorrow	  become	  initiated	  in	  hate	  and	  violence.”560	  	  
	  
Distrust	  and	  division:	  conflicting	  aims	  and	  ideologies	  
For	  the	  research	  in	  Tunisia,	  I	   interviewed	  25	  individuals	  working	  with	  secular	  organisations	  
(historic	  and	  newer),	  three	  Islamic	  associations,	  and	  eight	  multilateral	  donors	  (either	  based	  
in	  Tunis	  or	  regional	  offices	  in	  Cairo).561	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  informants	  spoke	  to	  some	  degree	  
of	   a	   growing	   (perceived)	   secular-­‐Islamist	   divide	   and	   the	   consequences	   this	   could	   have	  on	  
Tunisia’s	   efforts	   toward	   democratisation.	   For	   example,	   I	   conducted	   a	   research	   interview	  
with	  Kader,	  an	  activist	  and	  outreach	  worker	  with	  key	  populations	  affected	  by	  HIV/AIDS	   in	  
Tunis.	  He	  expressed	  his	  concern	  as	  to	  how	  civil	  these	  newly	  created	  organisations	  would	  be:	  
	  
Do	  they	  have	  these	  civil	  and	  community-­‐based	  objectives?	  Some	  of	  the	  associations	  
are	  very	  open	  about	  promoting	  good	  morals	  with	  Islamic	  objectives,	  and	  many	  have	  
strong	   influences	   from	   Saudi	   Arabia.	   So	   just	   because	   we	   have	   this	   explosion	   in	  
associational	   activity,	   this	   does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	   it	   is	   civil,	   it	   could	  be	   just	   the	  
opposite.	  Anyone	  now	  can	  create	  an	  association	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  ask	  what	  are	  
they	  doing	  and	  how	  they	  are	  working—perhaps	  they	  are	  working	  to	  restrict	   liberty	  
and	  human	  rights?562	  
	  
Moreover,	   another	   informant	   for	   the	   research—Wail,	   a	   former	  human	   rights	   activist	  who	  
had	  been	  imprisoned	  four	  times	  under	  Ben	  Ali—also	  highlighted	  disbelief	  among	  some	  civil	  
society	  actors	   that	   Islamists,	   in	  particular	   those	  perceived	  as	  Salafis,	  could	  have	  civil	  aims.	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  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  “Tunisie:	  Violences	  et	  Défi	  Salafiste,”	  15–16.	  
560	  Nemlaghi,	  “Associations	  et	  Embrigadement,”	  emphasis	  added.	  
561	  Some	  individuals	  interviewed	  for	  the	  research	  have	  not	  been	  included	  here	  either	  based	  on	  the	  limited	  
quality	  of	  the	  interview	  or	  because	  they	  could	  not	  be	  considered	  working	  with	  official	  associations.	  
562	  Informant	  26:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	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He	   argued,	   “The	   Salafis	   are	   active	   in	   the	   charity	   organisations	   and	   they	   actually	   do	   not	  
believe	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  other	  associations,	  nor	  do	  they	  believe	  in	  liberty.”563	  
	  
These	   expressions	   of	   distrust	   among	   some	   of	   the	   secular	   organisations	   also	   resonated	   in	  
their	  discomfort	  in	  having	  to	  share	  the	  expanding	  discursive,	  as	  well	  as	  very	  physical	  space,	  
with	   Islamists	   whose	   views	   and	   methods	   of	   civic	   activism	   were	   not	   always	   perceived	   as	  
respectful.	   These	  actors	   referred	   to	   the	   “space”	   in	  which	  multiple	   factions	   currently	  must	  
co-­‐exist.	  During	  the	  research	  interview	  with	  Muammar,	  a	  co-­‐founder	  of	  an	  English-­‐language	  
online	   news	   journal	   created	   immediately	   after	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising,	   he	   expressed	   how	  
quickly	   the	  nature	  of	   this	  discursive	  and	  physical	  public	   space	  was	  being	   transformed.	  He	  
observed,	  “Now	  there	  is	  this	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  Tunisians	  are	  seeing	  just	  how	  truly	  
conservative	   this	   society	   is.	  There	   is	  a	  very	  different	  kind	  of	  public	   space	  now	  opening	  up	  
and	  not	  everyone	   is	  happy	  about	   it;	  but	   it	   is	  a	  public	   space	  after	  all.”564	  Seventeen	  of	   the	  
twenty-­‐five	   secular-­‐liberal	   participants	   interviewed	   for	   the	   research	   expressed	   uneasiness	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  different	  actors	  emerging	  to	  participate	  in	  shaping	  Tunisia	  following	  the	  
downfall	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime,	   including	   the	   range	   of	   issues	   currently	   featuring	   in	   the	  
widening	   discursive	   space	   as	   well	   as	   the	   debates	   unfolding	   in	   the	   National	   Constituent	  
Assembly.565	  During	  the	  research	  interview	  Radi,	  a	  sociologist	  and	  lead	  researcher	  for	  many	  
of	   the	   HIV/AIDS-­‐related	   bio-­‐behavioural	   surveillance	   surveys	   conducted	   in	   Tunisia,	  
expressed	   his	   concern	   that	   the	   post-­‐revolution	   discursive	   arena	   was	   so	   immense.	   He	  
elaborated:	  
	  
Everything	   is	  permitted;	  however,	  the	  risks	  for	  me	  are	  the	  Salafis	  and	  violence.	  For	  
years	  we	  have	  not	  had	  some	  of	  the	  debates	  we	  are	  having	  now—everything	  is	  open	  
somehow	  for	  discussion—but	  what	  is	  interesting	  is	  that	  these	  are	  not	  discussions	  we	  
want	  to	  revisit,	  such	  as	  polygamy,	  abortion,	  or	  the	  death	  penalty—but	  all	  discussion	  
are	  being	  had	  now	  out	  in	  the	  open.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  pass	  through	  this	  phase	  (of	  the	  
transition	  to	  democracy).566	  
	  
On	  a	  number	  of	  occasions,	  for	  example	  on	  International	  Women’s	  day	  (8	  March	  2012),	  this	  
space	  was	  even	  physically	  contested	  when	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  approved	  permission	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563	  Informant	  41:	  Secretary	  general,	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  13	  Mar.	  2012.	  	  
564	  Informant	  27:	  Co-­‐founder	  and	  journalist,	  English	  news	  website/media;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	  
565	  Liberal	  associative	  informants	  no.	  18,	  21,	  23–26,	  30,	  32,	  36,	  37,	  38,	  40,	  41,	  42,	  45,	  47,	  and	  53.	  
566	  Informant	  30:	  Academic,	  HIV	  and	  gender;	  Tunis,	  7	  Feb.	  2012.	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two	   demonstrations	   occurring	   on	   the	   same	   day	   in	   the	   same	   area.	   Consequently,	   the	  
women’s	   demonstration	   calling	   for	   “equality	   and	   parity”	   coincided	   with	   the	   Salafis	  
demonstration	   calling	   for	   the	   implementation	  of	   Sharia	  principles	   in	   the	   constitution.567	  A	  
member	   of	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   women’s	   rights	   association	   claimed	   during	   the	   research	  
interview	  that	   it	  was	  not	  a	  mere	  coincidence.568	  While	   the	  actual	  number	  of	   incidences	  of	  
violence,	  in	  particular	  attributed	  to	  the	  Salafis,	  was	  small,	   it	  was	  argued	  that	  their	  capacity	  
to	   cause	   a	   “nuisance”	   was	   worrying,	   as	   was	   the	   past	   jihadi	   association	   of	   some	   of	   its	  
members.	   In	   May	   2012,	   the	   president	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   League	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (LTDH),	  
Abdessatar	   Ben	  Moussa,	   issued	   a	   statement	   on	   the	   35th	   anniversary	   of	   the	   organisation	  
stating	  that	  these	  groups	  (Salafis)	  propagate	  terror,	  “aggress	  physically	  and	  morally	  women,	  
intellectuals	  and	  journalists,	  …politicians	  and	  even	  human	  rights	  activists.”569	  This	  sentiment	  
was	   also	   shared	   by	  Naeema,	   an	   informant	   for	   the	   research	  working	   as	   a	  women’s	   rights	  
activist,	  who	  consequently	  encountered	  the	  heavy-­‐handed	  nature	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.	  She	  
expressed	  her	  frustration	  that	  the	  site	  of	  contestation	  for	  her	  activism	  has	  now	  shifted	  from	  
the	   former	   authoritarian	   regime	   to	   Salafis.	   She	   spoke	   of	   how	   after	   the	   revolution	   her	  
association	  organised	  an	  event	  to	  speak	  to	  and	  offer	  support	  to	  the	  victims	  of	  violence	  who	  
died	   during	   the	   revolution.	   She	   reported	   that	   “Ennahda”	   came	   to	   harass	   them	   so	   they	  
would	  leave,	  and	  then	  later	  articulated	  in	  the	  press	  that	  the	  organisation	  had	  been	  rejected	  
by	   the	  martyrs’	   families.	  She	  expressed	   frustration	   in	  her	   research	   interview,	  asserting	   for	  
example:	  
	  
We	  can	   in	  effect	  do	  all	   the	  activities	  we	  want	  which	   is	   great...but	  now	  we	  are	  not	  
alone,	  there	  are	  the	  Salafis.	  Now	  it	  is	  not	  the	  government,	  now	  it	  is	  the	  Salafis	  who	  
are	  trying	  to	  censure	  us—Ennahda	  and	  the	  Salafis	  who	  are	  against	  our	  association.	  
Their	   strategy	   is	   to	   largely	   discredit	   the	   associations	   working	   in	   women’s	   rights	  
through	   working	   through	   the	   media	   such	   as	   Facebook	   where	   they	   have	   set	   up	  
campaigns	  to	  defame	  and	  pass	  misinformation	  on	  our	  work.570	  
	  
During	  the	  interview	  with	  Wail,	  he	  also	  discussed	  this	  reluctance	  for	  the	  secular	  civil	  society	  
groups	  to	  share	  this	  previously	  uncontested	  space.	  He	  stated:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
567	  Goueset,	  “Les	  Droits	  des	  Femmes	  en	  Tunisie.”	  
568	  Informant	  42:	  Founder	  and	  secretary,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Mar.	  2012.	  	  
569	  Associated	  French	  Press,	  “Tunisie:	  Les	  Salafistes	  Multiplient	  les	  Coups	  d’Eclat.”	  
570	  Informant	  40:	  Director,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  12	  Mar.	  2012.	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The	  current	  regime	  [Ennahda]	  is	  not	  inclined	  to	  the	  Salafist	   ideology	  but	  the	  Salafis	  
are	  scaring	  the	  activists...because	  it	  is	  strongly	  believed	  that	  they	  are	  not	  just	  against	  
the	   liberties	   of	   women	   but	   of	   all.	   They	   are	   in	   conflict	   with	   democracy...and	   now	  
people	   are	   believing	   the	  worst...that	   they	   [Tunisia]	  will	   end	  up	   like	  Afghanistan	  or	  
Iraq.571	  
	  
Finally,	  there	  is	  an	  underlying	  suspicion	  of	  the	  aims	  and	  autonomy	  of	  some	  of	  the	  emerging	  
Islamist	   associations,	   in	   particular	   an	   assumption	   that	   they	   have	   either	   been	   created	   by	  
Ennahda	   as	   populist	   arms	   throughout	   the	  more	   deprived	   regions	   of	   Tunisia,	   or	   that	   their	  
aims	   are	   inherently	   political	   in	   nature.572	  In	   addition,	   despite	   the	   Islamist	   organisations	   I	  
interviewed	   admitting	   they	   were	   struggling	   to	   find	   the	   resources	   to	   implement	   their	  
activities,	  some	  secular	  groups	  suggested	  that	  not	  only	  did	  these	  associations	  have	  funding	  
from	   the	   wealthier	   Gulf	   Cooperation	   Council	   (GCC)	   countries,	   but	   ample	   resources	   to	  
affect/influence	  popular	  opinion	  especially	  in	  vulnerable	  communities.	  For	  example,	  Soli	  and	  
Merone	   argued,	   “This	   new	   scenario	   of	   associations	   started	   a	   debate	   on	   the	   nature	   of	  
influence	  coming	  from	  outside	  Tunisia.…Should	  the	  country	  really	  accept	  funding	  from	  other	  
countries	  such	  as	  Qatar—hardly	  known	  for	  respecting	  human	  rights	  or	  transparent	  criteria	  
of	   funding?”573	  While	   Islamic	   Relief	   and	  Qatar	   Charity	  were	   two	   principal	   donors	   in	   post-­‐
revolution	  Tunisia,	  alongside	  a	  range	  of	  Kuwaiti	  organisations	  and	  the	  International	  Islamic	  
Charity	  Organisation,	  these	  Islamic	  funding	  networks	  also	  span	  across	  the	  West	  such	  as	  the	  
United	   Kingdom	   (Manchester	   is	   home	   to	   the	   headquarters	   of	   two	   of	   the	   wealthiest	   and	  
influential	  Islamic	  associations),	  Turkey,	  and	  Germany.	  574	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   there	   was	   often	   a	   confusion	   regarding	   the	   participants’	   understanding	   of	  
whether	   civil	   society	   organisations	   should	   be	   political	   or	   apolitical	   organisations.	   This	  
conceptual	   conviction	   on	   the	   part	   of	   these	   actors	   seemed	   inconsistent	   given	   that	   a	  
significant	   proportion	   of	   their	   activities	   (human	   rights	   and	   HIV	   treatment	   advocacy,	   for	  
example)	   directly	   challenged	   the	   former	   government	   and	   advocated	   action	   of	   a	   political	  
nature.	   These	   disparate	   understandings	   of	   civil	   society	  were	   underscored	   in	   the	   research	  
interview	  with	  Soraya,	  a	  programme	  coordinator	  for	  one	  of	  the	  newer	  associations	  working	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
571	  Informant	  41:	  Secretary	  general,	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  13	  Mar.	  2013.	  
572	  See	  Soli	  and	  Merone,	  “Tunisia:	  The	  Islamic	  Associative	  System;”	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  “Tunisie:	  
Violences	  et	  Défi	  Salafiste;”	  and	  Gray,	  “Tunisia	  after	  the	  Uprising,”	  289.	  
573	  Soli	  and	  Merone,	  “Tunisia:	  The	  Islamic	  Associative	  System,”	  2.	  
574	  Ibid.,	  3–4.	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in	   women’s	   rights.	   She	   argued	   that	   deprived	   communities	   were	   being	   manipulated	  
following	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising	  as	  several	  hundred	  Islamist	  associations	  received	  money	  
from	  Ennahda	  (she	  reported	  that	  “a	  journalist”	  had	  cited	  826	  out	  of	  1,764	  associations	  were	  
Islamist).	   She	   stated,	   “This	   of	   course	   is	   a	   strategy	   of	   Ennahda	   to	   win	   the	   next	   elections	  
through	  these	  local	  associations	  [which]	  are	  consequently	  linked	  politically.”575	  Throughout	  
the	  course	  of	  the	  research,	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  was	  often	  taken	  as	  a	  given	  by	  many	  
of	  the	  research	  interviewees.	  Furthermore,	  there	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  an	  inclination	  on	  the	  
part	   of	   the	   actors	   with	   whom	   I	   spoke	   to	   explore	   this	   concept,	   its	   meaning	   and	   its	  
composition.	   In	   my	   attempts	   to	   further	   discern	   the	   understanding	   of	   this	   concept	   from	  
some	   of	   the	   research	   informants,	   my	   question	   was	   often	   met	   with	   furrowed	   brows	   or	  
indeterminate	  statements,	  such	  as	  from	  Soraya	  and	  her	  sister.	  They	  each	  exclaimed,	  “Civil	  
society	  is	  composed	  of	  citizens	  and	  associations,	  and	  not	  political	  parties	  with	  political	  aims.	  
They	  have	  to	  be	  independent	  from	  political	  parties.	  This	  cannot	  be	  a	  means	  for	  an	  end	  for	  
political	  parties	   to	  acquire	  more	  supporters.”576	  I	  not	  only	  observed	  different	  assumptions	  
concerning	   the	   definition	   of	   civil	   society	   among	   the	   associations,	   but	   equally	   from	  
international	  NGOs	  working	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  multilateral	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  UN.	  Some	  
of	   these	   actors	   were	   also	   not	   conscious	   that	   in	   their	   explanations	   of	   the	   definition	   or	  
composition	   of	   civil	   society	   they	   would	   exclude	   the	   Islamist	   associations	   in	   their	  
descriptions.	  For	  example,	  during	  the	  research	  interview	  with	  Dr	  Saqib,	  the	  director	  of	  one	  
of	  the	  newly	  established	  UN	  organisations	  based	  in	  Tunis,	  he	  stated:	  
	  
In	   a	   way	   some	   of	   the	   newer	   civil	   society	   organisations	   are	   trying	   to	   present	   a	  
different	  vision	  than	  the	  Islamists,	  in	  a	  way	  resisting	  this	  participation.	  There	  is	  a	  high	  
mobilisation	   towards	   a	   new	  political	   vision	   and	   this	   is	   a	   goal	   of	   the	   organisations.	  
Ennahda	  won	  with	   this	   strong	  social	  network	  and	   the	  distribution	  of	  aid	   to	  poorer	  
areas.	  Civil	  society	  is	  however	  focusing	  on	  the	  laicism	  of	  the	  state.577	  
	  
However,	   in	   the	   interview	  with	  Dr	  Dema,	  who	  established	  her	  own	   Islamist	  association	   to	  
support	   vulnerable	   families,	   she	   said	   that	   she	   believed	   that	   she	   and	   the	   work	   of	   her	  
association	  indeed	  formed	  part	  of	  civil	  society,	  stating:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575	  Informant	  47:	  Programme	  coordinator,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  22	  Mar.	  2012.	  
576	  Informant	  47:	  Programme	  coordinator,	  women’s	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  22	  Mar.	  2012.	  
577	  Informant	  34:	  Director,	  multilateral	  human	  rights	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  15	  Feb.	  2012.	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We	  are	  a	  part	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  our	  country	   is	  going	  through	  a	  very	  difficult	  period	  
and	  so	  therefore	  all	  associations	  need	  to	  be	  mobilised....We	  lived	  for	  years	  thinking	  
these	   things	   do	   not	   concern	   us	   and	   now	   we	   are	   trying	   to	   change	   this	   idea,	   our	  
country	  concerns	  all	  of	  us,	  one	  has	  to	  believe	  in	  what	  one	  can	  do	  for	  his	  country.578	  
	  
Despite	   some	  of	   the	   valuable	   services	   Islamist	  organisations	  provided,	   in	  particular	   at	   the	  
community	  level,	  this	  work	  was	  often	  met	  with	  suspicion	  and	  at	  times	  resistance	  on	  the	  part	  
of	   some	   of	   the	   secular	   actors.	   For	   example,	   during	   an	   interview	   conducted	   by	   the	  
International	  Crisis	  Group	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  Ansar	  al	  Sharia	  (the	  Islamist	  group	  eventually	  
blamed	  for	   the	  political	  assassinations	   in	  2013)	   invested	  considerably	   in	  providing	  support	  
to	   the	  victims	  of	   the	   floods	   in	   the	  North-­‐West	   region	  during	   the	  winter	  of	  2011–2012.	  An	  
imam	  in	  one	  of	  the	  more	  deprived	  areas	  of	  Tunisia	  remarked	  in	  an	  interview	  conducted	  by	  
the	   International	  Crisis	  Group,	  “The	  Salafis	  give	  money	   to	  children	   in	  hospitals,	   to	  widows	  
and	  orphans.	  They	  organise	  marriages,	  help	  to	  support	  the	  pilgrimage	  to	  Mecca,	  give	  money	  
to	  the	  poor	  during	  Ramadan	  and	  the	  secularists	  call	  them	  terrorists!”579	  
	  
	  
Conclusion	  
For	   many	   Tunisians	   unaccustomed	   to	   visible	   forms	   of	   politically	   motivated	   violence,	   the	  
assassinations	  of	  Belaid	  and	  Brahmi	   in	  2013	  came	  as	  a	  shock.	  Critics	  of	  Ennahda	   felt	   their	  
suspicions	  were	  being	  confirmed,	  that	  a	  new	  authoritarian	  regime	  could	  be	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
consolidating	   its	   power.	   This	   distrust	   directed	   at	   the	  new	   transition	   government	  was	   also	  
reflected	  onto	  the	  new	  actors,	  namely	  Islamists,	  emerging	  in	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces	  where	  
they	  would	  interact	  with	  a	  range	  of	  groups	  and	  organisations.	  Social	  Islam	  carved	  a	  space	  for	  
itself	   in	   post-­‐uprising	   Tunisia’s	   widening	   discursive	   arenas.	   Moreover,	   a	   host	   of	   Islamist	  
actors	   established	   legal	   civil	   society	   organisations	   to	   support	   deprived	   communities	   and	  
participate	  in	  the	  changing	  national	  landscape.	  Nevertheless,	  growing	  social	  divisions	  could	  
be	  perceived	  among	  the	  different	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  in	  the	  two	  years	  following	  
the	   downfall	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime.	   These	   cleavages	   manifested	   in	   particular	   between	  
secular	  and	  Islamist	  actors	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  the	  residue	  of	  authoritarian	  rule	  whereby	  civil	  
society	  was	   routinely	   constructed	   in	  opposition	   to	   Islam,	  as	  well	   as	   a	   consequence	  of	   the	  
multitude	   of	   actors	   and	   contrasting	   ideologies	   that	   quickly	   moved	   to	   inhabit	   these	   new	  
spaces.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578	  Informant	  49:	  Founder	  and	  president,	  development	  and	  education	  association;	  Tunis,	  28	  Mar.	  2012.	  
579	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  “Tunisie:	  Violences	  et	  Défi	  Salafiste,”	  19	  (in	  footnote	  103).	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Following	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising,	  civil	  society	  became	  more	  contested	  and	  conflictual	  between	  
its	   different	   actors	   and	   groups	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   number	   of	   factors.	   Historically	   both	   the	  
Bourguiba	  and	  Ben	  Ali	  regimes	  worked	  over	  several	  decades	  to	  remove	  political	  as	  well	  as	  
social	   Islam	   from	   the	   national	   imagination.	   This	  was	   carried	   out	   as	   an	   ambitious	   drive	   to	  
“modernise”	   the	   country	   based	   on	   principles	   of	   secularism	   and	   political	   liberalisation,	   as	  
well	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  consolidate	  state	   legitimacy	  through	  the	  elimination	  of	  opposition	  
and	  contestation	  to	  authoritarian	  rule.	  The	  promotion	  of	  the	  secular	  ideology	  also	  allowed	  
some	  members	  of	  civil	  society	  to	  perpetuate	  “Islamophobia,”	  thereby	  leaving	  limited	  room	  
in	  the	  national	   imagination	  for	  Islamist	  actors	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  Ultimately,	  decades	  of	  
repression	  and	  exclusion	   served	  as	  both	  a	  motivating	   factor	   for	   Islamists	   to	  participate	   in	  
Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces	   following	   the	   2010–2011	   uprising,	   but	   also	   as	   a	   delimiting	   factor	  
given	   ongoing	   contestations	   to	   this	   participation	   by	  many	   secular	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	  
groups.	  
	  
Islamists	  movements	   re-­‐emerged	  as	   some	  of	   the	  primary	   voices	  promoting	  an	  alternative	  
vision	  for	  Tunisia’s	  national	  identity.	  This	  was	  a	  result	  of	  the	  vigour	  with	  which	  both	  regimes	  
pursued	   secularisation,	   but	   also	   was	   a	   reaction	   to	   the	   extreme	   impiety	   and	   corruption	  
associated	  with	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.	  And	  while	  Islamist	  movements	  were	  not	  the	  main	  force	  
behind	   the	   events	   that	   began	   in	   December	   2010,	   their	   potential	   to	   mobilise	   mass	  
proportions	   of	   the	   population	   and	   to	   offer	   support	   to	   marginalised	   and	   deprived	  
communities	  across	  Tunisia	  in	  part	  allowed	  them	  to	  attain	  a	  majority	  following	  the	  elections	  
in	  October	  2011	  to	  the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly.	  Moreover,	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  political	  
Islam,	   there	   was	   also	   the	   concurrent	   rise	   in	   associative	   Islam	   where	   new,	   and	   often	  
unfamiliar,	  actors	  filled	  new	  spaces	  offered	  up	  in	  the	  expanding	  post-­‐revolution	  landscape.	  
Effectively,	   the	   denial	   of	   participation	   in	   civil	   society	   prior	   to	   2011	   eventually	   helped	   to	  
create	  the	  spaces	  for	  Islamist	  actors	  to	  establish	  associations	  and	  opportunities	  to	  embrace	  
their	   own	   sense	   of	  muwatana	   or	   citoyenneté	   subsequent	   to	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   former	  
regime.	  The	   result	  of	   this	  participation	  was	   the	  materialisation	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  unstable	  
and	   reversible	   hegemonies	   giving	   rise	   to	   a	   host	   of	   visible	   as	   well	   as	   invisible	   emerging	  
counter-­‐publics	   in	   Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces.	   For	   example,	   organisations	   such	   as	  Al-­‐Usra	   al-­‐
Amina	   seized	   the	   opportunity	   to	   more	   formally	   support	   deprived	   communities	   after	  
acquiring	  their	  associational	  visas	  in	  June	  2011.	  The	  members	  of	  the	  association	  focused	  on	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challenges	  for	  vulnerable	  families	  and	  young	  people,	  while	  working	  according	  to	  what	  they	  
felt	  was	  an	  Islamic	  moral	  value	  system.	  Al-­‐Usra	  al-­‐Amina	  and	  similar	  Islamist	  organisations	  
working	  in	  humanitarianism	  were	  able	  to	  use	  their	  participation	  in	  civil	  society	  as	  a	  means	  
to	  exercise	   their	  own	  sense	  of	  muwatana	   and	  national	  belonging	   in	  post-­‐uprising	  Tunisia.	  
Nevertheless,	  while	  providing	  support	  to	  deprived	  communities,	  some	  organisations	  such	  as	  
The	  League	  of	   the	  Protection	  of	   the	  Revolution	  also	  engaged	   in	  what	  could	  be	  considered	  
more	   subversive	   activities	   to	   disrupt	   Tunisia’s	   efforts	   toward	   democratisation.	   And	   while	  
organisations	  such	  as	  the	  League	  were	  legally	  established	  as	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  their	  
actions	   acted	   to	   exacerbate	   distrust	   and	   division	   between	   both	   secular	   and	   Islamist	  
organisations	  in	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces.	  	  	  
	  
This	   chapter	   analysed	   the	   second	   core	   theme	   of	   the	   thesis	   concerning	   the	   emerging	  
sociocultural	  and	  socioreligious	  divisions,	   including	  the	  rise	  of	  associational	  or	  social	   Islam,	  
following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  in	  2011.	  In	  particular	  it	  examined	  the	  growing	  
conflicts	   and	   cleavages	   among	   civil	   society,	   specifically	   between	   the	   secular	   and	   Islamist	  
actors.	  Following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  both	  the	  secular	  and	  the	  Islamist	  civil	  
society	   actors	   worked	   to	   repress	   contestation;	   at	   times	   these	   actors	   aggravated	   distrust	  
through	  exclusion,	   intimidation,	   and	   threats	  of	   violence.	  Moreover,	   as	   this	  had	  previously	  
been	   a	   relatively	   uncontested	   space	   composed	   of	   mainly	   secular	   organisations,	   the	  
consequence	   was	   a	   perceptible	   resistance,	   described	   here	   as	   well	   as	   in	   Chapter	   IV,	   to	  
expanding	   this	   space	   to	   include	   disparate	   and	   unfamiliar	   views.	   A	   limited	   sociocultural	  
imagination	  often	  excluded	  associative	  Islam;	  this	  permeated	  across	  the	  historic	  civil	  society	  
actors	  as	  well	  as	  the	  newer	  organisations,	  and	  equally	  across	  some	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  
donors	  providing	   support	   to	   these	  different	  organisations.	   This	   allowed	   for	   the	   increasing	  
emergence	  of	  a	  dual	  discourse	   in	  which	  civil	   society	  was	  discussed	   in	  contrast	   to	   Islam.	   In	  
the	  two	  years	  after	  the	  revolution,	  there	  were	  no	  clear	  winners	  or	  losers	  in	  Tunisia’s	  public	  
spaces,	   only	   what	   could	   be	   considered	   as	   the	   further	   exacerbation	   of	   social	   divisions	  
tempered	  by	  conflicting	  worldviews	  and	  agendas	  for	  post-­‐uprising	  Tunisia.	  	  
	  
Alongside	  Chapter	  IV,	  this	  chapter	  also	  emphasises	  the	  dual	  understandings	  of	  civil	  society	  
underpinning	   the	   actions	   and	   responses	   of	   the	   different	   actors.	   The	   secular	   civil	   society	  
organisations	  that	  were	  established	  during	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  emerged	  within	  the	  ideology	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of	  neoliberalism—operating	  within	  a	  more	  or	  less	  homogenous	  field	  of	  actors	  enshrined	  in	  
the	   liberal	   secular	   ideology.	  The	  actors	  who	  emerged	   to	  become	  members	  of	   civil	   society	  
following	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising	  more	  closely	  reflected	  a	  Gramscian	  understanding	  of	  the	  
concept	  and	  field	  of	  actors.	  Through	  the	  cultural,	  education,	  and	  religious	  institutions,	  civil	  
society	  was	  able	  not	  only	  to	  restore	  its	  sense	  of	  agency	  through	  self-­‐determination	  and	  self-­‐
management,	  but	  also	  to	  contest	  state	  power;	  at	  times	  these	  actors,	  such	  as	  the	  emerging	  
Salafi	   movement,	   even	   seemed	   capable	   of	   subverting	   this	   power.	   The	   Gramscian	  
contemporary	   understanding	   of	   the	   concept	   that	   emphasises	   agency,	   instability,	   and	   the	  
reversible	   nature	   of	   hegemony	   comes	   to	   stand	   in	   sharp	   opposition	   to	   the	   neoliberal	  
understanding	  in	  which	  the	  role	  ascribed	  for	  these	  actors	  is	  largely	  functionalist.	  I	  argue	  that	  
at	  the	  root	  of	  these	  social	  divisions	  and	  cleavages	  are	  also	  two	  simultaneously	  operating	  but	  
incompatible	  concepts	  of	  civil	  society	  influenced	  by	  the	  ideology	  of	  Communism	  on	  the	  one	  
hand	  and	  the	  ideology	  of	  neoliberalism	  on	  the	  other.	  	  
	  
The	  next	  chapter	  examines	   the	   final	   core	   theme	  of	   the	   research,	  namely	   the	  exclusionary	  
(and	   undemocratic)	   nature	   of	   consensus	   in	   “liberal”	   democracies.	   In	   setting	   out	   to	  
determine	   how	   conflict	   manifests	   among	   different	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups,	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	  trace	  and	  contrast	  the	  moments	  during	  which	  these	  conflicts	  are	  at	  their	  peak	  to	  
when	   they	   are	   gradually	   narrowed	   down	   based	   on	   the	   often	   exclusionary	   process	   of	  
consensus.	   This	   chapter	   continues	   to	   examine	   the	  multiple	   and	   competing	   priorities	   that	  
emerge	   following	   the	   downfall	   of	   an	   authoritarian	   regime,	   and	   in	   particular	   underscores	  
those	  voices	   left	  out	  when	  one	  regularly	   is	  cautioned	  “now	   is	  not	   the	   time”	  as	  a	   range	  of	  
mainstream	   as	   well	   as	   peripheral	   issues	   are	   presented	   for	   debate	   and	   discursive	  
contestation.	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Chapter	  VI.	  Consensus	  and	  marginalisation:	  the	  mapping	  of	  priorities	  in	  post-­‐
uprising	  Tunisia	  
	  
	  
	  
Do	  we	  need	  further	  strife	  because	  a	  very	  small	  minority	  expresses	  its	  perversion...not	  caring	  
about	  the	  feelings	  and	  the	  sacred	  beliefs	  of	  a	  majority?	  
	  
-­‐-­‐Samir	  El	  Wafi,	  Tunisian	  talk-­‐show	  host580	  
	  
	  
Before	  Ben	  Ali	  and	  after,	  I	  am	  not	  afraid	  to	  say	  what	  I	  think.	  
-­‐-­‐	  LGBT	  activist,	  Tunis581	  
	  
	  
Transitions	   from	   authoritarian	   rule	   often	   nourish	   expectations	   among	   a	   range	   of	  
stakeholders,	  from	  individuals	  to	  the	  international	  community,	  for	  an	  expansion	  of	  space	  for	  
political	  liberalisation,	  redistribution,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  recognition.	  Therefore,	  
it	  is	  often	  easy	  to	  overlook	  the	  groups	  and	  actors	  that	  find	  spaces	  contracting	  around	  them	  
as	  the	  priorities	  for	  democratisation	  are	  outlined	  and	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  concerns	  push	  certain	  
groups	  and	  issues	  to	  the	  periphery.	  This	  narrowing	  of	  spaces	  also	  underscores	  the	  complex	  
and	  unstable	  nature	  of	  democratisation	   itself.	   In	   the	  drive	   for	   consensus,	  one	  of	   the	  core	  
principles	  of	  democracy,	  issues	  perceived	  as	  contentious	  are	  often	  excluded	  in	  favour	  of	  less	  
controversial	  or	  more	  “acceptable”	  imaginings	  of	  a	  country’s	  national	  identity.	  In	  Agonistics,	  
Chantal	   Mouffe	   writes,	   “Every	   order	   is	   predicated	   upon	   the	   exclusion	   of	   other	  
possibilities.”582	  
	  
More	   recently,	   the	   issue	   of	   homosexuality	   has	   come	   to	   represent	   a	   benchmark	   for	  
“democratic”	   societies	   globally.	   The	   topic	   regularly	   rouses	   contention	   and	   sparks	   fierce	  
debate	   internationally	   on	   the	   role	   of	   identity	   politics,	   religion	   and	   sexuality,	   and	   the	  
international	   human	   rights	   agenda(s)	   tied	   to	   globalisation.	   In	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	   North	  
Africa	   homosexuality	   is	   a	   touchstone	   subject	   that	   continues	   to	   be	   the	   object	   of	   extreme	  
taboo	   in	   Arab	   societies.	   Throughout	   the	   region	   homosexual	   communities	   continue	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580	  Baeder,	  “Tunisian	  Human	  Rights	  Minister’s	  Remarks.”	  	  
581	  Informant	  25:	  Supervisor	  of	  peer	  educators	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  27	  Jan.	  2012,	  Nov.	  2012	  and	  14	  Mar.	  2013.	  
582	  Mouffe,	  Agonistics,	  2.	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experience	   substantial	   levels	   of	   discrimination	  and	   violence,	   often	   related	   to	   criminalising	  
policies	   situated	   at	   the	   political	   level	   or	   stigmatising	   sociocultural	   attitudes.	   However,	   a	  
transition	   from	   authoritarian	   rule	   can	   also	   signal	   new	   opportunities	   for	   sociopolitical	  
transformation—for	   communities	   of	   sexual	   minorities	   to	   openly	   advocate	   for	   legal	  
measures	  to	  support	  freedom	  from	  violence	  and	  discrimination,	  and	  for	  equal	  rights.	  	  
	  
For	  sexual	  minorities	  in	  many	  countries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  their	  concerns	  
in	   an	   increasingly	   conservative	   environment	   are	   often	   overshadowed	   when	   not	   made	  
discernible	   enough,	   and	  groups	   acting	   for/on	  behalf	   of	   homosexual	   communities,	   such	  as	  
HIV/AIDS	  organisations	   that	  work	  with	  marginalised	  populations,	  are	   routinely	  persecuted	  
when	  the	   line	  between	  discretion	  and	  visibility	   is	  crossed.	  Vulnerable	  groups,	   in	  particular	  
homosexual	  men,	  perceive	  and	  have	  also	  experienced	  increased	  degrees	  of	  marginalisation	  
since	  the	  2010	  to	  2011	  Tunisia	  uprising.	  As	  a	  specific	  case	  study,	  I	  follow	  the	  experiences	  of	  
some	   of	   the	   members	   of	   the	   homosexual	   community	   in	   Tunisia	   who	   established	   the	  
organisation	  Damj	  (“reintegration”)	  to	  more	  effectively	  defend	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  rights	  
of	   minorities,	   including	   lesbian,	   gays,	   bisexuals	   and	   transgender	   (LGBT)	   populations.	  
Through	   this	   case	   study,	   I	   further	   examine	  how	   conflict	   is	  manifested	   among	   civil	   society	  
groups	   and	   actors	   by	   looking	   to	   both	   the	   areas	   of	   these	   conflicts,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
consequences	  for	  these	  actors.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  analyse	  the	  third	  core	  theme	  of	  the	  thesis,	  
namely	  the	  exclusionary	  (and	  undemocratic)	  nature	  of	  consensus	   in	  “liberal”	  democracies.	  
The	   previous	   two	   chapters	   examine	   and	   illustrate	   Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces	   at	   their	   widest	  
following	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime,	   with	   the	  manifestation	   of	   a	   multiplicity	   of	  
visions	   and	   priorities	   for	   post-­‐uprising	   Tunisia.	   In	   the	   further	   mapping	   of	   democratic	  
priorities,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  observe	   in	   this	  chapter	  how	  these	  discursive	  spaces	  are	  at	   their	  
most	   expansive	   point	   following	   political	   liberalisation	   measures,	   and	   then	   are	   gradually	  
narrowed	  down.	   I	  argue	  that	  this	  discursive	  narrowing	   is	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	   fundamental	  
democratic	   practice:	   consensus.	   Following	   a	   transition	   from	   authoritarian	   rule,	   consensus	  
becomes	   a	   key	   mechanism	   to	   enforce	   hegemony	   as	   the	   post-­‐revolution	   hierarchy	   of	  
priorities	  is	  redefined	  and	  “other”	  is	  pushed	  to	  the	  periphery	  or	  negated	  entirely—or	  rather,	  
the	  notion	  of	  the	  hegemony	  of	  consensus.	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This	  chapter	  begins	  first	  with	  a	  theoretical	  exploration	  of	  the	  role	  of	  conflict	  and	  consensus	  
in	  liberal	  democracies	  and	  the	  notion,	  as	  understood	  by	  Mouffe,	  of	  “conflictual	  consensus.”	  
Once	  the	  exclusionary	  nature	  of	  consensus	  is	  further	  understood,	  I	  then	  situate	  the	  research	  
with	  sexual	  minorities	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  disparate	  objectives	  of	  LGBT	  communities.	  
This	  allows	  for	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  key	  debates	  as	  they	  relate	  to	   identity	  politics,	  namely	  
what	  these	  different	  movements	  aimed	  to	  achieve	  following	  the	  opening	  of	  Tunisia’s	  public	  
spaces	   in	   2011—whether	   they	   were	   for	   recognition,	   participation,	   equality,	   or	   freedom	  
from	  violence.	  The	  chapter	  then	  describes	  the	  advances	  different	  members	  of	  homosexual	  
communities	  made	  and	   the	  strategies	   they	  employed	   to	  manoeuvre	   in	  a	  highly	  contested	  
post-­‐revolution	  discursive	  environment.	  Finally,	   the	  chapter	  examines	  the	  core	  challenges,	  
areas	  of	  conflict	  and	  contestations	  communities	  of	  sexual	  minorities	  encountered	  in	  trying	  
to	  advance	  their	  objectives	  at	  the	  sociopolitical	  level.	  It	  emphasises	  the	  exclusionary	  nature	  
of	  consensus	  as	  the	  actors	  and	  groups	  within	  civil	  society	  marginalise	  contentious	  issues	  to	  
the	  periphery	  as	  they	  endeavour	  to	  win	  greater	  gains	  with	  the	  claim	  “now	  is	  not	  the	  time.”	  
It	   also	   highlights	   the	   dilemma	   that	   some	   vulnerable	   groups	   may	   experience	   greater	  
freedoms	  within	  secular-­‐authoritarian	  regimes	  than	  within	  democratic	  societies.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
1.	  Abandoning	  consensus,	  embracing	  dissent	  
	  
At	  the	  core	  of	  deliberations	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  conflict	  between	  and	  among	  civil	  society	  actors	  
is	   an	   underlying	   normative	   supposition	   that	   conflict	   is	   inherently	   destructive;	   more	  
importantly,	   that	   it	   can	   fundamentally	   obstruct	   efforts	   toward	   creating	  more	   democratic	  
and	  representative	  institutions.	  This	  normative	  frame	  is	  also	  inherent	  in	  neoliberal	  policies	  
that	   support	   civil	   society	   organisations	   as	   critical	   agents	   for	   good	   governance.	   The	  
preference	   for	   consensus	   over	   conflict	   among	   these	   different	   actors	   is	   implicit,	   as	  
democracy	   requires	   consensus	   on	   leadership,	   national	   priorities,	   and	   identity.	   Conflicts	  
among	  actors	  often	  characterised	  by	  solidarity,	  good	  will,	  and	  cooperation	  are	  perceived	  as	  
a	   negative	   consequence.	   However,	   in	  Agonistics,	  Mouffe	   advocates	   for	   a	   permanent	   role	  
and	  space	  for	  conflict.	  Mouffe’s	  aim	  is	  to	  re-­‐position	  conflict	  within	  democratic	  society	  while	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concurrently	  accepting	  the	  hegemonic	  nature	  of	  “every	  form	  of	  consensus.”583	  Although	  she	  
concentrates	   her	   argument	   on	   democracy	   and	   liberal	   theory,	   her	  main	   contribution	   is	   to	  
underscore	   the	   genuine	   limits	   of	   pluralism	   while	   scrutinising	   the	   two	   dimensions	   she	  
considers	  fundamental	  to	  politics:	  antagonism	  and	  hegemony.584	  She	  writes:	  
	  
What	   characterises	   democratic	   politics	   is	   the	   confrontation	   between	   conflicting	  
hegemonic	  projects,	  a	  confrontation	  with	  no	  possibility	  of	  final	  reconciliation....This	  
is	  what	  can	  be	  called	  “the	  moment	  of	  the	  political,”	  the	  recognition	  of	  constitutive	  
character	  of	  social	  division	  and	  the	  ineradicability	  of	  antagonism.585	  
	  
Mouffe	   delineates	   between	   agonistic	   and	   antagonistic	   forms	   of	   political	   confrontation	   in	  
which	  there	  can	  exist	   (or	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  exist)	  a	  permanent	  “conflictual	  consensus”	  
between	   adversaries.	   This	   can	   be	   achieved	   through	   conceptualising	   “radical	   negativity,”	  
which	  refers	  to	  the	  recognition	  that	  indeed	  there	  are	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  publics	  but	  that	  they	  
are	  also	  divided—and	  moreover,	   that	  one	  should	  abandon	  the	  notion	   that	   these	  divisions	  
can	   (or	   should)	   be	   overcome.586	  At	   the	   core	   of	   the	   argument	   against	   a	   predilection	   for	  
consensus	   is	  Mouffe’s	   conviction	   in	   the	   democratic	   framework	   despite	   her	   dissatisfaction	  
with	   the	   neoliberal	   architecture	   itself.	   It	   is	   in	   fact	   the	   neoliberal	   framework	   that	   has	   re-­‐
institutionalised	  the	  preference	  for	  consensus	  in	  political	  and	  public	  spaces	  above	  all	  else	  in	  
order	   to	   promote	   the	   virtues	   of	   democratic	   processes.	   Mouffe	   contends	   that	   this	  
overemphasis	  on	  popular	  consensus,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  actually	  exacerbates	  the	  exclusion	  of	  
marginalised	   views	   and	   “other.”	   In	   the	   Democratic	   Paradox,	   she	   argues,	   “Under	   the	  
pretence	   of	   rethinking	   and	   updating	   democratic	   demands,	   their	   calls	   for	   ‘modernization,’	  
‘flexibility’	  and	  ‘responsibility’	  disguise	  their	  refusal	  to	  consider	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  popular	  
sectors	  which	  are	  excluded	  from	  their	  political	  and	  societal	  priorities.	  Worse	  even,	  they	  are	  
rejected	  as	  ‘anti-­‐democratic’,	  ‘retrograde’...”587	  She	  underscores	  the	  negative	  consequences	  
of	  realising	  “rational	  consensus”	  and	  questions	  the	  underlying	  objectives	  of	  unanimity	  and	  
homogeneity	  inherent	  in	  democracy	  and	  liberalism.	  Mouffe	  also	  criticises	  the	  Habermasian	  
model	  of	  the	  “public	  sphere,”	  arguing	  not	  only	  in	  favour	  of	  pluralism	  but	  for	  the	  constitutive	  
potential	  it	  has.	  She	  writes:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
583	  Mouffe,	  Agonistics,	  xi	  and	  11.	  	  
584	  Ibid.,	  14.	  
585	  Ibid.,	  17–18.	  
586	  Ibid.,	  xii	  and	  xiv.	  
587	  Mouffe,	  The	  Democratic	  Paradox,	  6–7.	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Pluralism	   is	   not	  merely	   a	   fact,	   something	   that	   we	  must	   bear	   grudgingly	   or	   try	   to	  
reduce,	  but	  an	  axiological	  principle.	   It	   is	   taken	  to	  be	  constitutive	  at	   the	  conceptual	  
level	  of	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  modern	  democracy	  and	  considered	  as	  something	  that	  we	  
should	  celebrate	  and	  enhance.588	  	  
	  
Mouffe	  underscores	  not	  only	  the	  necessity	  to	  abandon	  the	  overall	  aspiration	  for	  consensus	  
without	  exclusion	   in	   the	  public	   space,	  but	   to	  also	  embrace	   the	  virtues	  of	  dissent,	   conflict,	  
and	  a	  plurality	  of	  hegemonies.	   She	  writes,	   “The	   search	   for	   a	   consensus	  without	  exclusion	  
and	  the	  hope	  for	  a	  perfectly	  reconciled	  and	  harmonious	  society	  have	  to	  be	  abandoned.”589	  
And	  while	  her	  contention	  is	  situated	  within	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  framework,	  
Mouffe	   is	   articulating	   something	   much	   grander	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   democratisation:	   that	  
democracy	   (and	   the	   institutions	   that	   are	   inherently	   linked	   to	   it)	   requires	   conflict.	   She	  
contends,	   “Conflict	   in	   liberal	   democratic	   societies	   cannot	   and	   should	   not	   be	   eradicated,	  
since	  the	  specificity	  of	  pluralist	  democracy	  is	  precisely	  the	  recognition	  and	  the	  legitimation	  
of	  conflict.”590	  Hence,	  by	  understanding	  the	  desire	  for	  consensus	  as	  a	  negative	  consequence	  
of	  hegemony,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  much	  more	  clearly	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  various	  conflicts	  and	  
contentions	   that	   emerge	   among	  and	  between	  different	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups,	   in	  
particular	   during	   periods	   where	   there	   are	   perceived	   opportunities	   to	   reshape	   national	  
identity.	   In	   mapping	   national	   priorities,	   exclusion	   and	   marginalisation	   become	   accepted	  
practice	   in	   both	   symbolic	   and	   physical	   public	   spaces.	   This	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   practices	   that	  
safeguard	   discursive	   arenas	   where	   conflicts	   and	   differences	   can	   be	   constructively	  
confronted.	  	  
	  
Finally,	   Mouffe	   engages	   with	   democratic	   theory	   and	   the	   tenets	   of	   liberalism	   in	   order	   to	  
advocate	   for	   the	   move	   away	   from	   aspirations	   for	   reconciliation,	   towards	   an	   “uncertain	  
something	   else”	   where	   relations	   of	   power	   are	   more	   fundamentally	   and	   explicitly	  
acknowledged—whereby	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  move	  toward	  something	  that	   is	  unstable,	  messy,	  
even	  at	  times	  troubling	  and	  chaotic,	  but	  which	  may	  also	  ultimately	  provide	  the	  institutions	  
associated	  with	   “liberal”	   democracy—including	   civil	   society,	   the	  most	   prolific	   opportunity	  
for	   the	  expression	  of	  genuine	  political	  pluralism.	  The	  next	  section	  examines	  how	  and	  why	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588	  Mouffe,	  The	  Democratic	  Paradox,	  19.	  
589	  Mouffe,	  Agonistics,	  xi.	  
590	  Ibid.,	  7.	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issues	   related	   to	   sexual	   identity	   and	   sexual	   minorities	   often	   manifest	   in	   public	   debates	  
during	   key	   moments	   of	   sociopolitical	   transformation.	   This	   concerns	   the	   simultaneous	  
emergence	  of	  movements	  seeking	  recognition	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  public	  spaces	  alongside	  
populist	  reactions,	  or	  moral	  panics,	  among	  both	  secular	  and	  non-­‐secular	  actors	  within	  and	  
outside	   these	   spaces.	   The	   overall	   question	   is	  whether	   there	   is	   a	   place	  within	   civil	   society	  
during	   transitions	   from	   authoritarian	   rule	   for	   the	   views	   and	   voices	   of	   marginalised	  
communities.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
2.	  Whose	  voice	  matters:	  situating	  the	  aims	  of	  sexual	  minorities	  	  
	  
After	  the	  Tunisia	  2010–2011	  uprising,	  the	  designation	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  concerns	  for	  the	  
transition	   from	  authoritarian	   rule	  was	   articulated	   and	   re-­‐articulated	   regularly	   in	   the	  drive	  
for	  consensus	  on	  national	  priorities.	  A	  principal	  feature	  of	  transitions	  is	  that	  the	  “rules	  of	  the	  
game”	  are	  no	  longer	  defined	  and	  therefore	  transitions	  from	  authoritarian	  rule	  can	  be	  highly	  
uncertain,	   if	   not	   volatile	   processes.591	  Although	   one	   has	   the	   impression	   of	   “disorder”592	  
during	   such	   periods,	   according	   to	   O’Donnell	   and	   Schmitter	   there	   is	   also	   “a	   context	   of	  
expanding	   (if	   uncertain)	   choices,	   of	   widespread	   (if	   often	   exaggerated)	   hopes,	   of	  
innumerable	   experiments	   towards	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   political	   arena,	   and	   of	   manifold	  
levels	  of	  social	  participation...the	  exultant	  feeling	  that	  the	  future	  is	  open...”593	  In	  relation	  to	  
post-­‐revolution	   Tunisia,	   the	   expansion	   of	   space	   provided	   by	   the	   transition	   was	   also	  
accompanied	  by	  a	  generalised	  perception	  of	  the	  “recovery	  of	  personal	  dignity”594	  as	  leaders	  
long	  considered	  morally	  bankrupt	  were	  ousted	  and	  new	  possibilities	  to	  rectify	  the	  residue	  of	  
corruption	   were	   on	   the	   horizon.	   An	   example	   of	   this	   is	   the	   Tunisian	   revolutionary	   slogan	  
calling	  for	  “work,	  freedom	  and	  dignity”	  as	  seen	  branded	  alongside	  posters	  featuring	  “irhal”	  
(“leave/get	  out”)	  and	  “the	  people	  want	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  regime!”595	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591	  O’Donnell	  and	  Schmitter,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Tentative	  Conclusions,	  6.	  
592	  Ibid.,	  4.	  
593	  Ibid.,	  19.	  
594	  Ibid.,	  52.	  
595	  Marzouki,	  “From	  People	  to	  Citizens	  in	  Tunisia.”	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Populist	   issues	   and	   rumour,	   however,	   can	   often	   obscure	   the	   ordering	   of	   priorities	  
subsequent	   to	   the	   downfall	   of	   an	   authoritarian	   regime.	   Such	   rumours	   and	   even	   myth-­‐
making	   can	   serve	   to	   exacerbate	  moral	   panics	   and	   scapegoat	   individuals	   and	   groups.	   The	  
choices	   that	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	   make,	   in	   particular	   marginalised	   groups,	   are	  
often	  predicated	  upon	  debates	  unfolding	  in	  the	  sociopolitical	  realm.	  In	  choosing	  strategies	  
that	   involve	  publicity	  and	  visibility	  versus	  strategies	   that	   require	  discretion	  and	   invisibility,	  
vulnerable	  groups,	  such	  as	  sexual	  minorities,	  must	  regularly	  gauge	  the	  terrain	  upon	  which	  
they	   are	   operating.	   During	   political	   transitions	   for	   example,	   it	   is	   not	   uncommon	   prior	   to	  
national	  elections	  to	  find	   issues	  concerning	  sex	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  sexual	  minorities	  high	  on	  
the	   agenda.	   Issues	   such	   as	   abortion	   and	   rights	   for	   homosexual	   communities	   regularly	  
feature	   in	   pre-­‐election	   debates,	   as	   they	   arouse	   emotions	   concerning	   family	   and	   the	  
imaginings	  of	  national	  identity;	  issues	  that	  are	  also	  accessible	  to	  constituents.	  Activists	  who	  
are	   looking	   to	   advocate	   for	   recognition,	   such	   as	   for	   greater	   rights	   and	   freedom	   from	  
discrimination,	  must	  routinely	  contend	  with	  moral	  panics	  and	  populist	  reactions.	  
	  
For	   example,	   following	   the	   2010–2011	   Tunisia	   uprising	   there	   was	   a	   rise	   in	   public	  
“conservative”	  or	   Islamist	  discourse(s)	  at	   the	  political	  and	  sociocultural	   levels.	  Perhaps	   for	  
the	  first	  time,	  Tunisians	  participated	  in	  a	  range	  of	  debates	  as	  all	  issues	  for	  contestation	  were	  
open;	   some	   of	   them	   were	   debates	   that	   many	   thought	   had	   been	   resolved	   following	  
independence	   in	   1956—such	   as	   temporary	   marriage,	   polygamy,	   the	   “problem”	   of	   single	  
mothers,	  abortion,	  and	  even	   female	  excision.596	  Sex	   in	  particular	  was	  back	  on	  the	  agenda.	  
Dennis	   Altman	   characterised	   sexuality	   as	   an	   area	   of	   “constant	   surveillance	   and	   control”	  
despite	   its	   inherent	   designation	   as	   that	   which	   is	   also	   “natural	   and	   private.”597	  Moreover,	  
Foucault	   situated	   the	   inter-­‐manipulation	   of	   sex	   and	   power—and	   in	   particular	   the	  
multiplication	  of	  discourses	  on	  sex—at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  eighteenth	  century	   in	  France,	  
when	   there	  “emerged	  a	  political,	  economic	  and	   technical	   incitement	   to	   talk	  about	  sex...in	  
the	   form	   of	   analysis,	   stocktaking,	   classification	   and	   specification.”598 	  From	   this	   period	  
multiple	   discourses	   began	   to	   increasingly	   delineate	   between	   “legitimate	   alliances”	   and	  
“illegitimate	   sexualities”	  where	   the	   “unnatural”	  materialised	   into	   an	   explicit	   dimension	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596	  See:	  Borsali,	  “Tunisie:	  8	  Mars	  2012	  ou	  le	  Défi	  Egalitaire;”	  Meziou-­‐Dourai,	  “A	  Propos	  du	  Mariage	  Coutumier;”	  
and	  Khalsi,	  “Excision...ou	  les	  Prédictions	  d’un	  Psychopathe.”	  
597	  Altman,	  Global	  Sex,	  2.	  
598	  Foucault,	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality,	  24.	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the	  analysis	  of	   sexuality.599	  For	  Foucault,	   an	  entire	   “sub-­‐race”	  came	   into	  view	   in	  which	  he	  
pinpoints,	   “The	   homosexual	   becomes	   a	   species.”600	  Within	   the	   French	   context,	   Foucault	  
endeavoured	   to	   understand,	   “Why	   has	   sexuality	   been	   so	   widely	   discussed	   and	  what	   has	  
been	  said	  about	  it?	  What	  were	  the	  effects	  of	  power	  generated	  by	  what	  was	  said?”601	  So	  in	  
effect,	   what	   was	   gained	   from	   new	   and	   emerging	   discourses	   on	   sexuality	   following	   the	  
downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  in	  Tunisia?	  And,	  who	  gained	  from	  speaking	  about	  them?	  	  
	  
Nowhere	   can	   these	   mechanisms	   of	   power	   and	   control	   be	   better	   observed	   than	   in	   the	  
emergence	   of	   the	   global	   HIV/AIDS	   epidemic	   in	   the	   early	   1980s,	  which	   afforded	   scientists	  
and	   government	   institutions	   great	   licence	   to	   monitor,	   map,	   and	   code	   “illegitimate	  
sexualities”	  throughout	  the	  world.	  Referring	  to	  these	  multiple	  apparatuses	  of	  power	  as	  the	  
“politics	  of	  AIDS,”	  Altman,	  along	  with	  Richard	  Parker,	  argues	  that	  HIV/AIDS	  has	  significantly	  
changed	   our	   understanding	   of	   human	   sexuality.602	  And	  while	   he	   posits	   that	   HIV/AIDS	   has	  
provided	   a	   global	   arena	   for	   more	   open	   discussions	   on	   sex	   and	   sexuality,	   it	   has	   also,	  
according	   to	   Altman,	   “required	   new	   ways	   of	   thinking	   about	   the	   links	   between	   ‘private’	  
behaviour	   and	  public	   health,	   and	   the	  often	  huge	  discrepancies	   between	  actual	   behaviour	  
and	  official	   ideology.”603	  Perhaps	   it	   is	   the	   conflation	  between	   the	   increasing	   identification	  
and	   categorisation	   of	   multiple	   “illegitimate	   sexualities”	   (as	   well	   as	   the	   systems	   and	  
institutions	   to	  analyse	  and	  police	   them)	  and	  political	  discourses	  on	  disease,	   the	   spread	  of	  
infection,	  and	  death	  that	  have	  in	  part	  led	  to	  “moral	  panics”	  at	  the	  sociocultural	  level	  and	  the	  
growing	  practice	  of	  what	  Altman	  considers	  the	  “scapegoating”	  of	  human	  sexualities.604	  	  
	  
Moral	   panics	   historically	   have	   often	   led	   to	   the	   adoption	   and	   justification	   of	   a	   number	   of	  
measures	   to	  halt	   the	   spread	  of	  disease	  and/or	   individuals	   identified	  as	   threats	   to	   society.	  
Altman	  argues,	  “‘moral	  panics’	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  both	  specific	  populist	  reactions,	  and	  as	  
calculated	   appeals	   by	   political	   and	   economic	   elites	   to	   these	   reactions	   as	  ways	   of	  winning	  
popular	   support	   for	   other	   political	   shifts.”605	  In	   post-­‐revolution	   Tunisia,	   one	   is	   able	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599	  Foucault,	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality,	  38–39.	  
600	  Ibid.,	  39	  and	  43.	  
601	  Ibid.,	  11.	  
602	  Parker,	  “Sexual	  Cultures,”	  68.	  
603	  Altman,	  Global	  Sex,	  75	  and	  83.	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  Ibid.,	  142.	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  Ibid.,	  143.	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distinguish	  two	  facets	  of	  moral	  panics—the	  moral	  panic	  concerning	  the	  secular	  population’s	  
response	   to	   the	   growing	   emergence	   of	   Salafist	   ideology	   and	   their	   physical	   presence	   in	  
Tunisia’s	  new	  public	  spaces	  (as	  explored	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter)—and	  specific	  to	  this	  case,	  
the	  increasing	  conservative	  backlash	  against	  “liberal”	  behaviour	  and	  identity	  associated	  with	  
the	  immorality	  and	  corruption	  of	  the	  former	  regime.	  	  
	  
Space	  for	  identity	  movements?	  
Similar	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   and	   its	   underlying	   relationship	   to	   modernisation	  
trajectories	   implicit	  within	  the	  neoliberal	  framework,	  the	  issue	  of	  homosexual	   identity	  and	  
“liberation”	   also	   shares	   this	   linkage	   to	   modernisation	   projects.	   A	   country	   is	   increasingly	  
deemed	  as	  modern	  or	  democratic	  depending	  upon	  the	  policies	  and	   laws	   it	  has	   in	  place	  to	  
combat	   inequality	  and	  discrimination	  against	  LGBT	  communities.606	  This	  trend	  can	  be	  seen	  
in	  the	  international	  condemnation	  of	  Uganda	  and	  Russia	  in	  2014	  for	  their	  legal	  positions	  on	  
homosexuality.	   Furthermore,	   it	   seems	   homosexual	   groups/organisations	   themselves	   are	  
bestowed	  the	  recognition	  of	  modernity	  depending	  upon	  their	  chosen	  degree	  of	  visibility	  in	  
public	  spaces—as	  activists	  calling	  for	  universal	  human	  rights,	  freedom	  from	  discrimination,	  
and	  violence,	  or	  liberation.	  In	  “How	  Do	  You	  Say	  ‘Come	  Out	  of	  the	  Closet’	  in	  Arabic?,”	  Jason	  
Ritchie	   argues	   that	   for	   several	   LGBT	   activist	   organisations	   in	   the	   Middle	   East	   and	   North	  
Africa,	   such	   as	   for	   the	   organisation	  HaAguda,	   “Visibility...is	   both	   a	   tactic	   and	   a	   goal,	   the	  
means	   and	   the	   end	   of	   gay	   activism.” 607 	  However,	   he	   questions	   whether	   homosexual	  
communities	  “need	  or	  want	  to	  come	  out	  and	  attain	  visibility.”608	  In	  considering	  the	  nature	  
of	   the	  conflicts	   that	  emerged	  among	  civil	   society	  actors	  and	  groups	   following	   the	  uprising	  
(and	  over	  which	   issues),	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   ascertain	  whether	  or	   not,	   and	   to	  what	  degree,	  
these	   groups	   were	   seeking	   political	   recognition	   or	   freedom	   from	   discrimination	   and	  
violence.	  
	  
Recognition	  could	  be	  related	  to	  identity,	  rights,	  or	  simply	  the	  freedom	  from	  discrimination	  
and	  violence.	  Fraser	   identifies	  a	  shift	   in	  the	  post-­‐socialist	  terrain	   in	  which	  groups	  of	  actors	  
are	   no	   longer	   simply	   “economically	   defined	   classes”	   seeking	   an	   end	   to	   exploitation	   and	  
means	  to	  greater	  distribution.	  Rather,	  these	  actors	  are	  also	  “culturally	  defined”	  groups	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606	  See	  Altman,	  Global	  Sex,	  91	  and	  Saner,	  “Gay	  Rights	  Around	  the	  World.”	  
607	  Quoting	  the	  Chair	  of	  HaAguda,	  Ritchie,	  “How	  Do	  You	  Say	  ‘Come	  Out	  of	  the	  Closet’	  in	  Arabic?”	  563.	  
608	  Ritchie,	  “How	  Do	  You	  Say	  ‘Come	  Out	  of	  the	  Closet’	  in	  Arabic?”	  563.	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“communities	   of	   value”	   seeking	   to	   preserve	   their	   identities	   and	   to	   attain	   recognition.609	  
However,	   Fraser	   also	   underscores	   the	   difficult	   choices	   subaltern	   and	  marginalised	   groups	  
must	  routinely	  make	  between	  strategies	  of	  publicity	  and	  visibility,	  and	  the	  protection	  that	  
invisibility	  and	  discretion	  offer.	  She	  argues,	  “It	  is	  not	  correct	  to	  view	  publicity	  as	  always	  and	  
unambiguously	   an	   instrument	   of	   empowerment	   and	   emancipation.	   For	   members	   of	  
subordinate	   groups	   it	  will	   always	   be	   a	  matter	   of	   balancing	   the	   potential	   uses	   of	   publicity	  
against	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	   loss	  of	  privacy.”610	  Furthermore,	   in	  supporting	  the	  creation	  and	  
safeguarding	  of	   spaces	   to	   allow	   room	  and	   the	  opportunity	   for	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   views	   and	  
counter-­‐publics	  to	  emerge	  through	  discursive	  contestation,	  “communities	  of	  value,”	  such	  as	  
homosexual	  communities	  could	  encounter	  greater	  space	  to	  manoeuvre	  for	  recognition.	  She	  
contends,	   “What	   will	   count	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   common	   concern	   will	   be	   decided	   precisely	  
through	   discursive	   contestation.	   It	   follows	   that	   no	   topics	   should	   be	   ruled	   off	   limits	   in	  
advance	   of	   such	   contestation.	   Democratic	   publicity	   requires	   positive	   guarantees	   of	  
opportunities	  for	  minorities	  to	  convince	  others	  that	  what	  in	  the	  past	  was	  not	  public…should	  
now	  become	  so.”611	  	  
	  
The	  question	  remains	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  was	  in	  fact	  space	  in	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia	  
for	  the	  issue	  of	  homosexuality	  to	  emerge	  as	  a	  public	   issue.	   Issues	  concerning	  sex	  regularly	  
featured	   in	   the	  media;	   however,	   they	  were	  manipulated	  by	  both	   liberal	   and	   conservative	  
factions	   as	   a	   means	   to	   underscore	   the	   other’s	   own	   illegitimacy	   to	   rule	   following	   the	  
downfall	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime.	   Sex	   was	   being	   used	   by	   the	   secular	   elements	   of	   the	  
population	   to	   highlight	   the	   more	   extreme	   or	   “conservative”	   tendencies	   of	   Ennahda	   for	  
example,	   and	  by	   the	   Islamists	   to	  demonstrate	   the	   immorality	   associated	  with	   the	  Ben	  Ali	  
regime	  (or	  secular	  regimes	   in	  general).	  So	  for	  both	  of	  these	  sides	   issues	  concerning	  sexual	  
minorities	  were	  being	  debated	  within	  a	  non-­‐neutral,	  and	  in	  fact	  heavily	  charged	  terrain.	  It	  is	  
this	   conservative	   backlash	   against	   “liberal”	   behaviour	   that	   dictated	   the	   strategies	   LGBT	  
communities	   would	   employ	   to	   bring	   issues	   of	   sexual	   identity	   and	   human	   rights	   to	   the	  
discursive	   arena	   and	   into	   civil	   society	   following	   the	   2010–2011	   Tunisia	   uprising.	   The	  
following	   sections	   describe	   the	   range	   of	   strategies	   these	   different	   groups	   used	   to	   place	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609	  Fraser,	  Justice	  Interruptus,	  2.	  
610	  Ibid.,	  116.	  
611	  Fraser,	  “Rethinking	  the	  Public	  Sphere,”	  71.	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issues	  for	  sexual	  minorities	  on	  the	  public	  agenda	  during	  the	  two	  years	  following	  the	  Tunisia	  
uprising.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
3.	  The	  expansion	  of	  space	  for	  homosexual	  communities?	  
	  
At	  present	  it	  is	  illegal	  to	  engage	  in	  same-­‐sex	  conduct	  in	  78	  countries,	  and	  in	  five	  countries—	  
Mauritania,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Sudan,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  and	  Yemen	  —the	  death	  penalty	  can	  
be	  invoked	  for	  homosexual	  activity.612	  The	  countries	  that	  have	  retained	  the	  death	  penalty	  all	  
justify	  this	  punishment	  based	  on	  the	  foundations	  of	  Islamic	  law.613	  For	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  
region,	  the	  penalty	  for	  sodomy	  in	  Bahrain	  is	  ten	  years’	  imprisonment;	  seven	  years	  in	  Kuwait;	  
five	  years	  in	  Libya	  and	  Qatar;	  three	  years	  in	  Algeria,	  Morocco,	  Oman,	  Somalia,	  and	  Tunisia;	  
and	  one	  year	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  Syria.614	  The	  number	  of	  individuals	  prosecuted	  or	  arrested	  for	  
same-­‐sex	  offenses	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  remains	  impossible	  to	  determine.615	  
	  
Alongside	   formal	   legal	   codes	   that	   persecute	   same-­‐sex	   behaviour	   throughout	   the	   region,	  
there	  is	  also	  discrimination,	  harassment,	  and	  violence	  committed	  by	  state	  security	  forces,	  as	  
well	  as	  by	  individuals	  and	  groups	  at	  the	  community-­‐level	  acting	  on	  their	  own	  sense	  of	  moral	  
authority.	  There	  are	  examples	  across	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  of	  the	  flagrant	  abuse	  
of	  authority	  against	  homosexual	  communities	  and	  equally	  homophobic	  acts	  committed	  by	  
individuals	   that	   consequently,	   through	   non-­‐response,	   can	   indicate	   sanctioning	   by	   state	  
entities.	  For	  example,	  in	  May	  2001,	  the	  police	  raided	  a	  Cairo	  discothèque	  known	  as	  “Queen	  
Boat;”	  of	   the	  52	  men	  eventually	   sent	   to	   trial,	   23	  were	  convicted	  and	   sentenced	   to	  prison	  
terms	  of	  one	  to	  five	  years	  for	  “immoral	  behaviour	  and	  contempt	  of	  religion.”616	  From	  early	  
2001	  until	  2004	  (when	  the	  report	  was	  published),	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  reported	  that	  it	  was	  
aware	  of	  more	   than	  170	  men	  whose	  cases	  under	   the	  Egyptian	   law	  of	   “debauchery”	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
612	  Speech	  by	  the	  RT.	  Hon.	  John	  Bercow,	  MP,	  Speaker	  of	  the	  British	  House	  of	  Commons	  to	  the	  Kaleidoscope	  
Trust	  IDAHO	  event,	  16	  May	  2012,	  www.kaleidoscopetrust.com/features-­‐bercow-­‐speech-­‐5-­‐12.php.	  It	  is	  
important	  to	  note	  that	  some	  activists	  and	  academics	  (such	  as	  the	  International	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Association)	  
cite	  81	  countries	  as	  outlawing	  same-­‐sex	  acts	  and	  Iran	  is	  also	  reported	  to	  invoke	  the	  death	  penalty	  for	  sodomy;	  
this	  also	  does	  not	  include	  the	  more	  recent	  passing	  of	  the	  Uganda	  Anti-­‐Homosexuality	  Act	  in	  February	  2014	  
that	  criminalises	  same-­‐sex	  acts;	  see	  Whitaker,	  Unspeakable	  Love,	  112	  and	  123.	  
613	  Whitaker,	  Unspeakable	  Love,	  112.	  
614	  Ibid.,	  123.	  
615	  Ibid.,	  139.	  
616	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  In	  a	  Time	  of	  Torture,	  2	  and	  Crary,	  “Gays	  in	  Egypt,	  Tunisia	  Worry.”	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brought	   before	   prosecutors.617	  Furthermore,	   in	   March	   2012	   international	   human	   rights	  
groups	   urged	   Iraqi	   authorities	   to	   investigate	   targeted	   killings	   against	   approximately	   15	  
teenagers	  perceived	  to	  be	  gay.	  Young	  people	  with	  “emo-­‐like”	  features	  such	  as	  tight-­‐fitting	  
clothes	  and	  “alternative”	  hairstyles	  were	  brutally	  stoned,	  beaten,	  or	  shot.	  It	  is	  even	  reported	  
that	   some	   victims	   had	   their	   heads	   smashed	   with	   concrete	   blocks.	   The	   Iraqi	   Minister	   of	  
Interior	  continues	  to	  deny	  any	  homophobic	  or	  “anti-­‐emo”	  killings	  took	  place.618	  Finally	  and	  
even	  more	   recently,	  36	  men	  were	  arrested	   in	  Beirut	   in	   July	  2012	   in	  an	  adult	   cinema.	  The	  
men	   were	   subjected	   to	   anal	   examinations	   to	   determine	   whether	   or	   not	   they	   were	  
homosexual.619	  These	  events	  at	  a	  minimum	  reflect	  the	  degree	  of	  stigmatisation	  and	  violence	  
against	  sexual	  minorities	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa.	  	  
	  
In	   part,	   this	   discrimination	   stems	   from	   discourses	   that	   situate	   homosexuality	   within	   the	  
context	   of	   an	   imported	   phenomenon,	   or	   “western	   borrowing,”	   as	   well	   as	   firmly	   within	  
colonial	   discourses.	   Moreover,	   these	   discourses	   allow	   intermittent	   moral	   panics	   to	  
(re)surface	   at	   peculiar	   times,	   resulting	   in	   targeted	   discrimination	   and	   in	   some	   cases,	  
brutality.	  Brian	  Whitaker	  attributes	  these	  crackdowns	  against	  homosexual	  communities	  on	  
the	   part	   of	   the	   government	   as	   serving	   enough	   to	   “appease	  moral	   outrage	   and	  make	   an	  
example	  of	  a	  few	  people,	  but	  not	  so	  many	  as	  to	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  public	  fiction	  that	  there	  is	  
little	   or	   no	   homosexuality	   in	   the	   country.”620	  Since	   the	   uprising,	   LGBT	   communities	   in	  
Tunisia	  have	  experienced	  noteworthy	  advances	   and	  have	  advocated	   for	   greater	   rights	   for	  
marginalised	  citizens	  and	   freedom	  from	  violence.	  However,	   they	  have	  also	  simultaneously	  
faced	   considerable	   contractions	   in	   the	   space	   to	   manoeuvre	   at	   the	   political	   as	   well	   as	  
sociocultural	   levels.	   The	   following	   two	   sections	   examine	   in	  more	   detail	   the	   conflicts	   and	  
contentions	   that	   arose	   both	   within	   and	   outside	   civil	   society	   as	   homosexual	   communities	  
attempted	   put	   issues	   of	   identity,	   human	   rights	   and	   freedom	   from	   discrimination	   on	   the	  
post-­‐revolution	  agenda.	   It	   looks	  to	  the	  case	  study	  of	  a	  group	  of	  men	  who	  worked	  as	  LGBT	  
activists	  before	  the	  revolution	  and	  collaborated	  together	  through	  their	  work	  at	  one	  of	  the	  
HIV/AIDS	   associations	   in	   Tunis.	   Several	   months	   after	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising,	   they	   legally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  In	  a	  Time	  of	  Torture,	  1.	  
618	  Associated	  French	  Press,	  “Rights	  Groups	  Urge	  Iraq	  to	  Investigate	  ‘Emo’	  Killings.”	  
619	  See	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  “Lebanon:	  Stop	  ‘Tests	  of	  Shame’”	  and	  Assir,	  “Lebanon’s	  Gay	  Community.”	  	  
620	  Whitaker,	  Unspeakable	  Love,	  140.	  
	   Page	  |	  212	  
established	  the	  organisation	  Damj	  or	  “reintegration”	  to	  defend	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  rights	  
of	  minorities,	  including	  the	  rights	  of	  LGBT	  individuals.	  	  
	  
Some	  openings,	  in	  some	  places	  
In	   1996,	   post-­‐Apartheid	   South	   Africa	   became	   the	   first	   country	   in	   the	   world	   to	   explicitly	  
integrate	  protections	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  into	  its	  constitution.621	  Since	  1996,	  
South	  African	  courts	  have	  decriminalised	  sodomy,	  ruled	  in	  favour	  of	  gay	  employees	  seeking	  
benefits	   for	   their	   partners,	   and	   supported	   immigration	   appeals	   for	   foreign	   partners	   of	  
homosexual	   South	   Africans.	   In	   “South	   Africa’s	   Democratisation	   and	   the	   Politics	   of	   Gay	  
Liberation,”	   Sheila	   Croucher	   observes,	   “These	   gains	   are	   remarkable	   given	   the	   previously	  
weak	  gay	  movement	  and	  the	  country’s	  already	  crowded	  political	  and	  economic	  agenda	   in	  
the	  wake	  of	  Apartheid.”622	  She	  adds,	   “In	  South	  Africa,	   the	  availability	  of	  an	  anti-­‐Apartheid	  
master	  frame,	  rooted	  in	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  equality	  for	  all,	  helped	  galvanise	  gays	  
and	   lesbians	   and	   to	   legitimate	   their	   demands	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   politicians	   and	   society	   as	   a	  
whole.”623	  Given	  the	  historical	  precedent	  for	  increased	  opportunities	  and	  indeed	  success	  in	  
putting	   greater	   rights	   for	   sexual	   minorities	   high	   on	   the	   agenda	   in	   other	   countries	   that	  
passed	   through	  extreme	  periods	  of	   sociopolitical	   transition,	   it	   should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  
that	   soon	   after	   the	   2010–2011	   uprising,	   different	   actors	   mobilised	   to	   take	   maximum	  
advantage	  of	  these	  new	  spaces	  opening	  up	  in	  Tunisia.	  Tunisia’s	  LGBT	  communities	  perceived	  
post-­‐revolution	   opportunities	   for	   the	   expansion	   of	   freedoms—such	   as	   freedom	   from	  
discrimination	   and	   violence.	   They	  worked	   to	   quickly	  maximise	  what	   could	   be	   achieved	   in	  
what	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  definitive	  window	  of	  opportunity	  following	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  
regime	  in	  January	  and	  elections	  to	  the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly	  in	  October	  2011.	  	  
	  
In	   one	   of	   the	   first	   instances,	   homosexual	   communities	   participated	   in	   the	  Atakni	   rally	   in	  
October	  2011	  in	  protest	  of	  the	  significant	  conservative	  backlash	  against	  the	  broadcasting	  of	  
the	  film	  “Persepolis”624	  and	  to	  counter	  threats	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  It	  is	  
reported	   that	   several	   dozen	   youths	   carried	   a	   large	   rainbow	   flag	   marked	   with	   the	   word	  
“PEACE.”625 	  	   Moreover,	   there	   were	   articles	   in	   the	   Tunisian	   press—Arabic,	   French	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621	  Croucher,	  “South	  Africa’s	  Democratisation,”	  315.	  
622	  Ibid.	  
623	  Ibid.,	  324.	  
624	  Chawki,	  “Vidéo-­‐Manifestation	  Contre	  La	  Violence	  et	  Pour	  La	  Liberté.	  ”	  
625	  Collins,	  “Effemines,	  Gigolos,	  and	  MSMs,”	  105.	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English-­‐speaking—on	   the	   issue	   of	   homosexuality	   that	   many	   observers	   agreed	   would	   not	  
have	  happened	  during	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  era.	  There	  was	  also	  an	  online	  magazine	  GayDay,	  which	  
was	  founded	  just	  after	  January	  2011	  by	  a	  group	  of	  “like-­‐minded	  individuals”	  and	  maintained	  
by	  Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief	  Fadi	  Krouj.626	  In	  addition,	  the	  year	  2012	  marked	  the	  first	  year	  in	  Tunisia	  in	  
which	  the	  LGBT	  community	  publicly	  celebrated	  the	  International	  Day	  Against	  Homophobia	  
and	   Transphobia,	   including	   by	   launching	   a	   declaration	   on	   behalf	   of	   this	   community.	   The	  
statement	  reaffirmed	  LGBT	  rights	  by	  claiming,	  “Stunned	  by	  the	  wind	  of	  revolt	  blowing	  over	  
Tunisia,	   they	   no	   longer	   hid	   themselves,	   they	   fought	   for	   the	   right	   to	   employment	   and	   for	  
dignity,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  sexual	  liberties.”627	  	  
	  
Not	   long	  after	  the	  revolution	  a	  group	  of	  three	  LGBT	  activists	  worked	  to	  establish	  the	  non-­‐
profit	   charity	  L’Association	  Tunisienne	  pour	   la	   Justice	  et	   l’Egalite	   (The	  Tunisian	  Association	  
for	   Justice	   and	   Equality),	   which	   was	   known	   as	   Damj	   (“reintegration”)	   in	   Arabic.628	  The	  
activists,	   Moazzam,	   Nasser,	   and	   Kader,	   each	   began	   their	   advocacy	   training	   in	   HIV/AIDS,	  
starting	   out	   as	   volunteers	   while	   students	   in	   university.	   Moazzam	   explained	   during	   the	  
research	   interview	   that	  he	  began	  his	   training	  as	   a	  peer	  educator	   in	  2008	  with	  one	  of	   the	  
HIV/AIDS	   organisations	  with	   programmes	   in	   Sousse	  while	   undertaking	   his	   studies.	   At	   the	  
time,	   his	   friend	   Kader	   had	   also	   decided	   to	   undergo	   training	   as	   a	   peer	   educator.	   After	  
finishing	  his	   studies,	  Moazzam	  found	  paid	  employment	   in	  a	  call	   centre	   in	  Tunis	  but	   found	  
the	   work	   depressing.629	  A	   colleague	   of	   his	   was	   doing	   paid	   work	   with	   the	   same	   HIV/AIDS	  
organisation	   in	   Tunis	   and	   eventually	   left	   his	   position.	   Moazzam	   then	   applied	   and	   was	  
accepted	  to	  a	  position	  as	  supervisor	  of	  outreach	  work	  with	  sex	  workers.	  	  
	  
Nasser	  served	  as	  a	  volunteer	  in	  Tunis	  from	  the	  age	  of	  18,	  working	  with	  organisations	  such	  as	  
the	  Red	  Crescent	  and	  Greenpeace.	  When	  I	  asked	  him	  during	  the	  research	  interview	  where	  
he	  felt	  his	  spirit	  of	  volunteerism	  originated,	  he	  explained	  that	  his	  father	  had	  been	  a	  staunch	  
advocate	  during	  the	  period	  when	  the	  Bourguiba	  government	  sought	  to	  modernise	  the	  old	  
quarter	  of	  the	  medina	  in	  Tunis.	  His	  father	  fought	  against	  the	  government’s	  plans	  for	  many	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626	  http://gaydaymagazine.com/	  
627	  Déclaration	  du	  17	  mai	  de	  la	  communauté	  LGBT	  Tunisienne,	  Mai	  2012	  featured	  in	  Krouj,	  2012.	  
628	  Homosexual	  women	  also	  eventually	  became	  involved	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  organisation	  Damj	  soon	  
after	  its	  official	  establishment	  in	  Tunisia.	  
629	  Informant	  23:	  Outreach	  worker	  with	  sex	  workers,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  Damj;	  Tunis,	  24	  Jan.	  
2012.	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years	   with	   the	   proverb	   “one	   does	   not	   need	   to	   burn	   his	   own	   house	   to	   be	   modern;”	  
eventually	   the	   medina	   was	   preserved.	   Nasser	   heard	   about	   the	   work	   of	   the	   HIV/AIDS	  
organisation	  in	  Tunis	  early	  in	  2004;	  however,	  he	  said	  there	  were	  rumours	  about	  the	  “actual	  
nature”	  of	  the	  work	  the	  association	  was	  doing	  and	  thus	  initially	  he	  was	  afraid	  to	  volunteer	  
with	  the	  group.	  However,	  in	  2007	  Nasser	  was	  the	  target	  of	  a	  physical	  assault.	  He	  went	  to	  the	  
police,	   who	   initially	   worked	   with	   him,	   but	   eventually	   the	   case	   was	   dropped.	   No	   longer	  
feeling	  safe	   in	  Tunis,	  Nasser	  moved	   to	  Sousse	  where	  Moazzam	  and	  Kader	  were	   living.	  His	  
friends	   encouraged	   him	   to	   volunteer	   with	   the	   organisation,	   especially	   given	   the	  
association’s	  anti-­‐stigma	  programme.	  Soon	  after	  he	  began	  volunteering	  as	  a	  peer	  educator,	  
he	   underwent	   a	   series	   of	   trainings	   on	   stigma	   and	   discrimination.	   He	   felt	   this	   helped	   him	  
considerably	   on	   a	   personal	   level,	   something	   that	   he	   considers	   to	   this	   day	   changed	   his	  
mentality	  entirely	  on	  his	  work.	  He	  eventually	  moved	  back	  to	  Tunis,	  where	  he	  acquired	  a	  paid	  
position	   with	   the	   HIV/AIDS	   organisation	   as	   a	   supervisor	   of	   volunteers	   and	   outreach	  
workers.630	  Up	  until	   2013,	   he	   continued	   to	   deliver	   anti-­‐stigma	   training	   to	   key	   populations	  
affected	  by	  HIV/AIDS	  in	  the	  communities	  in	  and	  around	  Tunis	  alongside	  his	  work	  with	  Damj.	  
	  
Kader,	  meanwhile,	  began	  to	  volunteer	  with	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  organisation	  with	  its	  programme	  
in	  Sousse,	  along	  with	  Moazzam	  and	  eventually	  Nasser.	  He	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  volunteer	  
with	   the	   organisation	   after	   attending	   one	   of	   its	   HIV/AIDS	   awareness-­‐raising	   sessions.	   He	  
explained	  that	  at	  the	  time	  he	  was	  anxious	  about	  working	  with	  an	  organisation	  that	  engaged	  
so	   outwardly	   in	   work	   with	   homosexual	   communities.	   While	   still	   a	   student	   in	   university,	  
Kader	   conducted	   peer	   educator	   trainings	   and	   supported	   outreach	   to	   key	   populations	  
affected	  by	  HIV.	  He	  had	  seen	  the	  work	  the	  organisation	  was	  doing	  with	  these	  populations	  in	  
Tunis,	   and	  advocated	   the	  necessity	   to	  do	   similar	  work	   in	   Sousse.	   Eventually	  he	  was	  given	  
permission	  from	  the	  head	  office	  in	  Tunis	  to	  conduct	  this	  work	  in	  Sousse.	  He	  laughed	  during	  
the	  research	  interview	  as	  he	  explained	  that	  he	  set	  up	  an	  office	  in	  his	  own	  home	  with	  all	  the	  
organisational	   “brochures,	   condoms,	   and	   lubrication!”631	  In	   2009	   he	   became	   a	   full-­‐time	  
employee	  with	   the	   organisation	   in	   Tunis	   to	   oversee	   outreach	  work	  with	   key	   populations	  
affected	  by	  HIV.	   I	   later	   asked	  him	  what	   he	   studied	   in	   university.	  He	   remarked	  during	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630	  Informant	  25:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  27	  Jan.	  2012,	  Nov.	  2012	  and	  14	  Mar.	  2013.	  
631	  Informant	  26:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	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interview,	   “I	   studied	   civil	   engineering,	   and	   then	   I	   went	   back	   to	   do	   a	   degree	   in	   hotel	  
management!”632	  He	   laughed	  once	  again	   knowing	  none	  of	  his	  degrees	  were	  ever	   applied,	  
much	  the	  same	  with	  his	  colleagues	  working	  at	  the	  organisation.	  
	  
The	  newly	  formed	  organisation	  Damj	  acquired	  its	  formal	  associational	  visa	  in	  October	  2011	  
under	  the	  rubric	  of	  work	  in	  “stigma	  and	  discrimination	  and	  human	  rights.”	  The	  word	  Damj	  
was	  chosen	  by	  the	  founders	  because	  it	  signified	  “integration”	  and	  alluded	  to	  the	  continued	  
exclusion	  of	  minorities	  and	  other	  vulnerable	  groups	  at	  the	  time.	  Kader	  explained	  during	  the	  
interview	  for	  the	  research:	  	  
	  
We	  labelled	  the	  application	  as	  “the	  fight	  against	  stigma	  and	  human	  rights”	  because	  
we	   felt	   it	   needed	   to	   be	   as	   general	   as	   possible	   in	   order	   for	   it	   to	   be	   accepted.	  
[Members	  of]	  the	  LGBT	  [community]	  were	  some	  of	  the	  first	  groups	  to	  come	  out	  and	  
speak	  about	  human	  rights	  before	  the	  revolution	  and	  we	  are	  the	  Tunisians	  who	  have	  
been	   outwardly	   demonstrating	   against	   these	   injustices.	   On	   our	   marches	   and	  
participation	   in	   the	   demonstrations,	   before	   and	   now,	  we	   bring	   the	   two	   flags—the	  
LGBT	  flag	  and	  the	  Tunisian	  flag!633	  
	  
Kader	  stated	  that	  as	  a	  new	  civil	  society	  organisation,	  Damj	  “wants	  to	  continue	  to	  mobilise	  
young	  people	  to	  take	  this	  fight	  forward	  and	  to	  be	  strong	  advocates.”	  On	  its	  Facebook	  page	  
(added	   in	  summer	  2013),	   the	  organisation	  outlined	   its	  goal	   to	  participate	   in	  spreading	  the	  
culture	  of	  universal	  human	  rights	  while	  specifically	  anchoring	  the	  principles	  of	  citoyenneté	  
and	   equality	   among	   Tunisian	   citizens;	   highlighting	   the	   factors	   that	   exacerbate	  
marginalisation	   and	   vulnerability;	   combating	   all	   forms	   of	   stigma	   and	   discrimination;	  
developing	  partnerships	  and	  networks	  of	  mutual	  aims	  and	  understanding	  as	  they	  pertain	  to	  
the	   fight	   against	   stigma	   and	   discrimination;	   and	   promoting	   human	   rights.	   Finally,	   the	  
organisation	  advocates	  that	   it	  aims	  to	  support	   individuals	   in	  precarious	  situations,	  such	  as	  
those	   who	   are	   victims	   of	   injustices,	   to	   help	   them	   to	   attain	   greater	   physical	   and	   moral	  
integrity.	  In	  a	  follow-­‐up	  research	  interview	  with	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  in	  March	  2013,	  Nasser,	  
who	  was	  also	  involved	  in	  the	  high-­‐profile	  Tunisian	  graffiti	  urban	  art	  group	  Zwela,634	  said	  that	  
his	  organisation	  worked	  to	  advocate	  for	  the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly	  to	  include	  issues	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632	  Informant	  26:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	  
633	  Informant	  26:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	  
634	  See	  Ben	  Mhenni,	  “Le	  Graffiti	  n’a	  pas	  Bonne	  Presse.”	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of	   equality	   and	   justice	   for	   minorities	   in	   the	   constitution,	   acknowledging	   however	   that	   a	  
majority	  of	   the	  Assembly’s	  members	  were	   “conservative.”	  He	  hoped	   that	  Damj	  would	  be	  
able	  to	  strengthen	  the	  rights	  of	  minority	  groups,	  including	  members	  of	  LGBT	  communities,	  
and	  to	  document	  human	  rights	  abuses	  as	  a	  stronger	  advocacy	  tool	  for	  rights	  reform.635	  
	  
In	  addition	   to	   the	  establishment	  of	  Damj	  after	   January	  2011,	  different	  groups	  such	  as	   the	  
Human	  Rights	  Observatory	  and	  the	  Tunisian	  Association	  for	  Minorities	  also	  came	  forward	  to	  
engage	   more	   in	   the	   protection	   of	   individual	   human	   rights,	   including	   the	   rigorous	  
documentation	   of	   human	   rights	   abuses	   against	   homosexual	   communities—abuses,	   some	  
would	   argue,	   that	   had	   increased	   since	   the	   revolution.636	  Moazzam	   asserted	   during	   the	  
interview	   that	   there	   was	   significant	   violence	   and	   aggression	   against	   homosexual	   men	  
including	  homicide,	  adding,	  “And	  of	  course	  we	  never	  see	  this	  information	  in	  the	  media,	  our	  
friends	  tell	  us.	  There	  is	  no	  protection,	  there	  is	  not	  as	  much	  security,	  and	  this	  creates	  many	  
problems.	  The	  law	  does	  not	  favour	  MSM	  [men	  who	  have	  sex	  with	  men].”637	  In	  response	  to	  
this	   perception	   of	   increasing	   violence	   a	   group	   of	   human	   rights	   lawyers	   came	   together	   to	  
form	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Observatory.	   This	   organisation	   aimed	   to	   document	   and	   collect	  
information	   related	   to	  HIV	   and	  human	   rights	   violations,	   including	   incidents	   of	   abuse.	   The	  
information	  would	  be	  used	  to	  advocate	  greater	  attention	  to	  universal	  human	  rights.	  In	  the	  
research	   interview	   with	   Walid,	   one	   of	   the	   principal	   proponents	   of	   the	   Observatory,	   he	  
stressed	   that	   regionally	   the	   issue	   of	   human	   rights	  was	   a	   very	   serious	   challenge.	   “We	  will	  
have	  to	  act	  now	  or	  we	  will	  lose	  this	  space,”	  he	  said.	  “We	  have	  to	  adopt	  our	  discourse	  now	  so	  
that	  this	  is	  not	  eventually	  turned	  against	  us.	  The	  rise	  in	  conservative	  discourse	  is	  worrying,	  
and	  so	  we	  can	  no	  longer	  work	  as	  we	  did	  before.”638	  
	  
There	   was	   also	   a	   host	   of	   regional	   initiatives	   that	   arose	   following	   the	   Arab	   uprisings	   to	  
specifically	   address	   how	   the	   revolutions	   across	   the	   Middle	   East	   and	   North	   Africa	   would	  
impact	  upon	  LGBT	  communities.	  Shereen	  El	  Feki	  cites	  the	  example	  of	  the	  establishment	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635	  Informant	  25:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  27	  Jan.	  2012,	  Nov.	  2012	  and	  14	  Mar.	  2013.	  
636	  See	  Mersch,	  “No	  Gay	  Rights	  Revolution	  in	  Tunisia.”	  
637	  Informant	  23:	  Outreach	  worker	  with	  sex	  workers,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  Damj;	  Tunis,	  24	  Jan.	  
2012;	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  than	  during	  the	  interviews	  with	  outreach	  workers	  working	  in	  HIV,	  they	  often	  used	  
the	  technical	  term	  “MSM”	  (men	  who	  have	  sex	  with	  men)	  to	  refer	  to	  homosexual	  communities.	  
638	  Informant	  36:	  Founder	  and	  lawyer,	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Feb.	  2012.	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2010	   of	   Mantiqitna	   Kamb	   (our	   region’s	   camp).	   The	   regional	   network	   provides	   the	  
opportunity	   for	   individuals	   working	   in	   the	   LGBT	   community	   to	   participate	   in	   clandestine	  
workshops	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  sexuality,	  gender,	  and	  activism,	  as	  well	  as	  training	  on	  life	  skills.	  
The	   network	   stipulates	   that	   its	   key	   aim	   is	   to	   connect	   less	   through	   gay	   identity	   and	  more	  
through	   Arab	   identity.639	  Through	   the	   regional	   network,	   Kader	   and	   Nasser	   were	   able	   to	  
attend	  a	  meeting	  organised	  in	  Turkey	  shortly	  after	  January	  2011	  of	  more	  than	  70	  members	  
of	  LGBT	  communities	  throughout	  the	  region.	  Nasser	  explained	  during	  the	  interview	  that	  the	  
rationale	   behind	   holding	   this	   meeting	   in	   Turkey	   was	   that	   Arabic	   was	   not	   widely	   spoken	  
there	  and	  therefore	  outsiders	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  them.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  state	  
during	  the	  research	  interview,	  “We	  wanted	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  everyone	  at	  this	  meeting	  was	  
from	   this	   region	  as	  we	   felt	   this	  was	  our	  problem	  and	  we	  need	   to	   come	  up	  with	  our	  own	  
solutions.	  So	  we	  tried	  to	  exchange	  experiences	  of	   this	   (the	  Arab	  uprisings)	  and	   learn	  from	  
each	  other.”640	  In	   the	   follow-­‐up	   interview	  with	  Nasser	   regarding	   the	   regional	  meeting,	   he	  
remarked,	  “We	  felt	  we	  needed	  to	  be	  prepared	  because	  we	  were	  afraid	  of	  the	  worst.…There	  
were	   many	   ideas	   but	   there	   were	   also	   so	   many	   different	   priorities	   among	   these	   [LGBT]	  
groups.”641	  
	  
Finally,	   activists	   and	   academics	   working	   in	   HIV/AIDS,	   in	   particular	   with	   homosexual	  
communities,	  used	  the	  finalisation	  of	  the	  2012–2016	  National	  Strategic	  Plan	  (NSP)	  to	  Fight	  
AIDS	   in	   Tunisia	   as	   a	   primary	   example	   of	   the	   advances	   that	   could	   be	   made	   in	   the	   post-­‐
revolution	  window	  of	  opportunity.	  Bio-­‐behavioural	  surveys	  conducted	  in	  2009	  and	  again	  in	  
2011	   indicated	  HIV	   prevalence	   of	   4.9	   and	   13	   percent,	   respectively,	   in	  men	  who	   have	   sex	  
with	  men	  (MSM).642	  The	  UNAIDS	  UNGASS	  Report	  (Tunisia	  2012)	  underscored	  the	  significant	  
impact	  of	   the	  revolution	   in	  Tunisia	  and	  the	  subsequent	  effects	  of	  sociopolitical	   turmoil	  on	  
the	  overall	  health	  system.643	  It	  indicated	  that	  administrative	  and	  key	  management	  functions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639	  El	  Feki,	  Sex	  and	  the	  Citadel,	  270.	  For	  additional	  information	  see:	  www.mantiqitna.org	  	  
640	  Informant	  25:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  27	  Jan.	  2012,	  Nov.	  2012	  and	  14	  Mar.	  2013.	  
641	  Informant	  25:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  27	  Jan.	  2012,	  Nov.	  2012	  and	  14	  Mar.	  2013.	  
642Le	  Programme	  National	  de	  Lutte	  Contre	  le	  Sida,	  8.	  
643	  The	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  Special	  Session	  (UNGASS)	  on	  HIV/AIDS	  took	  place	  in	  2001	  and	  
produced	  a	  declaration	  of	  commitment	  on	  HIV/AIDS	  setting	  out	  national	  targets	  and	  global	  actions	  to	  reverse	  
the	  HIV	  epidemic.	  See:	  www.unaids.org.ua/un_support/strategies/UNGASS	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were	   practically	   paralysed	   during	   the	   majority	   of	   2011.644	  Given	   these	   higher	   levels	   of	  
prevalence,	   the	   2012–2016	   NSP	   not	   only	   highlighted	   strategic	   objectives	   to	   intensify	  
targeted	  prevention	  and	  education	  work	  with	   sexual	  minorities,	  but	  also	  underscored	   the	  
need	  to	  conduct	  advocacy	  regarding	  the	  current	  legal	  and	  juridical	  frameworks	  in	  Tunisia—
Article	   230	   of	   the	   penal	   code645—which	   criminalises	   same-­‐sex	   behaviour	   and	   specifies	  
penalties	   of	   up	   to	   three	   years	   in	   prison.646	  During	   the	   research	   interview	   with	   Radi,	   an	  
academic	   and	   activist	   who	   worked	   on	   many	   of	   the	   HIV/AIDS	   bio-­‐behavioural	   studies	  
conducted	  among	  youth	  and	  key	  populations	  at	  higher	  risk	  in	  Tunisia,	  he	  argued	  that	  he	  and	  
his	   colleagues	  would	   not	   have	   had	   the	   courage	   to	   produce	   a	   similar	   NSP	   before	   January	  
2011.	  He	  stated:	  
	  
The	  NSP	  went	   through	  without	   exceptions.…Each	   time	   different	   actors	   are	   saying,	  
“now	   is	  not	   the	   time	   to	  be	  doing	  work	  on	  MSM,”	  but	  we	  now	  have	   very	   real	   and	  
worrying	  data	   so	  now	   is	   in	   fact	   the	   time	   to	  push	   these	  boundaries	  and	  now	   is	   the	  
time	  to	  act....But	  this	  can	  go	  against	  our	  objectives	  if	  we	  are	  not	  careful.647	  
	  
Following	   the	   2010–2011	  uprising,	   the	   founders	   of	  Damj	   chose	   to	   operate	   increasingly	   in	  
Tunisia’s	  expanding	  public	  spaces	  as	  greater	  opportunities	  to	  advocate	  for	  more	  peripheral	  
issues	  were	  perceived.	  The	  members	  of	  the	  organisation	  engaged	  in	  strategies	  of	  publicity	  
and	  visibility	   through	  a	   range	  of	  mechanisms	   that	   reflected	   the	  experience	   they	  gained	   in	  
working	  with	  one	  of	   the	   larger	  HIV/AIDS	  associations	  prior	   to	   the	   revolution.	  Through	   the	  
organisation	   they	   gained	   skills	   in	   advocacy,	   mentoring,	   campaigning,	   mobilising	   against	  
stigma	  and	  discrimination,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  the	  ability	  to	  manoeuvre	  through	  
and	  between	  disparate	  networks	  at	  the	  national	  and	  regional	  levels.	  Damj	  initially	  perceived	  
the	  new	  openings	  with	  the	  formal	  changes	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  association	  as	  a	  key	  opportunity	  to	  
establish	   their	   own	   organisation.	   This	   provided	   them	   a	   platform	   to	   work	   with	   other	  
organisations	  such	  as	  human	  rights	  organisations	  and	  regional	  LGBT	  networks	  to	  advocate	  
further	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  sexual	  minorities	  in	  Tunisia.	  They	  engaged	  in	  public	  advocacy	  with	  
the	   National	   Constituent	   Assembly	   to	   advocate	   for	   the	   inclusion	   of	   freedom	   from	  
discrimination	  in	  the	  new	  constitution.	  They	  also	  increasingly	  came	  to	  rely	  on	  social	  media	  
such	   as	   Facebook	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   objectives	   of	   their	   organisation	   as	   well	   as	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
644Le	  Programme	  National	  de	  Lutte	  Contre	  le	  Sida,	  33.	  
645	  See:	  www.jurisitetunisie.com/tunisie/codes/cp/cp1200.htm.	  
646	  Minister	  of	  Public	  Health	  and	  the	  National	  Programme	  to	  Fight	  HIV,	  45.	  
647	  Informant	  30:	  Academic,	  HIV	  and	  gender;	  Tunis,	  7	  Feb.	  2012.	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participate	   in	   international	   commemorative	   days	   such	   as	   the	   International	   Day	   Against	  
Homophobia	  and	  Transphobia.	   These	  bold	   strategies	   to	  engage	  more	   fully	   in	   the	  national	  
political	  terrain	  were	  intended	  as	  tools	  to	  expand	  the	  discursive	  arena	  and	  to	  contest	  what	  
was	   perceived	   as	   repression	   against	   sexual	   minorities.	   However,	   given	   what	   could	   be	  
characterised	   as	   an	   often	   violent	   ordering	   and	   re-­‐ordering	   of	   post-­‐revolution	   priorities	  
following	  a	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  rule,	  homosexual	  groups	  also	  faced	  the	  challenge	  
of	   a	   rising	   “conservative”	   backlash	   against	   the	   “immorality”	   associated	   with	   the	   former	  
regime.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
4.	  Contracting	  spaces	  for	  discursive	  contestation:	  “now	  is	  not	  the	  time”	  
	  
Before	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising,	   the	   former	   regime	   supported	   interventions	   to	   engage	   in	  
outreach	   work	   with	   homosexual	   communities	   and	   permitted	   the	   United	   Nations	  
Development	   Programme	   (UNDP)	   and	   the	   Joint	   United	   Nations	   Programme	   on	   HIV/AIDS	  
(UNAIDS)	   to	   conduct	   in-­‐depth	   bio-­‐behavioural	   research	   on	   multiple	   categories	   of	  
homosexual	  practice	  across	   the	  different	   regions	  of	  Tunisia.	   From	  2011–2013,	  however,	  a	  
sequence	  of	  highly	  public	  incidents	  re-­‐animated	  national	  discussions	  and	  subsequent	  moral	  
panics	  on	  the	  moral-­‐ethical	  dimensions	  of	  homosexuality.648	  Shortly	  after	  I	  arrived	  in	  Tunisia	  
in	   January	   2012,	   a	   lengthy	   YouTube	   video	   purported	   to	   depict	   Ali	   Laarayedh,	   the	   newly	  
appointed	   interior	  minister	  (and	  eventual	  prime	  minister	   in	  2013)	  engaging	   in	  a	  sexual	  act	  
with	  a	  male	  fellow	  inmate	  in	  a	  prison	  cell.649	  It	  was	  reported	  that	  the	  video	  was	  filmed	  while	  
he	   was	   imprisoned	   for	   nearly	   15	   years	   as	   an	   oppositional	   figure	   under	   Ben	   Ali.	   The	  
broadcasting	  of	   the	  video	  sparked	  outrage	  and	  condemnation	  within	  the	  government,	   the	  
media,	  and	  among	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups,	  and	  allowed	  many	  to	  further	  underscore	  
the	  cruel	   tactics	  of	   the	   former	  RCD	  party	  and	  the	  security	  apparatus	  of	   the	  shadow	  state.	  
However,	  the	  video	  also	  served	  to	  highlight	  the	  more	  general	  phenomenon	  of	  homophobia	  
in	  the	  Arab	  world	  and	  globally.	  Kader	  stated	  during	  the	  research	  interview,	  “Homosexuality	  
is	  used	  to	  humiliate	  someone	  in	  the	  worst	  way	  possible,	  it	  is	  the	  first	  thing	  someone	  raises	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648	  Collins,	  “Effemines,	  Gigolos,	  and	  MSMs,”	  104.	  
649	  See	  Baeder,	  “Release	  of	  Unauthenticated	  Prison-­‐Sex	  Video.”	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now	  to	  humiliate	  and	  embarrass...to	  delegitimize	  political	  figures	  for	  example	  [referring	  to	  
the	  video].”650	  	  
	  
During	  the	  two	  years	  following	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising,	  spaces	  for	  political	  expression	  and	  
for	  democratic	  liberalisation	  in	  the	  political	  realm	  expanded;	  however,	  sociocultural	  spaces	  
regarding	  what	  was	  acceptable	  in	  the	  post-­‐revolution	  era	  simultaneously	  contracted.	  Often	  
individuals	  would	  remark	  that	  “now	  is	  the	  right	  time	  to	  talk	  about	  everything	  in	  Tunisia,”	  but	  
that	   in	   reality	   it	   seems	   that	   “everything”	   had	   its	   limits.	   Homosexuality	   in	   Tunisia,	   for	  
example,	   is	  virtually	  forbidden	  at	  three	  principal	   levels.	  At	  the	  political	   level,	  Article	  230	  of	  
the	  Tunisian	  penal	  code	  criminalises	  same-­‐sex	  relations	  for	  up	  to	  three	  years	  in	  prison	  and	  
at	   the	   time	   of	   writing	   the	   law	   still	   applied.651	  At	   the	   religious	   level,	   in	   a	   country	   that	   is	  
approximately	   98	   percent	  Muslim,	   homosexuality,	  while	   not	   being	   officially	  haram	   in	   the	  
Qur’an,	   is	   forbidden	   in	   Sharia,	   and	   the	   punishments	   vary	   according	   to	   the	   school	   of	   fiqh	  
(Islamic	  jurisprudence).	  Finally,	  at	  the	  sociocultural	  level	  homosexuality	  is	  highly	  stigmatised	  
in	  the	  media	  (including	  online,	  print,	  and	  television)	  and	  at	  the	  community	  level,	  in	  families,	  
and	   in	   the	   workplace.	   Kader	   observed	   during	   the	   research	   interview,	   “Our	   society	   is	  
schizophrenic,	  people	  say	  one	  thing	  and	  do	  the	  complete	  opposite.”	  He	  used	  the	  example	  of	  
alcohol	  consumption,	  referring	  to	  men	  in	  bars	  drinking	  alcohol	  who	  at	  the	  same	  time	  insist	  
that	   homosexuality	   is	  haram.	   In	   Kader’s	   analysis,	   “The	   act	   of	   homosexuality	   is	   one	   thing,	  
speaking	  about	  it	  is	  another.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  act	  that	  is	  forbidden	  here	  it	  seems.	  It	  is	  saying	  you	  
are	   ‘homosexual.’	   When	   you	   want	   to	   express	   yourself,	   it	   is	   here	   where	   the	   problems	  
begin.”652	  	  
	  
In	  interviews	  with	  LGBT	  activists	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  one	  will	  quickly	  observe	  
that	  many	   are	   well	   read	   in	   the	   specific	   legal	   verses	   of	   the	   Qur’an	   as	   this	   is	   an	   essential	  
strategy	  and	  tool	  in	  their	  advocacy	  arsenal.	  Radi,	  a	  sociologist	  interviewed	  for	  the	  research,	  
felt	   that	   increasingly	   to	   reach	   his	   audience	   he	   could	   not	   simply	   rely	   on	   his	   scientific	  
audience—he	  also	  had	  to	  refer	  back	  to	  Arab–Muslim	  culture	  to	  reach	  what	  he	  perceived	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
650	  Informant	  26:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	  
651	  See:	  “Tunisia	  jails	  six	  students	  for	  homosexuality.”	  
652	  Informant	  26:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	  
	   Page	  |	  221	  
a	  more	  religious	  audience	  to	  make	  his	  point	  and	  to	  win	  his	  arguments.653	  For	  example,	  some	  
would	   argue	   quite	   fiercely	   that	   nowhere	   in	   the	   Qur’an	   is	   homosexuality	   haram,	   or	  
forbidden.	  Whitaker	  for	  example	  contends,	  “While	  Islamic	  teaching	  often	  provides	  a	  rational	  
for	  anti-­‐homosexual	  laws	  the	  law	  in	  practice	  is	  shaped	  mainly	  by	  the	  prevailing	  attitudes	  in	  
each	  country,	  and	  particularly	  by	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  government	  seeks	  to	  police	  personal	  
morality.”654	  Whitaker	  cites	  Scott	  al-­‐Haqq	  Kugle’s	  challenge	  to	  more	  traditionalist	  views	  as	  
he	  asserts	  that	  the	   issue	  of	  homosexuality	   is	  not	  addressed	  anywhere	   in	  the	  Qur’an	  nor	   is	  
there	   any	   evidence	   that	   the	   Prophet	   [Muhammad]	   ever	   punished	   people	   for	   same-­‐sex	  
acts.655	  The	  experience	  of	  Nasser	  also	  underscored	  the	  necessity	  for	  activists	  to	  understand	  
the	   Sources	   in	   order	   to	   effectively	   engage	   in	   debates	   as	   they	   relate	   to	   homosexuality	   in	  
Islamic	  contexts.	  He	  pointed	  out	  during	  the	  interview	  for	  the	  research:	  
	  
People	   here	   are	   also	   saying	   “this	   homosexuality”	   is	   something	   new,	   brought	   after	  
the	   revolution	   by	  westerns	   and	   occidentals.	   However	   there	   is	   no	   sanction	   against	  
homosexuality	   in	   the	  Qur’an,	   all	   sins	   in	   the	  Qur’an	  have	  a	  punishment	  or	   sanction	  
but	  not	  homosexuality….We	  try	  to	  convince	  people	  that	  our	  behaviour	  is	  not	  haram	  
but	  they	  now	  block	  and	  become	  violent.	  The	  sources	  of	   Islam—the	  Qur’an	  and	  the	  
hadiths—are	  silent	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  homosexuality.656	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  prevailing	  conservative	  attitudes	  in	  Tunisia	  perceived	  homosexuality	  to	  be	  not	  
only	  an	  illegal	  act,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  behaviour	  permitted	  under	  the	  “corrupt”	  and	  “impious”	  Ben	  
Ali	  regime.	  In	  the	  research	  interview	  with	  Nasser,	  he	  remarked	  that	  the	  LGBT	  community	  in	  
Tunisia	  became	  afraid	  shortly	  after	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising;	  eventually	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  
hundreds	   of	   sexual	   minorities	   left	   Tunisia.	   Nasser	   and	   Kader	   had	   both	   been	   subject	   to	  
physical	   violence	   after	   14	   January	   2011	   through	   attacks	   on	   the	   street	   or	   in	   known	   safe	  
spaces	  for	  homosexual	  men.	  According	  to	  Nasser,	  “Before	  the	  14th,	  the	  gay	  community	   in	  
Tunisia	   did	   not	   necessarily	   live	   freely,	   but	   at	   least	   we	   lived	   in	   security....Since	   the	   14th,	  
homophobic	  acts	  are	  clear	  and	  direct.	  Now	  everyone	  gives	  himself	  the	  right	  to	  criticize	  our	  
way	  of	  dressing,	  to	  stare	  or	  to	  physically	  assault	  us.”657	  Intruders	  physically	  beat	  Kader	  as	  he	  
tried	  to	  protect	  one	  of	  the	  known	  gay	  safe	  spaces	  from	  their	  entrance.	  His	  friend	  Nasser	  said	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
653	  Informant	  30:	  Academic,	  HIV	  and	  Gender;	  Tunis,	  7	  Feb.	  2012.	  
654	  Whitaker,	  Unspeakable	  Love,	  113.	  
655	  Ibid.,	  119.	  
656	  Informant	  25:	  Supervisor	  of	  peer	  educators	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  27	  Jan.	  2012,	  Nov.	  2012	  and	  14	  Mar.	  2013.	  
657	  Informant	  25:	  Supervisor	  of	  peer	  educators	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  27	  Jan.	  2012,	  Nov.	  2012	  and	  14	  Mar.	  2013.	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that	   these	   events	   were	   rare	   before	   the	   revolution.	   As	   to	   whether	   this	   was	   a	   traumatic	  
experience	  for	  him,	  Kader	  shrugged	  his	  shoulders	  and	  said,	  “Je	  reste	  et	  je	  résiste	  encore”—I	  
am	  staying	  and	  I	  am	  still	  resisting.658	  	  
	  
Some	  would	  argue	  that	  during	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime,	  the	  LGBT	  community	  was	  not	  singled	  out	  
because	   repression	   was	   targeted	   at	   political	   dissent	   in	   the	   form	   of	   opposition.	   However	  
after	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising,	  as	  one	  member	  of	  the	  LGBT	  community	  in	  Tunisia	  remarked	  in	  a	  
press	   interview,	  “Don’t	   forget	   the	   Islamist	  parties	  who	  are	  trying	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	   judge	  
right	  now,	  and	  who	  view	  homosexuality	  and	  the	  gay	  community	  as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  former	  
regime.”	  He	  added,	  “They	  call	  it	  ‘rot’	  that	  must	  be	  cleaned	  away.”659	  Some	  also	  argued	  that	  
while	  there	  was	  indeed	  a	  specific	  article	  of	  the	  penal	  code	  that	  penalised	  same-­‐sex	  acts,	   it	  
was	   not	   applied	   in	   practice.	   However,	  members	   of	   the	   homosexual	   community	   reported	  
having	   direct	   experience	   of	   the	   law	   being	   applied	   in	   practice	   as	   well	   as	   in	   theory	   even	  
following	   the	   revolution.	   Nasser	   mentioned	   during	   the	   interview	   a	   friend	   who	   was	  
reportedly	  robbed	  and	  beaten.	  The	  police	  caught	  the	  two	  perpetrators,	  who	  then	  argued	  to	  
the	  police	  that	  the	  victim	  was	  homosexual.	  Soon	  the	  victim	  himself	  was	  threatened	  with	  11	  
months	   incarceration	   under	   Article	   230	   of	   the	   penal	   code.	   Eventually	   he	   received	   a	   jail	  
sentence	  of	  two	  months	  and	  was	  forced	  to	  sign	  a	  confession	  that	  he	  was	  homosexual	  and	  
had	  broken	  the	  law;	  similar	  arrests	  are	  made	  under	  the	  offense	  of	  “atteinte	  a	  la	  pudeur”—
for	  being	  at	  risk	  of	  offending	  the	  moral	  sensibilities	  of	  the	  population.660	  
	  
There	  was	   (and	   continues	   to	   be	   at	   the	   time	  of	  writing)	   a	   blurred	   conflation	   between	   the	  
legal,	   the	   religious,	   and	   the	  moral	   in	   the	  post-­‐uprising	  government,	  media,	   and	   society	   in	  
Tunisia.	   For	  example,	   in	  February	  2012	  newly	  appointed	  Minister	   for	  Human	  Rights	  Samir	  
Dilou	  was	  quoted	  in	  a	  television	  interview	  speaking	  of	  homosexuality	  as	  “a	  perversion	  to	  be	  
medically	  treated”	  and	  that	  “freedom	  of	  expression	  has	  its	  limits.”661	  Of	  concern	  for	  human	  
rights	  activists	  in	  Tunisia	  was	  the	  contradiction	  of	  “pas	  les	  droits	  de	  l’homme,	  mais	  les	  droits	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
658	  Informant	  26:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	  
659	  As	  cited	  in	  Crary,	  “Gays	  in	  Egypt,	  Tunisia	  Worry.”	  
660	  Informant	  25:	  Supervisor	  of	  peer	  educators	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  27	  Jan.	  2012,	  Nov.	  2012	  and	  14	  Mar.	  2013.	  
661	  Baeder,	  “Tunisian	  Human	  Rights	  Minister’s	  Remarks.”	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de	  certains	  hommes”—not	  of	  human	  rights	  but	  of	  rights	  only	   for	  some.662	  Furthermore,	   in	  
response	   to	   the	   demonstration	   organised	   on	   28	   January	   2012	   for	   liberty	   (and	   against	  
violence)	  during	  which	  the	  LGBT	  rainbow	  flag	  was	  again	  featured,	  a	  Tunisian	  talk-­‐show	  host	  
(who	   also	   interviewed	   the	   human	   rights	   minister	   during	   which	   the	   aforementioned	  
comments	  were	  made)	  condemned	   the	  protesters	  on	  his	  Facebook	  page,	  writing,	   “Do	  we	  
need	  further	  strife	  because	  a	  very	  small	  minority	  expresses	  its	  perversion...not	  caring	  about	  
the	  feelings	  and	  the	  sacred	  beliefs	  of	  a	  majority?”663	  	  
	  
In	   the	   research	   interview	   with	   Ouroub,	   an	   employee	   of	   one	   of	   United	   Nations	   country	  
offices	  based	  in	  Tunis,	  she	  explained,	  “In	  a	  way	  they	  [homosexuals]	  were	  a	  bit	  protected	  by	  
the	  former	  system,	  but	  now	  this	  is	  perhaps	  the	  population	  which	  is	  the	  most	  stigmatised	  by	  
the	  government,	  by	  the	  police	  and	  the	   larger	  society.	  They	  have	  suffered	  a	   lot	  of	  violence	  
and	   unfortunately	   with	   this	   population	   they	   also	   have	   the	   highest	   HIV	   prevalence.”664	  
Moreover,	  she	  remarked,	  “So	  in	  a	  sense	  you	  have	  this	  enormous	  new	  opening	  but	  also	  very	  
high	  and	  somewhat	  new	  stigma	  that	  was	  not	  there	  before.”665	  The	  experience	  of	  the	  LGBT	  
activist	   Moazzam	   also	   underscored	   the	   more	   “conservative”	   backlash	   against	   sexual	  
minorities	  following	  the	  revolution.	  He	  stated	  during	  the	  interview,	  “They	  (Ennahda)	  played	  
on	  their	  words,	  on	  God	  and	  on	  religion,	  this	  is	  what	  I	  see	  at	  this	  time.	  Nothing	  is	  sure	  for	  the	  
rights	  of	  homosexuals,	  personally	   I	  do	  not	  feel	  safe,	   I	  even	  have	  friends	  who	  have	   left	  the	  
country	  out	  of	  fear.”	  He	  added	  “Actuellement,	  je	  ne	  veux	  pas	  vivre	  ici”—These	  days,	  I	  do	  not	  
want	  to	  live	  here.666	  	  
	  
Reports	  of	  discrimination	  and	  violence	  against	  LGBT	  communities	  in	  Tunisia	  both	  before	  and	  
after	   the	  Tunisia	  uprising	  spurred	  members	   to	  advocate	   for	   the	  addition	  of	   freedom	  from	  
stigma	  and	  violence	  to	   the	  democratic	   reform	  agenda.	  However,	  greater	  advocacy	   for	   the	  
expansion	   of	   the	   post-­‐revolution	   liberalisation	   terrain	   was	   met	   with	   voices	   encouraging	  
caution	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  as	  even	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  warned	  that	  “now	  is	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
662	  Informant	  36:	  Founder	  and	  lawyer,	  human	  rights	  association;	  Tunis,	  16	  Feb.	  2012.	  
663	  Baeder,	  “Tunisian	  Human	  Rights	  Minister’s	  Remarks.”	  
664	  Informant	  20:	  Country	  officer,	  multilateral	  development	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  16	  Jan.	  2012	  and	  13	  Mar.	  
2013.	  
665	  Informant	  20:	  Country	  officer,	  multilateral	  development	  organisation;	  Tunis,	  16	  Jan.	  2012	  and	  13	  Mar.	  
2013.	  
666	  Informant	  23:	  Outreach	  worker	  with	  sex	  workers,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  Damj;	  Tunis,	  24	  Jan.	  
2012.	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the	   time.”	  For	   the	   research,	   I	   interviewed	  a	  group	  of	   journalists	   from	  a	  newly	  established	  
Tunisian	   news	   English-­‐language	   website	   who	   had	   recently	   published	   an	   article	   on	  
homosexuality	  in	  Tunisia,	  just	  less	  than	  one	  year	  after	  the	  uprising.667	  Despite	  warnings	  from	  
the	  website’s	   lawyers	  not	  to	  publish	  the	  article,	  the	  piece	  drew	  a	  range	  of	  responses	  from	  
both	   within	   and	   outside	   homosexual	   communities	   (including	   many	   reactionary	   blog	  
commentaries).	  Muammar,	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  website	  and	  a	  former	  public	  health	  
professional	  working	  in	  HIV/AIDS,	  remarked	  in	  the	  research	  interview,	  “In	  2011	  there	  was	  so	  
much	  opportunity	  to	  take	  that	  space	  and	  LGBTs	  and	  most	  liberals	  did	  not	  act	  or	  were	  afraid	  
to	   act.	  We	   were	   very	   disappointed	   as	   the	   NGOs	   in	   general	   have	   taken	   a	   very	   hands-­‐off	  
approach	  with	  the	  media.”668	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  journalists,	  when	  the	  article	  was	  being	  developed	  they	  asked	  a	  number	  of	  
members	  of	   the	  LGBT	  community	   if	   the	   transition	  government	   should	  prioritise	   issues	   for	  
homosexual	   populations.	   They	   reported	   that	   most	   if	   not	   all	   responded	   in	   the	   negative,	  
arguing	  that	  “this	  was	  not	  the	  time;”	  furthermore,	  several	  consulted	  felt	  it	  would	  never	  be	  a	  
good	  time.	  In	  discussing	  Fedi’s	  viewpoints	  and	  opinions,	  the	  article	  states	  that	  “despite	  his	  
strong	   conviction	   about	   the	   need	   for	   legally	   guaranteed	   rights	   for	   the	   homosexual	  
community,	   [he]	   thinks	   that	   it	   is	   still	   too	   soon	   to	   officially	   demand	   them	   from	   the	  
government...”	   Fedi	   was	   quoted	   as	   saying,	   “Such	   a	   move	   would	   only	   destabilize	   the	  
situation	  in	  which	  we	  are	  living,	  and	  cause	  more	  violence	  and	  more	  insecurity.”669	  	  
	  
Voices	  of	  caution	  also	  came	  from	  secular	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  that	  filtered	  and	  re-­‐
ordered	  the	  reform	  agenda	  within	  Tunisia’s	  expanding	  public	  spaces.	  For	  example,	  following	  
the	  comments	  made	  against	  homosexuality	  by	  the	  human	  rights	  minister	  in	  February	  2012,	  
a	   number	   of	   individuals	   from	   LGBT	   communities	   signed	   a	   petition	   advocating	   for	   the	  
homophobic	   comments	  made	  by	   the	  minister	   to	   be	   addressed	  by	   the	   Tunisian	   League	  of	  
Human	   Rights	   (LTDH)	   as	   an	   illustration	   of	   the	   need	   to	   tackle	   homophobia	   in	   the	   new	  
constitution.	  Despite	  the	  petition	  and	  open	  confrontation	  during	  one	  of	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  
organisation,	  the	  human	  rights	  association	  concluded	  that	  “now	  is	  not	  the	  time	  to	  address	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
667	  Samti	  and	  Belkhiria.	  “Gay	  Tunisia:	  A	  ‘Don’t	  Ask,	  Don’t	  Tell’	  Situation.”	  
668	  Informants	  27:	  Co-­‐founder	  and	  journalists,	  English	  news	  website/media;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	  
669	  As	  quoted	  in	  Samti	  and	  Belkhiria,	  “Gay	  Tunisia:	  A	  ‘Don’t	  Ask,	  Don’t	  Tell’	  Situation.”	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these	   issues	   in	  Tunisia.”	  Even	  when	  one	   looks	  outside	   the	  country	  across	   the	  Middle	  East	  
and	  North	  Africa	  in	  the	  post-­‐Arab	  uprising	  era,	  members	  of	  LGBT	  organisations	  themselves	  
advise	  against	  engaging	   in	  overt	  advocacy	   for	  greater	   rights	   for	  homosexual	  communities,	  
such	   as	   establishing	   new	   LGBT	   associations.	   El	   Feki	   describes	   a	  member	   of	   a	  well-­‐known	  
LGBT	   organisation	   in	   Lebanon	   advising	   caution	   to	   homosexual	   communities	   in	   Egypt,	   for	  
example	   stating,	   “Now	   is	   not	   the	   time	   to	   say	   in	   Egypt,	   ‘I	   want	   to	   establish	   an	   LGBT	  
organisation.’	  There	  are	  foundational	  things	  that	  need	  to	  be	  laid	  first.	  You’re	  talking	  about	  a	  
society	  in	  a	  huge	  sway	  of	  transition,	  and	  the	  building	  blocks	  of	  a	  more	  open	  and	  democratic	  
society	  need	  to	  be	  laid	  down	  first.”670	  
	  
Perhaps	   it	   should	   come	   as	   no	   surprise	   that	   even	   actors	   from	   within	   homosexual	  
communities	  (both	  nationally	  and	  in	  the	  broader	  region)	  did	  not	  have	  consensus	  on	  whether	  
or	  not	   freedom	  from	  violence	  and	  discrimination	  should	   feature	  as	  critical	  post-­‐revolution	  
priorities.	   During	   a	   transition	   from	   authoritarian	   rule	   the	   space	   available	   for	   “other,”	   in	  
particular	  minority	   groups,	   shrinks	   as	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	   attempt	   to	  make	   as	  
many	   “wins”	   as	   possible	  without	   thwarting	   or	   reversing	   gains	  made.	   Voices	   are	   regularly	  
marginalised	   in	   the	   name	   of	   democracy	   and	   consensus	   as	   different	   groups	   and	   issues	  
emerging	   within	   civil	   society	   are	   often	   sidelined	   in	   favour	   of	   what	   is	   “acceptable”	   and	  
featuring	  what	  Tunisia’s	  new	  national	  identity	  should	  resemble.	  Consequently	  one	  observes	  
a	  minority	   that	   could	  move	  with	   relative	   freedom	   under	   the	   former	   system	   finding	   itself	  
being	   excluded	   from	   the	   new	   imaginings	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   state.	   During	  my	   return	   visit	   to	  
Tunisia	  in	  March	  2013,	  I	  learned	  that	  all	  three	  of	  the	  men	  who	  established	  Damj	  to	  defend	  
greater	  human	   rights	  at	   the	  national	   level	  had	   left	  Tunis	   for	   reasons	  of	   security—because	  
they	   felt	  unsafe	  as	  homosexual	  men	   in	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia.	  Moazzam	  and	  Kader	  were	  
given	  asylum	   in	  Europe	  and	   the	  United	  States,	   respectively,	  and	  Nasser	  moved	  outside	  of	  
Tunis	  to	  an	  environment	  where	  he	  could	  find	  more	  like-­‐minded	  peers.	  I	  interviewed	  Nasser	  
on	  my	  return	  visit	  about	  these	  changes.	  He	  said	  during	  the	  interview	  that	  he	  thought	  Kader	  
never	   recovered	   after	   the	   violence	   he	   experienced	   soon	   after	   the	   end	   of	   the	   uprising	   in	  
January	  2011	  (when	  he	  was	  robbed	  and	  beaten).	  He	  remarked	  that	  many	  of	  his	  own	  friends	  
had	  left	  Tunisia	  following	  the	  uprisings	  and	  that	  this	  has	  been	  a	  difficult	  time	  for	  him	  and	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670	  El	  Feki,	  Sex	  and	  the	  Citadel,	  269.	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peers.	  He	   concluded	  by	   saying	   that	  homosexual	   attacks	  were	   regular	   and	   that	   individuals	  
were	  even	  killed.671	  The	  way	  the	  violence	  is	  explained,	  he	  remarked,	  is	  that	  it	  never	  relates	  
to	   homosexuality	   (but	   rather	   to	   random	   untargeted	   acts	   of	   crime	   or	   violence)	   so	   these	  
instances	  of	  violence	  continue	  to	  be	  impossible	  to	  prove.672	  
	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Moments	  of	   sociopolitical	   transformation	   illuminate	  both	  how	  spaces	  expand	  and	   sharply	  
contract	  for	  a	  multitude	  of	  different	  actors	  and	  groups.	  More	  importantly,	  these	  spaces	  may	  
contract	   for	   some	   actors	   but	   expand	   for	   others.	   At	   the	   height	   of	   the	   post-­‐uprising	  
expectations	  for	  democratisation	  in	  Tunisia	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  in	  
2011,	   Tunisia’s	   symbolic	   and	   physical	   public	   spaces	   were	   perhaps	   at	   their	   widest.	   A	  
multiplicity	   of	   discursive	   arenas	   materialised	   in	   which	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	  
articulated	   their	   aspirations	   and	   priorities	   for	   post-­‐uprising	   Tunisia.	   In	   the	   two	   years	  
following	  the	  uprising,	  these	  spaces	  gradually	  narrowed	  for	  some	  actors	  as	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  
priorities	  was	   further	  defined	  and	  some	  views	  (and	  voices)	  were	  pushed	  to	  the	  periphery.	  
This	  eventual	  narrowing	  of	  spaces	  not	  only	  demonstrates	  the	  uncertain	  and	  unstable	  nature	  
of	  democratisation,	  but	  also	  the	  power	  of	  consensus	  to	  exclude	  concerns	  that	  do	  not	  align	  
with	  the	  new	  imaginings	  of	  a	  country’s	  national	  identity.	  
	  
Following	   the	   2010–2011	   Tunisia	   uprising,	   a	   variety	   of	   shifting	   priorities	   were	   fiercely	  
contested	   within	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   discursive	   arenas	   where	   dominant	   publics	   sought	   to	  
marginalise	   and	   enforce	   the	   hegemony	   of	   consensus.	   This	  marginalisation	  was	   facilitated	  
through	  moral	  panics	  produced	  at	  both	  the	  political	  and	  sociocultural	  level	  seeking	  manifold	  
forms	   of	   transitional	   justice	   associated	   with	   the	   impiety	   and	   corruption	   of	   the	   former	  
regime.	  These	  moral	  panics	  also	  heavily	  featured	  sex	  as	  a	  topic	  for	  national	  debate.	  Multiple	  
discourses	  on	  sex	  eventually	  permitted	  both	  the	  “liberal”	  and	  the	  “conservative”	  factions	  to	  
emphasise	  the	  other’s	  unsuitability	  to	  govern	  post-­‐revolution	  Tunisia.	  Each	  side	  could	  gain	  
as	  these	  discourses	  scapegoated	  minorities	  and	  marginalised	  new	  voices	  attempting	  to	  be	  
heard	   in	   Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces.	   Some	   members	   of	   vulnerable	   groups	   perceived	   a	   post-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671	  Ben	  Ammar,	  “Les	  Islamistes	  Tuent	  des	  Gays.”	  
672	  Informant	  25:	  Supervisor	  of	  peer	  educators	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  27	  Jan.	  2012,	  Nov.	  2012	  and	  14	  Mar.	  2013.	  
	   Page	  |	  227	  
revolution	  environment	  where	   they	  would	   likely	   continue	   to	  encounter	  marginalisation	  at	  
multiple	   levels	   and	   in	   which	   their	   own	   personal	   sense	   of	   security	   and	   well-­‐being	   would	  
remain	   uncertain.	   Actors	   who	   were	   hoping	   to	   maximise	   opportunities	   to	   widen	   the	  
discursive	  arena,	  such	  as	  through	  the	  touchstone	  issue	  of	  homosexuality,	  ultimately	  had	  to	  
weigh	   the	   benefits	   of	   visibility	   to	   advocate	   for	   greater	   inclusion	   and	   freedom	   from	  
discrimination	  against	  the	  risks	  of	  further	  violence	  and	  personal	  insecurity.	  
	  
Some	  members	  of	  homosexual	  communities	  were	  able	  to	  make	  remarkable	  advances	  within	  
post-­‐revolution	   Tunisia	   by	   adopting	   different	   mechanisms	   to	   contest	   the	   hegemonic	  
transition	   discourse(s).	   These	   actors	   explicitly	   chose	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   range	   of	   strategies	   to	  
advocate	   recognition	   and	   freedom	   from	   discrimination	   alongside	   the	   numerous	   priorities	  
tabled	  for	  discursive	  contestation.	  Actors	  working	  within	  these	  communities	  participated	  in	  
Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces	   through	   combined	   strategies	   of	   publicity	   and	   visibility	   such	   as	  
participating	  in	  public	  demonstrations	  articulating	  the	  need	  for	  recognition	  through	  symbols	  
such	   as	   the	   rainbow	   flag;	   appropriating	   social	   media	   such	   as	   Facebook	   to	   demonstrate	  
solidarity	   to	   the	   International	   Day	   Against	   Homophobia	   and	   Transphobia;	   establishing	   a	  
formal	   civil	   society	   organisation	   to	   combat	   stigma	   and	   discrimination	   against	   minorities;	  
publicly	   countering	   homophobic	   statements	   in	   the	   media	   through	   mass	   petitions;	   and	  
working	  through	  a	  range	  of	  national	  and	  regional	  networks	  such	  as	  human	  rights	  groups,	  to	  
articulate	   solutions	   to	   challenges	   for	   sexual	  minorities	   in	   Tunisia.	   They	   even	   altered	   their	  
typical	   advocacy	   discourse	   to	   feature	   more	   Islamist	   language	   to	   engage	   with	   more	  
“conservative”	  communities	  at	  the	  sociocultural	  level.	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  these	  actors	  also	  believed	  they	  encountered	  increased	  marginalisation	  at	  the	  
individual/personal-­‐level	   as	   an	   outcome	   of	   this	   growing	   visibility	   at	   the	   political	   and	  
sociocultural	   levels—even	   from	  actors	  within	   civil	   society	   cautioning	   that	   “now	   is	   not	   the	  
time.”	   This	   was	   also	   exacerbated	   by	   a	   series	   of	   public	   incidents	   featuring	   disparate	  
dimensions	   of	   homosexuality,	   including	   homophobic	   statements	   made	   by	   the	   newly	  
appointed	  human	  rights	  minister	  and	  media	  figures	  shortly	  after	  the	  uprising.	  Following	  the	  
field	   research,	   the	   issue	   of	   freedom	   from	   discrimination	   and	   violence	   for	   homosexual	  
communities	  continued	  to	  spark	  controversy	  and	  contention	   in	  Tunisia	  as	  several	  Tunisian	  
students	   were	   imprisoned	   on	   official	   charges	   of	   homosexuality	   (Article	   230	   of	   the	   penal	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code)	   in	  2015.673	  The	   justice	  minister	  under	  the	  new	  secular	  government,	  Salah	  Ben	  Aissa,	  
subsequently	   called	   for	   the	   removal	   of	   Article	   230;	   he	   was	   dismissed	   from	   his	   post	   the	  
following	  month,	   in	   October	   2015.674	  In	   one	   case,	   six	   students	   were	   given	   the	  maximum	  
sentence	  of	  three	  years.	  Moreover,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  reported	  that	  from	  2010–2011	  ten	  
homosexual	  men	  in	  Tunisia	  had	  been	  killed	  in	  hate	  crimes.675	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  examined	  the	  third	  and	  final	  theme	  of	  the	  thesis,	  specifically	  the	  exclusionary	  
nature	   of	   consensus	   in	   “liberal”	   democracies.	   In	   continuing	   to	   analyse	   how	   conflict	   is	  
manifested	  among	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups,	  it	  traced	  the	  areas	  of	  these	  contestations	  
and	   their	   consequences	   for	   these	   actors	   and	   more	   broadly.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   rather	   than	  
critical	   conflicts	   and	   contestations	   emerging	   between	   secular	   and	   Islamist	   groups,	   as	  
demonstrated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  areas	  of	  contestation	  were	  over	  key	  touchstone	  
issues	   such	   as	   sex	   and	   homosexuality.	   Issues	   concerning	   sexual	   minorities	   often	   spark	  
intense	   debates	   on	   identity	   politics,	   socioreligious	   norms	   and	   the	   influence	   of	   Western	  
understandings	  of	  liberalism	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  human	  rights	  and	  equality.	  More	  importantly,	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  Tunisia,	  they	  aroused	  contention	  among	  both	  secular	  and	  Islamist	  civil	  society	  
actors	  and	  groups.	  As	  many	  Tunisians	  felt	  “now	  is	  not	  the	  time”	  to	  highlight	  human	  rights	  
abuses	   against	   homosexual	   communities	   or	   to	   advocate	   for	   changing	   criminalising	   penal	  
codes,	   the	   consequence	   was	   an	   effective	   discursive	   narrowing	   following	   earlier	   political	  
liberalisation	  measures	  to	  expand	  these	  spaces.	  This	  discursive	  narrowing	  is	  a	  consequence	  
of	  a	   fundamental	  democratic	  practice,	   consensus.	  The	   ideal	  of	   consensus	  allows	  a	  host	  of	  
actors	   to	   exclude	   and	   negate	   alternative	   views	   through	   the	   hegemony	   of	   consensus.	  
Moreover,	   through	   the	   neoliberal	   framework	   the	   preference	   for	   consensus	   has	   been	   re-­‐
institutionalised	   to	   promote	   the	   virtues	   of	   democratisation.	   Following	   a	   transition	   from	  
authoritarian	   rule,	   consensus	   effectively	   becomes	   a	   key	  means	   to	   enforce	  hegemonies	   as	  
the	   post-­‐revolution	   hierarchy	   of	   priorities	   is	   redefined	   and	   “other”	   is	   pushed	   to	   the	  
periphery	   or	   negated	   entirely.	   Consequently,	   consensus	   becomes	   a	   critical	   mechanism	  
through	  which	   conflicts	   are	  muted	  and	  discursive	  arenas	  are	   squeezed.	   In	   the	  absence	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
673	  See:	  “Tunisia	  jails	  six	  students	  for	  homosexuality”	  and	  McCormick-­‐Cavanagh,	  “Tunisia	  LGBT	  group	  battles	  
for	  justice.”	  
674	  See:	  “Tunisia	  jails	  six	  students	  for	  homosexuality.”	  
675	  McCormick-­‐Cavanagh,	  “Tunisia	  LGBT	  group	  battles	  for	  justice.”	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these	  conflicts,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  genuine	  discursive	  contestation	  
is	  taking	  place.	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Change	  and	  continuity	  
Chapter	  VII.	  Conclusion	  	  
	  
	  
	  
I	  was,	  I	  am	  and	  I	  will	  remain	  an	  activist.	  I	  will	  stay	  in	  this	  county,	  	  
it	  is	  mine	  and	  I	  will	  not	  let	  it	  go.	  
	  
-­‐-­‐LGBT	  activist,	  Tunisia676	  
	  
	  
The	  image	  I	  keep	  thinking	  of	  is	  a	  mother	  giving	  birth	  to	  her	  child,	  with	  cries	  of	  pain.	  Out	  of	  
this,	  I	  think	  we	  can	  grow	  into	  a	  Tunisia	  that’s	  more	  modern,	  open,	  and	  tolerant.	  
	  
-­‐-­‐Tunisian	  activist677	  
	  
	  
The	  year	  2014	  marked	  a	  milestone	  in	  Tunisia’s	  evolution	  and	  in	  the	  post-­‐“Arab	  Spring”	  era	  
as	   the	  country	  ratified	  a	  new	  constitution	  and	  elected	  a	  new	  president.	   In	   January	  of	   that	  
year,	   the	   National	   Constituent	   Assembly	   adopted	   the	   new	   constitution	   based	   on	   the	  
consensus	   of	   the	   majority,	   thereby	   putting	   an	   end	   to	   the	   political	   stalemate	   between	  
secular	   and	   Islamist	   factions	   in	   which	   the	   country	   had	   been	   mired	   for	   more	   than	   two	  
years.678	  Moreover,	   in	  October	  2014,	  Beji	  Caid	  Essebsi,	  who	  briefly	  served	  as	  a	  transitional	  
prime	  minister	   in	  2011	   immediately	   following	   the	  downfall	  of	   the	  Ben	  Ali	   regime,	  won	  55	  
percent	  of	  votes	  cast	  as	  the	  candidate	  of	  the	  secular	  Nidaa	  Tounes	  party.	  Essebsi,	  a	  former	  
three-­‐time	  minister	  under	  Bourguiba,	  was	   confirmed	  as	   the	  winner	  of	   Tunisia’s	   “first	   free	  
presidential	   election”	   since	   independence	   from	   France	   in	   1956. 679 	  Nevertheless,	   it	   is	  
estimated	   that	  over	  half	  of	   the	  new	  86	  Nidaa	  Tounes	   parliamentary	  members	  are	   former	  
members	  of	  the	  RCD	  party,	  reflecting	  both	  change	  and	  continuity	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  
2010–2011	  Tunisia	  uprising.	  
	  
Tunisia,	   a	   country	   of	   approximately	   11	   million	   inhabitants	   wedged	   between	   Algeria	   and	  
Libya	  in	  North	  Africa,	  has	  claimed	  a	  number	  of	  firsts	  since	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  began	  in	  early	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
676	  Informant	  26:	  Supervisor	  of	  key	  populations	  and	  outreach	  worker,	  HIV/AIDS	  association	  and	  founder	  of	  
Damj;	  Tunis,	  30	  Jan.	  2012.	  
677	  As	  cited	  in	  Crary,	  “Gays	  in	  Egypt,	  Tunisia	  Worry.”	  
678	  Grote,	  “The	  New	  2014	  Tunisian	  Constitution.”	  	  
679	  Byrne,	  “Tunisia	  Elections.”	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2011,	   including	  being	  the	  first	  country	  to	  bring	  down	  a	  repressive	  dictator	  and	  the	  first	   to	  
hold	  peaceful	  democratic	  elections.	  The	  small	  country	  nourished	  expectations	  globally	  that	  
a	  higher	  standard	  of	  democracy	  was	  being	  put	  forward,	  cultivated,	  and	  led	  by	  the	  will	  of	  the	  
people.	   In	   effect,	   every	   move	   in	   Tunisia’s	   political	   and	   public	   spaces	   was	   intensely	  
monitored	   by	   both	   those	  within	   and	   outside	   the	   country.	  Moreover,	   the	   “resurrection	   of	  
civil	   society”	   captured	   the	  attention	  of	  activists,	   associations,	  academics,	  decision-­‐makers,	  
and	   international	  donors	  who	  once	  again	  attempted	  to	  determine	  whether	   there	   is	  a	   role	  
for	   civil	   society	   actors	   during	   a	   transition	   from	   authoritarian	   rule.	   On	   10	   October	   2015,	  
almost	  five	  years	  after	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising,	  a	  handful	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  known	  as	  
the	   Tunisian	   National	   Dialogue	   Quartet	   were	   awarded	   the	   Nobel	   Peace	   Prize	   for	   their	  
“decisive	   contribution	   to	   the	   building	   of	   a	   pluralist	   democracy	   in	   Tunisia”	   following	   the	  
2010–2011	   uprising.680	  These	   four	   organisations	  were	   the	   Tunisian	   General	   Labour	   Union	  
(UGTT),	  the	  Tunisian	  Confederation	  of	  Industry,	  Trade	  and	  Handicrafts	  (UTICA),	  the	  Tunisian	  
Human	   Rights	   League	   (LTDH),	   and	   the	   Tunisian	   Order	   of	   Lawyers.	   While	   praising	   the	  
Tunisian	  groups’	   specific	  work,	   the	  Norwegian	  Nobel	  Committee	   indicated	   that	   the	  honor	  
also	   reflected	   on	   civil	   society	   actors	  more	   broadly.	   The	   press	   release	   regarding	   the	   2015	  
prize,	   posted	   on	   the	   committee’s	   official	   website,	   states	   that	   “the	   transition	   in	   Tunisia	  
shows	  that	  civil	   society	   institutions	  and	  organisations	  can	  play	  a	  crucial	   role	   in	  a	  country’s	  
democratisation,	   and	   that	   such	   a	  process,	   even	  under	  difficult	   circumstances,	   can	   lead	   to	  
free	  elections	  and	  the	  peaceful	  transfer	  of	  power.”681	  As	  observed	  in	  the	  social	  movements	  
of	   Eastern	   Europe	   and	   Latin	   America	   in	   the	   1980s,	   and	   across	   the	   neoliberal	   framework	  
today,	  civil	  society	  has	  come	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  torchbearer	  for	  democracy	  and	  simultaneously	  as	  
the	  antithesis	  to	  authoritarianism.	  	  
	  
This	  thesis	  undertook	  both	  a	  conceptual	  and	  an	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  Tunisia	  
by	  focusing	  on	  many	  of	  the	  sector’s	  actors	  during	  a	  two-­‐year	  period	  of	  critical	  sociopolitical	  
disruption	  and	  transformation	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime.	  In	  particular,	  it	  
analysed	  how	  and	  why	  different	  conflicts	  and	  cleavages	  emerged	  among	  civil	  society	  actors	  
and	  groups	  after	  the	  Tunisia	  uprising.	  As	  an	  initial	  point	  of	  departure	  I	  recognised	  that	  just	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
680	  See:	  “The	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  for	  2015,”	  available	  at:	  
www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2015/press.html.	  
681	  Ibid.	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as	   there	  are	  areas	  of	  consensus	  and	  solidarity	  among	  these	  actors,	   there	  are	  also	  matters	  
over	   which	   there	   is	   intense	   disagreement	   and	   divergence.	   Therefore,	   just	   as	   there	   is	  
harmony	   and	   inclusion,	   there	   is	   also	   conflict	   and	   exclusion.	   Within	   the	   context	   of	   a	  
transition	   from	   authoritarian	   rule	   and	   a	   national	   drive	   toward	   democratisation,	   I	  
endeavoured	   to	   further	  understand	   these	  exclusions.	  Hence,	   the	  overarching	  question	   for	  
the	   research	   was	   to	   consider	   how	   conflict	   is	   manifested	   among	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	  
groups.	  This	  was	  undertaken	  primarily	   to	  examine	   the	  areas	   in	  which	   these	   conflicts	   took	  
place	  and	  the	  specific	  consequences	  of	  these	  contestations.	  I	  conducted	  this	  research	  within	  
the	  post-­‐uprising	   context	   in	  order	   to	  both	  1)	   shed	   further	   light	  on	   these	   conflicts	   as	   they	  
emerged	   in	   the	   country’s	   expanding	   symbolic	   and	   physical	   discursive	   arenas,	   and	   2)	  
determine	   whether	   these	   conflicts	   served	   as	   productive	   forces	   to	   maintain	   discursive	  
contestation	  as	  Tunisia	  pursued	  a	  pluralist	  democracy.	  Furthermore,	  because	  these	  conflicts	  
assumed	  vital	  importance	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  a	  dictatorship	  and	  at	  a	  time	  when	  issues	  
such	  as	  the	  status	  of	  women,	  human	  rights,	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  press,	  legalised	  prostitution	  
and	   homosexuality	   became	   critical	   matters	   of	   contestation	   regarding	   Tunisia’s	   post-­‐
revolution	   national	   identity,	   I	   contend	   that	   these	   conflicts	   are	   indeed	   consequential	   and	  
worthy	  of	  further	  scrutiny.	  
	  
As	  the	  principal	  context	  of	  the	  research	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  events	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  
two	  years	  subsequent	  to	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising,	   the	  thesis	   identified	  and	  explored	  three	  
principal	  themes:	  the	  “illiberal”	  effects	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  public	  space(s),	  the	  emerging	  
sociocultural	  and	  socioreligious	  divisions	  (including	  the	  rise	  of	  associational	  or	  social	  Islam),	  
and	   finally	   the	   exclusionary	   (and	   undemocratic)	   nature	   of	   consensus	   in	   “liberal”	  
democracies.	   Effectively,	   these	   three	   themes	   underscore	   the	   premise	   that	   civil	   society	  
became	  more	   conflictual	   and	   contested	   among	   and	   across	   its	   diverse	   elements	   following	  
the	   Tunisia	   uprising	   compared	  with	   the	   situation	  previously	   under	   authoritarian	   rule.	   The	  
research	  observed	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  that	  emerged	  to	  fill	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces	  following	  the	  
implementation	  of	  political	   liberalisation	  measures	   in	  the	  immediate	  months	  following	  the	  
departure	   of	   the	   Ben	  Ali	   regime.	   These	   groups	   not	   only	   included	   social	  welfare	   provision	  
organisations	   but	   also	   organisations	   working	   with	   marginalised	   populations	   who	   often	  
found	   themselves	   on	   the	   periphery,	  mostly	   excluded	   from	  mainstream	   public	   discourses.	  
Specifically,	  the	  research	  included	  participants	  from	  human	  rights	  organisations	  established	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before	   and	   after	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   regime,	   humanitarian	   development	   organisations	  
(including	   Islamic	   associations)	   created	   after	   2011,	   and	   organisations	   working	   with	  
communities	  living	  with	  and	  affected	  by	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  sexual	  minorities	  established	  before	  
and	  subsequent	  to	  the	  uprising	  in	  Tunisia.	  Finally,	  I	  advocated	  the	  importance	  of	  researching	  
marginalised	   communities	   who	   experienced	   the	   brunt	   of	   sociopolitical	   turmoil	   and	   who	  
often	   struggled	   to	   participate	   in	   mainstream	   discursive	   arenas.	   What	   happens	   at	   the	  
periphery	   sheds	   light	   on	   populations	  who	   are	   routinely	   stigmatised	   and	   criminalised,	   and	  
more	  importantly,	  who	  often	  find	  their	  human	  rights	  eroded	  as	  a	  result	  of	  populist	  decisions	  
and	  moral	  panics	  associated	  with	  transitions.	  	  
	  
This	   chapter	   reflects	   back	   on	   the	   core	   three	   themes	   of	   the	   thesis	   and	   considers	   the	  
overarching	   research	   question	   as	   well	   as	   the	   emerging	   questions	   framed	   across	   the	  
different	   chapters.	  However,	   first	   this	   final	   chapter	  discusses	   some	  of	   the	  methodological	  
challenges	  and	  opportunities	   involved	   in	   conducting	   research	  during	  periods	  of	   significant	  
sociopolitical	   transformation.	  Throughout	   the	  research	   I	   regularly	  considered	  the	  different	  
aspects	   that	   can	   be	   general	   and	   specific	   to	   transitions	   from	   authoritarian	   rule.	   Some	   of	  
these	   considerations	   can	   arguably	   affect	   both	   the	   research	   and	   the	   researcher.	   Following	  
this	  discussion,	   I	  present	  summaries	  of	   the	  core	  themes	  and	  chapters	  of	   the	  research	  and	  
consider	  the	  overall	   implications	  of	  this	  research	  on	  civil	  society	  through	  the	  case	  study	  of	  
Tunisia.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
1. Disruptions	   and	   transformations:	   conducting	   research	   following	   the	   downfall	   of	   a	  
regime	  
	  
Conducting	   research	   during	   a	   period	   of	   significant	   sociopolitical	   disruption	   and	  
transformation,	  such	  as	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  in	  place	  over	  two	  
decades,	   brings	   both	   challenges	   and	   opportunities	   for	   the	   researcher,	   and	   more	  
importantly,	  requires	  flexibility	  in	  the	  research	  model	  as	  well	  as	  enhanced	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  
informants	  during	  the	  interviews.	  During	  the	  main	  research	  period	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  the	  initial	  
six	  weeks	  of	  research	  in	  Egypt,	  I	  observed	  three	  main	  factors	  that	  can	  affect	  research	  within	  
contexts	   of	   sociopolitical	   transformations.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   interviews—
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specifically,	  how	  closely	  an	  interview	  followed	  the	  uprisings	  corresponded	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  
openness	   of	   the	   participant.	   The	   second	   was	   the	   residue	   of	   authoritarian	   rule	   and	   the	  
nature	  of	   the	  security	  apparatus	  of	   the	  shadow	  state.	  This	   residue	  affected	   the	  degree	  of	  
caution	   some	   participants	   would	   have	   in	   the	   interviews	   and,	   furthermore,	   inevitably	  
necessitated	  and	  resulted	  in	  some	  degree	  of	  carefulness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  researcher.	  And	  
finally,	   the	   third	   factor	   is	   the	   (sense	   of)	   turbulence	   of	   the	   transition(ing)	   environment	  
itself—the	   spectrum	   of	   emotions	   and	   the	   rapid	   nature	   in	   which	   they	   routinely	   vacillated	  
among	  members	  of	  the	  population	  as	  reflected	  in	  the	  media	  and	  within	  public	  spaces.	  While	  
the	  majority	  of	  the	  research	  was	  eventually	  carried	  out	  following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  
regime	   in	  Tunisia,	   the	   initial	   research	  phase	   in	  Egypt	  allowed	   for	   some	  comparisons	   to	  be	  
made	   for	   the	  overall	   research	  context.	  Experiencing	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  uprisings	   in	   two	  
countries	   ultimately	   allowed	   for	   the	   articulation	   of	   a	  more	   refined	   set	   of	  methodological	  
considerations	  for	  researching	  in	  similar	  contexts.	  And	  while	  I	  do	  not	  think	  these	  factors	  are	  
necessarily	   universal,	   I	   do	   think	   they	   merit	   consideration	   when	   undertaking	   research	   in	  
comparable	  environments.	  
	  
First,	   as	   with	   other	   research	   conducted	   following	   the	   Arab	   uprisings,	   the	   timing	   of	   the	  
interviews	  often	  shapes	  the	  response	  of	  the	  interviewee.682	  The	  timing	  determined	  whether	  
people	  were	  still	  experiencing	  the	  euphoria	  of	  having	  brought	  the	  downfall	  of	  a	  regime,	  or	  
perhaps	   were	   instead	   concerned	   about	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   the	   transition.	   Following	   the	  
Tunisia	   uprising,	   for	   example,	   individuals	   were	   much	   more	   willing	   and	   eager	   to	   speak	  
candidly	  about	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  the	  broader	  region,	  from	  rumours	  about	  
the	  former	  regime’s	  family	  to	  frank	  outbursts	  concerning	  Ennahda.	  The	  initial	  eagerness	  to	  
speak	   openly	   about	   the	   political	   and	   cultural	   transition(s)	   transpiring	   across	   Tunisia	   was	  
manifested	  by	   the	   fact	   that	  many	  people	  gave	  me	  an	  unexpectedly	  substantial	  amount	  of	  
time	  during	  interviews	  even	  up	  to	  one	  year	  after	  Ben	  Ali	  fled	  the	  country.	  It	  was	  not	  unusual	  
for	  people	   to	  give	   two	  hours	  and	  an	  additional	  meeting	   to	   follow-­‐up.	  When	  asked	  what	   I	  
was	  studying	  and	  I	  replied	  “political	  science	  in	  the	  Middle	  East”	  (as	  not	  that	  many	  seemed	  to	  
understand	  the	  concept	  of	  development	  studies),	  most	  individuals	  replied	  with	  laughter	  at	  
my	  timing	  before	   launching	  into	  a	  monologue	  of	  their	  own	  personal	  perceptions	  following	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
682	  See:	  Gunning	  and	  Baron,	  Why	  Occupy	  a	  Square,	  19.	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the	   end	   of	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime.	   Furthermore,	   once	   a	   discussion	   began	   it	   was	   usually	   the	  
interviewee	  who	  spoke	  without	  much	  prompting	  at	  all	  and	  covered	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues	  
related	   to	  my	   topic	  of	   research.	  All	   of	   the	   family	  members	  and	   friends	  of	   the	   family	  with	  
whom	   I	   interacted	   in	   2012	   spoke	   at	   length	   with	   me	   on	   the	   political	   situation,	   as	   did	  
swimmers	   at	   my	   local	   pool,	   taxi	   drivers,	   and	   even	   research	   assistants	   at	   the	   national	  
documentation	   centre.	   However,	   while	   I	   encountered	   an	   incredible	   openness	   among	   the	  
general	  population	  and	  different	  civil	  society	  actors	  working	  with	  marginalised	  communities	  
in	   2011	   and	   2012,	   upon	   my	   return	   in	   2013	   I	   found	   that	   for	   many,	   the	   residue	   of	  
authoritarian	   rule	   had	   resurfaced;	   individuals	   were	  more	   guarded	   and	   cautious	   in	   where	  
they	  chose	  to	  meet	  me,	  for	  example	  in	  crowded	  cafes	  rather	  than	  their	  offices,	  and	  in	  their	  
responses.	  
	  
Second,	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   research,	   I	   concentrated	   on	   the	   particular	   period	   of	  
sociopolitical	   transformation	   for	   civil	   society	   organisations	   in	   Tunisia.	   However,	   soon	  
thereafter	   I	   noticed	   a	   degree	   of	   discomfort	   in	   some	   of	   my	   initial	   interviews;	   some	  
participants	   visibly	   became	   uneasy	   and	   guarded	   simply	   because	   I	   referred	   outright	   to	  
specific	  political	  phenomena.	  At	  this	  stage	  (early	  in	  the	  research)	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  change	  
my	   interview	   approach	   to	   be	   less	   overtly	   political	   and	   therefore	   less	   threatening	   to	   the	  
interviewees,	  many	  of	  whom	  acted	   as	   representatives	   of	   organisations,	   given	   the	   current	  
climate.	  To	  allow	  the	  research	  framework	  more	  flexibility	  following	  the	  uprising,	  I	  was	  also	  
required	   to	   expand	   my	   focus.	   I	   adapted	   the	   research	   to	   allow	   for	   a	   before	   and	   after	  
discussion	  during	  which	  both	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐revolution	  perceptions	  could	  emerge	  as	  well	  as	  
a	   discussion	   on	   social	   turmoil	   and	   different	   transition	   processes.	   This	   permitted	   those	  
organisations	   working	   with	   vulnerable	   groups	   (female	   sex	   workers,	   sexual	   minorities,	  
socially	  excluded	  women,	  and	  people	  who	  use	  drugs)	  to	  detail	  how—within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  
government/political	   system	   that	   regularly	   expanded	   and	   contracted	   its	   public	   spaces	   as	  
well	  as	   its	  methods	  to	  control	  civil	  society—they	  had	  to	  adapt	  their	  strategies	   for	  working	  
over	   time.	   This	   alteration	   opened	   up	   my	   topic	   and	   created	   a	   stronger	   opportunity	   for	  
discussion	   with	   the	   research	   participants,	   several	   of	   whom	   seemed	   convinced	   the	  
surveillance	  and	  security	  apparatus	  of	  the	  state	  was	  still	  fully	  operational.	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Nevertheless,	   I	   was	   regularly	   reminded	   that	  many	   Egyptians	   and	   Tunisians	   had	   lived	   in	   a	  
climate	  of	  fear	  and	  indiscriminate	  violence	  for	  more	  than	  three	  decades;	  furthermore,	  this	  
fear	  would	  not	  disappear	  overnight.	  Moreover,	  during	  the	  field	  research	  I	  found	  that	  even	  I	  
was	  caught	  off-­‐guard	  with	  the	  degree	  of	  caution	   I	  undertook	  during	  some	  of	   the	  research	  
interviews,	   for	  example	  by	  choosing	  not	   to	  ask	  probing	  questions	   in	  some	   instances	  or	  by	  
reverting	   back	   to	   questions	   of	   a	   more	   programmatic/organisational	   nature.	   Both	   the	  
sensationalist	  reports	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  media	  and	  an	  overall	  general	  climate	  of	  fear	  among	  
friends	  and	  colleagues	  undoubtedly	  contributed	  to	  my	  own	  sense	  of	   restraint	  and	  respect	  
for	  the	  concerns	  of	  my	  interviewees	  in	  this	  regard.	  When	  friends,	  including	  my	  28-­‐year-­‐old	  
female	  neighbour	  (and	  self-­‐appointed	  caretaker)	  upstairs,	  asked	  what	   I	  was	  researching	   in	  
Cairo,	  they	  would	  often	  express	  worry	  for	  my	  own	  personal	  safety	  because	  I	  was	  studying	  
civil	   society	   organisations	   and	   because	   I	   was	   foreign.	   Even	   one	   of	   the	   World	   Health	  
Organization	   representatives	   in	   Egypt	   said	   my	   research	   “could	   be	   dangerous	   for	   the	  
organisations	   I	  am	   interviewing,	  as	  well	  as	  dangerous	   for	  me.”	  Admittedly,	   the	  anxiety	   for	  
my	   own	   safety	   elicited	   by	   friends	   and	   colleagues	   alongside	   a	   creeping	   xenophobia	   in	   the	  
region	  were	  complex	  elements	  to	  grapple	  with	  during	  the	  research.	  
	  
Third,	   when	   researching	   within	   transition	   contexts	   a	   rapid	   and	   accumulated	   sense	   of	  
exhaustion	  eventually	  sets	   in.	   In	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia,	  the	  collective	  populations	   in	  the	  urban	  
areas	  where	  I	  was	  researching	  appeared	  to	  be	  on	  high	  alert	  and	  engaged	  completely	  in	  the	  
sociopolitical	   transformations	   occurring	   in	   their	   country.	   People	   were	   angry,	   euphoric,	  
frustrated,	  and	  scared.	  One	  example	  was	  in	  Tunisia	  when	  one	  of	  the	  older	  neighbours	  met	  
us	   in	   the	   road	   crying.	   She	   said	   she	   was	   crying	   because	   she	   was	   now	   worried	   about	   the	  
future	  of	  her	  granddaughter	  under	  an	  Islamist	  government.	  She	  was	  concerned	  whether	  her	  
granddaughter	  would	  have	   to	  wear	   the	  hijab	   and	  would	   risk	  having	  a	  husband	  with	  more	  
than	   one	  wife.	   These	  were	   her	   apprehensions	   as	   she	   cried	   openly	   in	   a	   residential	   street.	  
Bendana	   writes,	   "the	   restlessness	   of	   opinion	   is	   an	   additional	   emotion	   in	   this	   transitory	  
phase....The	   speed	   of	   events	   makes	   things	   hard	   to	   understand	   [or	   literally	   ‘confuses	   the	  
sight’]	  as	  so	  much	  of	  Tunisian	  political	  life	  remains	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  practices	  that	  are	  
difficult	  to	  reverse	  overnight."683	  I	  often	  felt	  as	  a	  researcher	  that	  these	  collective	  emotions	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  Transition,	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were	  challenging	  to	  contend	  with.	  Nevertheless	  throughout	  the	  research	  period	  I	  felt	  I	  was	  
participating	   in	   something	  exceptional,	   as	   I	   too	  allowed	  myself	   to	  be	   taken	  on	   this	   ride.	   I	  
experienced	  the	  shock	  when	  the	  young	  woman	  was	  pushed	  off	  the	  wall	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Manouba	   trying	   to	   replace	   the	   Salafi	   flag	   with	   the	   Tunisian	   flag	   in	   2012	   and	   a	   sense	   of	  
disillusionment	  when	  Chokri	  Belaid	  was	  assassinated	  in	  2013.	  	  
	  
Finally,	   these	   challenges	   encountered	   in	   the	  methodology	   and	   in	   the	   research	  within	   this	  
context	  reflect	  more	  generally	  my	  central	  findings	  concerning	  what	  transpires	  during	  these	  
transitional	   periods.	   Following	   the	   downfall	   of	   an	   authoritarian	   regime	   or	   any	   significant	  
sociopolitical	   transformation,	   time	   often	   becomes	   seemingly	   chaotic	   and	   non-­‐linear	   as	   a	  
range	  of	  different	   ideas,	  priorities,	  and	  visions	  effectively	  rush	  into	  the	  public	  space.	  Static	  
concepts	   are	   reborn	   as	  multiple	   actors	   emerge	   to	   stamp	   their	   ideological	   claim	   onto	   the	  
present.	  Transitions	  from	  authoritarian	  rule	  can	  be	  characterised	  by	  a	  jostling	  between	  state	  
and	  society	  whereby	  relations	  of	  power	  are	  both	  macro	  and	  micro,	  horizontal	  and	  vertical,	  
repressive	  and	  emancipatory.	  These	  moments	  of	  disruption,	  change,	  and	  transformation	  are	  
also	  remarkable	  periods	  that	  can	  offer	  a	  renewed	  dynamism	  to	  these	  concepts	  and	  actors.	  It	  
is	  a	  period	  of	  expansions	  and	  contractions	  across	  many	  levels	  simultaneously,	  fluid	  change,	  
and	  micro-­‐practices	  that	  reveal,	  in	  their	  temporariness,	  the	  plurality	  of	  humanity	  itself.	  	  
	  
The	   next	   section	   considers	   the	   overarching	   research	   question	   and	   emerging	   questions	  
across	  the	  core	  chapters	  and	  themes	  of	  the	  thesis.	  It	  concludes	  with	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  
research	  and	  considerations	  for	  future	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  research	  on	  civil	  society	  in	  
post-­‐authoritarian	  contexts.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
2. Expansions	   and	   contractions:	   tracking	   the	   movement	   of	   national	   priorities	   in	   post-­‐
uprising	  Tunisia	  
	  
In	   January	   2011	   a	   space	   opened.	   The	  moments	   of	   solidarity	   and	   national	   unity	   of	   having	  
brought	  down	  a	  dictator	  created	  a	  momentum	  whereby	  the	  popular	  masses	  forced	  the	  field	  
open	  for	  political	  liberalisation.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  range	  of	  both	  secular	  and	  non-­‐secular	  political	  
parties	  were	  able	  to	  register	  and	  the	  laws	  of	  association	  were	  amended,	  two	  developments	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that	   allowed	   thousands	   of	   new	   organisations	   to	   find	   their	   voices	   and	   strive	   to	   openly	  
influence	   the	   shaping	   of	   a	   new	   Tunisia.	   One	   observed	   the	   elements	   that	   are	   considered	  
general	  to	  transitions	  from	  authoritarian	  rule:	  the	  popular	  upsurge,	  the	  implementation	  of	  
political	   liberalisation	   measures,	   and	   the	   “resurrection	   of	   civil	   society”	   in	   the	   immediate	  
months	   that	   preceded	   and	   followed	   the	   uprising.	   However,	   one	   also	   witnessed	   the	  
disruption	  and	  transformation	  wrought	  by	  a	  country	   in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  higher	  or	  different	  
standard	  of	  democracy.	  These	  moments	  of	  sociopolitical	  unrest	  carried	  with	  them	  a	  host	  of	  
emerging	   conflicts	   and	   contestations	   within	   political	   as	   well	   as	   public	   spaces	   as	   critical	  
decisions	   were	   made	   regarding	   political	   leaders	   and	   national	   priorities.	   Moreover,	  
previously	  marginalised	   actors	   and	   groups	   sought	   recognition	   and	   dignity	   as	   the	   country	  
defined	   its	   new	   national	   identity.	   The	   three	   core	   themes	   of	   the	   thesis	   underscore	   the	  
specific	  areas	  and	  consequences	  of	   these	  conflicts,	   in	  particular	  among	  civil	   society	  actors	  
and	   groups	   as	   they	   move	   to	   participate	   in	   Tunisia’s	   new	   and	   expanding	   symbolic	   and	  
physical	  public	  spaces	  following	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising.	  As	  noted	  previously	  in	  this	  chapter,	  
these	  three	  core	  themes	  are:	  1)	  the	  “illiberal”	  effects	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  public	  space(s),	  
2)	  the	  emerging	  sociocultural	  and	  socioreligious	  divisions	  (including	  the	  rise	  of	  associational	  
or	  social	  Islam),	  and	  3)	  the	  exclusionary	  (and	  undemocratic)	  nature	  of	  consensus	  in	  “liberal”	  
democracies.	   These	   themes	   serve	   to	   show	   how	   civil	   society	   became	   more	   conflictual	  
between	  its	  different	  elements	  after	  the	  uprising	  than	  previously	  under	  authoritarian	  rule.	  
They	  also	  illuminate	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  conflicts,	  stemming	  from	  both	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  
pre-­‐revolution	   regimes	   of	   Bourguiba	   and	   Ben	   Ali,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   new	   and	   uncertain	  
sociopolitical	  terrain	  that	  materialised	  after	  2011.	  	  	  
	  
Chapter	   III:	   The	   consolidation	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   state	   examined	   the	   approaches	   of	   the	  
Bourguiba	  and	  Ben	  Ali	  regimes	  to	  civil	  society	  from	  the	  period	  of	  independence	  in	  1956,	  in	  
particular	   in	   regards	   to	   how	   each	   regime	   manipulated	   the	   spaces	   for	   these	   actors	   to	  
manoeuvre	   over	   time.	   In	   order	   to	   do	   this,	   the	   chapter	   first	   discusses	   how	   the	   particular	  
origins,	  initial	  structures,	  and	  leadership	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  shaped	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  
engaged	   with	   these	   actors	   and	   groups.	   Through	   Ben	   Romdhane’s	   description	   of	   the	  
“authoritarian	   spiral”	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   discern	   how	   particular	   crisis	   moments	   in	   the	  
transformation	   of	   the	   state	   represented	   critical	   watersheds	   in	   Tunisia’s	   sociopolitical	  
development.	  For	  example,	  although	  Bourguiba	  inherited	  a	  highly	  centralised	  and	  efficient	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state	  apparatus	  following	  independence	  from	  French	  colonial	  rule	  in	  1956,	  he	  was	  required	  
to	  repeatedly	  prevent	  and	  manage	  the	  conflicts	  that	  emerged	  prior	  to	  and	  following	  his	  rise	  
to	  leadership.	  He	  encountered	  contestations	  to	  his	  legitimacy	  both	  within	  the	  Neo-­‐Destour	  
Party	  (PSD)	  and	  throughout	  his	  drive	  to	  implement	  controversial	  policies	  such	  as	  the	  Code	  of	  
Personal	   Status	   and	   austere	   socioeconomic	   reforms.	   Over	   the	   three	   decades	   in	   which	  
Bourguiba	  governed	  Tunisia,	   the	  overall	  project	  and	  prioritisation	  of	  national	   construction	  
inevitably	   supplanted	   measures	   to	   foster	   political	   pluralism	   and	   liberalism.	   As	   this	  
“authoritarian	  spiral”	  intensified,	  the	  response	  to	  perceived	  opposition	  became	  increasingly	  
severe.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  institutions	  of	  civil	  society	  became	  weak	  or	  non-­‐existent,	  and	  were	  
gradually	  co-­‐opted	  into	  the	  broader	  Tunisian	  state	  and	  PSD.	  
	  
The	   residue	   of	   authoritarianism	   eventually	   carried	   over	   into	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime	   despite	  
initial	  optimism	  for	  democratic	  reform	  and	  a	  more	  pluralist	  society.	  After	  Ben	  Ali	  succeeded	  
Bourguiba,	   the	   new	   president	   was	   keen	   to	   demonstrate	   a	   commitment	   to	   neoliberal	  
economic	  reform	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad;	  he	  was	  equally	  committed	  to	  demonstrating	  his	  
outward	   conviction	   in	   liberal	   political	   reform.	   As	   early	   as	   the	   1990s,	   Ben	   Ali	   created	  
perceptible	  openings	  for	  political	  liberalisation.	  What	  accompanied	  these	  measures	  was	  an	  
international	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  democratic	  potential	  these	  new	  opportunities	  could	  offer	  
Tunisian	   political	   society.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   regime’s	   preoccupation	   with	   the	  
implementation	   of	   neoliberal	   economic	   reform	   and	   political	   stability	   and	   security,	  
eventually	  necessitated	  harsh	  crackdowns	  on	  perceived	  unrest	  and	  opposition.	  Following	  an	  
initial	  loosening	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  association,	  for	  example,	  these	  laws	  were	  then	  amended	  to	  
bring	   civil	   society	  organisations	  under	   the	   further	   control	  of	   the	   state	  and	   the	  RCD	  party.	  
Moreover,	   the	   threat	  of	   Islamist	  extremism	  as	  perceived	  more	  broadly	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  
and	  North	  Africa	  during	  the	  1990s	  allowed	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  to	  repress	  significant	  sections	  
of	   the	   population	   as	   well	   as	   any	   form	   of	   collective	   activism	   understood	   as	   potential	  
opposition.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  targeting	  of	  secular	  organisations,	  the	  regime	  gradually	  closed	  
down	  spaces	  for	  Islamist	  actors	  and	  groups	  to	  manoeuvre.	  Over	  time,	  the	  vigorous	  targeting	  
of	  the	  Islamists	  by	  the	  government	  had	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  Tunisian	  society	  as	  
some	  secular	  organisations	  also	  began	  to	  distance	  themselves	   from	  Islamist	  organisations.	  
Eventually,	   this	   resulted	   in	   a	   more	   or	   less	   homogenous	   field	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	  
groups	   interacting	   within	   relatively	   uncontested,	   albeit	   constrained,	   public	   spaces.	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Moreover,	   as	   many	   of	   these	   organisations	   emerged	   during	   a	   period	   of	   adoption	   and	  
implementation	  of	  neoliberal	  policies,	  many	  were	  largely	  restricted	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  social	  
welfare	  services.	  The	  limited	  nature	  of	  the	  work	  civil	  society	  organisations	  could	  engage	  in,	  
the	  repressive	  conditions	  under	  which	  they	  operated,	  and	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  field	   in	  
which	   they	   manoeuvred	   all	   had	   direct	   implications	   on	   the	   conflicts	   and	   cleavages	   that	  
manifested	  among	   these	  different	  actors	   following	   the	  2010–2011	  uprising.	  However,	   the	  
force	   of	   the	   state	   security	   apparatus	   and	   RCD	   party	   applied	   against	   these	   actors	   also	  
unwittingly	  provided	  the	  conditions	  and	  momentum	  for	   independent	  social	  action	  to	  arise	  
following	  decades	  of	  authoritarian	  rule.	  	  
	  
Chapter	   IV:	  Civil	   society	  and	  the	  opening	  up	  of	   the	  public	   space	  analysed	  the	  outcomes	  of	  
the	  opening	  up	  of	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  critical	  and	  sustained	  pressure	  
from	   the	   popular	   masses	   on	   the	   High	   Authority	   for	   political	   liberalisation	   following	   the	  
downfall	  of	  the	  regime	  in	  January	  2011.	  This	  chapter	  examined	  the	  first	  core	  theme	  of	  the	  
research,	  specifically	  the	  “illiberal”	  effects	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  public	  space(s).	  This	  chapter	  
and	  the	  remaining	  core	  research	  chapters	  reflect	  the	  analogy	  of	  a	  reverse	  pyramid	  in	  order	  
to	   conceptualise	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   discursive	   arena	   during	   a	   transition	   from	  
authoritarian	  rule.	  Chapters	   IV	  and	  V	   illustrate	  this	  pyramid	  at	   its	  widest	  point	  as	  Tunisia’s	  
public	   spaces	   rapidly	   expanded	   to	   accommodate	   a	   host	   of	   new	   actors,	   priorities	   and	  
ideologies;	   Chapter	   VI	   however	   reflects	   this	   discursive	   pyramid	   at	   its	   narrowest	   point,	   as	  
conflicts	  and	  contestations	  are	  gradually	  muted	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  consensus	  filters	  down	  
national	  priorities	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  uprising.	  For	  example,	  during	  the	  initial	  months	  
following	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime,	  the	  discursive	  arena	  was	  at	   its	  widest	  as	  not	  
only	   were	   thousands	   of	   new	   organisations	   legally	   established,	   but	   also	   a	   host	   of	   new	  
priorities,	  visions,	  and	   ideologies	   filled	  this	  expansive	  space.	  These	  expanding	  spaces	  were	  
also	   shared	   with	   the	   organisations	   formerly	   established	   under	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime.	   The	  
newer	   and	   historic	   organisations	   effectively	   encountered	   opportunities	   and	   challenges	   as	  
they	  endeavoured	  to	  participate	  in	  Tunisia’s	  post-­‐uprising	  public	  spaces.	  As	  a	  consequence	  
of	  a	  multitude	  of	  various	  actors	  emerging	  to	  the	  forefront,	  a	  range	  of	  issues	  were	  tabled	  for	  
discursive	  contestation,	  including	  the	  issue	  of	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  and	  media	  (or	  the	  limits	  
of);	  issues	  regarding	  the	  status	  of	  women;	  support	  to	  and	  recognition	  of	  vulnerable	  but	  also	  
criminalised	   populations	   such	   as	   people	   affected	   by	   HIV/AIDS,	   including	   sex	  workers	   and	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homosexual	   communities;	  and	   finally,	  a	  key	   symbol	  of	  national	   identity,	   the	  Tunisian	   flag.	  
These	   issues	  became	  critical	  areas	  of	  conflict	  among	  civil	   society	  actors	  and	  groups	   in	   the	  
months	   that	   followed	   the	   Tunisia	   uprising.	   In	   addition	   to	   navigating	   these	   debates,	  many	  
civil	   society	   actors	   also	   found	   themselves	   operating	   on	   uncertain	   terrain,	   as	   they	   were	  
required	   to	   cultivate	   relationships	   with	   new	   political	   leaders	   and	   donors	   as	   well	   as	   to	  
rearticulate	   their	   post-­‐revolution	   mandates.	   During	   this	   time,	   the	   landscape	   of	   Tunisia’s	  
public	  spaces	  was	  characterised	  by	  an	  unfolding	  sense	  of	  citoyenneté	  and	  dynamism	  as	  well	  
as	  by	  competition,	  uncertainty,	  suspicion,	  and	  distrust.	  	  
	  
Chapter	   IV	   also	   begins	   to	   underscore	   the	   incompatibility	   between	   two	   specific	  
understandings	   of	   civil	   society	   that	   are	   evident	   today.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   Gramscian	  
understanding	   in	   which	   civil	   society	   is	   a	   dynamic	   set	   of	   actors	   capable	   of	   subverting	   the	  
hegemony	  of	  the	  state,	  an	  approach	  revived	  and	  rearticulated	  during	  the	  social	  movements	  
in	   Eastern	   Europe	   and	   Latin	   America	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	  which	   has	   come	   to	   recognise	   civil	  
society	   as	   antithetical	   to	   authoritarianism.	   The	   second	   is	   the	   neoliberal	   understanding	  
applied	  and	  upheld	  during	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  during	  which	  many	  of	  these	  actors	  served	  as	  
providers	  of	  social	  welfare	  services	  to	  supplement	  the	  social	  contract	  between	  the	  Tunisian	  
state	   and	   its	   citizens.	   Both	   of	   these	   understandings,	   and	   the	   ideologies	   underpinning	  
them—Communism	  and	  neoliberalism—manifested	  in	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces	  following	  the	  
uprisings,	  effectively	  exacerbating	  conflicts	  and	  cleavages	  among	  civil	  society	  actors.	  	  
	  
The	   opening	   of	   space	   following	   the	   downfall	   of	   an	   authoritarian	   regime	   can	   create	   new	  
opportunities	  for	  participation	  in	  sociopolitical	  processes	  as	  well	  as	  establish	  fresh	  priorities	  
as	   the	   state	   transitions	   to	   an	   uncertain	   something	   else.	   Conflict	   is	  manifested	  within	   civil	  
society	  when	  the	  public	  space	  suddenly	  widens	  to	  accommodate	  a	  vast	  range	  of	  new	  actors	  
and	   disparate,	   often	   competing,	   ideologies.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Tunisia,	   this	   space	   opened	  
following	  the	  amendments	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  association	  in	  early	  2011.	  However,	  the	  residue	  of	  
authoritarian	  rule,	  and	  the	  residue	  it	  left	  upon	  the	  different	  webs	  of	  relationships	  forged	  in	  
Tunisian	   society	   throughout	   the	   former	   regime,	   significantly	   influenced	   how	   these	   actors	  
responded	   to	   change—the	   disruption	   and	   transformation	   brought	   by	   the	   transition.	   This	  
thesis	   shows	  that	   there	   is	  a	   tumultuous	  but	  definitive	  period	   following	   the	  downfall	  of	  an	  
authoritarian	   regime	   that	   is	   intensified	   by	   the	   implementation	   of	   political	   liberalisation	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measures	  during	  which	  actors	  can	  take	  maximum	  advantage	  of	  these	  expanding	  spaces,	  and	  
where	   the	   field	   for	  discursive	   contestation	  grows	   to	   its	  widest	  point.	   The	   consequence	  of	  
these	  new	  and	  vast	  public	  spaces,	  and	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  different	  conflicts	  which	  emerge,	  
can	  result	   in	  an	  uncivil	  and	  illiberal	   jostling	  of	  views,	  visions,	  and	  ideologies.	  These	  sites	  of	  
contestation	   reveal	   a	   crowded	   terrain	   of	   actors,	   yet	   also	   give	   evidence	   that	   discursive	  
contestation	  is	  indeed	  taking	  place.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  V:	  Rising	  social	  division	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  social	  Islam	  analysed	  in	  more	  depth	  
the	   emerging	   conflicts	   and	   divisions	   between	   secular	   and	   Islamist	   actors	   and	   groups	   to	  
further	  determine	  how	  conflict	   is	  manifested	  within	  and	  among	   civil	   society.	   This	   chapter	  
examined	   the	   second	  core	   theme	  of	   the	   research,	  namely	   the	  emerging	   sociocultural	  and	  
socioreligious	   divisions,	   including	   the	   rise	   of	   associational	   or	   social	   Islam	   following	   the	  
downfall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  in	  2011.	  This	  chapter	  also	  continues	  to	  reflect	  the	  analogy	  of	  
the	  reverse	  pyramid,	  where	  there	  is	  an	  expansive	  space	  for	  old	  and	  new	  civil	  society	  actors	  
to	  operate.	  Moreover,	   it	  mapped	  the	  areas	  where	  conflict	  materialised	  among	  secular	  and	  
non-­‐secular	   groups	   and	  analysed	   the	   consequences	  of	   these	   contestations	   for	   both	   these	  
sets	  of	  actors,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  democratisation	  in	  Tunisia	  following	  the	  uprising.	  Subsequent	  to	  
the	  October	  2011	  elections	  that	  resulted	   in	  the	  Ennahda	  party	  holding	  power	  through	  the	  
formation	   of	   the	   Islamist-­‐secular	   coalition,	   the	   Troika,	   the	   growing	   cleavages	   between	  
Islamist	   and	   secular	   actors	   in	   political	   and	   public	   spaces	   became	   more	   perceptible.	   The	  
conflicts	   and	   contestations	   among	   these	   actors	   manifested	   as	   a	   result	   of	   three	   principal	  
factors.	  	  
	  
For	  one,	  these	  cleavages	  had	  their	  origins	  in	  the	  practice	  during	  both	  the	  Bourguiba	  and	  Ben	  
Ali	  regimes	  of	  marginalising	  Islamic	  actors	  and	  groups,	  which	  eventually	  resulted	  in	  Ennahda	  
being	   officially	   banned	   from	   political	   activity,	   its	   leaders	   imprisoned,	   and	   many	   of	   its	  
members	  exiled.	  This	  was	  carried	  out	  as	  part	  of	  an	  ambitious	  drive	  to	  modernise	  the	  country	  
based	  on	  principles	  of	  secularism	  and	  political	  liberalisation;	  in	  addition,	  it	  was	  a	  mechanism	  
to	   consolidate	   state	   legitimacy	   through	   the	   elimination	  of	   opposition	   and	   contestation	   to	  
authoritarian	   rule.	   In	   particular	   during	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime,	   civil	   society	   as	   a	   concept	   was	  
routinely	   constructed	   in	   opposition	   to	   Islam.	   The	   promotion	   of	   the	   secular	   ideology	   also	  
allowed	  some	  members	  of	  civil	  society	  to	  perpetuate	  anti-­‐Islamist	  attitudes,	  thereby	  leaving	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limited	   room	   in	   the	   national	   imagination	   for	   Islamist	   actors.	   Second,	   the	   divergences	  
between	   secular	   and	   Islamist	   civil	   society	   actors	   reflected	   the	   conflicts	   and	   contestations	  
manifesting	   at	   the	   political	   level	   within	   the	   National	   Constituent	   Assembly	   and	   in	   the	  
growing	   political	   challenges	   to	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   Ennahda.	   The	   distrust	   and	   suspicion	  
targeted	  at	   Islamist	  actors	   in	  political	  arenas—concerning,	  for	  example,	  Ennahda’s	  funding	  
sources,	  the	  growing	  presence	  of	  Salafism,	  and	  the	  party’s	  position	  on	  the	  status	  of	  women,	  
minorities,	  and	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  press—were	  mirrored	  onto	  the	  different	  actors	  and	  
groups	  manoeuvring	  in	  Tunisia’s	  symbolic	  and	  physical	  public	  spaces.	  Third,	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  
political	  Islam,	  there	  was	  also	  the	  concurrent	  rise	  in	  associative	  Islam	  where	  new,	  and	  often	  
unfamiliar,	  actors	   filled	   the	  expanding	  post-­‐revolution	   landscape.	  Effectively,	   the	  denial	  of	  
their	  participation	   in	  civil	   society	  prior	   to	  2011	  eventually	  helped	   to	  create	   the	  spaces	   for	  
Islamist	  actors	  to	  establish	  legal	  associations	  and	  opportunities	  to	  embrace	  their	  own	  sense	  
of	  muwatana	   or	   citoyenneté	   following	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   former	   regime.	   Consequently,	  
decades	  of	  the	  repression	  and	  exclusion	  of	  these	  actors	  served	  as	  both	  a	  motivating	  factor	  
for	   Islamists	  to	  participate	   in	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces	  following	  the	  2010–2011	  uprising	  and	  
also	  as	  a	  delimiting	  factor	  given	  ongoing	  contestations	  to	  this	  participation	  by	  some	  secular	  
civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups.	  	  
	  
Finally,	   and	   further	  elaborating	  on	  discussions	   in	  Chapter	   IV,	   this	   chapter	  emphasised	   the	  
dual	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	   influencing	  the	  actions	  and	  responses	  of	  
the	  different	  actors	  in	  Tunisia’s	  discursive	  arenas.	  The	  secular	  civil	  society	  organisations	  that	  
were	  established	  during	  the	  Ben	  Ali	   regime	  emerged	  within	  the	   ideology	  of	  neoliberalism.	  
The	   actors	   that	   materialised	   to	   become	   part	   of	   civil	   society	   following	   the	   uprising	   more	  
closely	  reflected	  a	  Gramscian	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  field	  of	  actors.	  Through	  the	  
cultural,	   education,	   and	   religious	   institutions,	   civil	   society	  was	  able	   to	   restore	   its	   sense	  of	  
agency	  through	  self-­‐determination	  and	  self-­‐management,	  but	  also	  to	  contest	  state	  power;	  
at	   times	   these	   actors,	   such	   as	   the	   emerging	   Salafi	   movement,	   even	   seemed	   capable	   of	  
subverting	   this	   power.	   The	   Gramscian	   understanding	   of	   the	   concept	   that	   emphasises	  
agency,	   instability,	   and	   the	   reversible	   nature	   of	   hegemony	   comes	   to	   stand	   in	   sharp	  
opposition	   to	   the	   neoliberal	   understanding	   in	  which	   the	   role	   ascribed	   for	   these	   actors	   is	  
largely	  functionalist.	  I	  argue	  that	  at	  the	  root	  of	  these	  social	  divisions	  and	  cleavages	  are	  also	  
two	  simultaneously	  operating	  but	  incompatible	  concepts	  of	  civil	  society.	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Chapter	  VI:	  Consensus	  and	  marginalisation:	  the	  mapping	  of	  priorities	  in	  post-­‐uprising	  Tunisia	  
further	   analysed	   how	   conflict	   is	   manifested	   among	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	   by	  
observing	  more	   closely	   the	   areas	   in	  which	   these	   conflicts	   occur	   and	   the	   consequences	   of	  
these	   contentions.	   This	   chapter	   discussed	   the	   third	   core	   theme	  of	   the	   thesis,	   namely	   the	  
exclusionary	   (and	  undemocratic)	  nature	  of	  consensus	   in	  “liberal”	  democracies.	   In	  order	   to	  
do	   this,	   I	   examined	   the	   touchstone	   issue	  of	   homosexuality	   through	   the	   case	   study	  of	   the	  
civil	   society	   organisation	  Damj,	   created	   after	   the	   2010–2011	   uprising	   to	  more	   effectively	  
defend	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   rights	   of	   minorities,	   including	   lesbian,	   gay,	   bisexual,	   and	  
transgender	  (LGBT)	  populations.	  Following	  the	  uprising,	  the	  issue	  of	  homosexuality	  featured	  
in	   the	  printed	  and	  online	  press	   and	   in	   the	  debates	  of	   the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly;	  
ultimately	  it	  was	  an	  area	  of	  contestation	  among	  civil	  society	  within	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces.	  
Chapters	  IV	  and	  V	  examined	  and	  illustrated	  Tunisia’s	  public	  spaces	  at	  their	  widest	  following	  
the	  downfall	  of	   the	  Ben	  Ali	   regime,	  with	   the	  manifestation	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  visions	  and	  
priorities	  for	  post-­‐uprising	  Tunisia.	  In	  effect,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  pressure	  to	  achieve	  consensus	  on	  
key	  issues,	  this	  chapter	  returns	  to	  the	  analogy	  of	  the	  reverse	  pyramid,	  here	  at	  its	  narrowest	  
point.	  In	  the	  further	  mapping	  of	  democratic	  priorities,	  for	  example	  in	  determining	  whether	  
issues	   for	   sexual	   minorities	   such	   as	   freedom	   from	   discrimination	   and	   violence	   would	   be	  
addressed,	  the	  discursive	  pyramid	  tapers	  downward.	  Accordingly,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  observe	  
in	  this	  chapter	  how	  these	  discursive	  spaces	  are	  gradually	  narrowed	  down	  from	  their	  most	  
expansive	   point	   following	   the	   institutionalisation	   of	   political	   liberalisation	  measures.	   This	  
discursive	  narrowing	  is	  an	  outcome	  of	  consensus,	  a	  fundamental	  democratic	  practice.	  	  
	  
In	   many	   contexts,	   the	   downfall	   of	   an	   authoritarian	   regime	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	  
political	   liberalisation	   measures	   can	   signal	   to	   a	   range	   of	   actors	   and	   groups	   fresh	  
opportunities	   for	   recognition	   and	   redistribution.	   As	   aforementioned,	   in	   1996,	   post-­‐
Apartheid	   South	   Africa	   became	   the	   first	   country	   in	   the	   world	   to	   integrate	   explicit	  
protections	   for	   the	   rights	   of	   homosexual	   communities	   into	   its	   constitution.	   Given	   this	  
precedent	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  following	  decades	  of	  authoritarian	  rule,	  some	  members	  of	  
homosexual	  communities	  in	  Tunisia	  would	  also	  seek	  greater	  rights	  and	  freedoms.	  However,	  
these	   actors	   regularly	   had	   to	   gauge	   an	   uncertain	   terrain	   as	   a	   variety	   of	   shifting	   priorities	  
were	   sharply	   contested	  within	   Tunisia’s	   public	   spaces.	   Over	   time,	   dominant	   publics	  were	  
able	   to	   marginalise	   issues	   and	   views	   that	   did	   not	   conform	   to	   Tunisia’s	   new	   imagined	  
	   Page	  |	  245	  
national	  and	  collective	   identity.	  This	  marginalisation	  was	  made	  possible,	   first,	   through	   the	  
propagation	   of	   moral	   panics	   in	   Tunisia’s	   political	   as	   well	   as	   public	   spaces.	   Following	   the	  
uprisings,	   these	  moral	   panics,	   as	  manifested	   in	   debates	   on	   the	   status	   of	  women	   and	   the	  
rights	  of	  homosexual	  communities,	  featured	  sex	  as	  a	  topic	  of	  national	  debate.	  Second,	  this	  
marginalisation	  was	  made	   possible	   through	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   hegemony	   of	   consensus	   as	  
civil	  society	  actors	  and	  organisations	  themselves	  urged	  “now	  is	  not	  the	  time”	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  
consolidate	  and	  protect	  gains	  made	   in	   the	  debates	  of	   the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly.	  
Despite	   these	   challenges,	   some	   members	   of	   Tunisia’s	   homosexual	   communities	   made	  
remarkable	  advances	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  different	  strategies	  to	  engage	  in	  and	  contest	  
the	   hegemonic	   transition	   discourse.	   This	   engagement	   brought	   increased	   publicity	   and	  
visibility	   to	   a	   formerly	   peripheral	   issue	   in	   Tunisian	   society;	   however,	   it	   also	   brought	   the	  
uncertain	   risk	   of	   discrimination	   and	   violence	   against	   these	   activists	   in	   the	   years	   that	  
followed	   the	  2010–2011	  uprising.	   For	  example,	   in	  2015,	  under	   the	   leadership	  of	   Tunisia’s	  
new	   secular	   president,	   Essebsi,	   several	   homosexual	   men	   were	   imprisoned	   on	   official	  
charges	  of	  homosexuality	  and	  given	  the	  maximum	  sentence	  of	  three	  years.	  And	  while	  new	  
organisations	  working	   to	   defend	   the	   rights	   of	   sexual	  minorities	   in	   Tunisia	   alongside	  Damj	  
have	  emerged	  since	  2013,	   such	  as	   the	  organisation	  Shams,684	  the	  hegemony	  of	  consensus	  
often	   ensures	   these	   communities	   remain	   on	   the	   periphery.	   Following	   a	   transition	   from	  
authoritarian	  rule	  consensus	  becomes	  a	  key	  mechanism	  to	  enforce	  hegemony	  as	  the	  post-­‐
revolution	   hierarchy	   of	   priorities	   is	   redefined.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   “other”—and	   in	   this	  
particular	   case	   the	   issue	   of	   homosexuality—is	   pushed	   to	   the	   margins,	   thus	   squeezing	  
discursive	   spaces	   and	  muting	   conflict.	  Without	   such	   conflicts	   there	   is	   little	   evidence	   that	  
discursive	   contestation	   is	   taking	   place	   or,	   moreover,	   that	   opportunities	   for	   a	   genuine	  
pluralist	  democracy	  have	  not	  been	  eroded.	  
	  
	  
	  
3.	  Disruption,	  change,	  and	  transformation:	  situating	  conflict	  
	  
In	   late	  2010	  and	  early	  2011	  Tunisians	  mobilised	   in	  solidarity	  to	  bring	  down	  a	  dictator	  with	  
the	   critical	   revolutionary	   slogan	   “Ash-­‐sh’ab	   yurid	   isqat	   al-­‐nizam,”	   the	   people	   want	   the	  
overthrow	  of	   the	   regime.	   The	   slogan	  eventually	   spread	  across	   the	  Middle	  East	   and	  North	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
684	  See:	  McCormick-­‐Cavanagh,	  “Tunisia	  LGBT	  Group	  Battles	  for	  Justice.”	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Africa	  to	  Bahrain,	  Egypt,	  Libya,	  Syria,	  and	  Yemen,	  igniting	  in	  all	  these	  places	  popular	  protest	  
in	   the	   face	   of	   authoritarian	   regimes.	   Tunisians	   demonstrated	   together,	   calling	   for	   dignity,	  
employment,	  and	  freedom,	  and	  through	  sustained	  popular	  mobilisations	  they	  advocated	  for	  
the	  institutionalisation	  of	  political	   liberalism.	  In	  the	  months	  following	  the	  departure	  of	  the	  
Ben	  Ali	  regime,	  Tunisian	  activists	  had	  succeeded	  in	  making	  a	  number	  of	  key	  gains,	  including	  
the	   widening	   of	   the	   terrain	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   political	   actors	   and	   parties	   to	  
participate	   in	   the	   National	   Constituent	   Assembly	   and	   the	   expansion	   of	   Tunisia’s	   public	  
spaces	  to	  harness	  a	  multitude	  of	  old	  and	  new	  actors	  seeking	  to	  put	  into	  practice	  their	  own	  
conception	  of	  citoyenneté.	  Given	  the	  national	  and	  regional	  momentum	  behind	  the	  moments	  
leading	   up	   to	   and	   following	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   regime,	   the	   stakes	   for	   choosing	   political	  
leaders,	  alliances,	  and	  national	  priorities	  were	  high,	  resulting	  in	  what	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  
an	  uncivil	  jostling	  among	  actors	  as	  these	  critical	  battles	  unfolded	  in	  Tunisia’s	  vast	  discursive	  
arenas.	  
	  
This	  thesis	  demonstrates	  that	  civil	  society	  became	  more	  conflictual	  and	  contested	  among	  its	  
diverse	   elements	   during	   the	   two	   years	   following	   the	   Tunisia	   2010–2011	   uprising	   than	  
previously	  under	  authoritarian	  rule.	  It	  also	  contends,	  however,	  that	  over	  time	  as	  consensus	  
was	   eventually	   taken	   on	   a	   number	   of	   critical	   national	   priorities,	   these	   conflicts	   and	  
contentions	   gradually	   waned.	   To	   answer	   the	   overall	   research	   question	   for	   the	   thesis,	  
conflict	   is	   manifested	   among	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	   as	   a	   result	   of	   four	   specific	  
factors.	  These	  four	  factors	  are	  prominent	  across	  each	  of	  the	  three	  thematic	  areas	  in	  each	  of	  
the	   three	   core	   research	   chapters	   concerning	   the	   “illiberal”	   effects	   of	   the	   opening	   of	   the	  
public	  space(s),	  the	  emerging	  sociocultural	  and	  socioreligious	  divisions	  (including	  the	  rise	  of	  
associational	  or	  social	  Islam),	  and	  the	  exclusionary	  (and	  undemocratic)	  nature	  of	  consensus	  
in	  “liberal”	  democracies.	  The	  first	  factor	  is	  the	  residue	  of	  authoritarian	  rule,	  in	  particular	  the	  
cleavages	   that	   materialised	   and	   were	   perpetuated	   by	   the	   former	   regime.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  
Tunisia,	   both	   the	   Bourguiba	   and	   Ben	   Ali	   regimes	   exacerbated	   tensions	   and	   divergences	  
between	  secular	  and	   Islamist	  actors	   in	  an	  overall	  effort	   to	  sustain	   their	   legitimacy	  to	  rule.	  
The	   divisions	   that	   were	   established	   and	   maintained	   in	   the	   five	   decades	   following	  
independence	  from	  French	  colonial	  rule	  in	  1956	  carried	  over	  into	  post-­‐uprising	  Tunisia	  and	  
influenced	  how	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  responded	  to	  diversity	  and	  conflict.	  	  
	   Page	  |	  247	  
The	  second	  factor	  affecting	  how	  conflict	  is	  manifested	  is	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  
a	   space	   with	   the	   simultaneous	   emergence	   of	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   views,	   priorities,	   and	  
ideologies.	   Under	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   High	   Authority,	   the	   transition	   government	  
implemented	  measures	   for	   political	   liberalisation	   in	  March	   and	   April	   2011	   to	   expand	   the	  
opportunities	  for	  political	  representatives	  and	  parties	  to	  register,	  and	  amended	  the	  former	  
laws	  of	  association	  to	  allow	  new	  civil	  society	  organisations	  to	  be	  legally	  created.	  As	  a	  result	  
of	  the	  concurrent	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  expansion	  of	  these	  spaces	  in	  a	  relatively	  short	  
amount	   of	   time,	   thousands	   of	   new	   organisations	   were	   created	   and	   many	   older	  
organisations	   dissolved.	  Moreover,	   a	   range	  of	   touchstone	   issues	   featured	   across	   Tunisia’s	  
public	  spaces—issues	  that	  often	  ignited	  contention	  and	  sparked	  intense	  national	  debate.	  	  
	  
The	  third	  factor	  that	  affects	  how	  conflict	  is	  manifested	  among	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  
is	   the	   political	   mirroring	   that	   occurs	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   debates	   unfolding	   at	   the	  
political	   level,	  within	   the	  Ennahda	  party,	   inside	   the	  National	  Constituent	  Assembly,	  and	   in	  
the	   media.	   These	   debates	   in	   Tunisia’s	   political	   spaces	   reflect	   back	   onto	   the	   country’s	  
symbolic	   and	   physical	   public	   spaces;	   the	   conflicts	   that	   emerged	   at	   the	   political	   level—for	  
example,	  on	   the	   status	  of	  women	  and	  sexual	  minorities—were	  hence	   reproduced	  and	   re-­‐
enacted	   in	   the	   discursive	   arenas	   where	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   groups	   encountered	   one	  
another.	  
	  
Finally,	   the	   fourth	   factor	   responsible	   for	   how	   conflict	   is	   manifested	   among	   civil	   society	  
actors	  relates	  back	  to	  the	  conceptual	  understandings	  of	  civil	  society	  considered	  in	  Chapter	  
II:	   Situating	   civil	   society:	   emancipation	   or	   modernisation.	   In	   particular,	   this	   chapter	  
underscored	  the	  Gramscian	  understanding	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  which	  its	  actors	  are	  attributed	  a	  
more	  dynamic	  sense	  of	  agency	  and	  are	  capable	  of	  self-­‐management	  and	  self-­‐organisation.	  
This	   understanding	   was	   eventually	   resurrected	   during	   the	   social	   movements	   in	   Eastern	  
Europe	   and	   Latin	   America	   in	   the	   1980s.	   As	   many	   of	   the	   actors	   during	   this	   period	   re-­‐
appropriated	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   in	   seeking	   defence	   and	   freedom	   from	   the	   state,	  
this	   concept	   was	   also	   rearticulated	   to	   subvert	   the	   power	   of	   the	   state.	   The	   active	  
understanding	  of	  the	  concept	  was	  later	  co-­‐opted,	  however,	  by	  the	  neoliberals	  to	  celebrate	  
the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	   in	  the	  transition	  to	  and	  consolidation	  of	  democracy	  through	  
good	   governance	   agendas.	   Over	   time	   a	   concept	   that	   emphasised	   the	   dynamic	   nature	   of	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conflict	   was	   gradually	   replaced	   by	   conceptual	   understandings	   that	   de-­‐emphasises	   these	  
divisions.	  I	  argue	  that	  underpinning	  the	  conflicts	  that	  manifest	  among	  these	  actors	  today	  are	  
two	  simultaneously	  active	  but	  incompatible	  concepts	  of	  civil	  society	  defined	  and	  upheld	  by	  
disparate	  ideologies—Communism	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  neoliberalism	  on	  the	  other.	  At	  the	  
root	  of	  the	  conflicts	  within	  civil	  society	  are	  these	   irreconcilable	   ideologies.	  This	  also	  brings	  
the	  thesis	  back	  to	  Pearce,	  who	  in	  Chapter	  II	  observed	  a	  fundamental	  shift	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  civil	  
society	  organisations	  as	  agents	  formerly	  organised	  to	  contest	  hegemony	  to	  actors	  who	  now	  
are	  considered	  to	  consolidate	  and	  maintain	  hegemonies.	  This	  follows	  on	  from	  the	  premise	  
that	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  role	  of	  these	  immeasurably	  different	  organisations	  
have	  gained	  greater	  prominence	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  architecture	  over	  the	  last	  three	  and	  a	  half	  
decades.	   This	   change	   has	   resulted	   in	   criticisms	   by	   some	   actors	   in	   the	   academic	   and	  
international	   development	   sectors	   based	   on	   their	   scepticism	   as	   to	   whether	   these	  
organisations	   can	   effectively	   put	   forward	   alternatives	   to	   social	   change	   or	   can	   realistically	  
contest	   hegemonic	   international	   development	   discourses.	   Because	   civil	   society	  
organisations	  are	  expected	  to	  fill	  both	  a	  role	  of	  public	  service	  contractor	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  
social	  welfare	   services	   and	   as	   agents	   to	   uphold	   democratic	   values	   and	   good	   governance,	  
many	   of	   them	   have	   instead	   gradually	   become	   instruments	   to	   maintain	   and	   consolidate	  
these	   hegemonies.	   This	   practice	   can	   be	   observed	   in	   the	   jostling	   over	   priorities	   and	  
worldviews	  between	  both	  the	  historic	  and	  newer	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups	  in	  Tunisia’s	  
post-­‐uprising	  public	  spaces.	  Moreover,	  it	  raises	  the	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  there	  are	  indeed	  
spaces	  to	  pursue	  these	  alternatives,	  a	  question	  that	  necessitates	  further	  reflection	  on	  areas	  
where	   there	   has	   been	   change	   and	   matters	   upon	   which	   there	   is	   continuity	   in	   Tunisia’s	  
discursive	  arenas	  today.	  
	  
The	   implications	   of	   this	   research	   on	   civil	   society	   are	   three-­‐fold.	   First,	   academics,	  
international	  development	  practitioners,	  donors	  and	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  civil	  society	  
actors	   and	   groups	   themselves	   must	   give	   further	   scrutiny	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   two	   roles	  
afforded	   to	   civil	   society	   in	   neoliberal	   frameworks—as	   providers	   of	   social	  welfare	   services	  
and	   as	   key	   actors	   in	   holding	   states	   accountable	   and	   in	   democratisation—are	   compatible.	  
Does	  civil	  society	  have	  the	  tools	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  do	  both?	  Does	  one	  necessarily	  relate	  to	  
the	  other?	  Given	   these	   two	   incompatible	  mandates,	   it	   comes	  as	  no	   surprise	   that	   there	   is	  
conflict	   among	   actors	   that	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   are	   defined	   by	   their	   apolitical	   nature	   of	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delivering	   services	   to	   deprived	   communities,	   and	   yet	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   are	   driven	   by	   a	  
mandate	   to	  engage	   in	   the	  political	  by	  holding	   states	  accountable.	  Moreover,	  perhaps	   it	   is	  
this	  dual	   role	  articulated	   for	   these	  actors	   that	  prevents	  civil	   society	  as	  a	   field	  of	  disparate	  
actors	   and	   groups	   from	   being	   genuinely	   politically	   transformative,	   from	   offering	   real	  
alternatives.	  
	  
Second,	  this	  research	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  often	  destructive	  nature	  of	  democratisation	  and	  its	  
associated	   principles,	   namely	   consensus.	   In	   particular,	   international	   development	  
practitioners	  and	  donors	  regularly	  give	  weight	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  consensus	  among	  civil	  
society	  actors	  and	  groups	  on	  key	  matters	  of	  concerns,	  whereby	  conflict	  among	  these	  actors	  
is	  perceived	  as	  unproductive	  and	  destructive.	  Conflicts	  are	  muted	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  predilection	  
for	   these	   actors	   to	   “speak	  with	  one	   voice.”	  One	   returns	   to	  Mouffe,	  who	  underscores	   the	  
inherent	  problematic	  of	  a	  preference	  for	  “rational	  consensus”	  in	  which	  conflicting	  views	  are	  
negated.	  Her	  premise	  that	  you	  cannot	  have	  consensus	  without	  exclusion	  should	  serve	  as	  a	  
reminder	   that	   democracy	   requires	   conflict,	   and	   hence,	   its	   associated	   institutions,	   such	   as	  
civil	   society	   require	   the	  practice	   of	   dissent.	   This	   thesis	   advocates	   and	  urges	   practitioners,	  
donors	  and	  civil	  society	  stakeholders	  and	  groups	  to	  consider	  which	  actors	  and	  which	  critical	  
matters	  of	  concern	  are	  being	  excluded	  when	  consensus	  is	  achieved.	  
	  
Finally,	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   deliberations	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   conflict,	   including	   how	   and	  why	   it	  
manifests	  among	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  groups,	  is	  an	  underlying	  normative	  supposition	  that	  
conflict	  is	  inherently	  negative	  and	  therefore	  destructive—and,	  more	  importantly,	  that	  it	  can	  
fundamentally	   obstruct	   efforts	   toward	   creating	   more	   democratic	   and	   representative	  
institutions.	   This	   normative	   frame	   is	   also	   inherent	   in	   neoliberal	   policies	   that	   support	   civil	  
society	   organisations	   as	   critical	   agents	   for	   good	   governance	   and	   democratisation.	   The	  
eventual	  preference	  for	  consensus	  over	  conflict	  among	  these	  different	  actors	  is	  implicit,	  as	  
democracy	   requires	   consensus	  on	  a	   range	  of	   issues	   and	  priorities.	   Conflicts	   among	  actors	  
whose	   relations	   are	   often	   characterised	   by	   solidarity,	   good	   will,	   and	   cooperation	   are	  
perceived	   as	   a	   negative	   consequence.	   Together	   the	   different	   chapters	   and	   three	   core	  
themes	   featured	  across	   the	   thesis	  demonstrate	   that	  conflict	  among	  civil	   society	   is	  neither	  
positive	  nor	  negative,	  but	  is	  nevertheless	  consequential.	  Conflicts	  and	  contestations	  among	  
these	   actors	   can	   be	   productive	   forces	   for	   sustaining	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   discursive	   arenas;	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effectively,	  they	  are	  proof	  of	  democratic	  pluralism.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  conflict	  there	  is	   little	  
empirical	  evidence	  that	  discursive	  contestation	  is	  taking	  place.	  Dissent	  allows	  democracy	  to	  
become	  possible,	  and	  without	  it	  authoritarian	  tendencies	  quickly	  return.	  The	  dynamic	  of	  the	  
three	   themes	   featured	  across	   the	   thesis	   reveals,	   in	  effect,	   the	  complexity	  and	  volatility	  of	  
democracy	  itself,	  as	  observed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  civil	  society.	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Annex	  1:	  Organisational	  Survey	  (English	  Version)	  
	  
Mapping	   Survey:	  HIV/AIDS-­‐Related	  Civil	   Society	  Organisations	  Working	   in	   the	  Middle	   East	  
and	  North	  Africa	  	  
	  
Date:	  ________________________________________________________________	  
Name	  of	  the	  organisation:	  _______________________________________________	  
Name	  of	  the	  interviewee:	  ________________________________________________	  
Country	  and	  city/town	  where	  organisation	  is	  based:	  __________________________	  
	  
1. How	  would	  you	  best	  describe	  your	  organisation?	  
  a.	  Non-­‐governmental	  organisation	  (NGO)	  
  b.	  Association	  for	  People	  Living	  with	  HIV	  (PLHIV)	  
  c.	  National	  Network	  of	  PLHIV	  
  d.	  Community-­‐based	  organisation	  
  e.	  Faith-­‐based	  organisation	  
  f.	  Other	  (please	  specify):	  ______________________________________	  
	  
	  
2. How	  many	  people	  are	  members	  of	  your	  organisation/association	  (this	  includes	  Board	  members)?	  
  Less	  than	  10	  	  
  11-­‐19	  
  20-­‐49	  
  50-­‐99	  
  100-­‐149	  
  150-­‐199	  
  200-­‐399	  
  More	  than	  400	  
	  
	  
3. Is	   your	   organisation	   a	  member	   of	   a	   network	   of	   HIV/Aids	   organisations?	   Please	   tick	   all	   boxes	   that	  
apply.	  
  Yes.	  Our	  organisation	  is	  a	  member	  of	  a	  national	  network	  (list):	  _________________________	  
  Yes.	  Our	  organisation	  is	  a	  member	  of	  a	  regional	  network	  (list):	  _________________________	  
  Yes.	   Our	   organisation	   is	   a	   member	   of	   an	   international	   network	   (list):	  
_________________________	  
  No.	   Our	   organisation	   is	   a	   member	   of	   a	   development	   network	   (list):	  
_________________________	  
  No,	  not	  a	  member	  of	  any	  networks	  currently.	  
	  
	  
4. How	  long	  has	  your	  organisation	  been	  working	  in	  the	  field	  of	  HIV	  and	  AIDS?	  
  a.	  Less	  than	  6	  months	  
  b.	  Less	  than	  one	  year	  
  c.	  Less	  than	  2	  years	  
  d.	  Less	  than	  3	  years	  
  e.	  From	  3-­‐5	  years	  
  f.	  From	  6-­‐10	  years	  
  g.	  More	  than	  10	  years	  
	  
	  
5. Is	  your	  organisation	  currently	  registered	  officially	  with	  the	  government	  in	  your	  country?	  
  Yes	  
  No	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6. How	  many	  individuals	  work	  to	  fulfil	  the	  core	  functions	  of	  your	  organisation?	  
	  
v If	  you	  have	  a	  Board	  structure,	  please	  indicate	  the	  number	  of	  Board	  members	  for	  your	  organisation:-­‐
______	  	  
v Please	   indicate	   the	   number	   of	   paid	   employees	   in	   your	   organisation:	   full-­‐time:	   _____	   part-­‐
time:_________	  
v Please	   indicate	   the	   number	   of	   volunteers	   or	   individuals	   supporting	   your	   organisation	  
regularly:____________________________	  
	  
	  
7. Which	  key	  groups	  does	  your	  organisation	  work	  with	  and	  what	  proportion	  of	  your	  organisation’s	  core	  
activities	  does	   this	   represent	   	   (tick	  where	  this	  work	  applies	  to	  your	  organisation	  and	  also	  circle	  the	  
approximate	  percentage	  of	  work	  this	  represents	  overall	  for	  your	  organisation	  over	  one	  year):	  
	  
  Children	  and	  young	  people:	  	   <10%	  	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	  
  Women:	   	   	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	  
  Men	  having	  sex	  with	  men:	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	   	  
  Commercial	  sex	  workers:	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	   	  
  Injecting	  Drug	  Users:	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	   	  
  Migrant	  workers	  or	  refugees:	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	   	  
  Prisoners:	   	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	   	  
  Other:____________________	  	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	  
	  
	  
8. How	  many	  individuals	   is	  your	  organisation	  able	  to	  reach	  from	  the	  key	  groups	  listed	  above	  per	  year	  
(please	  circle	  the	  approximate	  number	  of	  individuals	  reached):	  
	  
  Children	  and	  young	  people:	  	   <50	  	   100	   150	   200	   >200	   >________	  
  Women:	   	   	   	   <50	  	   100	   150	   200	   >200	   >________	  
  Men	  having	  sex	  with	  men:	   	   <50	  	   100	   150	   200	   >200	   >________
	   	  
  Commercial	  sex	  workers:	   	   <50	  	   100	   150	   200	   >200	   >________
	   	  
  Injecting	  Drug	  Users:	   	   <50	  	   100	   150	   200	   >200	   >________	  
  Migrant	  workers	  or	  refugees:	   <50	  	   100	   150	   200	   >200	   >________
	   	  
  Prisoners:	   	   	   <50	  	   100	   150	   200	   >200	   >________
	   	  
  Other:____________________	  	   <50	  	   100	   150	   200	   >200	   >________	  
	  
9. What	   kind	   of	   work	   does	   your	   organisation	   engage	   in	   (tick	   where	   this	   work	   applies	   to	   your	  
organisation	  and	  circle	  the	  approximate	  percentage	  of	  the	  work	  this	  represents	  for	  your	  organisation	  
over	  one	  year):	  
	  
  Education	  and	  prevention:	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	  
  Outreach	  to	  key	  populations:	  	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	   	  
  Provision	  of	  testing	  or	  treatment:	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	   	  
  Psycho-­‐social	  support	  and	  care:	  	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	   	  
  Advocacy	  &	  Leadership:	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	  
  Skills	  development	  :	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	  
	   	  
  Other:___________________	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	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10. Where	   does	   your	   organisation	   receive	   its	   funding	   from,	   including	   resources	   for	   technical	   support	  
(please	  tick	  where	  appropriate	  and	  circle	  the	  approximate	  percentage	  over	  one	  year).	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  
tick	  more	  than	  one	  box:	  
	  
  From	  your	  country’s	  government:	  	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	   	  
  From	  a	  UN	  Agency:	  __________	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	  
	   	  
  From	  the	  Global	  Fund:	  	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	  
	   	  
  USAID	   	   	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	  
  DFID	  or	  other	  bi-­‐lateral	  donor	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	  
	   	  
  International	  NGO:	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	  
	   	  
  Private	  organisation:	   	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	  	   	  
	   	  
  Private	  foundation	  (i.e.Gates):	  	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	   	  
  Other:____________________	   <10%	   25%	   50%	   75%	   100%	   	   	  
  Do	  not	  know.	  
	  
11. Is	   your	   organisation	   a	  member	   of	   a	   Global	   Fund	   Country	   Coordinating	  Mechanism	   (CCM)	   or	   is	   a	  
person	  working	  for	  your	  organisation	  currently	  a	  member	  of	  the	  CCM	  in	  your	  country?	  
  Yes.	  If	  yes,	  please	  specify	  who:_____________________________________	  
  No.	  	  
	  
	  
12. What	  are	  some	  of	  the	  key	  challenges	  that	  your	  organisation	  is	  currently	  facing—please	  rank	  in	  order	  
of	  priority	  from	  1-­‐10,	  with	  (1)	  being	  the	  smallest	  challenge	  your	  organisation	  faces	  and	  (10)	  being	  the	  
biggest	  challenge.	  
  Lack	  of	  funding	  
  Not	  enough	  paid	  staff	  members	  
  Lack	  of	  management	  and	  financial	  skills	  
  Lack	  of	  office	  space	  or	  administrative	  infrastructure	  
  Lack	  of	  enabling	  policy	  or	  legal	  environment	  
  Lack	  of	  coordination	  and	  support	  from	  the	  government	  
  Stigma	  and	  discrimination	  towards	  PLHIV	  
  Lack	  of	  enough	  political	  leadership	  on	  HIV	  in	  the	  country	  
  Lack	  of	  partnership	  with	  other	  organisations	  in	  the	  area	  	  
  Other,please	  
specify:______________________________________________________________	  
	  
13. Please	  describe	  the	  geographical	  coverage	  of	  your	  organisation	  including	  which	  areas	  in	  your	  country	  
you	  have	  programmes	  and	  work	  with	  your	  target	  populations.	  
__________________________________________________________________________	  
__________________________________________________________________________	  
__________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
14. What	  other	  organisations	  working	  in	  HIV	  and	  AIDS	  in	  your	  country	  do	  you	  know	  of	  (please	  list):	  
  _________________________________________________	  
  _________________________________________________	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Annex	  2:	  Qualitative	  Interview	  Database	  and	  Organisational	  Typology	  Oct.2011-­‐Mar.2013	  
	  
	  
	   Name	   Type	   Entity	   Title/Position	   Location	   Date	   of	  
Interview	  
1	   Fatiha	   Health/HIV	   Multi-­‐lateral	   HIV/AIDS	  
Technical	  
Adviser	  
Cairo,	  Egypt	   October	  
2011	  
2	   Nadje	   Human	  Rights	   Association	   Health	  and	  
Discrimination	  
Project	  Officer	  
Cairo,	  Egypt	   11	  Oct.	  2011	  
3	   Lamia	   HIV/Health	   Multi-­‐lateral	   Country	  Officer	  	   Cairo,	  Egypt	   11	  Oct.	  2011	  
and	  1	  May	  
2012	  
4	   Said	   HIV/Health	   Association	   Programme	  
Director	  
Cairo,	  Egypt	   18	  Oct.	  2011	  
5	   Richard	   Development/HIV	   Multi-­‐lateral	   Programme	  
Adviser	  	  
Cairo,	  Egypt	   17	  Oct.	  2011	  
and	  30	  April	  	  
2012	  
6	   Dr	  Mehdi	   HIV	  and	  Harm	  
Reduction	  
Association	   Executive	  
Director	  
Cairo,	  Egypt	   17	  Oct.	  2011	  
7	   Dr	  Tariq	   Association	  of	  
People	  living	  with	  
HIV	  (PLHIV)	  
Association	  	   Board	  Member	   Alexandria,	  
Egypt	  
20	  Oct.	  2011	  
8	   Sonia	   Development	   Association	   President	   Cairo,	  Egypt	   20	  Oct.	  2011	  
9	   Rita	   Association	  of	  
PLHIV	  
Association	   President	   Alexandria,	  
Egypt	  
20	  Oct.	  2011	  
10	   Ahmed	   Association	  of	  
PLHIV	  
Association	   Programme	  
Officer	  
Alexandria,	  
Egypt	  
20	  Oct.	  2011	  
11	   Amal	   Health/HIV	   Multi-­‐lateral	  	   Executive	  
Director	  
Cairo,	  Egypt	   23	  Oct.	  2011	  
12	   Dr.	  Arsalan	   HIV	   Association	   Executive	  
Director	  
Alexandria,	  
Egypt	  	  
24	  Oct.	  2011	  
13	   Dr.	  
Mohammed	  
HIV	   Association	   Consultant	  in	  
Harm	  
Reduction	  
Program	  
Alexandria,	  
Egypt	  
24	  Oct.	  2011	  
14	   Dr.	  Senim	   HIV	   Association	  	   Project	  
Coordinator	  
Home-­‐Based	  
Care	  
Alexandria,	  
Egypt	  
24	  Oct.	  2011	  
15	   Hamida	   HIV/Technical	  
Support	  
Association	   Coordinator	  
MENA	  
Marrakesh,	  
Morocco	  	  
Oct.	  2011	  
16	   Fatima	   HIV/Civil	  Society	   Consultant	   Public	  Health	  
and	  Social	  
Development	  
Consultant	  
Cairo,	  Egypt	  	   8	  May	  2012	  
17	   Catherine	  
Jenkins	  
HIV/Health	   Bi-­‐lateral	   Health	  Advisor,	  
MENA	  
Washington,	  
USA	  
15	  May	  2012	  
18	   Dr	  Malik	   HIV	   Association	   Executive	  
Director	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
13	  Jan.	  2012	  
and	  5	  March	  
2013	  
19	   Dr	  Zied	   HIV/Health	   INGO	   Associate	  
Director	  	  
Brighton,	  
England	  	  
20	  Dec.	  2011	  
20	   Ouroub	   Development	  and	   Multi-­‐lateral	   Country	  Officer	  	   Tunis,	   16	  Jan.	  2012	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HIV	   Tunisia	   and	  13	  
March	  2013	  
21	   Amir	   HIV	   Association	   Executive	  
Coordinator	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
18	  Jan.	  2012	  
22	   Amina	   Human	  Rights	   Lawyer	   Attorney	  at	  
Law	  Partner	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
18	  Jan.	  2012	  
23	   Moazzam	   HIV	   Association	   Outreach	  
worker	  with	  
sex	  workers;	  
founder	  of	  
Damj	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
24	  Jan.	  2012	  
24	   Mohid	   HIV	   Association	   PLHIV	  
Representative	  
and	  person	  
living	  with	  HIV	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
24	  Jan.	  2012	  
and	  7	  March	  
2013	  
25	   Nasser	   HIV	   Association	   Supervisor	  of	  
Peer	  educators	  
and	  Outreach	  
Work;	  founder	  
of	  Damj	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
27	  Jan.	  2012,	  
call	  Nov.	  
2012,	  and	  14	  
March	  2013	  
26	   Kader	   HIV	   Association	   Supervisor	  of	  
Key	  
Populations	  
and	  Outreach	  
Worker;	  
founder	  of	  
Damj	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
30	  Jan.	  2012	  
27	   Muammar,	  
Jason	  and	  
Maha	  
English	  News	  
website	  
Media	   Co-­‐Founder	  
and	  2	  
Journalists	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
30	  Jan.	  2012	  
28	   Kareem	   Development	   Multi-­‐lateral	   Project	  
Coordinator	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
1	  Feb.	  2012	  
29	   Dr	  Raahil	   HIV	   Association	   Executive	  
Director	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
5	  Feb.	  2012	  
30	   Radi	   HIV/Gender	   Academic	   Sociologist,	  
Faculty	  of	  
Human	  and	  
Social	  Sciences	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
7	  Feb.	  2012	  
31	   Tawfiq	   HIV/Harm	  
reduction	  
Association	   Programme	  
Manager/	  
Medical	  Doctor	  
Sfax,	  Tunisia	   9	  Feb.	  2012	  
32	   Fajr	   Democracy/	  
Civil	  Society	  
Capacity	  Building	  
Association	   Programme	  
Officer	  (former	  
employee	  of	  
HIV	  
association)	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
10	  Feb.	  2012	  
33	   Uday	   Development	  	   Association	   Co-­‐Director	   Nabeul,	  
Tunisia	  
13	  Feb.	  2012	  
34	   Saqib	  and	  
Mohammed	  
Human	  Rights	   Multi-­‐lateral	   Director	  and	  
Policy	  Adviser	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
15	  Feb.	  2012	  
35	   Shafiq	   Human	  Rights	   Association	   Communication	  
Officer	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
15	  Feb.	  2012	  
36	   Walid	   Human	  Rights	   Association	   Founder	  and	  
Lawyer	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
16	  Feb.	  2012	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37	   Dr	  Faiza	   Women	  and	  
Human	  RIghts	  
Association	   President	   Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
6	  March	  
2012	  
38	   Najeeb	   Development/	  
Environment	  
Bi-­‐Lateral	  
And	  
Associational	  
Senior	  Expert	  
Environment;	  
associational	  
member	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
6	  March	  
2012	  	  and	  12	  
March	  2013	  
39	   Dr	  Nadiyah	   HIV/	  
Reproductive	  
Health	  
Medical	  
Professional	  and	  
former	  government	  
employee	  
Public	  Health	  
Specialist	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
9	  March	  
2012	  
40	   Naeema	   Women	  and	  
Human	  Rights	  
Association	   Director	   Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
12	  March	  
2012	  
41	   Wail	   Human	  Rights	  	   Association	   Secretary	  
General	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
13	  March	  
2012	  
42	   Naila	   Women	  and	  
Human	  Rights	  
Association	   Founder	  and	  
Secretary	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
16	  March	  
2012	  
43	   Shiyam	   Urbanism/	  
Development	  
Association	   Treasurer	  and	  
former	  
Programme	  
Coordinator	  	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
16	  March	  
2012	  
44	   Siham	   HIV	   Association	   Programme	  
Coordinator	  
and	  Head	  of	  
Testing	  	  
Sfax,	  Tunisia	   21	  March	  
2012	  
45	   Dr	  Waseem	   HIV	   Association	   Executive	  
Director	  
Sfax,	  Tunisia	   21	  March	  
2012	  
46	   Yasir	   HIV	  and	  Harm	  
Reduction	  	  
Association	   Outreach	  
worker	  and	  
program	  
assistant	  
Sfax,	  Tunisia	   21	  March	  
2012	  
47	   Soraya	   Women	  and	  
Human	  Rights	  
Association	   Programme	  
Coordinator	  
Kef,	  Tunisia	   22	  March	  
2012	  
48	   Busrah	   HIV	   Association	   President	  and	  
Founder;	  
person	  living	  
with	  HIV	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
23	  March	  
2012	  
49	   Dema	   Development/	  
Education	  
Association	   Founder	  and	  
President	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
28	  March	  
2012	  
50	   Dr	  Youssef	   Family	  Planning/	  
Reproductive	  
Health	  
Government	   Director	  of	  
Communication	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
29	  March	  
2012	  
51	   Dr	  Faiqa	   Media	   Association	   Co-­‐Founder	   Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
2	  April	  2012	  
52	   Elizabeth	  
Lewis	  
HIV	   Bi-­‐lateral	   Policy	  Adviser	  
(Former)	  
Washington,	  
USA	  
2	  April	  2012	  
53	   Ghilzlan	   Democracy	  and	  
Human	  Rights	  
Association	   Secretary	  
General	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
3	  April	  2012	  
54	   Dr	  Zahir	   HIV/Family	  
Planning/	  
Reproductive	  
Health	  
Government	   Head	  
Coordinator	  of	  
Global	  Fund	  
Programmes	  
Tunis,	  
Tunisia	  
3	  May	  2012	  
55	   Dr	  Haajar	   Development	  and	  
HIV/AIDS	  
Multi-­‐lateral	   Former	  
Director	  of	  
Regional	  
HIV/AIDS	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